The Politics of Apolitical Culture

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and post-war American hegemony

Giles Scott-Smith

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The Politics of
Apolitical Culture

'This enjoyable, well-written book demonstrates impressive scholarship. It investigates the paradoxes of cultural and political policies, which often escape the aims of those promoting them, and provides a useful addition to work in several academic fields while being of interest well beyond the academy.'

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'Giles Scott-Smith has produced a sophisticated and comprehensive analysis of the CCF and its role in the development of post-WWII hegemony. Scott-Smith's well-researched book shows that the formation of the European–American transatlantic cultural axis was neither inevitable nor an accident of history. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the ways international organizations contribute to the development of hegemony.'

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Giles Scott-Smith is a post-doctoral researcher with the Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands.

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Giles Scott-Smith

For Christine and Joanne

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Preface

This book is something of a 'crossover' text, covering political economy, Gramscian theory, intellectual history and archival analysis of a particular episode in the early Cold War period. It looks at the formation and consolidation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) by placing its history in the context of post-war US–European relations between 1945 and 1955. This was the period when there was a clear coalescence between the intellectual concerns and the political and economic interests of key groups on both sides of the Atlantic. By the mid-1950s, with the Atlantic alliance secured, the Congress began to turn its attention to relations with the Third World, a path that will not be followed here. The CCF can best be seen as a vital cultural–intellectual component to that Atlanticism, a 'normative' institution that linked with broader political and economic motives.

In order to explore these linkages between the political, economic and cultural realms, the CCF is viewed via the conception of hegemony put forward by Antonio Gramsci. To approach the Congress via Gramsci raises some important questions. If the CCF was to a degree a hegemonic instrument of American foreign policy, what were the ideas and cultural values that were being instrumentalised, and how did they link with the dominant political and economic interests of the time? What were the political and economic interests that led to this instrumentalisation of cultural activity in the first place? If it is accepted, as it should be, that these ideas and cultural values had their own semi-autonomous development aside from any instrumental political intervention that occurred, what was their importance in the cultural realm itself? One of the most important aspects to the Congress as a normative institution is that it made more explicit the cultural–intellectual concerns that were already present. Recognition of this fact, and the complexity that it involves, is necessary in order to better appreciate the CIA's role and the historical context in which these events occurred.

Any analysis of political influence in the cultural realm can tend to undermine the actual legitimacy of the culture *as culture*, and the intricacies of the semi-autonomous, contingent development of cultural–intellectual activity. Arguments are often reduced to an emphasis either on the autonomy or the dependence of art, neither being particularly satisfactory for the broadening of

historical understanding. In relation to the CCF, the role of the CIA makes this issue all the more acute, for instance in the claim that the CIA acted as an 'unacknowledged facilitator to a broad range of creative activity, positioning intellectuals and their work like chess pieces to be played in the Great Game'.[1] It is true that the CIA's influence (and that of secret services in general) still needs to be fully acknowledged before a more credible understanding of the Cold War can be achieved. Yet a middle way that addresses the aspects of both autonomy and dependency in the CCF story can be found if it is placed within the broader historical context of post-war Atlanticist political economy.

Several accounts of the CCF have been written. Pierre Grémion considered the Congress as an important semi-autonomous transnational organisation that contributed a great deal to the major intellectual debates of its time, whatever the CIA role. Michael Hochgeschwender, while acknowledging the CIA, was principally interested in the CCF's intellectual impact in post-war Germany. Frances Stonor Saunders has written a forthright critique of the Congress's connection with the CIA, and interpreted it as a distortion of post-war cultural–intellectual life. Peter Coleman, an actual participant with the CCF in Australia, defended its intellectual and cultural merits while at the same time admitting at several points that there was a significant level of influence behind the scenes on Congress activities.[2] Yet, due to its scale and influence, there remains plenty more to be said in assessing the legacy of the CCF. As Michael Rohrwasser stated at a conference marking the CCF's fiftieth anniversary, the validity of the Congress's anti-totalitarian standpoint has largely been forgotten because of its connection with the CIA.[3] The fact that this organisation was dealing with the question of freedom on one side and the CIA on the other makes it a complex business to interpret it from a historical, political or cultural perspective. But it is exactly the complexities that also make the Congress a subject worth further consideration.

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

ACCF	American Committee for Cultural Freedom
ACUE	American Committee on United Europe
ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AFL	American Federation of Labor
AIF	Americans for Intellectual Freedom
CED	Committee for Economic Development
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organisations
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CMP	Committee for the Marshall Plan to aid European Recovery
EAG	Europe–America Groups
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ERP	European Recovery Program
FTUC	Free Trade Union Committee
IACF	International Association for Cultural Freedom
ICD	Information Control Division
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IOD	International Organisations Division
NCFE	National Committee for a Free Europe
NCL	Non-Communist Left
NSC	National Security Council
OMGUS	Office of the Military Governor, United States
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PCF	Parti Communiste Français
RDR	Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire
RPF	Rassemblement du Peuple Français
SFIO	Section Française de l'Internationel Ouvrière
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USIA	United States Information Agency
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Introduction

Approaching the CCF: Gramsci, culture and the Cold War

> The United States was paying the piper and it was always a great problem how loudly we could call the tune.[1]

> With its Headquarters in Paris and its dozen or so periodicals, its frequent conferences and seminars, the Congress was supported by the CIA as part of that organization's covert activities, money being channeled through several existing foundations. This was kept a secret at the time … Not that it would have been considered a matter of paramount concern by the key figures in the organization had they known, because at the time the sense of freedom under attack was so strong that help would have been accepted from just about any quarter.[2]

This book addresses the importance of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) as a cultural formation that had a decidedly *political* impact during the Cold War. It is argued that culture, and especially the autonomous, apolitical culture that the Congress ostensibly represented, was institutionalised by the US government (in particular the CIA) as an ideological force representative of the free society of the West from which it emerged. This determination presented such cultural activity in stark contrast to the cultural sterility that resulted from the doctrines imposed by both fascist and communist (i.e. totalitarian) regimes, but directly in relation to the Soviet Union. The Congress was, from its very beginnings, an institution created by and shaped by the political demands of the Cold War. Yet, importantly, it was also representative of cultural–intellectual concerns held by many in that same period.

Culture, of course, is a problematic research topic due to its lack of a uniform definition. As Samir Amin states, 'there is no generally accepted definition of the domain of culture, for the definition depends on the underlying theory of social dynamics that one adopts'.[3] Culture has often been considered at best secondary and at worst irrelevant for an understanding of political processes, with one scholar even remarking that 'culture and international relations easily appear to be mutually contradictive terms'.[4] Despite an increasing interest in cultural matters in recent years, with some valuable research on the history of cultural relations,[5] approaches have on the whole remained general and on a meta-theoretical level.[6]

For this study, two broad outlines of culture are made use of. First, the sociologist Raymond Williams referred to two interlocking interpretations of culture: as a broad 'informing spirit' of a people from a religious, national or ideal perspective, and as the 'active cultivation of the mind' that involves the arts and the expressions of the intellect. As Williams said, these two levels 'coexist, often uneasily … to indicate the "whole way of life" of a distinct people or other social group'.[7] Second, and interlocking with the above, there is the introduction of the cultural–political connection by Edward Said in *Culture and Imperialism*. For Said there is no culturally neutral space – the aesthetic 'arts of description, communication, and representation' are always associated, however much at a distance, with ideas of nation, tradition, history and identity. Whereas culture can therefore be seen as 'a sort of theatre where various political and ideological causes engage each other', [8] the more cogent linkages between culture and power are more relevant here:

> Culture serves authority, and ultimately the nation state, not because it represses and coerces but because it is affirmative, positive, and persuasive. Culture is productive … It is a historical force possessing its own configurations, ones that intertwine with those in the socio-economic sphere … [9]

It is not just the promotion of an elite or high culture and its linkage to broader socio-cultural belief-systems that is at issue in this book. It is also how this process connected to power relations in the political and economic spheres in the West in the early Cold War period. In short, it is an attempt to deal with the complexities of a part of what has become known as the cultural Cold War.

In recent years the analysis of post-war US–European relations has diversified away from a simple treatment of overwhelming American power towards a greater understanding of the European input into Western political culture during the Cold War.[10] The 'orthodox' approach was to emphasise American political and military capabilities, so that if cultural issues were dealt with at all, it was in the context of the export of US mass culture and the process of so-called 'Americanisation'.[11] While the study of early Cold War politics does now acknowledge the contribution of the Europeans towards the forging of a political–economic–military Atlanticism in alliance with the USA, the formation of a similar Atlanticist outlook on the cultural–intellectual plane remains to be fully explored. Yet it was exactly in the cultural–intellectual realm of activity, the realm of 'high culture' as it were, that considerable efforts were made to legitimise Euro-American Atlanticism, a prime example being the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Congress is therefore understood here (as it was by its founding personnel) as the cultural–intellectual equivalent of the political economy of the Marshall Plan, its goals in the sphere of culture and ideas being complementary with the Economic Recovery Program's socio-economic and political aims.

In order to understand these connections more fully, the CCF is interpreted via the framework of hegemony as put forward by the influential theorist of

political economy and base–superstructure relations, Antonio Gramsci. Building on his work in the *Prison Notebooks*, it is possible to examine the linkages between the political, economic and cultural–intellectual realms through the connections and influence of transnational social elites. In particular, Gramsci's main contribution comes from his elucidation of culture as a complex set of norms in the domain of ideas, and how such norms are solidified through the influence of specific elite networks operating in the interests of a ruling group in the economy. In terms of the CCF, Gramsci's conception of hegemony thus offers a way to achieve a broader understanding of the Congress's historical context and cultural-intellectual purpose. While there was a clear instrumentalisation of culture (and 'cultural personnel' – the intellectuals) via the Congress for political purposes, it is claimed here that there was a more complex process of ideological alignment going on between key elites in the political, economic and cultural realms, and on an international scale. This is similar to what Scott Lucas has referred to as the development of 'State–private networks'. Lucas puts this framework forward not as a means to find the cause of Cold War political activity, but to enable a greater understanding of the cohesion of public–private interests and the effects this had on the conduct and outlook of political and civil society.[12]

The Congress for Cultural Freedom was initiated at a conference held in West Berlin from 26–9 June 1950 and lasted until its dissolution in 1979, its name having been changed in 1967 (due to the revelations of its funding by the CIA) to the International Association for Cultural Freedom. The initial gathering in Berlin, organised by private individuals with the support of the CIA and the US military authorities, represented in many ways a 'grand coalition' of individuals and viewpoints from a wide cross-section of post-war intellectual life, and the intention from the beginning was to solidify and maintain an anti-communist consensus amongst the Western intelligentsia. The catalyst for the formation of the Congress had been the efforts of the reinvigorated Cominform to influence European public opinion against the Marshall Plan and against American involvement in European affairs in general. In terms of occupations, those present in Berlin were mainly philosophers, historians, writers, editors, politicians and union leaders.[13] Those attending included former communists and members of the anti-fascist resistance, emigrés/refugees from the Soviet bloc, and European federalists. There were also several intellectual refugees who had fled Nazi Germany during the 1930s and who now returned from either Britain or, especially, the USA in order to renew contact with their homeland. One hundred and eighteen invitees represented twenty-one nationalities, including sizeable American, German, British, French, Swiss, Russian, Italian and Austrian contingents. Only two delegates, Kesha Malik from India and German Arciniegas from Colombia, came from beyond Europe. From a sociological angle, the Congress reinforced an important post-war intellectual axis between the USA and Europe, and specifically between New York, Berlin and Paris, which had already existed but which was now to be given a much higher profile. Politically, the dominant outlook was liberal-social democratic, although some

prominent delegates were certainly more to the right, reflecting the cross-section of political interests that the Congress represented in the beginning. This also gave the gathering a favourable polyphony of voices rather than a deliberate unanimity.[14]

Through 1950–1 the Congress was established as a permanent institution, with a headquarters in Paris. Over the coming years, through its prominent journals, large-scale conferences and seminars, and sometimes lavish festivals, it was to proclaim consistently (and, one might say, insistently) that freedom of the intellect and of culture in general was a prerequisite for any assessment of a progressive democratic society. In other words, no intellectual or cultural activity worth its name could be carried out, and no claim to cultural excellence could be made, without the assurance of complete independence from political interference. While this was intended as a direct refutation of the claims of Soviet logic that the West was ruled by a militant, decadent and doomed bourgeoisie, the contradictions were all too apparent when the CIA involvement became public knowledge in the late 1960s. Despite the continuation of the Congress under an altered name and new personnel, the legitimacy of this organisation and the credibility of what it stood for was irreparably damaged.

Gramsci, intellectuals and hegemony

An important element of Gramsci's explorations in the theory of political economy is his extension of the sense of the political, building on Marx's secondary treatment of politics to put forward a wider, more practical interpretation.

> [A]ll men are political beings … Every man, in as much as he is active, i.e. living, contributes to modifying the social environment in which he develops (to modifying certain of its characteristics or to preserving others); in other words, he tends to establish 'norms', rules of living and behaviour.[15]

This determination of politics as involving far more than the simple machinations of state power can be usefully explored when looking at the Congress. How ideas become transformed, or, better, institutionalised and presented as norms of social thought and behaviour (and which ideas become norms in this way), is therefore a fundamental question. This involves looking at the state–civil society relationship, since it was in the realm of civil society that the cultural formation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was intended to have its political impact as a cultural formation. The CCF was part of the 'politics of apolitical culture': an organisation representing the connection between semi-autonomous cultural–intellectual developments and political intentions. For Gramsci, the 'bridge' between political and civil society (which was, as he fully admitted, necessarily an abstract distinction for the purposes of theoretical understanding) was provided by the alliances of leading groups, and the coordination of their interests, in the political, economic and cultural realms. The result, in certain specific historical

periods, can be referred to as the hegemony or 'intellectual-moral leadership' of a particular social group based upon a 'historic bloc'. This, clearly, is a step beyond simple notions of base–superstructure relations. Above all, Gramsci considered that this concept of hegemony depended on the transformation of sectional interests, via influence and compromise, into a 'general interest' for society as a whole that could overcome conflicting interpretations of the world. Hegemony thus operates as a kind of 'umbrella of interpretation' and not as a simple integrated system. The complexities involved in achieving any level of 'intellectual and moral leadership' by means of consent in a democratic society make hegemony necessarily a multi-layered, multi-faceted coalition of social forces, its components and alliances changing through time.

The key participants in the elucidation of a 'general interest' were 'the intellectuals'. As with 'culture', problems of definition arise again.

> Although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals … Each man … carries on some form of intellectual activity … he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it … [16]

By emphasising that the way to approach this group was via their social function and not via their individual characteristics, Gramsci was able to represent intellectuals as 'the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the wide sense – whether in the field of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration'.[17] From this perspective the CCF therefore becomes an intervention in the cultural realm within civil society, organised with the intention of achieving a hegemonic, normative influence for a particular conception of the role of the intellectual and the direction of post-war thought. It provided a sense of consensus around certain shared values and interests, and therefore contributed towards achieving social stability. However, although presented as if they apply to and affect everyone equally, such values actually support a conception of society that continues to maintain specific hierarchies of power.[18]

However, referring to the formation of the CCF primarily as an intervention in civil society tends to undermine how far the Congress did address the actual concerns of those who considered cultural–intellectual values to be genuinely under threat at that time. Crucially, this observation points out why the CCF was relatively successful as a hegemonic institution. Sections of the post-war Euro-American intelligentsia actively teamed up with the Atlanticist political–economic elites because this gave their opinions greater effect. The CCF therefore represented more than just the ideological justification for Atlanticism. It is in this respect that Gramsci offers some valuable insights, since 'by clarifying *the political functions of cultural symbols*, the concept of cultural hegemony can aid intellectual historians trying to understand how ideas reinforce or undermine existing social structures … '.[19] In this way the concept of hegemony effectively transforms the critical appreciation of cultural activity.

> Cultural work and activity are not now, in any ordinary sense, a superstructure: not only because of the depth and thoroughness at which any cultural hegemony is lived, but because cultural tradition and practice are seen as much more than superstructural expressions … of a formed social and economic structure. On the contrary, they are among the basic processes of the formation itself and, further, related to a much wider area of reality than the abstractions of 'social' and 'economic' experience.[20]

The Congress for Cultural Freedom represented a notable attempt to normalise the view that the USA and Western Europe belonged to the same intellectual–cultural heritage, and that this heritage required a sustained defence. This tied in with the interests of elites in the USA and Europe who considered it a political, military, economic, and indeed cultural necessity that America adopt an internationalist position which would solidify its connection to and involvement in post-war European affairs. The cultural element to this process was therefore not superficial, but intrinsic. Thus in the words of Raymond Williams: ' "cultural practice" and "cultural production" are not simply derived from an otherwise constituted social order but are themselves major elements in its constitution'.[21]

Gramsci on an international level

Over the last twenty years the work of Antonio Gramsci has provided the basis for some important theoretical developments in the field of international studies, and a significant body of literature now exists that has been broadly inspired by his investigations.[22] For researchers of international political economy, Gramscian-influenced theory has been used to explain the formation and effects of social relations beyond the national level, such that the focus has been on how ideas, their solidification into norms, and their relation to material forces, have operated with a transnational scope.[23] Critiques of both orthodox interpretations of power and vulgar notions of hegemony as political–military dominance have pointed out how state–civil society relations involve a far more complex coalition of forces than previously presented.[24] Stephen Gill has noted that:

> [t]he movement towards the extension of Gramscian ideas has [led to research] on the internationalisation of state and civil society, the international aspects of social hegemony and supremacy, transnational class and bloc formations and economic forces, the role of organic intellectuals and of international organisations and other issues which help to define the nature of global politics in the twentieth century.[25]

Above all, this trend of thought has attempted to articulate a more complex understanding of the operation of power within social relations on an international level. Yet, despite the salience of much of the work that has been inspired by Gramsci's developments of Marxist-based theory, it is a mistake to assume

that the usage of his concepts for explaining social forces and formations on an international level is trouble-free. The claim has been made, with some justification, that researchers in international studies 'have been content simply to "apply" Gramsci, without asking how and under what conditions his method and concepts shed light on developments in their field of study'.[26] Apart from the inconsistencies and ambiguities in Gramsci's writing, there is also:

> the paradox that Gramsci, above all a theorist who grappled with the discourses and realities of 'statism' in the early twentieth century, is now being used to theorize not only the existence of a global civil society disembedded from the nation-state, but also a form of hegemony reliant on transnational social forces.[27]

In other words, without the framework of political and socio-economic conditions as conceived on a national level, the basis for Gramsci's whole conception of state–civil society relations collapses. However, there was a definite transnational element within Gramsci's work, such as when he stated that '[i]t is also necessary to take into account that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique, and historically concrete combinations'.[28] Neither is this position undermined by the fact that international relations are necessarily a consequence of developments on the national level.[29] Indeed, as Mark Rupert pointed out, due to the transnational nature of capitalism itself it would be wrong to conceive of politics in such territorially bounded terms, for this offers only a false separation of the political and the economic realms of activity. Instead, what needs to be recognised are exactly the institutions and formations in civil society that have a transnational element, and how they are involved in the operation of coercion and consent beyond the nation-state's borders.[30] In the context of the CCF, the organisation of transnational social forces in the West occurred exactly in response to both the expanding interests of the American political–economic elite and the international threat of Soviet communism.

Yet the question remains: if the Gramscian notion of hegemony can be used at the level of international relations, who is the hegemonic group? For Marx the answer was simple: 'the class, which is the ruling material force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force'.[31] For Gramsci himself, the coherence of any historic bloc and consequent hegemonic formation in society also rested on the leadership of a particular class – thus 'class hegemony is not a wholly practical result of struggle, but has an ultimate ontological foundation'.[32] Against this essentialist view on class two points can be made. First, there has been the valuable work of Kees van der Pijl in mapping the class alliances between groups in the USA and Western Europe in the twentieth century.[33] Van der Pijl's demonstration of the interlocking political and socio-economic interests of key transnational class formations, and the consequent attempts to solidify a 'general interest' of Atlantic unity, is an area that can be built on further. The CCF itself represented exactly a transnational alliance of cultural–intellectual schools of

thought that complemented the contemporaneous developments in the political and economic fields. However, second and more important is the issue of how rigid the conception of class should be taken to be. Anne Sassoon has illustrated this issue well:

> The very fact that Gramsci uses a variety of terms, sometimes in an almost interchangeable way, for what in English is usually subsumed under the category 'ruling class' … indicates both the dual nature of that rule and the complexity of the group which is actually involved in governing. In this group there will be elements of social forces in the dominant (and directing) political bloc, and the ruling group or class will manifest the contradictory nature of the bloc it represents.[34]

Due to the necessary search for consensus among sometimes quite disparate groups and interests during the process of forming a historic bloc, it seems fair to say that the variety of terms used by Gramsci in this case does not represent merely a debilitating inconsistency. It is more worthwhile to examine the expanded spaces for political analysis that Gramsci opened up, rather than expecting him to provide a totally coherent method – as Hobsbawm said, Gramsci should be read 'as a thinker and a guide and not as a dogmatic authority'.[35] Coupled to this is the determination that ideology is not a simple representation of ruling class interests. While the development of ideas is related to material conditions and class interests, it is wrong to assume that these factors therefore determine all possibilities outright. There are too many contingencies involved for this to be the case. Ideology should be related, but not solely, to the social forces that arise from a particular economic structure.[36] This is the semi-autonomy of the cultural realm, and it is a factor that Gramsci recognised when he stated that 'the relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society … '.[37] Thus, in his important work on the Trilateral Commission as part of the 'ideological apparatus' through which US hegemony in the global political economy has been maintained, Gill stated that although the Marxist tradition stresses the importance of a ruling class, this should be loosened with reference to class fractions and the ' "establishment" [which encompasses] associated elites within a wider social process aimed at securing the hegemony of a fraction of transnational capital'.[38] Such a rendition of class opens up new possibilities for reading aspects of post-war history through a Gramscian lens.

The Cold War and 'Americanisation'

The Cold War has generated, and will no doubt continue to generate, a great deal of scholarship as to its political, economic, ideological, and military causes and effects. Whereas prior to 1989–91 and the collapse of the Soviet Union much of the focus was necessarily on the posture of the USA due to the greater

accessibility of sources, the last decade has seen a welcome introduction of material from Soviet and former Eastern bloc archives.[39] Since the late 1940s, Western research has itself produced several conflicting views on the origins and reasons for this superpower confrontation, representing an 'orthodoxy' (an expansionist USSR fuelled by a totalitarian communist ideology) followed by a 'revisionism' (the equal blame of an economically aggressive USA) and a 'post-revisionism' (relating the positions of the USSR and the USA within the workings of the international system).[40] With respect to these arguments, some have since referred to this search for an ultimate cause within history as fundamentally flawed.[41] While sympathetic to some revisionist work, the present study avoids an explicit class-based analysis for a broader view of power relations, as discussed above.[42] In this respect the work of C. Wright Mills, an important forerunner of revisionism, is relevant for its denial of the efficacy of an analysis of policy-making based on a crude class stratification.

> [W]e must always be historically specific and open to complexities. The simple Marxian view makes the big economic man the real holder of power; the simple liberal view makes the big political man the chief of the power system; and there are some who would view the warlords [the military hierarchy] as virtual dictators. Each of these is an oversimplified view. It is to avoid them that we use the term 'power elite' rather than, for example, 'ruling class'.[43]

In the immediate years after the Second World War, American foreign policy was to a large extent directed by an Atlanticist elite who were convinced that the national interest required a firm commitment to involvement in European affairs. This was complemented by key elites in Western Europe who considered such American involvement as crucial.[44] While the political, economic and military interests of elements of the Euro-American power elite coincided on the ground of Atlanticist cooperation, a similar movement occurred in the cultural realm. This has too often been referred to as the 'Americanisation' of Europe. As Richard Pells put it:

> Europeans have been exposed more than anyone else to the full force of America's economic, political, and cultural power in the twentieth century … In the Cold War … the US government, along with America's corporations and the American media, exported their ideas and their merchandise to postwar Europe on a much greater scale [than ever before].[45]

But important alliances were also being made in the cultural-intellectual sphere. Cultural values were under threat from both Soviet communism *and* American-style capitalism, and sections of the Euro-American intelligentsia were quite explicit about this. The opportunity to utilise these (high) cultural values for political purposes in the Cold War contest was clearly taken. In Cold War scholarship, interest in the mobilisation of the US government in the cultural realm

has been limited. From the orthodox viewpoint, this struggle was a simple contest between right and wrong, and the idea that this coordinated cultural activity should be considered as a deliberate psychological strategy, let alone that it contributed anything of worth to the contest, has often been discounted.[46] In recent years, however, interest has grown in the use of cultural events as political demonstrations meant to provide images of the apparent freedom and abundance in the West.[47] Yet the scale and consequences of these efforts is still to be properly understood. As Scott Lucas put it, in relation to Truman's 'Doctrine' speech of March 1947, '[i]n less than 20 minutes, Truman had established the Cold War not as a clash of military forces or a struggle for economic supremacy but as a contest of values'.[48] In such a contest, all areas of civil society were to be mobilised for the cause. However, this strategy of the government relied heavily on like-minded citizens who were more than willing to fill this ideological space and join the contest with the financial and organisational support of the US state. Thus one participant has spoken about the 'privatisation' of the Cold War, with certain civil institutions being funded with state money but 'in the hands of semi-private agencies only loosely or nominally controlled by Western governments'.[49] The Congress for Cultural Freedom is exactly one such organisation that represented a joining of interests across the state–civil society boundary.

Gramsci himself was intrigued by the USA, and in particular the socio-economic conditions that were being developed around the precepts of 'Taylorism'.[50] Named after Frederick Taylor's work *The Principles of Scientific Management* of 1911, 'Taylorism' referred to a process of maximising productive efficiency through the reduction of the worker to a virtual automaton confined to specialised tasks that should become as instinctive and mechanical as possible. Combined with a puritanical work ethic, prohibition, and the incentive of high wages offered on an individual basis, Taylorism heralded the introduction of mass production industry (exemplified by the car manufacturing plants of Henry Ford)[51] supported by a rigid social order.[52] Gramsci decided that such a rationalisation of the productive process (and so of social relations in general) was not possible in Europe, since the existence there of a diverse and complex class structure from centuries of social development made this transformation impossible. But it was nevertheless a challenge to European socio-economic relations that would eventually have to be met.

In the USA, according to Gramsci, 'hegemony…is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries [i.e. intellectuals]'.[53] This absence of any 'intellectual-moral leadership' has suggested for some that post-war American power rested on political and economic dominance alone. For Robert Bocock, 'Philosophy, in the Gramscian sense of a coherent world-view and morality, is not thought to be a viable intellectual activity in the United States, therefore it cannot produce such a philosophy and lead the Western world "hegemonically".' According to Christine Buci-Glucksmann, the dominant class 'had no real superstructure, no cultural self-consciousness, no self-criticism. It had not yet created a conception of the world and a group of intellectuals leading the people in a framework of

civil society …'. Bocock follows this view up by insisting that the dominance of positivism and empiricism in American thought did not suffice as a world-view in this context, and that anyway Europeans regarded American culture in general as 'vulgar and philistine'. He therefore concludes that 'a country cannot be hegemonic if it fails to lead the educated, culture groups'.[54] However, the CCF story provides a direct refutation of these positions.

It is true that Gramsci dismissively asked 'what have the pragmatists accomplished besides helping to create the Rotary Club and supporting every single backward, conservative movement?'. But he also presciently queried 'whether America, through the implacable weight of its economic production … will compel or is already compelling Europe to overturn its excessively antiquated economic and social basis'.[55] The rest of this book looks at how the USA attempted this process of transforming Europe, and how the Congress was an integral part of the joining of Euro-American interests and opinions. Chapter 1 deals with the traditional definition of 'the intellectuals' and their role within Gramsci's conception of hegemony. Chapter 2 considers the political economy of post-war American power and its extension to Europe via the Marshall Plan. Building on this analysis, Chapter 3 examines the cultural diplomacy of the USA and the importance of the covert dimension, provided by the CIA, after the Second World War. Chapter 4 outlines the personalities and intellectual threads that came together for the first meeting of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin in June 1950, and Chapter 5 takes the narrative through the first three years of the CCF's existence to look at the formation of its coherent cultural-intellectual standpoint. Chapter 6 focuses on the years 1953–5, in particular the association of the Congress with the 'end of ideology' and its relationship with the political economy interests already discussed.

1   Intellectuals and hegemony

> We observe nowadays that 'culture' attracts the attention of men of politics: not
> that politicians are always 'men of culture', but that culture is recognised both as
> an instrument of policy, and as something socially desirable which it is the busi-
> ness of the State to promote.[1]

The most common usage of the term 'intellectual' refers to, first, a certain
degree of learning, and through this an assumed moral standing in society that
allows comment and influence on issues that concern the whole body politic. Yet
the category 'intellectuals' remains a problematic classification for the purposes
of social science. This is because, *pace* the above, there can be no satisfactory set
of inherent criteria which defines one person as an intellectual and someone
else not. Sociological studies of intellectuals as a coherent social group immedi-
ately run into problems of definitional accuracy concerning who is and who is
not an intellectual, leading to lists of acceptable professions within the remit of
this term.[2] Also, by supposedly identifying a category of intellectuals, it follows
that analysis of the category can only continue according to the inherent char-
acteristics of that category and not according to how the category is itself
constituted according to social relations.[3] Therefore, in opposition to this view,
any working definition of intellectuals can best be sought in terms of the rela-
tions between different socio-political interests and forces in a given historical
situation. Despite his reservations about the feasibility of the category 'intellec-
tuals' for sociological research, Williams does admit its historical cogency as a
common term of reference.

> For the category 'intellectuals', typically centred on certain kinds of writers,
> philosophers and social thinkers, in important but uncertain relations with a
> social order and its major classes, is in fact a *very specific historical formation*,
> which cannot be taken as exclusively representative of the social organisa-
> tion of cultural producers.[4]

In this way the use of an assumed universal, ahistorical definition can be
avoided, although some form of generalisation is always necessarily going to
occur. Openly rejecting the sociological approach that attempts to 'draw an

"objective" boundary' around certain professions or levels of education,[5] Bauman instead echoes Gramsci in his assertion of the category of the intellectual as:

> a structural element within the societal figuration, an element defined not by its intrinsic qualities, but by the place it occupies within the system of dependencies which such a figuration represents, and by the role it performs in the reproduction and development of the figuration.[6]

Gramsci's importance on this subject lies in his insertion of the role of intellectuals within the construction and maintenance of hegemony. This recognises cultural–intellectual activity as essentially connected to, and crucially involved with, the material conditions of society.

What needs to be explored here is how a particular image of the intellectual was built up from the nineteenth century, and how the Congress for Cultural Freedom simultaneously followed that tradition and, through its relationship with the Cold War power structure, also represented its dramatic transformation. The Congress arose at a time when the traditional position of the autonomous critical intellectual was under threat from the demands of political conformism in the East and West, and it was in a sense a response to these conditions. Yet there is a double contradiction here. First, the formation of an institution to safeguard the identity of the traditional independent intelligentsia would seem a paradox. Second, there is the fact that while the CCF did present itself as the guardian of the free-thinking intelligentsia, in doing so it was fulfilling this function with a deeply political intent. The CIA's interest in this organisation, after all, came from an opportunity to monopolise the cause of intellectual freedom in the Cold War struggle. Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's chief cultural commissar, announced at the Congress of Soviet Writers in Moscow in 1934 that all cultural production should be carried out according to the doctrine of Socialist Realism. The role of the intelligentsia was to become 'engineers of human souls' for the advance of communist society.[7] After the Second World War this regime became more oppressive still.

> Under the control of Zhdanov and then Suslov after 1948, literature, music and art were subjected to more and more strict supervision. Denunciations of Western influences were accompanied by political and ideological demands which became increasingly incompatible with original creation and serious research.[8]

But the problem of 'the institutionalisation of freedom' remains, and this can be seen as the role or function that the CCF had in 'the ensemble of the system of relations' of US internationalism after 1945. In 1950, when the Congress was founded, there was little space left for 'intellectual neutrality' in a world depicted as being in a struggle to the death between capitalist democracy and communist totalitarianism. In attempting to find a way out of this impasse and secure a

place for the independent intellectual within a universal ethics of freedom and responsibility, the CCF sought to police the boundaries of how this intelligentsia should be defined. The best example of this is the infamous Freedom Manifesto, written for the CCF's inaugural conference in West Berlin in June 1950. Such a goal was necessarily an intricate business, for it required a self-conscious reflection on the part of the Congress intelligentsia as to their identity and political role. However, the fact that this was accomplished does indicate a remarkable intertwining and alignment of Cold War political demands and the mid-century concerns of the intelligentsia. In the wake of fascism and the recognition of Soviet totalitarianism, there was a sense that cultural–intellectual values had to be publicly reasserted and defended. But doing so contributed to the setting of 'boundaries to freedom' in line with the interests of American hegemony.

Before turning to Gramsci's treatment of intellectuals and hegemony, it is first useful to give a brief outline of the historical conditions that led to the emergence of the term 'intellectual', and to assess its most common forms of general usage.

The tradition of intellectuals

The term 'intellectual' only entered popular usage around the end of the nineteenth century following the *Manifeste des intellectuels* of 1898 during the Dreyfus affair in France.[9] A public proclamation made by the defenders of the unjustly imprisoned army officer Dreyfus against the blatant anti-semitism surrounding his arrest and charge, the term 'intellectuals' became attached to:

> a motley collection of novelists, poets, artists, journalists, scientists and other public figures who felt it their moral responsibility, and their collective right, to interfere with the political process through influencing the minds of the nation and moulding the actions of its political leaders.[10]

The collective identity of the intellectuals therefore came about by seeking to act in the name of the conscience of society as a whole, and to act in a way that questioned the moral right of political power. As Chomsky put it, the Dreyfus affair was a catalyst, providing the model of 'a committed group of intellectuals [taking] a prominent stand on an issue of justice'.[11] In the context of the increasing specialisations and divisions of intellectual activity that occurred in the nineteenth century, the Dreyfus case provided 'a rallying call … a call to resuscitate the tradition (or materialise the collective memory) of "men of knowledge" embodying and practising the unity of truth, moral values and aesthetic judgement'.[12]

Despite the importance of the Dreyfus case in twentieth-century conceptions of the intellectual, it is apposite to note that 'the word "intelligentsia" is Russian, and it was in Russia that the phenomenon itself first appeared'.[13] The expansion of secular education by Peter the Great and his successors that was intended to supplement the political, economic and military modernisation of Russia also created a stratum of society inculcated with radical ideals of emancipation imported from Western Europe and particularly France. Concentrated in the 'free

professions' of law, medicine and teaching, separated from the majority of the population due to their elite education yet also excluded from political influence in an autocratic regime, by the mid-nineteenth century many among the intelligentsia felt increasingly alienated and became involved in seeking a revolutionary means of opposition.[14] Out of this came 'the sense both of a group separated from ordinary humanity and of a suprapersonal force active in history'.[15]

It is also worth noting that the difference in meaning between 'intellectuals' and 'intelligentsia' can be of some value. Some discount the relevance of interpreting the two terms differently.[16] In his study of Max Weber, Sadri posits an ideal-type distinction that refers to the intelligentsia as the collective educated elite, more or less self-conscious of their social status, in contrast to the more individualistic and creative intellectuals. In this respect, the intelligentsia are concerned with practical knowledge to apply within their organisational roles in society, whereas intellectuals are associated with theoretical, universalist concerns from positions more alienated from immediate social reality.[17] This separation will be looked at below (pp. 26–8), especially in connection with Gramsci's focus on organic and traditional intellectuals. It is important to note at this point that the CCF aimed at a conflation of the two: first, through directing intellectual expertise towards addressing the conditions of modern society, and second by utilising the prestige of renowned individuals to ensure the status and legitimacy of the organisation itself.

The 'origin' of the intellectual, and the idealised source of many of the intellectual's presumed characteristics, is seen as the secluded, contemplative world of the monastic orders in former centuries, where truth was sought for its very worth alone.[18] In the secular world of modernity this tradition was continued by those who felt the 'interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience' – the intellectual as 'modern priest'.[19] Having such an interior need to search for the truths of the world was inseparable from needing to communicate it, making the writer/educator the classic intellectual identity in Western thought.[20] Yet this secularisation of the tradition maintained as part of its own identity the presumption of being in contact with the realm of the sacred outside of the reach of the majority. The main difference was of course that in the secular world 'the sacred' had become 'truth'.

If there is one group in history who have epitomised the striking image, mythology, or even ideology of the intellectual as defender of freedom in modern society, it is *les philosophes* of eigteenth-century France. Despite the dissensions and contradictions that are evident between their respective positions, it has been their apparent unity around the cause of Reason that has led to '[t]he persistent presence of *les philosophes* (rather than their philosophies) in the living historical memory … as an active utopia, a promise still awaiting fulfilment, a pattern for self-definition, a horizon for the blueprints of good society … '.[21] Thus there has been, since the eighteenth century, a kind of ethical security in the perceived social identity of the intellectual as guardian of universal values, an identity that can be seen to be almost as valuable as the values themselves. This collective mythology of the Enlightenment is therefore

the basis for the classic, traditional identity of the intellectual in the modern age of the West. This is the intellectual as someone who, because of their determination to serve the goals of Reason undistorted by worldly interests, intervenes to try and prevent the misuse of reason for political gain.

The importance of this eighteenth-century panacea for modern conceptions of the intellectual is emphasised by Bauman's comment that to be an intellectual 'is not fully determined by mundane functions. It remains in the end a question of decision and commitment.'[22] By this he means more than simply acting in accordance with the intrinsic 'traditions of perception, appreciation, and expression, and the affirmation of the importance of performing in the modes accredited by these traditions', by which intellectuals as a group may be defined.[23] Neither is it the simple acknowledgement of an 'intellectual community' that one may join at will. Rather, Bauman is referring to the powerful ideological image of the intellectual as an identity closely associated with freedom, as the many references above have indicated. Accepting the obligations that come with the title 'intellectual' is part of the commitment required to follow in the steps of this historically defined persona. Whereas Gramsci identified the importance of intellectuals as functionaries within a particular socio-economic structure (and as defined by their positions within that structure), Bauman rightly also emphasises the historical heritage of the identity of the intellectual in modernity as itself a characteristic of great influence. As mentioned above, for the Congress for Cultural Freedom this intellectual identity was as vital for the organisation's self-representation as any of its pronouncements or activities. In Bauman's sense, it was another 'rallying call' to unite the diverse intellectual professions around the principals of the traditional intellectual identity.

The most notorious perspective on the social position of the intellectual as discussed so far came from Julien Benda with his work *The Treason of the Intellectuals* (*La Trahison des clercs*) from 1927.[24] Because of the status that is given to this work as the epitome of idealist interpretations of the intellectual, it is worth paraphrasing it in some detail. Benda saw society as being made up of the 'lay people', who were involved with the practical achievement of social goals through the application of science and rationality, and the '*clercs*' who, by placing themselves above such practical matters, were the advocates of higher non-material disinterested values. Benda demanded an absolute code of conduct for the *clercs*, maintaining that via the search for and attainment of truth the *clerc* becomes a privileged being in touch with the realm of universally applicable philosophical absolutes. By following this path one can seek 'possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner [be able to say]: "My kingdom is not of this world." '[25] Society could therefore be kept in some kind of favourable equilibrium by the balance between *clercs* and lay people, the former's concern for universal human values preventing their usurpation for questionable purposes by the latter. This view very much rests upon a Platonic belief in the existence of a universal ethical code, and the presence of the guardian-intellectual to ensure its maintenance. As Peter Viereck, himself a member of the American branch of the CCF, put it: 'When they fulfill their civilising function, intellectuals are the

ethical Geiger counters of their society, the warning-signals of conscience.'
Hence the intellectual should not be completely separated from the base concerns
of everyday life, since public interventions of a *temporary* and *timely* nature were
necessary now and again in order to apply the force of Reason to particular
abuses of justice. From this absolutist position the political power of the intellec-
tual comes from holding an impartial position, and that can only be claimed from
an independent social position above any partisan political interest. For an intel-
lectual to commit to a political programme of any sort is thus to discredit both
the essential status of intellectual thought and the rarefied identity of intellectuals
themselves. It also confers a legitimacy and authority on political doctrines which
is not merited, transforming mere ideology into creditable fact. Benda, himself a
Jew, was a veteran of the Dreyfus affair and all too aware of the growing anti-
semitism and its political articulation in fascism in France and elsewhere in the
1920s and 1930s.[26] The intellectual, by holding allegiances to an unworldly
kingdom, had a crucial obligation to translate these allegiances into necessary
worldly action in times of need. Yet, will be explained below, for Gramsci there
was no 'universal spirit', only bourgeois ideology; Benda's removal of intellectuals
from their class identity and purpose could only lead to political reaction.

The role of the intellectual as visionary with a historical mission was some-
thing also taken up by the sociologist Karl Mannheim in the 1920s, who
emphasised the importance of thought directed towards utopian ideals as 'a
developing structure in whose compass the evolution of man takes place'.
Intellectuals, as 'social groups whose special task is to provide an interpretation
of the world' for their society, thus can act to transform the historical–social
conditions of reality.[27] The release of scholarly thought from the monastery after
the Middle Ages gave rise to what Mannheim referred to as the 'free-floating' or
'socially unattached intelligentsia' (*relativ freischwebende Intelligenz*), able to pursue
the spiritual life through advancing emancipatory causes while remaining
outside, but able to attach themselves to, a particular class distinction.[28]
Synthesising some of the points already made, Mannheim insisted on the rela-
tively classless and socially heterogeneous identity of intellectuals, a
characteristic that arose from their various social backgrounds and political alle-
giances, and their consequent relatively independent scholarly *esprit de corps* based
upon the common ground of attaining a certain level of education.[29] By
remaining outside direct class antagonisms, it was possible for intellectuals both
to maintain an understanding of and promote the interests of the social whole.
Yet in relation to this Mannheim at one point adds a caveat that he does not
expand on. Not only are intellectuals outside any class distinction, but they
should also not form a political party in order to promote their views. This
would do more than complicate their crucial independent role – 'the formation
of a party of intellectuals would inevitably lead to fascism'.[30]

There is more to Mannheim's comment than a historically specific observa-
tion on socio-political life in the 1920s and 1930s. It is related to the connection
between knowledge and power and the appeal of being in a position to influence
and transform social life according to overriding principles. The condition of

relative autonomy for intellectuals in society has to be qualified in important ways. There is, first, the effect of the market and the demands that this places on intellectual production. Second, there is the question of political influence. The relationship between intellectuals, 'those in the know', and the holders of political power has always been an ambiguous one. As stated above, one of the prominent themes behind the definition of intellectuals since the nineteenth century has been their oppositional stance towards the uses and abuses of political power. Yet, if intellectuals are a select stratum of society with privileged knowledge, such knowledge can only have an effect on society through its active application. Likewise, those faced with the tasks of ruling and administering society require the aid of 'those in the know'. This power/knowledge nexus became solidified through the centralisation of control associated with the formation of the nation-state and the decline of the localised structures of control of feudalism. The consolidation of state power required information on all aspects of social life, expertise to correlate it and an ethical–political vision to manage it. Bauman refers to intellectuals under these emerging conditions of modernity as the 'legislators', not only for their initiation of universal ethical or cultural ideals and standards, but also for their concomitant role as *legitimators* of a certain socio-political system.[31]

From this starting point, several conflicting themes on the identity and role of intellectuals that occur in much of this scholarship should be made apparent.

First, from Mannheim comes the assertion that intellectuals have the special task of providing 'an interpretation of the world' for society as a whole. As Hollander noted, while intellectuals often do aspire to providing such interpretations, '[t]he extent to which they are accepted, ignored, ridiculed, or defined as authoritative depends on concrete historical situations and the type of society they live in'.[32]

Second, a more recent definition, somewhat in conflict with the above, concerns the role that intellectuals fulfil by taking positions in opposition to the unjust opinions and actions of political power, generally represented by the state.[33] Associated with this is the important role of the intellectual as social critic, 'speaking truth to power', as Edward Said phrased it, on behalf of society and humanism in general.[34] As Chomsky stated in *American Power and the New Mandarins* in 1969:

> In the Western world at least, [intellectuals] have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology, and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us … It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies.[35]

Third, there is the assumption that the intellectual as social critic must somehow be outside the machinations of power that are being criticised. This perception is reinforced by the list of professions that Bauman named as taking

part in the 1898 *Manifeste*, and was epitomised by the work of Benda. The independent so-called 'man of letters' could pronounce on matters of social concern without the apparent taint of political partisanship obscuring the worthy intention. This independence has remained an important claim on the part of those aiming to continue the classic role of the intellectual – for Chomsky and Said, dissidence can only be expressed from a position of autonomy, and autonomy can only be claimed through the expression of dissidence.[36]

Fourth is the association of intellectuals with the fundamental morals and values of social belief and action. This position needs to be clarified. For an absolutist like Julien Benda, to be able to critique political power from a position outside its corrupting influence is to suggest that there is a select group in touch with the truthful, absolute and universal characteristics of human nature. Without this claim there could be no legitimate standpoint from which to intervene in the political realm from a position over and above the distortions which that realm apparently lives by. Further, any political intervention on behalf of society as a whole had to be from a 'disinterested' position that sought no material political gain other than the advancement of truth itself for the good of all. Benda's position on this is important, even though it does represent too 'pure' a view. In contrast, Said and Chomsky are more self-critical and maintain specific socio-political aspirations rather than presuming to act as privileged communicators of Truth alone. For Pierre Bourdieu, the linkage between the 'autonomy' and the 'engagement' of the intellectual is vital.

> To claim the title of intellectual, cultural producers must fulfill two conditions: on the one hand, they must belong to an intellectually autonomous field, one independent of religious, political, economic or other powers, and they must respect that field's particular laws; on the other, they must deploy their specific expertise and authority in their particular intellectual domain in a political activity outside it. They must remain full-time cultural producers without becoming politicians.[37]

Fifth, a great deal of ideological baggage has been built up around the idea of the intellectual, such that to aspire to this identity requires a self-conscious acceptance of its traditions as laid out above.[38] Bauman has therefore stressed the taking on of this role and its heritage as a voluntary act, replete with expectations and consequences in the public realm. A strong proponent of this position was American sociologist and CCF member Edward Shils, for whom the position of intellectual meant assuming a certain responsibility for this tradition.[39]

Sixth, there is the sense of *esprit de corps* amongst intellectuals based upon a common recognition of learning and, equally important, a mutual understanding of the codes of intellectual language. Related to this point, and important for any discussion of the social position of the intelligentsia, is the elitism that comes with this identity. This elitism is due not only to the presumption of greater knowledge, but also to belonging to a select group who claim a certain social status on matters of public import.[40] In *Notes towards the*

Definition of Culture, T.S. Eliot considered that such social elitism was vital for the defence of cultural values in the modern age. Arguing for the efficacy of class differences, he argued that 'in a healthy society this maintenance of a particular level of culture is to the benefit, not merely of the class which maintains it, but of the society as a whole'.[41] Published in 1948, Eliot's work represented a fair reflection of the cultural concerns of many among the post-war intelligentsia, with cultural values seen as being under threat from the levelling forces of either Marxist doctrine or commercialised mass culture (or, as was the case with Eliot himself, the influence of the social democratic welfare state). Eliot's ideas were certainly influential for the positions taken by the Congress (particularly the outlook of its journal *Encounter*).

The Congress for Cultural Freedom consciously positioned itself as the representative of the intellectual standpoints listed above. In an article from 1990, Edward Shils restated his belief that 'it was intellectual liberty, not anti-communism, which was the crucial interest of the Congress'.

> The Congress for Cultural Freedom stands in a tradition of intellectuals of a common outlook joined together in a common task – it is a product of the 18th-century Enlightenment. I think it is not wrong to see its forerunners in the circle which produced the *Encyclopédie*.[42]

However, the list of central themes involved has to be completed with reference to the last and (for the CCF at least) most controversial issue, the ambiguous relationship between knowledge and power. This can be related to the sense of elitism that comes from the claim to a deeper understanding of social life, and how particular representations of the world become active and influential when aligned with configurations of political and economic interests. Whatever the critical edge, it is naturally difficult to pass up the opportunity to affect social reality from within a given power structure. There is also the added meaning, from Foucault, of the integral connections between the production of knowledge and power itself, an approach which offers a more complex view of the CCF than simply seeing it as a mouthpiece for the CIA.

> Foucault does not seek to reduce knowledge to a hypothetical base in power nor to conceptualize power as an always coherent strategy. He attempts to show the specificity and materiality of their interconnections. They have a correlative, not a causal relationship, which must be determined in its historical specificity.[43]

Before developing these positions through Gramsci's ideas on intellectuals and hegemony, it is necessary to add one further element to the identity of the traditional intellectuals and their status within the Western cultural tradition. The self-isolation of intellectuals from the rest of the population does not take place only in a political context, since equally as important is the preserve of culture, or specifically high culture, as a token of intellectual identity. The distinction of

high culture, and the defence of its status as such, can be considered as a key realm for the self-assertion of an intellectual identity within the traditional discourse. Hence, as Szacki recognises, 'there is a notion of intellectuals which is *neither sociological nor political* … One can call it cultural, where the essential feature of an intellectual is a certain relation to *cultural values*.'[44] What constitutes 'cultural values' is of course another questionable issue. From a historical point of view the emergence of the term 'culture' alongside the usage of 'civilisation' in seventeenth-century France was directly related to their mutual association with the beneficial development of an orderly society.[45] Cultural values relate to the 'hierarchy of taste' in terms of the connection between the self-professed identity of the intellectual and an affinity with cultural activities and products of a more esoteric nature.[46] Linked to this, and essential for the interpretation of culture used here, is the assertion that:

> cultural needs are a product of upbringing and education: surveys establish that all cultural practices (museum visits, concert-going, reading etc.), and preferences in literature, painting or music, are closely linked to educational level (measured by qualifications or length of schooling) and secondarily to social origin.[47]

The importance of the designation 'high culture' comes exactly from its representation as a code, an understanding (or 'ownership') of which is related to an educated elite. What is important here is not the dogmatic assertion that particular cultural–intellectual activities and identities are associated with particular social classes, but rather the relevance of how establishing an affinity with particular cultural forms (i.e. 'breaking the code') allows the assumption of belonging to a social elite. Thus:

> [Cultural] consumption is, in this case, a stage in a process of communication, that is, an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code … A work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded … A beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colors and lines, without rhyme or reason.[48]

The traditional intellectual so far discussed has been regarded not only as the defender of ethics and morality, but also the defender of the cultural values of taste (culture as 'the art of distinction') closely associated with the general belief in the progress of Western society itself.[49] Culture and ethics therefore come together in the persona of the intellectual, defender of the good (benevolent) society and good (superior) culture.[50] While the emphasis on superiority can be challenged, the link between culture and ethics has been perceived as an essential characteristic for the identity of the traditional intellectual.

This provides the background to the formation of the Congress. After the Second World War there continued to be serious disagreements among European intellectuals concerning the type of society that should be created in the wake of the defeat of fascism. Sympathies for the political left were strong, reflecting both recognition of the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Hitler and the desire to transform society after the general social effort and losses of the war.[51] Alongside this were concerns over the degradation of culture by American mass-produced kitsch. The cultural-intellectual realm therefore became an area of political contestation. Ostensibly opposed to the politicisation of culture, the CCF supported the view that cultural excellence could only be maintained within a free society and not as part of a political programme. The Soviet Union under Stalin, formerly the home of revolutionary hope, had (via revelations of the Purges and the truth of its authoritarian violence) become the totalitarian nightmare alongside Nazism. The Congress was thus partly an alliance of European and American intellectuals against what they saw as the denigration of cultural values for political ends and capitalist profit.[52] Thus several Congress participants later expressed little concern over the CIA connection, since they considered themselves to have been defending cultural values *aside from the immediate aims of the covert network*. The starting point for interpreting the CCF, therefore, should not be the outlook of the CIA but the views of the post-war intelligentsia, and how the Congress both emerged as a consequence of those views and *simultaneously* represented their political cooptation within the conditions of the Cold War.

Yet, while the CCF genuinely represented another 'rallying call' to unify those among the independent intellectual professions around their collective allegiance to truth and freedom, the parallel interpretation revolves around its role as an expression of power. The link with the CIA, and the attempt to present the Congress as *the* legitimate site of Western intellectual opinion within the conditions of East–West confrontation and the containment of communist influence, represents a remarkable case of the instrumentalising of the supposedly independent traditional intellectual for particular socio-political interests. The CCF also represented part of the ideological superstructure of post-war American hegemony. Its importance then comes from its role in solidifying a disparate collection of European traditional intellectuals into an institution prepared to defend, ideologically, a nascent Atlantic community against the communist threat, a threat posed both internationally and domestically. What is more, they chose this role willingly because of their concern for the very cultural values that made their intellectual status possible.

The state and hegemony

> Gramsci paid special attention to the institutional frameworks in which intellectuals develop, produce, and disseminate ideologies and theories … [A]ny historic bloc requires 'organic intellectuals' to help cement the links between [the economic] structure and [the socio-political] superstructure. These intellectuals

are the 'concrete articulators' of the hegemonic ideology which provides cohesion for, and helps to integrate, the historic bloc. Intellectuals are not simply producers of ideology, they are also the 'organisers of hegemony', that is, they theorise the ways in which hegemony can be developed or maintained.[53]

Gramsci, taking his lead from Hegel, referred to civil society as the public space that existed between the structures of the state and the economy on the one hand, and the private realm of the family on the other. Crucially, this involved examining the operation of 'organisations which generate opinions and goals with which they seek not only to influence wider public opinions and policies within existing structures and rules, but sometimes also to alter the structures and rules themselves'. Thus 'like Hegel (indeed, even more than Hegel) he conceived civil society as a field of cultural-political struggle'.[54] Gramsci proposed that forms of coercion may be utilised as a final resort in order to keep any disaffected parties in line, but by far the most felicitous way to maintain social stability is to foster a sense of consensus around certain shared values and interests. Needless to say, these values and interests, while being universalised as the 'general interest' and taking into account other interests in a 'compromise equilibrium', benefit the orchestrators of the hegemony the most by projecting a conception of society that maintains specific hierarchies of power.[55] Gramsci, building on one of the great political thinkers of the past, argued that political activity always involved 'two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur – half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation … '.[56] From this view of politics, a broad interpretation of the state can be projected.

   Gramsci had a double agenda: to confront the liberal–idealist interpretation of the state as a taken-for-granted 'absolute' separate from productive forces, and to go beyond the 'instrumentalist' interpretation of the state that was prevalent in the Marxism of his time, whereby the state became a mere instrument of class rule. Lack of a developed analysis of the state had long been regarded as a weakness in Marxism, with the state being presented as merely an instrument of class rule and the realm of the political as a superstructural element determined by fundamental socio-economic relations.[57] Instead, Gramsci's conception of hegemony stressed the importance of the relationship between the state and civil society. In response to the profound 'economism' that dominated the socialist debate at that time, Gramsci instead proposed a much wider definition, where a

> general notion of the State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion).[58]

   Gramsci was writing during a period in the 1920s and 1930s when the crisis of the liberal democratic state seemed very real. Even if the assumption of an inevitable collapse of capitalism proved mistaken, there is no doubt that the level

of intervention in socio-economic relations by all forms of state did increase significantly to maintain order.

> The transformation of the economic sphere into organised capitalism with the increasing dominance of trusts, cartels, and limited companies was but one aspect of the increasing complexity of the social and political fabric as mass political parties, trade unions and pressure groups developed. Above all else, the relationship between state and society changed. The role of the state expanded dramatically, its impact on society increased and came to influence even those spheres where it did not intervene directly.[59]

The upshot of this is a relative correspondence between the interventionist policies of the New Deal, Belgian socialist Henrik de Man's *Plan de travail* of 1933, fascist corporatism and, more extreme, the Five Year Plans of the Soviet Union. In the liberal democracies the issue of organising an integrated socio-economic system to ensure productivity and social stability became a major issue, and such increased state activity was not always welcomed by vested interests, especially in the economy. In the interests of the maintenance of consent, alliances between different social groups were the result, necessarily involving a degree of compromise on objectives. This was the background to Gramsci's discussion of the state, and goes some way towards explaining his ambiguity because the nature of the state was changing in ways that made it difficult to conceive in accepted political language. Crucially, the boundary between state and civil society becomes more blurred as the liberal idea of an independent social sphere becomes indefensible. This analysis of the transitions of the liberal state, with its limited functions, into fascist corporatism or New Deal interventionism, has led Gramsci to be described as 'the Marxist contemporary of Keynes'. Focusing on the changing nature of consent and legitimisation in modern society, Gramsci shows that 'hegemony indicates a new political strategy because of the very transformations of the state and its historical base'.[60] We are confronted with the conception of the state that 'should be understood [as] not only the apparatus of government *but also the "private" apparatus of "hegemony" or civil society*'.[61] Hence 'elements [of state power/influence] which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society', since, for the existence of hegemony, the organisation of private associations in civil society can be as important as the functioning of the juridical or bureaucratic aspects of government.[62]

By recognising the complexity of the state–civil society relationship, Gramsci emphasised the necessary element of 'intellectual and moral leadership' alongside control of the forces of domination as essential for the pursuit and maintenance of power. Thus 'one should not count only on the material force which power gives in order to exercise an effective leadership'.[63] This extension of the realm of the political, combined with the argument that the force of ideas (i.e. ideology) could count as much as the force of material conditions, demanded the realisation of a new relationship between the economic base and the rest of social life seen as the superstructure. While this has caused consider-

able debate over the mutually determining force of each level in the field of their interaction, it should be the interaction between the levels that is of most importance, and not whether one or the other is dominant.[64] Gramsci was quite clear: the single unifying principle behind every hegemonic situation, what Mouffe refers to as the 'articulating subject', must be the leading class. '[F]or though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity.' Thus there can be no hegemonic situation without the formation of a historic bloc, a concept that refers to how 'the complex, contradictory, and discordant *ensemble* of the superstructures is the reflection of the *ensemble* of the social relations of production'.[65]

But what kind of political trade-offs does the formation of a historic bloc require? Hegemony becomes 'characterised by ideological struggle which attempts to forge unity between economic, political and intellectual objectives', a struggle which is posed on a 'universal' level (i.e. apparently beyond the specific interests of any one class).[66] In this way potential antagonisms are neutralised within a space of socio-political consensus. For this reason Gramsci identified the political role of the social group known as 'the intellectuals' as being that of the 'functionaries' and ideological legitimisers within and for a particular conception of socio-economic relations.[67] The ideological realm (which includes all cultural–intellectual activity) is therefore a crucial site in the struggle for hegemony, and the intellectuals the perpetrators of that struggle throughout the domain of political and civil society. In his development of the importance of the intellectuals in this struggle, Gramsci took from Marx the important realisation that 'a popular conviction often has the same energy as a material force', and in doing so emphasised how the battle of ideas going on in any historical period is as relevant for the prospects of social change as the battle over control of the productive forces.[68] But Gramsci would not agree with the more mechanistic view of Marx whereby '[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force'.[69] In order to appreciate the power relationship between rulers and ruled, a far more complex understanding of socio-political relations is required.

This leads into Gramsci's formulation of the importance of the intellectuals as a social group that projects a unity of interests across the state–civil society spectrum of activity. The importance of intellectuals for Gramsci's whole interpretation of political power and its projection has been emphasised by several authors.[70] The vertical, organic stability between, or fusion of, the economic realm of the base and the socio-political–cultural realm of the superstructure that is represented via a historic bloc can only be achieved if the intellectuals act as 'mediators' between the two.[71] They then become the 'articulators of hegemony', legitimising a particular configuration of socio-economic and political power and influencing the consciousness of the mass of the population.[72] The institutions of civil society, both public and private, become the realm of struggle for articulation of alternative conceptions of social order and social ideals.

Hence the very wide importance Gramsci gave to the forging of a collective will from diverse social groups through the practice of education, and not just within the boundary of the nation.

> Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations.[73]

This connects to the divergence between the intelligentsia, meaning the specialists limited to a specific field of practical knowledge, and the 'universal' intellectuals representing the 'just-and-true-for-all'.[74] This divide between the intellectual as social engineer and as social conscience is at the heart of Gramsci's interpretation of intellectuals as either organic (expressing a class allegiance) or traditional (outside class divisions, i.e. universal). The expansion of capitalist socio-economic relations in the early twentieth century, epitomised by the institutionalised planning of increasing areas of social life, had led to the emergence of the 'technocrat' or 'cadre' as the 'organiser of masses of men'. The technocrat did not simply exist in the economic system, but was 'an organiser of society in general, including its complex organism of services, right up to the state organism',[75] according to the demands of a particular configuration of socio-economic forces. For the purposes of this study, the most important characteristic is the perception of the technocrat-intellectual as part of a vanguard, having the potential to play a vital role in the transformation of society. Gramsci, well aware of the arrogance of power that this situation could bring about, ideally wanted the intellectuals to be integrated fully with the aspirations of the working class in a more complex way than simply as a Leninist vanguard political party. The process needed to be democratically grounded.[76]

The organic intellectuals

> It is commonly asked whether 'intellectuals' can be a 'class', or how, as some other kind of group, they relate or fail to relate to major social classes.[77]

In Western thought the traditional intellectual has clearly been idealised as social outsider and protector of values, occupying a privileged position that holds considerable responsibilities. This common interpretation is not to be discarded because, as Bauman has pointed out, it holds substantial ideological influence according to its requirement of commitment to a certain identity and role. In fact, this interpretation can be inserted into the conceptual framework offered by Gramsci, thus offering a wider understanding of the position of the intellectual in the articulation of hegemony in the historical circumstances related here.

Gramsci's view, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, was that there could

be no worthwhile understanding of the identity or role of the intellectual without recognition of the formative influence of social relations themselves. This clearly contrasts with many of the views expressed above, and demonstrated his aim to demystify intellectual activity from its apparent independent status.

> By intellectuals must be understood not those strata commonly described by this term [i.e. the views of Benda, Mannheim *et al.*], but in general the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the wide sense – whether in the field of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration.[78]

This places intellectuals in multifarious positions across the whole range of technical and managerial aspects of production, institutions of political and civil administration, offices of the law, the media, the military, etc.[79] Gramsci was well-informed of the positions held by Benda, Mannheim and others, and his interpretation of intellectuals should be read as a deliberate reaction to contemporaneous debates of the period.[80] 'Benda, like Croce, examines the question of the intellectuals by abstracting from the class situation of the intellectuals themselves *and from their function*.'[81] Thus 'all men are intellectuals, one could therefore say, but not all men have the *function* of intellectuals'.[82] The broadness of this conception, which rules out the existence of 'non-intellectuals' because every physical activity involves varying degrees of intellectual consciousness, is only manageable as part of an overall interpretation of society and the power relations that operate within it.[83] This, of course, was Gramsci's intention, involved as he was with a critical appraisal of not only why the socialist revolution had not occurred in Italy, but also why the fascism of Mussolini had triumphed in its stead.

Therefore, any attempt to suggest that intellectuals as a social group are independent of class or class relations is mistaken.[84] Gramsci divided his analysis of intellectuals into two parts, the 'organic' and the 'traditional'. The organic intellectuals identify fully with their respective classes.

> Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function *not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields*.[85]

Organic intellectuals therefore owe their identity to developments in the production process that determine the formation of their class. They operate on a level above merely expressing their class economic interests, aiming to expand on this in order 'to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class' within society as a whole. Rejecting the traditional association with eloquence and oratory, the organic intellectual must be 'in active participation in

practical life, as constructor, organiser, "permanent persuader" '.[86] Gramsci's whole approach was based upon how intellectuals potentially hold the key to social change because of their organisational function.[87] The aim of the organic intellectuals is therefore to assimilate and direct the needs and aspirations of their particular class so that it may achieve a hegemonic predominance in society as a whole.[88] While the intellectuals must be the 'purveyors of consciousness … this consciousness must be rooted in the world of production'.[89]

However, every 'essential' social group that arises from the economic structure, and that creates its own organic intellectuals, finds already present groups of 'traditional intellectuals'. Gramsci states that 'the traditional and vulgarised type of the intellectual is given by the man of letters, the philosopher, the artist'. They may also be organic intellectuals from a former dominant social formation, e.g. ecclesiastics. These bear the traits of intellectual identity discussed in the first part of this chapter. First, they seem 'to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms'. This of course relates back to the history of the very idea and image of the intellectual in the modern age. Second, because of their specialised knowledge, 'they thus put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group'. Third, the 'social complex' of traditional intellectuals leads them to be inevitably idealist in their outlook, which 'can be defined as the expression of that social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as "independent", autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc'.[90] Fourth, the recognition of these characteristics allows a certain intellectual *esprit de corps* to be maintained through mutual respect, social significance and status. On the passage to hegemony of an ascending social class or group one of the most important and necessary phases is the assimilation and overcoming 'ideologically' of the traditional intellectuals.[91] It is here that the vital position and identity of the intellectuals becomes clearer. While the traditional intellectuals may claim an independent position outside direct political involvement, for Gramsci any formulation of ideas that does not recognise the fundamental socio-economic relations of society through which and within which any ideas are expressed (and are allowed to be expressed) must necessarily indirectly serve the ruling social group. Therefore:

> the only ideas capable of becoming generally accepted and institutionalised in social life are those which *both* serve the interests and *reflect the experience of* either the dominant group or the class that is 'rising' (i.e. the possessor of qualities best suited to cope with the newly emergent productive forces).[92]

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the emergent dominance of a political–economic elite in the United States, who were able to overcome the latent isolationism of the population and a significant section of its political professionals, provides the relevant background to this point. Western Europe was to be incorporated into an Atlantic political–economic synthesis with the United States, a move exemplified by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall

Plan of 1947 and presented as being in the general interest.[93] Yet the complexities of these developments should prevent a simple unidimensional interpretation, particularly from an economic or 'conspiracy' perspective.

> By stressing the integration of all the economic, political, or cultural expressions of a particular society, the concepts of hegemony and historical bloc suggested not how some of these spheres are reflected in others but rather how they are *partial totalities of potentially equal significance* which are knit together or drift apart in accordance with the political actions that people carry out in concrete historical circumstances.[94]

Thus, against the vulgar representations of hegemony as a relationship of oppressive dominance, Gramsci understood it not as a static apparatus of power but a 'process of continuous creation' in all areas of society.[95] Gramsci did not intend to give a set model of how it operates in every situation, since he recognised that the diversity of social relations present in an advanced democratic-capitalist society made this a pointless and self-defeating goal.[96] But it is clear that it requires political intervention within civil society in order to solidify normative views that support political–economic interests, and their 'management' by interconnecting groups of elites. Otherwise 'intellectual–moral leadership' cannot be claimed, or achieved. But there is a degree of subtlety in this process, because Gramsci stressed how the complexities of hegemony and historic bloc make them always a necessarily incomplete set of social controls, mixing attempts at dominance with a continuing level of social autonomy.

> [I]n any given historical situation hegemony is only going to be found as the partial exercise of leadership of the dominant class, or alliance of class fractions, in some of these spheres but not in all of them equally successfully all the time.[97]

This factor relates to what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as 'the logic of the contingent' that is necessarily involved in any conception of hegemony.[98] Indeed, the 'open-ended' element of any hegemonic discourse is essential, because any hegemony functions most successfully on the level of spontaneous consent.[99] This leads to the conclusion that the more authentic a hegemony actually is, the more space there is for a diversity of viewpoints, because the fundamental social, economic and political conditions of the hegemony are so fully taken for granted.[100] As Williams put it:

> it is misleading, as a general method, to reduce all political and cultural initiatives and contributions to the terms of the hegemony … The specific functions of 'the hegemonic', 'the dominant', have always to be stressed, but not in ways which suggest any a priori totality.[101]

Gramsci's insistence on the semi-autonomy of intellectuals is therefore a vital

qualifying characteristic. In denying that intellectuals have a direct relationship with the world of production (in contrast to the fundamental attachment of the proletariat or the bourgeoisie), he instead states that their relationship is ' "mediated" by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the "functionaries" '.[102] For Williams, coming from the angle of cultural criticism, this idea of 'mediation' was crucial for understanding how the relative autonomy of the cultural-intellectual realm is both preserved and simultaneously linked to the constantly changing power relations in the political and economic spheres.[103]

It would appear that, by arguing that intellectuals are in some way semi-autonomous from the world of production, Gramsci is in danger of accepting one of the central planks of an idealist conception of the intellectual.[104] Yet this can be seen another way, in the sense that by saying this he clearly respects the ideological resonance of the identity and status of the intellectual within modern society. This can be seen in the relationship between Gramsci and Benedetto Croce. Gramsci was clearly critical of the positions taken by Croce, such that 'whereas Croce had regarded the intellectuals as the disinterested servants of spirit, Gramsci maintained that they must represent the needs and aspirations of the economically progressive class of the moment'.[105] Intellectuals could be, and often were, aligned with the forces of reaction. Yet it was the public persona of Croce, the 'lay Pope' of Italian culture, that was also noticeable. As the most renowned Italian intellectual of his generation Croce played a crucial role in initially legitimising Mussolini's fascist regime. However, Croce's influence was itself being affected by the social transformations occurring around him. Commenting on how the effects of the increasing intervention in and organisation of social affairs by the state and the growth of mass political parties were undermining the traditional role of the intellectual, Sassoon makes the following point which is worth quoting at length:

> If traditional intellectuals wanted to maintain their influence, they had to change their way of working and become organisers, that is, undertake cultural activity in a modern form appropriate to advanced capitalism. Moreover, traditional intellectuals like Croce came to perform a function organic to the maintenance of the [capitalist] historic bloc by providing an ideology to unify the ruling groups and to limit the revolutionary potential of the masses. Despite maintaining a traditional view of their role, they perform a function organic to capitalism. They are 'assimilated' into the capitalist project as their old role becomes anachronistic. They, too, become organic intellectuals.[106]

This is an important claim, one that can be applied to the historical conditions after the Second World War even more than to the period before it. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was exactly an expression of this dilemma. On the one hand the CCF united intellectuals around the common universal concerns of freedom of expression and the defence of cultural values, both

under threat from (Soviet-inspired) totalitarianism. On the other hand, however, and whatever the legitimacy of the above concerns, the Congress became part of the expanding interests of post-war US internationalism and the US state through its association with the CIA. The combination of these two perspectives points exactly towards Sassoon's observation above on the breakdown of the traditional/organic distinction. The Congress can therefore be seen as a kind of 'institutionalisation' of the traditional intellectual for distinct political purposes in relation to American foreign policy at that time.

There was a definite elitist element to the CCF, in that it was never intended to be an organisation for anyone else but the intellectual community. Where does this position it in a post-war American hegemony? Gramsci's view was based upon the intention that intellectuals should not be separated from the mass of the people – 'without this sentimental connection … the relations between the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced to, relationships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order; the intellectuals become a caste, or a priesthood'.[107] But hegemony can operate on different levels, and the elitism of particularly the CCF was due to their self-perception as a post-war intellectual vanguard attempting to surpass the moral temptations offered by the corrupted communist left. The CIA was also an elitist organisation that considered its support for the Congress and its concern with cultural values to be connected to its overall attempt to create a pro-Western consensus across other areas of society. There is the added factor of the elitism of high culture itself, and the position of Eliot, which was widely accepted at the time, that an intellectual elite was necessary in order to ensure the survival of 'refined culture' for the good of society as a whole.[108]

The CCF's aim was to dissociate a large section of the Western European intellectual community from support for the left or political neutrality, and to project the fact that American involvement in European affairs was the only guarantee of freedom. Yet this could only succeed because genuine concerns existed over the actual threat to freedom posed by the aims or actions of the Soviet Union.[109] The actions of the CIA, therefore, were only successful because the conditions for their success were there already. What was needed to make these conditions manifest was organisation and a lot of money, both of which the Agency could provide in abundance. Thus, for Gramsci, 'world views only spread *insofar as they correspond to existing contradictions and social struggles*. Historical philosophies have to make sense to the groups that espouse them.'[110] By attempting to secure an intellectual status quo in this way, any other viewpoint (particularly from the left) could be characterised as extreme and not worthy of attention. By opposing the leftist ethos, the Congress in a sense strove to turn Gramsci's words against himself:

> One must speak of a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality … [111]

It is time to turn to the actual configuration of American power in the early Cold War in order to look in more detail at the political economy of post-war US foreign policy. By following this with a study of the development of the CIA, the broad outline of overt and covert impulses in US foreign policy will allow a greater understanding of the hegemonic context for the formation of the CCF.

2   The political economy of US hegemony 1945–50

The initial context for examining the formation and cultural agenda of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) is the rise to dominance of an American internationalism that, combined with a deep-seated anti-communism, set the goals for post-war US foreign policy. Above all, this policy sought to overcome the conflicting interpretations and expectations of the post-war world by promoting the solution to European socio-economic problems through free enterprise and astute democratic political management. Through the interlocking of political, economic, and cultural-intellectual interests, their mediation via a network of social elites in the USA and Western Europe, and the promotion of their unity by means of a common ideology in favour of the 'general interest', the potential for hegemony emerged. This was not a simple integrated system but a set of conditions where the interests of various social elites converged and were expressed within connected realms as a kind of 'umbrella of interpretation'. Thus a 'historic bloc' came together whereby the 'political, cultural, and economic aspects of a particular social formation [are united] in historically specific ways to form a complex, politically contestable and dynamic ensemble of social relations'.[1] To achieve 'intellectual and moral leadership' by means of consent in democratic societies, norms of intellectual–cultural behaviour have to be institutionalised in such a way that they reflect 'natural conditions', their legitimacy not being impaired by any apparent political or economic interest. The contours of post-war American political economy, and the extension of its interests, therefore need to be sketched out.

Anti-communism

In the context of American–European relations, the most significant development after the Second World War was the consolidation of 'internationalism' under the Truman presidency. Truman's predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, had sought to ensure a post-war peace through the cooperation of the major states in the forum of the United Nations (UN) and the smooth functioning of the world economy as overseen by the Bretton Woods institutions, therefore avoiding not only any long-term commitments abroad for the USA but also the lack of international stability that was present after the First World War.[2] Roosevelt's

announcement of the Four Freedoms – freedom of speech and of religion, and freedom from want and from fear – in his message to Congress in January 1941, became the high moral ground from which the USA would fight the Second World War and secure the peace.[3] It did not take long after the war for this aim to be upset.

It seems relatively clear now that the Soviet position was based upon an understanding of inevitable confrontation with the capitalist West, but that this could be contained within a post-war balance of power between the two camps. Yet this was a wish that became complicated due to the unwanted high-level involvement of the nuclear-armed USA in European affairs.[4] Following the agreements of the Yalta conference in February 1945 concerning the future self-determination of Eastern Europe, the level of cooperation or even dialogue between the USA and the USSR began to disintegrate increasingly through 1946–7. Apportioning blame for the origins of the Cold War, generally considered to have arisen after Yalta, is of no concern here. Indeed, 'the casting of blame on either side obscures the possibility that each saw its actions primarily as defense against the threat from the other'.[5] What is of greater relevance is the form that American internationalism took. In his State of the Union speech of January 1948 Truman spelled it out.

> We have learned that the loss of freedom in any area of the world means a loss of freedom to ourselves – that the loss of independence by any nation adds directly to the insecurity of the USA and all free nations. We have learned that a healthy world economy is essential to world peace – that economic distress is a disease whose evil effects spread far beyond the boundaries of the afflicted nation.[6]

Two aspects to this statement need to be emphasised. First, the assumed universalism of a particular conception of human freedom, for which the USA has become the principal defender. The Cold War was above all an ideological struggle between opposed conceptions – and trajectories – of social organisation and world order. Second, the importance of improving economic conditions as a means to prevent the 'evil effects' of communism from gaining increased support. If socio-economic prosperity could be assured, the causes of communist allegiance – poverty, insecurity, unstable governance – would be effectively removed. These issues had been heavily endorsed the previous year through the initiation of the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (ERP) or Marshall Plan, both of which marked 1947 as an apparent watershed in post-war US foreign policy for their open commitment to European affairs. Above all, 1947 signalled the end of Roosevelt's aim for a managed international political and economic landscape based on a multilateral foundation of cooperation and consent. For instance, there is a considerable difference in outlook on the world between the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration of 1943–6 and the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan of 1947.[7] For Clark Clifford, one of Truman's key advisers on foreign policy, these later schemes 'represented

the triumph of internationalism in America', and it was an internationalism determined to confront Soviet communism on both the political–ideological and socio-economic level.[8] The anti-fascist Grand Alliance of the war years was no longer an influence on the interpretation of national policy.

Communism in particular, and totalitarianism in general, became the *bête noire*, the alien 'other', to the political, economic and cultural freedoms inherent in American life. Of course, this creation of an 'enemy' is a fundamental aspect to the theory and practice of traditional politics.[9] It is interesting in this respect to note the portrayal of the communist threat compared with previous challenges to American power. In terms of US involvement abroad in two world wars and beyond, 'in all three cases, the enemy, be it Wilhelmine Germany, Hitler's Germany, or Soviet Russia, was depicted in Manichaean terms and inflated rhetoric as the fountainhead of a global attempt to wipe out democracy, civilization, and freedom'.[10] This common concern for civilisation, first in the face of the rise of fascism and Nazi Germany, then soon afterwards communism and Stalin's Soviet Union, explains the importance of anti-totalitarianism in post-war American thought.[11] The point at which American foreign policy clearly stated the form its post-war internationalism would take can be marked as Truman's request in early 1947 for aid to Greece and Turkey. The call to arms was explicit:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. *I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way*.[12]

This was a direct response to the decline of the ability of Great Britain to maintain its influence in world affairs. The USA had to act to fill this impending 'power vacuum' in order to prevent possible undesirable consequences.[13] As the *New York Times* put it, 'the positions evacuated by one Power will not remain power vacuums but are likely to be taken over by another Power'.[14] Any lack of resolve would mean, in the words of a document typical of the time, that 'Russia might be sorely tempted to combine her strength with her ideology to expand her influence over the earth'.[15] It was this interpretation of the post-war situation as one of *potential* more than actual threat that determined US action.

> For US policymakers, the problem in the aftermath of World War Two was not so much Stalin's diplomatic behaviour, which was contradictory and

ambivalent, as an international system the appeared beyond the control of any government … The Soviet Union was not responsible for these circumstances … Nevertheless, with the Kremlin now ensconced in a powerful position in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia, with its regime legitimised by victory in the war, and with Communist parties at the height of their popularity, there was the overwhelming fear in US policy circles that the Soviet leadership could capitalize on these systemic conditions.[16]

Overall, however, it would be wrong to view the Truman Doctrine as a totally new venture for American foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine was not a sudden shift in priorities in American policy, but a public statement of intent, the culmination of a policy formulation process that had been evolving since Potsdam and had been influenced by such initiatives as George Kennan's 'long telegram' from Moscow in February 1946, Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in March and the Clifford–Elsey 'American Relations with the Soviet Union' report of September.[17] Thus Truman adviser Clark Clifford later stated that the Truman Doctrine 'was derived from thinking that existed in relatively specific form as early as the summer of 1946'.[18] All that was needed was the right moment to express it in coordinated fashion, which leads to the conclusion that if it had not been triggered by the decline of British power it would have been by another event of similar proportions. As Melvin Leffler put it, the USA after 1945 basically experienced a 'preponderance of power', and an important consequence of this was a greatly expanded definition of the US national interest.[19]

    The Doctrine was therefore the first major expression of an increasing underlying consensus amongst policy-makers over the necessity to confront presumed Soviet intentions around the world. Truman, himself uncertain in the rapidly changing post-war environment, faced considerable domestic opposition to this move. As Republican Senator Robert Taft complained, the excessive government of Roosevelt's New Deal was being followed after the war by Truman's increasingly extravagant foreign policy. Taft stated that 'we will scrutinize every expenditure, including the Marshall Plan, so that it may include nothing which is not absolutely necessary'.[20] The Republicans were in control of Congress for the first time in eighteen years, and a combined belief in budget-cutting, demobilisation and security behind the atom bomb dominated the atmosphere.[21] 'Under increasing attack from the anti-communist coalition of embittered Southern Democrats and anti-New Deal Republicans', and aware of domestic concerns, Truman had hesitated on a foreign policy offensive prior to 1947.[22] In this situation anti-communism became the key to galvanising support for Truman's internationalism. Presented as the threat of Western Europe falling under Soviet domination, anti-communism became the unifying patriotic cause that largely united an otherwise impossibly hostile Congress.[23] As influential Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg said to Truman at the discussion meeting prior to the announcement of the Doctrine, the only way to get it passed would be to 'scare hell out of the country'. Yet the consequences of such an approach were profound for American policy, since 'the danger in nursing anti-Communism as a means to

achieve other ends was that it would build up its own momentum and soon become an important ingredient in policy formation'. Without a doubt, this occurred.[24]

As Stephen Whitfield has put it, 'if judged in the light of liberal democratic ideals, of the promise inherent in personal autonomy and of the conventions of ordinary decency, Communism *was* evil'.[25] This simplicity created a vicious circle from which American policy never really escaped. Soviet power and communist ideology became the ultimate threat to a free world and therefore, by implication, to American interests as well. By using anti-communism the Truman administration, and the power elite allied to it, certainly created the domestic conditions that made an activist interventionist foreign policy acceptable. The message had to be as stark as possible, or the administration would not have succeeded in its aim. Yet by doing so, American policy would constantly be judged by its own dramatic message of communist danger, with the result that any advance of communism would necessarily be viewed as an American failure. Also, by attempting to exorcise the communist spectre abroad, Truman could hardly avoid acting harshly against the same subversive threat at home. The post-war years saw the introduction of loyalty oaths for public employees and the ever-increasing expansion of the state's ability to monitor potential domestic threats. There were many in Congress who went along with an activist foreign policy because the trade-off was a more conservative domestic policy on matters such as trade union power and civil rights.[26] For instance, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 ended compulsory union membership in unionised industries and removed the protection of the National Labour Relations Board for those unions whose leaders refused to take an anti-communist oath.[27] Truman's anti-communism was also a move to outflank the political threat from the left within the USA itself. By tarring the communists and communist sympathisers and fellow travellers with the same brush, while simultaneously appeasing the anti-communist right, Truman successfully, and against the odds, steered a course towards victory in the 1948 presidential election.[28]

It was more or less agreed by the policy planners that Soviet-supported communism would prevail less through invading Western Europe and more through socio-political and economic distress amongst their populations.[29] This was a technocratic interpretation of a problem that was considered to have broader implications. George Kennan, one of the architects of the policy of 'containment', made this clear in his first major report on the European situation as head of the newly formed State Department Policy Planning Staff in May 1947.

> The Policy Planning Staff does not see communist activities as the root of the difficulties of western Europe. It believes that the present crisis results in large part from the disruptive effect of the war on the economic, political, and social structure of Europe and from a profound exhaustion of physical plant *and of spiritual vigour*.[30]

This view, that the Americans could therefore provide both the economic and the spiritual resources for the tottering institutions of post-war European society,

became the manner in which the necessity of internationalism was portrayed. The idea that the Old World had self-destructed and now had to look to the New for its inspiration in all areas of life has been remarkably pervasive. As Alan Milward mentioned:

> Even those historians who see the Marshall Plan as the product of an aggressive American foreign policy designed to impose America's will on Europe and the Soviet Union [i.e. many of the revisionists] have accepted the impression, conveyed by the State Department to Congress and the American people, of a European continent on the verge of total collapse, from which it had to be rescued by American aid.[31]

Milward's claim that the Marshall Plan was largely unnecessary for European reconstruction will be dealt with later in the chapter. But, whatever the disputes on this issue, it would be a mistake to assume that the arguments for or against can be decided by economics alone. Kennan's reference to the 'exhaustion of spiritual vigour' in Europe leads to the need for a broader interpretation of the socio-cultural impact of American involvement in Europe, and the causes for it. Just as there was a plan for how the European economies should be transformed, so in a necessarily more haphazard but nonetheless deliberate fashion were there efforts to transform and organise European civil society also. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, contained a clear logic – by aiding the recovery of the West European economies, support for communism would decline. One can also read into this position the unstated aim to prove wrong the Marxist logic of inevitable capitalist collapse, and it was the Americans, not the Europeans, who had the techniques and ability to do so. But this would prove to be more than a simple game of economics. As Secretary of State Marshall said in his speech announcing the plan, 'its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist'.[32] Yet, as will be claimed below, Marshall himself accepted that the revival of European economies alone did not ensure that the desired socio-political conditions would necessarily arise. Free institutions sometimes had to be given a covert helping hand in order to solidify the required consensus, and this was, of course, in the general interest.

These initiatives represented a major success for what Alan Wolfe refers to as the 'growth coalition', 'an East Coast-based, European-oriented, financial and industrial elite located in large monopolistic corporations that had made its peace with conservative, anti-communist labor leaders'.[33] Wolfe names amongst this coalition Kennan, Paul Nitze, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Clark Clifford, labour leader Walter Reuther, and prominent lawyers and financiers who played major roles in the Truman administrations: Acheson (corporate lawyer, Secretary of State 1949–53), W. Averell Harriman (investment banker, US representative in Europe for the Marshall Plan), and John J. McCloy (corporate lawyer, investment banker, first Director of the World Bank 1947–9, High Commissioner to Germany 1949–52). This elite sought to promote the expansion of American

power abroad on the back of a growing economy geared to the goals of ever higher productivity. This was the transformation of Roosevelt's New Deal into Truman's Fair Deal, with the domestically orientated radicalism of the 1930s now turned outwards in policies designed to propel American economic and political power into a position of leadership in world affairs. By presenting the values of the USA as under threat, this coalition was able to seize the initiative in post-war policy planning and point the way forward in relations with Europe.

George Kennan had previously been stationed in the US embassy in Moscow, and had achieved great notoriety for the 'long telegram' that he sent from there to the State Department in February 1946 as a requested interpretation of Soviet policy. A graduate of Princeton and a career scholar-diplomat, Kennan's message was highly influential at a time when the paths of American policy towards the Soviet Union were still being created. As he later said, if it had been sent to Washington six months earlier it would have caused widespread disapproval, while six months later it would have been no more than a standard interpretation.[34] Kennan's main point in the telegram was that Marxism had become a self-serving ideology in the Soviet Union, with the Communist Party regarding itself as the sole arbiter of truth in the inevitable and inescapable confrontation with the powers of capitalism. The hierarchy of absolute power from Stalin downwards meant that once a policy had been decided 'the whole Soviet governmental machine … moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force'. In stating that American policy must therefore aim for 'a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies', Kennan provided the watchword for US foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s.[35]

The 'long telegram' presented a position that soon became a dominant logic: that Soviet communism was a wholly dysfunctional politics with which there could be no lasting compromise. On a broader front, Kennan's point of view added to the emerging consensus that communism could only arise elsewhere through the USSR deliberately fomenting and taking advantage of an already-existing social disorder. Communism, with its basis in socio-economic instability, its negation of private property and its inherent expansionist goals in the hands of the totalitarian politics of the USSR, became 'a code for distinguishing the "civilised" from the "barbaric", the normal from the pathological' throughout American life.[36] As a form of politics, therefore, communism was denied any legitimacy and could be outlawed both domestically and abroad.

The lack of a Soviet military threat to Western Europe has since been verified; while the exploding of the atomic bombs in August 1945 did cause a huge rearmament programme in the USSR, the goal was parity and security rather than deliberate aggression.[37] Therefore, while the introduction of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 forged an image of collective American–European security against the USSR, it was also an important psychological support for post-war West European recovery. It would be a mistake to treat NATO as a purely military treaty, considering its influence on a socio-political level as an

international quasi-governmental organisation. According to Michael Hogan, 'military policy, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty and the military assistance program, sought to reinforce the corporative design for a new European order that inhered in the Marshall Plan.'[38] In this respect the reaction of France towards the initiation of the Atlantic Alliance is particularly relevant. Unhappy about the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon perspective on post-war European affairs, but becoming increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions (especially in Germany):

> the different French governments saw the [Soviet] threat more in a general political sense than in a strictly military one. The first aim of the Western military alliance, in French eyes, was always to build a framework of cohesion and political stability. That, they judged, would be enough to deter the Soviets from any imprudent action, up to a point independently of the actual military balance.[39]

This is why Noam Chomsky has referred to the general American political–economic influence in post-war European affairs as a form of 'international military Keynesianism', whereby the combination of productivity drives and military rearmament produced a large-scale revival of European industry (simultaneously and necessarily linked to a virulent domestic anti-communism and an unrelenting anti-Soviet foreign policy). According to Chomsky, this was a strategy of which the Marshall Plan was only the beginning, since the determination to secure an increase in European military expenditure prefigured the shift from the Marshall Plan to Mutual Security Aid in 1951.[40] Thus already in 1951, before the end of Marshall Aid, NATO chief General Eisenhower was urging a 33 per cent increase for European military expenditure, arguing that 'nations must divert more production to arms and increase their productivity'.[41] As Truman put it, NATO and the Marshall Plan were 'two halves of the same walnut'.[42]

   This development of US threat-perception and Cold War strategy towards the Soviet Union reached what is widely considered to be its apogee in the National Security Document NSC-68, 'The Strategy of Freedom', completed in April 1950. Largely written by Kennan's successor as head of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, and requested by Truman in order to re-examine foreign policy objectives after the 'fall' of China to communism and the explosion of the Soviet atom bomb, it is often cited as being the quintessential US Cold War document.[43] Echoing and transcending the Truman Doctrine, NSC-68 was designed to 'bludgeon the mass mind of "top government"' by categorically reducing the world situation to an inexorable polarisation between good and evil.[44] There was an inevitable contest between 'the idea of freedom under a government of laws' and 'the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin', making it the duty of the USA to contain this threat within the bounds of an international community of independent states under US leadership.[45] The universalism of American values was now complete, since 'a defeat of free institutions anywhere

is a defeat everywhere', and only the USA could guarantee to safeguard the difference between either possessing the freedom to act as an individual or being told to act like a slave. The intentions were now truly global, since a major element of the approach of NSC-68 was deliberately to undermine the Soviet sphere of influence and, ultimately, the Soviet Union itself. This was going way beyond the position of the Marshall Plan and the relatively more pragmatic and limited consideration of the socio-economic causes of communist support. There was now a shift away from any interest in coexistence with the USSR towards a determination that negotiation was pointless with a regime that did not play by the rules of acceptable compromise and agreement. The only way forward, as laid out in NSC-68, was to create 'situations of strength', solidify the Western position and project it abroad with ever increasing zeal.[46]

NSC-68 contained key practical recommendations such as the development of the hydrogen bomb, a huge increase in spending on conventional military forces, and the extension of economic and military aid to allies abroad. No budget estimate was included – Acheson later stated that this would only have directed interest away from the real issues at stake – but the estimate was that the military budget alone would need to increase from $13.5 billion to somewhere around $50 billion a year.[47] However, the real significance in this document was its explicit linkage of these overt measures with the covert dimension 'in the fields of economic and political and psychological warfare'. If the contest was about values rather than simply military capability, all areas of society had to be targeted to promote the message of the free world against tyranny, and all methods were therefore justifiable. Freedom, in other words, needed a strategy for it to triumph, and every effort to influence civil society towards recognising the natural moral and rational supremacy of 'the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of the individual' was now given the official seal of approval.[48] Such a projection of values also required that channels other than the government had to be supported or, perhaps, created, in order to emphasise the general concern for these issues across civil society. Thus, through the utilisation of the state–private network of elites across the political, economic and socio-cultural fields, the Gramscian 'enlarged state', crossing the boundaries of the political/civil society divide, was coming into official existence.

Yet if NSC-68 was to promote a politics of anti-communism in civil society, what form would that politics take? While Nitze was representative of the hardline school of thought that supported the transition from pragmatic 'containment' to aggressive 'rollback' in US policy,[49] there were important links between the trajectory of the US government's outlook and those in the liberal anti-communist or non-communist left, the so-called NCL, in the America of the late 1940s. Paramount among works by those expressing this position was *The Vital Center* by Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr, which appeared in 1949.[50] Schlesinger had influential contacts in Washington through his wartime work with OSS, and he was in regular contact with Allen Dulles (they were both on the board of the National Committee for a Free Europe) and Averell Harriman, for whom he had worked as an assistant on the European Recovery

Program. Schlesinger could speak with some inside knowledge about 'this quiet revolution in the attitudes of the State Department' towards open support for the NCL in Europe. A participant at the inaugural CCF conference in Berlin in 1950, he was one of the few who knew about the CIA connection from the beginning, a move he wholeheartedly supported as one of the Agency's 'most worthwhile and successful' expenditures.[51] Arguing that liberalism was the 'vital center' in a world under threat from the totalitarian extremism of the right and left, Schlesinger maintained that the freedoms of individualism in the modern world could only be maintained by a vigorous defence of the principles of democracy. Echoing Kennan on the need to provide a bulwark for social and economic well-being to prevent communist forces benefiting from a demoralising disorder, Schlesinger stated that 'people deprived of any meaningful role in society, lacking even their own groups to give them a sense of belonging, become cannon-fodder for totalitarianism'. But the response to totalitarianism should not itself involve a restriction of civil liberties.

> We must tolerate dangerous opinions … even when their eventual tendency, should they win out by democratic methods, would be to extinguish freedom. But we must draw the line at opinion which results in the imme-diate and violent obliteration of the conditions of subsequent free discussion … [This tolerance] comes partly from our conviction that a free people will never vote for totalitarianism … and it comes partly too from a hard-boiled reading of our own experience: the curtailment of civil liberties in advance of any 'clear and present danger' has simply given overwhelming power to the champions of the existing order … [52]

Interestingly, Schlesinger did not portray free society as being harmonious. Instead, recognising the transformative aspect of contradiction and conflict, *The Vital Center* calls for 'a determination to create a social framework where conflict issues, not in excessive anxiety, but in creativity'.[53] This, then, was pluralism, reconciling different viewpoints within a progressive politics that had a clear standpoint on the limits of the legitimate.

   In its search for a non-ideological, liberal political middle-ground between the extremes of left and right, Schlesinger's was one of the most influential works of the time. There is no doubt that it provided an important intellectual stimulus for the American position on the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which would be created a year later. The CIA, by getting involved with the CCF, was effectively attempting to create a space for a 'vital center' of political consensus amongst the post-war European intelligentsia. Schlesinger himself was involved with the Congress from the very beginning, being part of an American intellectual contingent that aimed to overcome European reticence and neutrality towards the increasingly hostile relations between the USA and the USSR.[54] He later lamented the fact that, while an adviser in the Kennedy White House, he had done nothing to loosen the institution's close ties with the CIA to avoid later scandal.[55]

Kennan became famously disillusioned with the course US foreign policy took after the late 1940s. While continuing to play an intermittent role in the foreign policy establishment, becoming ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952 (for only one year, due to the USSR declaring him *persona non grata*) and to Yugoslavia in 1961, he also became one of its most renowned critics. He regarded NSC-68 as far too rigid and militaristic, categorising the Soviet Union in exactly the way that would prevent any pragmatic, constructive coexistence between the two powers. To his great concern 'the moderate Marshall Plan approach – an approach aimed at creating strength in the West rather than destroying strength in Russia' – seemed to be on the way out.[56] Above all, he disagreed with the perception of the USSR as a major military threat, and saw no reason to justify the massive escalation of atomic weaponry that the USA was making the centre of its policy.[57] In 1955 Kennan gave a speech at the Museum of Modern Art in New York which spelled out his more sophisticated under-standing of international affairs. He remarked how the Soviet Union had successfully cultivated the support of artists, 'knowing that these individuals enjoyed a form of confidence in the minds of men elsewhere which no political ideology could ever rival', and that via this the Soviet leaders could claim a legiti-macy and value for their 'hopeful and creditable civilisation'. Kennan noted that the USA had been slow to respond to these methods, but that now the time was ripe to do so in order to confront how 'particularly in Western Europe … we have become identified with things and impulses of the modern age which they hate in themselves – such things as modern technology, standardization and mass culture … ' It was no longer sufficient to leave the promotion of culture 'to the blind workings of commercial interests'. It was also in 1955 that Kennan became associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and it is easy to see how the Congress would represent for him exactly an attempt to solidify and project Western cultural values as a vital part of the Cold War struggle.[58]

Roosevelt's 'war for civilisation' against fascism was therefore soon followed by a similar ideological struggle against communism, causing the 'merging' of these two doctrines as equally totalitarian and so equally threatening for the American way of life. Hence the popularity of the apparently contradictory phrase 'red fascism' after the war, which covered the ideological gap between 'hot war' and 'cold war' politics.[59] This approach was given further intellectual credence by Hannah Arendt's magnum opus *The Origins of Totalitarianism* that appeared in 1951. Conflating fascism and communism according to their mutual capacity for 'radical evil', in her view they became two versions of a totalitarian belief in representing the force of history itself. By enforcing every aspect of life to correspond to the ideological norm, all values of human differ-ence were removed and reality became whatever the dominant ideology demanded. Her whole post-war *oeuvre*, of which this was the first major part, represented a continuous struggle with the tradition of Western political theory and political rationality in the light of the totalitarian experience. Arendt's work was in no way conservative – in particular, she feared for the totalitarian tenden-cies in American politics and society itself at that time – but the conservative

intellectual climate in which it appeared profoundly affected how it was read.[60] Regarding her intellectual position in the context of the Cold War, then, leads to the somewhat simplified but nonetheless relevant conclusion that:

> the philosopher and sociologist Hannah Arendt … and many others finished what the diplomat George Kennan had started: they explained to a public that had been sympathetic to the Soviet Union as the main fighter against the Nazi threat or as an 'interesting social experiment' that the Stalinist state and Hitler's regime had one common denominator – they were totalitarian states. The motto of the Western Cold Warriors became 'free world versus totalitarianism'.[61]

It is therefore significant that Arendt, along with Kennan, was present at the watershed CCF conference in Milan in 1955 entitled 'The Future of Freedom'. Conflating the extremes of left and right under the heading of totalitarianism did have considerable policy implications. An important part of American strategy in Europe was to break up the anti-fascist alliance in order to isolate the communists politically. The non-communist left became a vital part of this strategy, and the arrival of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was intimately linked to these developments.

The configuration of US economic development

When Truman informed Sam Rayburn, leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives, of the expected costs of rescuing Western Europe from economic ruin in early 1947, he emphasised the crucial importance of this move for the general well-being of the USA. Truman utilised the most emotive event in American life up to that point: 'you and I have both lived through one Depression, and we don't want to live through another one, do we, Sam?'[62]

As stated above, the post-war attitude towards communism was shaped by concerns for the very continuation of the ideals of American life. One of the key elements of this standpoint was the prosperity of the economy. The Depression had severely harmed American self-confidence, and it was out of the particular economic conditions of the USA in the pre-Second World War era, and the social relations that arose from them, that the post-war internationalist policies were shaped. From the socio-economic upheavals of the 1930s came the American vision of 'social harmony through production growth and prosperity [that] was the ideological basis for internationalizing the socio-political relations of the USA', reshaping those of its major partners in the post-war world, and the relations of the world economy more generally.[63] It is here that Gramsci's comment 'hegemony is born in the factory' should be recalled.

Gramsci's recognition of the importance of the production methods of Henry Ford was well-founded. The economics of mass production required a disciplined workforce, able to cope with the demands of such mechanised labour. Ford attempted to achieve this partly by enforcing a strict moral code for

his workers. However, he recognised that, in order to overcome the possibility of conflict between capital and labour, the workforce had to be integrated into the profit-making process as well as the demands of production. His 'partnership for prosperity' profit-sharing scheme of 1914 was aimed at enabling his workers not only to benefit from their input into the production process but also to be able to consume more. Crucially, if the capitalist system could provide for all, then there would be no need for socialist upheaval to redress any inequality. Ford considered that the advancement of the production process and its resulting technological developments 'shall shortly bring the whole world to a complete reconciliation'.[64] Ford's standpoint was developed further in the inter-war years by John Maynard Keynes, who sought to emphasise the potential 'general interest' of the workings of capitalism by replacing the apparent inevitability of class conflict with the possibility of ensuring benefits for all social groups. Thus:

> capital is not a self-subsistent entity existing apart from consumption. On the contrary, every weakness in the propensity to consume regarded as a permanent habit must weaken the demand for capital as well as the demand for consumption.[65]

Keynes recognised that the only way this far-reaching shift in capital–labour relations could succeed was through the active intervention of the state in the economy. By facilitating the introduction of mass production techniques and incorporating the labour movement partly into both the decision-making structure and the sharing of its benefits, a 'democratic compromise' could be reached. As a report by the Geneva-based International Labour Organisation in 1927 stated, American scientific management (i.e. Taylorism–Fordism) 'holds up the material prosperity of all members of society as one of the goals of civilisation'.[66] By subordinating money (i.e. finance) capital to industrial capital, investment could be orientated towards (and recouped through) mass production (involving, in Keynes's famous dictum, 'the euthanasia of the rentier'). This was emphasised by the events of 1929. The Wall Street Crash's lessons of unchecked financial instability profoundly influenced the state–business synthesis of interests in favour of industrial capital and away from finance. This was the background to Roosevelt's New Deal and the shift to a 'war economy' in the 1940s. Roosevelt had been elected in 1932 to oppose the corruption of the economic system by big business, a situation that was widely considered to have caused the Depression, and state intervention was necessary to redress the balance. However, through the 1930s the ability to achieve this without harming corporate interests became more limited.[67] As Charles Maier notes, 'by the late 1930's, the New Deal thrust to displace economic power from private capital to either corporatist National Recovery Administration institutions or to countervailing private forces (i.e. labor unions) was rapidly dissipating'.[68]

Roosevelt's turn away from wealth redistribution and back towards the interests of the corporations increased with the deterioration of the political situation

in Europe, especially with the considerable needs of war production.[69] Productivity, or rather 'the supposedly apolitical politics of productivity', became the way out of this complex nexus of political and economic interests.

> The recurrent ideas all stressed that by enhancing productive efficiency, whether through scientific management, business planning, industrial cooperation, or corporatist groupings, American society could transcend the class conflicts that arose from scarcity.[70]

The increased membership and consequent leverage of American unions, brought about by the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (the Wagner Act) that permitted free union association and organisation (something American employers had long resisted), strengthened the position of labour organisations as part of this planning structure. The balance of power within New Deal policies did shift back to business in the late 1930s and particularly with the onset of war, but unionised labour still had an essential, if less equal and more quiescent, part to play.[71] Out of these circumstances came the ethos of corporate liberalism or 'corporatism', 'the co-prosperity alliance between big business and organised labour' that welded together the twin themes of free-market individualism and institutional regulation within an organised capitalism geared to ever-growing economies of scale.[72] Corporatism, according to Michael Hogan, 'refers to a system that is founded on officially recognized functional groups, such as organized labor [and] business … In such a system … elites in the private and public sectors collaborate to guarantee stability and harmony.'[73] With the onset of the Marshall Plan, this synthesis was internationalised beyond the USA – 'The final act of the New Deal was the Marshall Plan … [I]t renewed the corporatist tendency of the New Deal in an international framework.'[74] By ensuring prosperity through the mode and relations of mass production, Western Europe would be incorporated into an 'Atlantic Union' with the USA, restoring social order and optimism and removing the threat of an independent communist Europe outside of the influence of American capital.

   Once this synthesis of interests on production among the political-economic elites came together on a national level, there began moves towards a restructuring of the international political-economic order.[75] The position of Britain was a major factor in this. During the 1930s depression aggressive sphere-of-influence policies, notably by Nazi Germany and Japan, had sought an autarkic self-sufficiency outside the international economic system. Similarly, Britain attempted to turn its empire into an exclusive trade area dominated by Sterling with the Imperial Preference System in 1932. But the decline of the British financial position and the growing threat of Nazi Germany led to increased efforts to reach mutually acceptable agreements with the USA.[76] British debt to the USA built up during the war and only intensified this switch of financial power from London to New York.[77] Lend Lease aid was ended in 1945 and tough negotiations between the two countries for a $3.75 billion loan to Britain followed in 1946.[78] While Britain's role within the Western alliance would some-

times obscure these difficulties, the transition of power in international economic decision-making towards the USA was clear.

Planning groups within the American socio-economic elite had already begun to assess the possibilities for the post-war American economy in 1940 (before the USA was at war), also in a sphere-of-influence manner. Nelson Rockefeller was formulating an American 'Hemispheric Foreign Policy' that included Latin America in 1939–40. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), in response to the dominance of Nazi Germany on the European continent, presented a report to Roosevelt in July 1941 that outlined a so-called Grand Area Strategy. The CFR came out of a New York dinner club in 1918, and, after plans for an Anglo-American discussion group on foreign affairs foundered (the Royal Institute of International Affairs retaining a British identity), the Council became a highly influential foreign policy investigation and planning forum for the American political-economic elite.[79] The report stated that the USA would need to secure open access to markets and raw materials throughout the rest of the world if the Germans monopolised Europe. However, in the event of 'an American–British victory' the plan would still prove useful towards integrating the European economies into a US-dominated Grand Area.[80]

Other New Deal 'corporate liberal coalitions of businessmen, government officials, and academic experts' sought similar internationalist solutions to American domestic needs. The National Planning Association report 'America's New Opportunities in World Trade' from November 1944 envisaged a massive expansion of American foreign investment in order to stimulate the necessary demand for exports abroad and maintain full peacetime employment at home. This logic changed further over the next three years, from the offering of loans to other countries (as after the First World War) to advocating the *granting* of dollars on a massive scale, thus avoiding a 'loans to repay loans' cycle and knowing that these dollars would return to the USA via its favourable balance of trade anyway.[81] This thinking formed the basis for the Marshall Plan.[82] It also signalled a general business opinion after the depression-hit 1930s that the state should maintain its interventionist role in the economy in alliance with big business in order to sustain employment and investment, a new responsibility in the traditionally *laissez-faire* USA. Influential on this terrain was the Committee for Economic Development (CED), which came out of several pro-New Deal business committees to press for considerable business influence in government planning in order to avoid a post-war depression. Wolfe includes both the CFR and the CED in his 'growth coalition' of post-war internationalists.

The extension of the New Deal

Criticisms of American post-war 'dollar diplomacy', particularly from the revisionist historians of the late 1960s and early 1970s, have focused on the dominance of corporate interests in the formulation of foreign policy.[83] There is no doubt that these interests were well represented in the European Recovery Program. William Clayton, a militant free-trader and former head of the world's

largest cotton-exporting company Anderson, Clayton, is a typical example. Clayton shifted from isolationism to internationalism because he became converted to the socio-economic benefits of export development. Involved with the CED during the war, Clayton then became Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and contributed significantly to the developing consensus among the American political-economic elite that post-war European economic recovery had to be remodelled and speeded up. His comment that a major grant should be made to Western Europe 'principally of coal, food, cotton, tobacco, shipping services and similar things – all now produced in the USA in surplus' seems to give evidence that Clayton was above all too interested in corporate profit.[84] Indeed, it is noticeable that whereas the ERP envisaged exporting 6 per cent of US coal production and 6 per cent of its grain to Europe in the first year, the figure for cotton was 23 per cent, possibly reflecting Clayton's real corporate allegiance. But Clayton's aim was to burden the US economy as little as possible, so that anything in surplus could be exported and paid for largely through taxation instead. 'Cotton, tobacco and dairy products … which were in surplus in the USA, were provided freely.'[85] Tobacco, not easily recognised as an essential product, was also a mainstay of the black market barter system in post-war Europe because of its scarcity – removing the scarcity meant normalising trade relations once more. The goal was therefore to stabilise the Atlantic trade system by stimulating the European economies, removing bottlenecks of a lack of key supplies, escaping from the interminable cycle of demands for more US aid, and so avoiding the potentially adverse effects on the American economy of continued European disarray.

> Without further prompt and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe. Aside from the awful implications which this would have for the future peace and security of the world, the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression … [86]

The 'growth coalition' represented a formidable cross-section of the American financial, industrial, political and legal ruling elite. While anti-communism may have been a convenient ideological vehicle with which to manipulate wider opinion in favour of internationalism, such that it 'was to some extent a convenient, emotive rallying call that the State Department was happy to ride in order to get its foreign economic policy through an economy-minded Congress', it was also a genuine spur to action amongst this coalition.[87] This, along with the galvanising experience of the 'war for civilisation', gave a more messianic zeal to plans that were already in discussion before the threat of Soviet communism was accepted.

The Marshall Plan therefore arose in 1947 as a practical means of applying the Truman Doctrine's broad anti-communism in order to meet both the threat of European economic stagnation or, equally important, autarky, *and* the socio-

political, ideological danger of Europe going communist.[88] Above all, in Kennan's words, the ERP should oppose the misapprehension of the Doctrine as offering a 'blank check' for American aid against communism in any situation. 'It must be made clear that the extension of American aid is essentially a question of *political economy*', such that it would only be offered under conditions that would provide a return on the investment.[89] Simply providing goods or money to fill a European 'shopping list' and temporarily end certain shortages was totally inadequate. The Plan aimed to restructure West European socio-economic conditions to ensure the smooth workings of international capitalism on the American Fordist model.[90] By removing production bottlenecks and balance of payments problems in Europe, 'American aid allowed the European economies to generate their own capital more freely, certainly without returning to the deflationary competition of the 1930's.'[91] With the engineering of efficient production methods, scarcity, and so the appeal of communism, would end. Via formal institutional channels set up by the European Productivity Agency, American models of production techniques, management structures and industrial relations were promoted in European firms, although, it needs to be said, often with mixed results.[92] Milward has argued that while the West European economies were not in a state of crisis by 1947, the gradual increase in production and the loss of export earnings due to the war meant there was a severe shortage of dollars to pay for the necessary American imports for large-scale reconstruction. The answer was to overcome the dollar shortage by rapidly increasing European productivity, at the same time ensuring the integration of the European economies within an American sphere of influence.[93] Whatever the issue of communism, for the Americans these goals also represented an economics of pragmatic rationality – practical, efficient and apolitical.[94]

Thus, in the language of New Deal social-democratic compromise, 'the true dialectic was not one of class against class, but waste versus abundance'.[95]

> Ever more efficient and cheaper production would be managed scientifically by forward-looking industrialists, and guided on rational economic lines by the state. This would transform the ancient battle between reactionary capitalists and revolutionary workers into a constructive, dynamic relationship, uniting enlightened producers and contented consumers. Growth would resolve all the difficulties, overcome all the challenges, just as in America.[96]

Hence the crucial involvement of the US labour unions in promoting the benefits of productivity to their European counterparts. Even when it became clear that productivity and price stability were given far more emphasis than increases in wages and the general standard of living, the American union organisations did not switch to an oppositional stance.[97] The criteria for aid forced a rapid decline in public spending in European recipient nations. Inflation declined but wages stagnated and unemployment and profits rose due to the policy imperative of setting the economic conditions for increased productivity. Needless to say, the increased production was intended for export in order to improve foreign

currency (dollar) reserves. Yet by the late 1940s the major American unions, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) were being led by determined anti-communists like CIO leader Walther Reuther and AFL head George Meany, who closely associated themselves and their movements with US internationalism.[98]

The fifteen participating nations were granted $13 billion via the ERP between 1948 and 1952. Barnet comments that the real significance of the Marshall Plan 'was not that the Americans were either altruistic or self-serving – they were both – but that the survival of the economic system in the richest nation on earth was perceived to require a systematic transfer of resources'.[99] Yet it would be wrong to view the Plan simply in terms of an influx of dollars into Western Europe. Due to the expanding post-war American economy, total foreign assistance never rose above 2.6 per cent of GNP during the late 1940s and early 1950s.

> At the time that the plan was being formulated, economists calculated that [while] World War II had cost America about $350bn., a future war would cost very much more. The annual cost of the Marshall Plan, about $5bn. on a GNP of about $230bn., was relatively small, therefore.[100]

This does not suggest that a huge transfer of resources was necessary, but rather that the emphasis was on how to manage them. Thus the ERP:

> reflected a more general confidence that American methods could revive Europe. American history had convinced leading US businessmen, diplomats and politicians that Europe could become far more efficient and self-sufficient if national rivalries and petty internal barriers on trade, capital movements and migration were whittled away … Americans were also confident that they had found the right combination of industrial structure and government intervention to achieve high productivity.[101]

There was considerable interest among the American political-economic elites involved in managing the ERP for moves towards some form of European unity, particularly on an economic level, although there were doubts over the potential dangers of a united Europe using its new-found economic power to go against US interests.[102] However, the need to integrate the western zones of Germany economically and militarily, without which the West European apparatus would be untenable, became the dominant factor. Associated with this was a backlash against nationalism as a cause of needless rivalry and destruction between European powers – it was time, finally, to move beyond the conditions of the nineteenth century. The Marshall Plan, by insisting on German recovery and rehabilitation so soon after the war, therefore alienated the Soviet Union and effectively split Europe into east and west.[103] A united Western Europe that included Germany would gain economically from a supranational, coordinated division of labour and economies of scale that would transform the region from

one of independent units vulnerable to nationalist deviation and/or communist subversion into a self-sustaining bulwark against Soviet imperialism.[104] Paul Hoffman, former corporate boss of the Studebaker Motor Company and co-founder of the CED, became the chief administrator of the Marshall Plan's coordinating body, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Hoffman attempted to apply the experience of large-scale production methods gained from the US auto industry to the needs of European recovery. When reporting to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the ECA in 1950, Hoffman stated that European economic unification would be 'the single greatest factor in determining whether the European economy can ever get the kind of strength and prosperity that will completely immunize it against the appeals of communism or any other -ism'.[105]

The Marshall Plan had a major effect on the stabilisation of West European society.[106] The fact that the USA was committing itself to European recovery was of enormous socio-political and psychological significance in terms of European self-perception. How far Western Europe was in need of material and 'spiritual' reconstruction remains debatable, but the transatlantic elites who seized the initiative perceived it as being on the verge of collapse in terms of their long-term interests and beliefs, and therefore determined policy on that basis. While the demands of socio-economic restructuring did not improve the general standard of living of the recipient nations in the short term, over the long term the benefits of higher productivity and financial equilibrium would pay off. Yet, as Maier has noted, 'stabilization meant not so much preserving liberal procedures as re-establishing the overlapping hierarchies of power, wealth, and status that can loosely be termed "capitalist"'. This, in effect, meant 're-establishing the contested legitimacy of European social and economic elites' at a time when this legitimacy was under threat from the left, especially in France and Italy.[107]

Broadly put, 'for US officials and European elites there was a convergence of purpose: to contain indigenous communism at home and Soviet power abroad'.[108] The desire for social change and the upheaval in traditional communal values led to the electoral dominance of Socialists and Christian Democrats across Western Europe in the second half of the 1940s, with the Communists involved in coalition governments in France, Belgium and Italy. The dominant theme on the political left, and indeed in the centre, was a desire for reconstruction and rejuvenation on a national level, with the socio-economic benefits of the peace to be shared equally after the sufferings of the war.[109] The possibility was there that, in coalitions between the socialists and communists and, possibly, the conservative right, the left could orchestrate a period of economic protectionism or, beyond that, political neutrality towards Cold War alliances. Hence the American fear of a European Third Force. The task of American internationalism was not only to confront this possibility, but also to transcend it with a more coherent vision of European renewal that would meet general needs and provide a redefined sense of political and economic order. Western Europe therefore became the prime site of contest between post-war

ideologies of reconstruction. Already in the 1930s Gramsci was aware of the social consequences of importing the American model of mass production and consumption. Thus 'the intellectual and moral reactions against the establishment of the new methods of production … are due to the remains of old, disintegrating [social] strata, and not to groups whose destiny is linked to the further development of the new method'.[110] Yet the potential reaction against these changes never took hold. As Donald Sassoon has shown, the priority of national concerns among the majority of West European socialist parties prevented any distinctive Europe-wide foreign policy emerging that could challenge an American involvement in European affairs. When Marshall Aid was offered to ease the burdens of reconstruction, almost universal acceptance among European socialist parties was the result. In doing this, the democratic left moved to the right to strengthen itself with American political and economic support against the threat of the communist parties, which meant opting not for socio-economic conservatism but in a way for a different kind of radicalism.[111]

> Therefore, not only in Italy but also in France, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, the presence of the communist party was seen as the major obstacle preventing those decisions [on economic modernisation] being taken. If a policy of productivity and modernization was the aim, the moderate West European parties were left by the Americans confronting the dilemma of how to achieve that aim. Strong pressures from Washington were not needed because the paralysis which the coalition governments were experiencing suggested that the solution could only be found in a new political and economic environment.[112]

Just as the Truman Doctrine had denied the possibility of a moral–political middle ground between right and wrong, so the offer of US aid to Europe demanded the break-up of the wartime anti-fascist coalitions to reconfigure postwar politics along lines that excluded the communists. Both Prime Ministers Ramadier in France and de Gasperi in Italy removed the communists from their centre-left coalition governments in May 1947, before the announcement of the Marshall Plan. As a CFR-sponsored study at the time stated, both leaders 'apparently counted on improving economic conditions and American aid to pull them through'.[113] It is easy to see here the relevance of the non-communist left for the American strategy.

While the European left (minus the communists) realigned itself towards a form of welfare-state managed capitalism, the financial and industrial elites themselves re-aligned away from Eastern Europe and (to a degree) imperial commitments towards an Atlantic-based Pax Americana.[114] The conception of the American ruling class in the late 1940s, that Western Europe had to be transformed according to the 'productivist' corporate-liberal synthesis to prevent economic stagnation from leading to socio-political disorder, found many supporters among European elites feeling threatened by the possibilities of postwar upheaval. The level of support varied from country to country, with the

Netherlands being perhaps the most outrightly Atlanticist, but this should not obscure the fact that American power could not have operated as it did in European affairs without this level of elite consensus on American involvement in the first place. This has led to some commentators to refer to an 'empire by invitation'.[115] Of course, the existence of this transatlantic consensus should not obscure the fact that American economic strength was certainly used at times to gain political leverage and secure specific restructuring objectives.[116] Nevertheless, this transnational configuration of elites operating in big business, the trade unions, in politics and in institutions of civil society would be the basis for American hegemonic leadership in the West until the early 1970s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, an important aspect to Gramsci's conception of hegemony is the ability of any leading social group to offer 'intellectual and moral leadership' in order to gain the broader support of other allied (but subordinate) groups. The participation of the American trade unions in this post-war 'growth coalition' is thus a crucial case in point, as is the cooperation of sections of the European business and political elites. The changing dynamics of that hegemony, caused by the shifting priorities of Republican or Democratic administrations or the separate path taken by European unification, are not important here. What is important is the commitment of American business and political interests to European affairs, so much so that from 1948 to 1952 they literally aimed to restructure European socio-economic relations and transform its political landscape.

Despite the support of key sections of the European political-economic elites, there was an awareness from the beginning on the part of the Marshall Planners that a major effort would be required to ensure the necessary popular consensus for their ambitions. The whole point, after all, was to ensure the future of capitalist democratic regimes, and public opinion had to be taken into account. Thus 'from the beginning the symbolic and psychological dimensions of their action were as high among their priorities as its economic effects'.[117] Above all, there was a need to confront the opposition to the Plan that would be directed by the Soviet Union. Once it became clear at the Paris conference convened to organise the European response to the proffered American aid that Soviet participation would mean a complete undermining of their hold on Eastern Europe, the prospect of cooperation between the two superpowers disintegrated.[118] The formation of the ERP therefore effectively drew the battle lines for influence over the continent. Stalin reconvened the Comintern as the Cominform (the Informational Bureau of Communist Parties) in September 1947 explicitly to consolidate Soviet power in Eastern Europe and organise opposition tactics to the ERP in Western Europe.[119] The immediate result was a clampdown on political opposition in Eastern Europe and large-scale industrial unrest organised by the communist parties in France and Italy. For Kennan these strikes, followed by the Czech coup in March 1948 and the 1948–9 Berlin blockade, represented 'Moscow's attempt to play, before it was too late, the various political cards it still possessed on the European continent'.[120] Others in the Truman administration and in Congress would view them with far more alarm as evidence of the

expanding communist conspiracy, and the immediate effect of the Czech drama was the sudden passage of the ERP by Congressmen who had previously been more interested in delaying it for several months.[121]

Kennan, aware from the beginning of the likely communist response to the ERP, spoke in May 1947 of the need to confront this by stimulating an 'enlightened public opinion, a public opinion which understands that this is the only way Western Europe can be saved from disaster'.[122] Domestically, this led to a major effort on the part of elites in civil society who were linked to those in the state apparatus either socially or professionally to publicise the necessity of the Plan for US interests. That this was a peacetime mobilisation made it all the more noticeable. The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery (CMP), created in September 1947 by 'a coalition of corporate and labor interests and a liberal elite closely linked to the internationalist "foreign policy establishment"', became '*the principal instrument* through which the State Department persuaded Congress and the American people to sponsor a huge program for reconstructing postwar Europe'. Members included Acheson, Allen Dulles, bankers Winthrop Aldrich and Frank Altschul, General Electric boss Philip Reed, and union leader David Dubinsky. In terms of the extension of the state into civil society, it is worth noting that 'although [it was] labeled a "citizens' organization", the CMP was hardly independent of State Department influence and could be described as an external propaganda agency acting on behalf of the European Recovery Program'.[123]

In Europe itself, the task was taken up by the ERP administrators in Paris, the Economic Cooperation Administration, under the leadership of Averell Harriman. Setting about 'the largest international propaganda operation ever seen in peacetime', the ECA sought to spread the message as much as possible that the ERP was all about creating a higher standard of living and political and economic stability, for all Europeans. Aiming to meet what Kennan had referred to as the need to revive Europe's 'spiritual vigour', the goal transcended economics and focused on creating 'a radical shift in the priorities of individuals, towards new ideals of personal progress which could be defined in the language of income and consumption'.[124] All channels were used to achieve this, from local press and radio outlets to the Voice of America and international media like *Fortune* and the *International Herald Tribune*, from mass pamphleteering to information tours to newsreels. The ECA was able to fund this campaign through the notorious counterpart funds, the money received in local currency from the sale of ERP products in Europe. Held by national banks but able to be used only with ECA approval, much of this sum (which reached over $8.6 billion by the end of the Plan in 1952) was used for financial stabilisation and infrastructure purposes, but a sizeable part, about 13 per cent, went on the public relations/propaganda campaign. The main recipients of this attention were the French and the Italians, reflecting the concern in the ECA at the strength of their respective communist parties, followed by the western zones of Germany. There is no doubt that this effort must have had some impact in explaining the major economic issues of the day, from an American perspective, to the wider

populace.[125] However, as will be discussed in the following chapter, alongside this campaign went the growth of an increasingly intricate covert capability on the part of the USA that sought to ensure that nothing so vital as the ERP could be at the mercy of public opinion. If securing the freedom of Western civil society was the aim then all methods were justified, whatever the apparent contradictions.

While there were definite limits to how far the ECA could transform the functioning of European production methods and socio-economic relations, mainly due to resistance at both local and state levels, the European economies did experience the beginnings of the long post-war boom on the back of the American intervention.[126] With this intervention came the advent of American-style consumerism, and the effects of this are undeniable.

> However alien, especially for the older generation, some American practices seemed, however often gadget mania was ridiculed, however much American naiveté and pragmatism were mocked, however strongly American civilisation was despised … the century old attraction the USA had held especially for the European poor was now bolstered by a variety of important factors: the presence of the incredibly powerful, rich, and wasteful US Army; the generous assistance programs; and the ubiquitous presence of American wealth and good life in the products of American popular culture, which had an unbeatable allure, especially for the young.
>
> In 1945, more than ever before, the United States signified the codes of modernity and promised the pursuit of happiness in its most updated version, as the pursuit of consumption.[127]

But the developing consumer society in Europe was definitely not without its critics, and much of the antagonism was directed across the Atlantic. Opposition was to be expected from the harder conservatives of the political right and the dogmatists of the left, but in particular, 'if anti-Americanism flourished in these years it was due mostly to the work of the intellectuals'. For Ellwood, this group's rejection of the large-scale American influence in every aspect of European life was partly 'the outward sign of the problems encountered by intellectuals and the left in general in redefining their role as guardians of national identity in the new era of limited sovereignty and high mass consumption'.[128] In other words, the social space from which the traditional intellectual could fulfil the role of defender of cultural values was diminishing due to the American-fostered transformation of European society. If all political, economic and social questions came down to a matter of management and technocratic expertise, then traditional intellectuals were literally becoming obsolete in a society that no longer needed their voice. Cultural values became the battleground on which European superiority could still be proclaimed, whatever the merits and practicalities of the American can-do logic. Thus 'Coca-Cola became the symbol of everything that a certain intellectual discourse in Europe had always rejected in America, as the country that had succeeded in mass-marketing bad taste.' For those fighting the cultural Cold War there had to be more than the simple provision of

consumer goods. As the founder of the CCF, Melvin Lasky, remarked in 1951, 'we know you can't fight Karl Marx with Coca-Cola'.[129]

When Raymond Aron paid tribute to the Marshall Plan on the radio and in *Le Figaro* in 1949, he spoke of how it had restored 'a sense of hope and confidence', transforming 'almost at once, the psychological atmosphere of the "cold war"'. Aron, along with:

> Anthony Crosland in England [and] the editors of *Der Monat* in West Germany represented a new intellectual synthesis of reformism and Americanism, and it was to such 'opinion-makers' that the American effort of persuasion directed its attention when direct mass propaganda was abandoned and the culture of 'Atlanticism' took its place.[130]

If anyone was a lone voice, preaching the merits of Atlanticist cooperation in the France of the late 1940s, it was Aron. Through the network set up by the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the 1950s, however, Aron found his intellectual constituency. Crosland also participated in the CCF in the mid-1950s, and it was the editor of *Der Monat* himself, Melvin Lasky, who originally put together the first gathering of the Congress in 1950. It should therefore be apparent that the CCF epitomised, more than any other transnational institution, the 'reformism and Americanism' that the USA was looking to support in intellectual life. Not only that, but the CCF was based on the clear rationale that the Euro-American synthesis of interests promoted by the ERP and NATO did *not* mean that Europe was to be culturally neutered by the products of American-inspired mass consumption. On the contrary, the USA belonged wholeheartedly to the same cultural lineage and sought to defend the same cultural values as the Europeans. What is more, with the transformation of Euro-American political, economic and military relations in the immediate post-war years, the need was great for an intellectual–cultural synthesis of the same magnitude to express the seamlessness of Atlanticism. While this of course suited the aims of American internationalism by combining the interests of the West Europeans with those of the USA, it also provided a space for the traditional intellectual that reflected a certain worth in the rapidly changing post-war world. In order to protect Western intellectual-cultural values under American tutelage, they had to be 'institutionalised', and in the form of the CCF the linkages between ideas, institutions and material forces, the tri-partite framework for an analysis of hegemony, therefore becomes clear.

In this context it is intriguing to note the setting for Secretary of State Marshall's speech announcing the Plan itself. Marshall was at Harvard on 5 June 1947 together with four others to receive an honorary degree. It was a symbolic gathering. The President of Harvard conferring the degrees was James Conant, who, as head of the wartime National Defence Research Committee, had overseen the building of the atomic bomb. Receiving the degrees were scientist Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Manhattan Project that built the bomb; D-Day commander General Omar Bradley; wartime US Army Chief of Staff

General Marshall; and T.S. Eliot.[131] While this may seem to be an incongruous group, they represented an alignment of forces that significantly tied America to Europe on various levels: the military that had fought against the tyranny of Hitler; the nuclear weapon that protected the Western hemisphere from further threats; and the cultural heritage that was now being protected.

3   Securing the Pax Americana
Overt and covert agendas

Having looked at the consolidation of the political economy of US internationalism after the Second World War, it is time to consider the actual means by which intellectual-cultural Atlanticism was sought. This involves, first, for the purposes of context, a consideration of the expansion of American cultural diplomacy itself, since an important aspect to this process was the public projection of American 'values' abroad in a more insistent manner. This was related to the growing awareness that cultural phenomena could be consistently utilised as a significant tool of foreign policy, a relatively new development within US government circles. Second, and more important, is an analysis of the formation, ground rules and objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency itself in the late 1940s. The arrival of the CIA and the authorisation of covert action can be seen as signalling both an increased commitment to and a radicalisation of the methods and goals of political action on the part of the USA. Alongside the public promotion of 'the truth' and 'the American way', there was a more complex process that involved the cooption or creation of institutions and support for particular groups, allied to the Atlanticist cause of US internationalism, within the civil societies of other nations. In the late 1940s and 1950s the focus for this was Western Europe. It was the CIA, as an arm of the US state, that acted as the principal liaison and mechanism of control for the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Any appreciation of the CCF, therefore, *must* include some understanding of the CIA and its agenda. This places the Congress in the context of actual foreign policy objectives, *without* assuming that this explains its cultural relevance in its entirety.

The expansion of cultural diplomacy

Prior to 1938, the only effort at cultural diplomacy that the US government had undertaken had been the brief Committee on Public Information set up in 1917 to coordinate propaganda at home and abroad during the First World War. The Committee attempted to propagate 'global acceptance of an international order based on American values', with the USA held up as the model for modernisation, progress and a 'powerful, industrialised, free and just society'.[1] The Committee did not survive into peacetime because of the inherent suspi-

cion of centralised control of information and cultural diplomacy. The model that the USA offered, after all, was one that represented the success of private initiative liberalism. The period of 'isolationism' in the 1920s and 1930s was therefore marked by a large expansion of American corporate activity abroad, particularly in the area of mass communications – news agencies, radio, film and aviation. This dominance of the 'consciousness industry', as Wagnleitner put it, greatly facilitated the projection of the modernisation ethos that the USA stood for. The increase in trade and the provision of loans involved simultaneously the circulation of American ideas of consumerism, social harmony and progress. Unequivocal support from the US government transformed companies and philanthropic institutions such as Pan-American Airways, United Press, the Radio Corporation of America, and the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations 'into the chosen instruments for the continuation of politics by other means'.[2]

However, when American economic expansion and control of the communications networks began to be threatened by the rise of fascist autarky in Europe in the 1930s, the Committee did provide a blueprint for the reinstatement of governmental interest in coordinating cultural diplomacy. Fears of a growing influence in Latin America for Nazi Germany prompted the formation of the Division of Cultural Affairs within the State Department, involving determined efforts to stress that support for cultural freedom rather than the projection of cultural nationalism was the goal. Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles summed up this liberal-universalist approach by declaring that 'the idea of an "official culture" is alien to us'.[3] Nevertheless, this kind of statement only emphasises the presentation of the essential inseparability of national and universal interests for much American activity abroad.

> For US cultural diplomacy Latin America became the laboratory for the development of techniques to influence foreign cultures … All possibilities of cultural propaganda that were eventually implemented after the Second World War, from the exchange of scholars and artists to the direct manipulation of the media, were initially tested in Central and South America.[4]

The insistence on an apolitical cultural diplomacy soon broke down under the pressure of approaching war. Significantly, the first major development was the creation in 1940 of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs separate from the State Department and under the stewardship of Nelson Rockefeller, who set about confronting the 'imperialism of ideas' that was threatening the predominance of the USA in Latin America.[5] Rockefeller's importance comes from his linkage of cultural diplomacy with the protection of the national interest, a link that would prove vital for the internationalists when they sought to maintain and then increase the role of the US state to confront the Soviet Union on an ideological level in the immediate post-war years.

As the importance of cultural diplomacy and propaganda increased with the entry of the USA into the Second World War, the uneasy divide between

the approach of liberal internationalism, epitomised by Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, and the actual political objectives of US foreign policy in time of war began to have an effect. While the Office of War Information (OWI) sought to coordinate the presentation of the conflict, both domestically and abroad, as a necessary struggle for freedom and democracy, the military began to develop its own information strategies outside of the control of the OWI.[6] The trend away from universalism towards a more overtly political and nationalist approach in cultural diplomacy was exemplified by the immediate 'failure' of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1946–7. UNESCO was an institution that exactly originated from universalist aspirations within the US State Department to encourage post-war cooperation and reconciliation, but which became a site of political tension from its first meeting in Paris in November 1946. Concerned that the purpose of UNESCO was becoming undermined by communist sympathisers, 'the State Department now took the position that universality would have to reflect American national values, and not the reverse'.[7] With no secure bilateral relations established, the possibility of agreement between the two superpowers on the actual content of these universal values soon disintegrated. UNESCO became a major casualty of Cold War tension, leading the USA to turn towards more direct unilateral methods to portray its way of life abroad. It is worth noting in this respect that the CCF was partly an attempt to fill the space left by the decline of UNESCO as a Western-orientated intellectual–cultural organisation. In his report after the Congress's inaugural conference in Berlin in 1950 Melvin Lasky remarked that

> the Congress task is one of information, education, orientation, agitation. None of the existing organisations – surely not the UNESCO, nor the French-Anglo-American official services in central Europe, nor the Marshall Plan publicists in the West – can properly meet this problem.[8]

The post-war expansion of American cultural diplomacy was based on the premise that by making contact directly with the peoples of other nations outside official diplomatic networks, the policies of foreign governments would inevitably be altered by the resulting shifts in understanding and expectations at a grassroots level. Cultural policy therefore became recognised as an essential 'fourth dimension' to foreign policy alongside the political, economic and military domains, with the assumption being that, despite the involvement of the US government, the apparently undisputed truth of the message would override any concerns among the receiving populations about attempted manipulation.[9] In 1947 Archibald Macleish, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Affairs in 1944–5 and then US representative at UNESCO, wrote that because 'international relations have entirely altered as a result of technological advances in the machinery of communication' it would be an 'inexplicable error' for governments to avoid utilising the expanding channels of cultural exchange.

Whether Governments like it or not, their people will learn of the principal problems which face them in international affairs. It is to the interest of Governments to see to it that what they learn is accurate and not inaccurate, truthful and not partisan or prejudiced. In the same way, whether Governments like it or not, people will communicate directly with each other through the innumerable channels of print, of radio, of trade, of travel, of goods, of songs, of scientific achievements, of architecture, of agricultural practices, of business methods, of works of art. What is important to all Governments … is that the nature of the communication should be such that understanding and not misunderstanding will result; that comprehension and not prejudice or hatred will be disseminated throughout the world.[10]

Yet this intent was at first only advocated by a minority within the foreign policy establishment. In the immediate years after the war there was much less belief among Congressmen and the wider population that this side to government activity was really necessary in peacetime. In this budget-cutting, 'demobilising' atmosphere, attempts to improve American cultural diplomacy struggled to succeed. The 1946 Fulbright Act, set up to encourage the exchange of academics to and from the USA, was only passed because it was financed by the sale of surplus war material to the participating countries. The Act, however, became illustrative of the changing mood; focused on Europe, the programme's ostensibly independent scholarly intention was soon overcome by the State Department's more direct Cold War policies, so much so that it 'became a sort of cultural Marshall Plan helping to revive and defend the intellectual vitality' of European academia.[11] The announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947 heightened the debate surrounding the merits of American 'information services' and brought about an increased determination within the policy-making establishment to promote US culture and its 'discourse of freedom' abroad in a more forceful manner. Representative Dewey Short, a Republican from Missouri, spoke for an increasingly bipartisan number in Congress when he stated in May 1947 that 'today we battle for men's minds'.

We need friends abroad, and to win friends, it is essential that our policies be understood and fully known to the peoples of the world … The information program is really a part of our defense program, for one of its principal missions is to overcome the misrepresentations and correct the distortions that are one of the factors that may lead to another war.[12]

The next major step, in January 1948, was the swift passage of the Information and Educational Exchange Act (or Smith–Mundt Act) through Congress. This authorised the State Department to undertake a full-scale public relations campaign via literature, films, lectures and radio (Voice of America) to explain abroad the 'true motives' of US foreign policy. Specifically

restricted from operating within the USA (or indeed Latin America), the main aim was to reach audiences in Europe. While the Fulbright Act was still reliant on funding from the sale of surplus war material abroad, Smith–Mundt represented an expanded commitment based on considerable financial appropriations – over $31 million in 1949, its first year of operation. As Wagnleitner put it, 'the ever-present fears of right-wing congressmen – that cultural diplomacy would be infiltrated by liberal New Dealers – now were defused by the increased attention given instead to its value in fighting Communism'.[13]

This escalation of commitment to the promulgation of favourable opinion abroad can be directly related to the escalation of American political, economic and military commitment to a particular conception of the post-war world. The scale of this commitment, exemplified by the determination to prevent further communist expansion and to revive and reconfigure the economies of Western Europe, had to involve as much as possible the exclusion of *risk*. By the late 1940s the stakes for US foreign policy had become so high that almost all means were becoming justified on the premise that the ends were unquestionably right and just. In order to secure the cause of freedom and democracy internationally, the boundaries to 'acceptable' political action were being extended. Major questions arose: how could freedom be *guaranteed* rather than simply promoted abroad? How could it be ensured that this commitment would not be a costly lost cause?

An important element to this was the emphasis on 'truth' as the basis for American cultural diplomacy. This provided a rallying call against a post-war world that did not seem to be working as it should. With truth came justice, right and freedom. Expressing the truth was the obvious reply to the false propaganda of left-wing ideology. Yet the motto for the newly formed CIA was also the biblical 'And Ye Shall Know the Truth, and the Truth Shall Make You Free'. Thus, in April 1950, the same period when NSC-68 was being formulated and when Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined his idea for 'total diplomacy' (government should work together in state–private alliances with key groups in civil society such as the unions and the media in a Cold War 'united front'),[14] a corresponding 'Campaign of Truth' was organised by the State Department and announced by Truman.

> We cannot run the risk that nations may be lost to the cause of freedom because their people do not know the facts … We must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing … as important as armed strength or economic aid.[15]

Congress allocated $110 million for all manner of radio, press, publishing, cinematic promotions, social exchanges and cultural activities. This effort was still primarily focused on Europe into the early 1950s because of the priority search

for unifying principles and structures around which to cement an 'Atlantic civilisation' of the West.[16] Testifying for its implementation in the Senate, Democrat William Benton invoked the most visible US commitment to affairs abroad when he called for 'a Marshall Plan in the field of ideas'.[17] Melvin Lasky himself situated the arrival of the CCF within these contemporaneous debates: 'It might well be that the strictly non-governmental and international pattern of the Congress could serve as a pattern for the "Marshall Plan of Truth" which is being promoted at present in the Western hemisphere.'[18] The effort to promote the Marshall Plan domestically and internationally had already created a major precedent for the large-scale dissemination of news and information via formal and informal channels. The Campaign of Truth would lead to efforts to coordinate all anti-communist 'psychological operations' under the guidance of the Psychological Strategy Board in 1951–3.[19]

The pivotal role of the media and advertising in these processes was reflected in the personnel used by government. William Benton, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1945 to 1947, had formerly worked in advertising. A successor as Assistant Secretary (and principal advocate of the Campaign of Truth) would be his friend Edward Barrett, who, between 1946 and 1950, was the Editorial Director of *Newsweek*. When Truman announced the Campaign of Truth, his forum for doing so was a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In 1953, President Eisenhower, already an advocate of 'information strategy' in the Second World War, appointed his former wartime psychological warfare officer and media mogul (as Time-Life Managing Director) C.D. Jackson to the role of Special Assistant for psychological operations.[20]

These state–private networks linking the government and the media were therefore of major importance for the presentation and dissemination of a hardening Cold War foreign policy. The goal was to reach the widest public possible, and this naturally affected the methods used. Benton in particular:

> was an ardent promoter of mass communications as opposed to the 'slower' cultural media … The cultural approach, with its 'slow' media (exchanges of persons, books, art, and so forth) focused on influential elites and envisioned beneficent results in long-range cultural readjustments. The informational approach, using the comparatively 'fast' media of radio, film, and print journalism, was technologically oriented, populist in its partiality for undifferentiated mass audiences, and attuned to achieving immediate results in the form of altered opinion or attitudes.[21]

Benton was certainly an advocate of mixing all forms of media within an overall cultural programme. He put together the first major touring exhibition of American art in 1947 with the explicit aim of demonstrating the cultural achievement of the USA.[22] But the emphasis was on the use of mass communications for their wider impact.

> With their strategy of 'fast media' (advertisements through radio, films, and news of all kind), the Madison Avenue methods promised more than just short-term success … The new Madison Avenue guard wagered upon the attractiveness of the messages of US popular culture, which could easily be spread over the channels of the media networks. Even if the elites raised their brows, this new commercial-through-commercial style created the opportunity to reach the largest possible number of people quickly and directly.[23]

The determination to ensure that the 'truth' was packaged and presented in such a way as to ensure audience agreement leads into the second element for securing American interests abroad: 'psychological warfare'. Simpson has described this as 'a group of strategies and tactics designed to achieve the ideological, political, or military objectives of the sponsoring organisation (typically a government or political movement) through exploitation of a target audience's cultural-psychological attributes and its communication system'. Lucas refers to it more broadly as encompassing 'any initiative which might affect the position of a foreign regime'.[24] Interest in 'psychological warfare' and the securing of consent did not originate in the Cold War. After the experience of the First World War, journalist Walter Lippman and sociologist Harold Lasswell had pioneered the belief that the control of information and the determination of people's responses was becoming essential for the stability of democracy, especially when particular responses were essential for the state, as in wartime. Lippman, who gave us the phrase the 'manufacture of consent', stated that representative government could not continue unless the tools of mass communication were used for the greater good.

> That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies … The creation of consent … is a very old [act] which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technique, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power.[25]

His theories therefore paralleled the efforts of Henry Ford to stabilise the manufacturing process according to social control mechanisms designed for the apparent good of all. Lasswell expanded on this viewpoint: 'Successful social and political management often depends on proper co-ordination of propaganda with coercion, violent or non-violent; economic inducement (including bribery); diplomatic negotiation; and other techniques.' Thus in his view the propagandist was 'no phrasemonger but *a promoter of overt acts*'.[26] The public relations expert Edward Bernays added the determination of scientific management when he wrote in 1947 that the 'engineering of consent quite simply means the application of scientific principles and practices to the task of getting people to support

ideas and programs'.[27] The basic argument, therefore, was that in the increasingly confusing modern world the mass of the population did not know where their actual interests lay, and had to be told. These principles filtered through into policy-making circles, so that in the early Cold War period a widespread linkage was created between the national security establishment, university research personnel, and commercial and media interests. Communications research as a subject, with its own rationale and methodology, was largely defined as a result of government patronage that was running at between $7 million and $13 million a year in the early 1950s.[28] Typical of this collusion was Project TROY in 1950–1, that saw psychologists, information and communication researchers from Harvard and MIT drawing up a plan to 'penetrate' the Iron Curtain via various media, particularly radio, to undermine the Soviet Union from within.[29]

There was therefore a clear belief that the manipulation of ideas and opinion was a vital aspect to the maintenance of order in capitalist democratic society. The result was a necessary expansion of the tasks of the state to maintain a level of social consensus.

> The state's relationship to the economy, along with its intervention in spheres of social organisation (e.g. different types of welfare systems) and related to this, the need to organise masses of people who particularly after the 1914–18 war begin to appear as political actors, constitute a substantial change in the traditional limited bourgeois state.[30]

This only became emphasised by the presence of the rival world-view of communism. The ideological realm, as Gramsci determined, is an essential area of contestation for the development and maintenance of any socio-economic hegemony. After 1945, the prospect of a world going communist prompted intervention by the dominant internationalist coalition in the USA in all areas of social life in other countries to try and ensure the stability (and, ultimately, expansion) of an international capitalist-democratic society. The threat of the Soviet Union and 'world communism' was the justification for all efforts to bolster this international society, however 'undemocratic' some of the efforts may now seem to be. The challenge from the left was therefore confronted by a determined effort to wrest the principles of 'truth' and 'freedom' away from their potentially radical social connotations towards a more conservative, stabilised, *reified* condition. Only a certain mode of freedom was acceptable – freedom had its limits, and the strategy of US internationalism was to define them.

This attempted exercise of control through the manipulation and dissemination of information provides the great paradox of the Cold War anti-communist strategy. Only by trying to establish norms of behaviour and thought could greater freedom be assured. The sense of crisis drove national security logic to extreme lengths.[31] As NSC-68 stated, 'practical and ideological considerations … both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by *its constructive application* …'[32] This can

be compared with the more public declaration of James Byrnes, Secretary of State 1945–6: 'In extending economic aid, we must not seek to control the people of a country, but rather we must seek to make them free.'[33] These two statements illustrate the fact that, from the point of view of American internationalism, freedom had to be created and, literally, institutionalised, in post-war Western Europe. Nothing should be left to chance.

The projection of American values abroad via an all-pervasive commercial–media apparatus claiming a monopoly of the truth was an important aspect to Cold War strategy. But alongside this, the search for a more secure Atlanticism that involved a deeper 'constructive application' of consensus within Western civil society deserves more attention. This included the formation of a covert operations apparatus and the deliberate attempt to influence, interfere with or actually create institutions within international civil society in order to solidify the ideals of freedom 'apolitically'. The CIA was keen to use all available media, 'fast' and 'slow', to promote Atlanticism and fight the Cold War. However, on an international level, hegemony relies on more than the apparatus of mass communication – there has to be a transnational network of elite groups and institutions in political and civil society in order to solidify any social-ideological consensus. Atlanticism was far more than the simple expansion and normalisation of US national security interests. It was also, crucially, the link-up between internationalist groups within the USA and Western Europe whose interests coincided around anti-communism. It is how this Atlanticist consensus was institutionalised that is the key to understanding American hegemony.

Approaching the CIA

The trouble with referring to the Central Intelligence Agency in most contexts is that it always brings with it the whiff of conspiracy. Since the mid-1960s, when the emerging tales of subversion on behalf of the Free West met with howls of derision from a younger generation who did not share the same world-view, the CIA has been popularly branded as a highly suspect and somewhat megalomaniac institution operating outside the law. The obvious problem with this is that it points to the Agency as a 'secret state' pariah, without acknowledging that, despite its unique position under discussion here, it has always been a part of the US government structure. From the point of view of International Relations, Intelligence Studies has always been considered as peripheral, or, put another way, 'there is nothing there that cannot be subsumed under existing theory'. John Lewis Gaddis, in an article from 1989, maintained that the unreliability of intelligence research on the Cold War due to the unavailability of first-hand material meant that 'the basis for solid history' was still not present.[34] Yet, as one historian stated in his reply to this claim, this should not deter serious scholarship, since it is important to

> treat the development and continuity of intelligence services as an element in the decision-making process in the same way that we would treat the

evolution of any other institution … with regard to continuity or discontinuities in both the personnel and in the use made of the institutions by those ultimately responsible for top-level decisions. This does require … that we should be able to write about the development of the intelligence services or institutions, both in their own right and as they relate to the other more overt elements in the processes by which policy decisions are made.[35]

The importance of the CIA is exactly that its personnel were able to operate on a large scale with a separate mandate, yet its hierarchy was always in touch with the workings of democratic government and legitimacy. In the early years there was a significant crossover of personnel and responsibility between the CIA, the State Department, and other key institutions such as the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Europe. The determination to defend the apparently self-evident values of democracy and capitalism that was shown by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan effectively legitimised the use of clandestine methods in order to make certain of success. To advance the politics of freedom, the CIA's covert apparatus was given a wide brief to operate as a manufacturer of consent abroad. It is not enough, in other words, to examine American hegemony by moving from political economy to the cultural-intellectual activities of the CCF without taking into account the CIA's origins as an outgrowth of the 'Marshall Plan ethic' of European reconstruction.

An important aspect to the origin and early development of the American intelligence establishment is that it came about in response to perceived or direct threats to American interests. While this may seem like a truism for all intelligence services, its relevance in this context comes from how its development charted the transition of the USA from wary isolationism to full-blown internationalism from 1945 to 1950. The appointment of William Donovan as head of the Office of Coordinator of Information in June 1941 in response to the worsening international political situation was the first significant step in this direction, marking the emergence of 'a peacetime, civilian, centralized intelligence agency incorporating military concerns'.[36] Yet the scattered institutional arrangements of intelligence-gathering, particularly between the different arms of the military and the FBI, meant that President Roosevelt was still receiving reports from ten different agencies around the time of Pearl Harbor.[37] The shock of that attack provoked the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the granting of more expansive powers for one institution along the lines of what Donovan always wanted, including sabotage, propaganda, and research and analysis.[38] The OSS can be regarded as the institution responsible for 'psychological warfare' that provided the covert complement to the overt media and information activities of the OWI.[39] The OSS, like the OWI, was to be a wartime escapade only. Despite Donovan's efforts, the OSS was disbanded by Truman on 20 September 1945, a victim of the need to move to peacetime issues and peacetime budgets; its various sections were either wound up or allocated to the State Department or the military. This was not a popular development – Secretary of State Byrnes remarked how his department's role as

' "undertaker" for war agencies' was something that 'did not make me very happy'.[40]

The uncertainties of the world situation after the war and the need to be informed about it, the successful wartime experiment with the OSS, and the inefficient post-war bureaucratic arrangement all ensured that the American intelligence story didn't come to an end in 1945. Already, on 22 January 1946, Truman authorised the creation of a Central Intelligence Group headed by a director to coordinate the gathering of intelligence by the Departments of State, War and the Navy. However, the constant rivalry between these institutions made it clear that an independent, civilian body, centralising intelligence activity and having direct access to the president, was a necessity. The result was the National Security Act, passed on 26 July 1947, that authorised the Central Intelligence Agency under a Director of Central Intelligence, unified the military services into a Defense Department and created the foremost decision-making body of the government, the National Security Council (NSC).[41] Yet the powers given to the CIA were still vague, due to both the uncertainty over what methods the new agency should actually be able to make use of, and the concern that if its powers were spelled out the proposed Act would meet considerable opposition in Congress.[42] As the Senate's Committee on Intelligence Activities (the 'Church Committee') would report nearly thirty years later, 'nowhere in the 1947 Act was the CIA explicitly empowered to collect intelligence or intervene secretly in the affairs of other nations', the power to authorise these activities and many others emerging from either executive orders or National Security Council directives over the years.[43]

The Act should be seen in the context of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan that had been announced earlier in the same year. The post-war world was not turning out as the regulated place to be overseen by the four victors via the United Nations (UN) as Roosevelt had hoped, and the development of the CIA was a response to the perceived threatening political environment facing the USA. This is especially the case in terms of the ability of the new Agency to carry out authorised covert operations. After the demise of the wartime OSS in 1945, the focus had only been on how to create an effective intelligence-gathering apparatus, demonstrating that the prime aim was to discern the intentions of others (the impact of Pearl Harbour is evident here). Despite suggestions to the contrary, perhaps due to sections of the OSS network remaining in place after 1945, it does seem as if the expansion of CIA activity into covert operations was sanctioned only in the light of the shift to an outright internationalist anti-communist stance by the Truman administration in early 1947.[44] Those committed to regenerating European capitalism and shoring up democratic rule had to confront the possibility of facing successful communist-led nationalist movements, particularly in France and Italy, backed by the newly-invigorated Cominform. Not only that, but the delay in passing the European Recovery Program (ERP) through Congress in 1947–8 heightened the sense of crisis. The CIA's directive, to perform 'such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security' as stated in the 1947 Act,

was deemed not specific enough for the activities now envisaged for the new organisation.[45]

The response was swift. In December National Security Council documents 4 and 4-A were approved by Truman, the latter specifically stating the perceived threat 'of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers'. It was therefore deemed necessary that 'the foreign information activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations'. While there was a deliberate separation between NSC-4 and 4-A in order to keep the State Department immune from the potentially dangerous military operations, the two directives were seen as complementary – a covert dimension to the accepted information programmes was now seen as essential. Secretary of State Marshall, although unwilling to accept anything that might compromise the open strategy of his department to European economic development, nevertheless 'was obliged to coordinate the open with the covert policy'.[46] It is worth noting that this was passed before the Czech coup of February 1948 and the Berlin blockade of 1948–9, demonstrating the rapid emergence of the CIA and the immediate institutionalisation of coercive measures prior to some of the major confrontational events. In the aftermath of these events, NSC-4 and 4-A were backed up by document NSC-10\2 in June 1948 that justified:

> any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage … subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.[47]

This determination of the US government (and the Soviet Union) to apply all means in order to influence and interfere with socio-political and economic developments in other nations can be seen as one of the defining aspects of the Cold War. To perform these multiple tasks a new body was created, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the anodyne title being deliberately discreet, its very existence an actual secret. What directive NSC-10\2 also stipulated was that all actions planned under this remit should take into account 'that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them'.[48] With this the secret war really began. The OPC represented the 'direct action' approach towards the Cold War situation that Kennan and Forrestal in particular had been arguing for. Directive NSC-4-A stated that the CIA Director must ensure all 'psychological operations are consistent with US foreign policy and overt foreign information activities'. Yet for its first few years the OPC was effectively outside direct CIA control, allowing its first chief, Frank Wisner, to exercise considerable autonomy in how to go about fulfilling the increasingly trenchant NSC directives. Kennan, in particular, was urging the formation of a separate body to focus exclusively on psychological and 'political warfare', meaning direct

covert intervention in political matters abroad.[49] Fuelled by Marshall Plan counterpart funds and the demands of NSC-68, the OPC expanded from a staff of 302 with a budget of $4.7 million in 1948, to 2,812 staff and an $84 million budget in 1952, to a budget of $200 million in 1953.[50] Again a foreign crisis (this time the Korean War) brought about a further reorganisation of the intelligence set-up, with Agency Director Walter Bedell Smith overcoming internal rivalries and incorporating the OPC into a unified intelligence-gathering and covert action CIA in 1952.[51] By that stage, financial provisions had been clarified by basically allowing *carte blanche*. The 1949 Central Intelligence Act stated that CIA funds would not have to be accounted for by Congress. Instead:

> the sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature, such expenditure to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein received.[52]

By the early 1950s, therefore, the CIA had a formidable organisational framework and unlimited funds with which to operate. It is important to place this development in the context of the changing world-view of the American foreign policy establishment in the immediate years after 1945. As one scholar has summed it up:

> contemporary politics had a great deal to do with the origins of the intelligence policies. During the late 1940s and into the 1950s, Europe was the CIA's prime concern. Reconstruction was being carried out in Western Europe, but Communist influence was strong. Politically, in Italy and France, the Communists threatened to destabilize the post-war political and economic balance that the United States was attempting to establish throughout the Western world. Communist unions and organisations posed serious threats to the economic and social welfare of a rebuilding Europe. Thus, the policies of the CIA were to stabilize Western politics as much in favour of the US while simultaneously destabilizing and removing any elements that could threaten economic reconstruction.[53]

This is clearly outlining the dual operation of coercion and consent. The Marshall Plan was intended to remove the obstacles to a fast-track European economic recovery. It would thus ensure the continuation of democratic systems of government by satisfying necessary needs and preventing the potential for civil strife based on material scarcity. Allen Dulles, CIA Director from 1953 to 1961 and a major influence in post-war planning groups such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), noted that 'democracy requires a reasonable standard of living … it is impossible in areas of want'.[54] Yet the Plan's effects would take a while to realise themselves in European society, and there were concerns that the

European situation would worsen even before aid had arrived.[55] Above all, it was clear the Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration did not have a sufficient mandate to face this challenge. There was a direct link between the goals of the Plan, the limits to the ECA's capabilities, and the development of a separate covert action wing in the form of the OPC. The key factor in this link was ERP finance – the so-called counterpart funds. 'The "Counterpart Funds" were the local-currency receipt of sales of Marshall Plan supplies', and the Plan's system required recipient governments to deposit these sums in their own banks. While most of these counterpart funds, used at the discretion of the US government, were directed by the ECA towards governmental, industrial or infrastructure investments, 5 per cent – something like $200 million a year – was kept separate for costs and other unspecified purposes. It is clear that a considerable part of this was appropriated for the newly formed OPC.[56] There is no doubt that the level of available funding did lead to an excessive belief in the OPC's ability to deliver all manner of results. A memo from October 1949 from the CIA's Finance Division referred to:

> the various general and specific agreements between ECA and CIA, wherein certain portions of the 5% Counterpart funds of ECA are made available to CIA for the purpose of furthering the Marshall Plan by [deleted] combatting Communist elements in participating countries.

While this included 'lump sum subsidy grants to specific foreign labor, religious and political groups', there was also funding given 'for specific purposes, such as the purchase of a newspaper for a labor group, the underwriting of a peace conference [and] direct propaganda' as part of 'furthering the joint ECA–OPC activities'.[57] It is clear from this that considerable discretion was given by the ECA to the OPC for these disbursements. ECA administrator Paul Hoffman did not approve of this clandestine aspect to the Marshall Plan, believing economics alone would solve the problems.[58] But Richard Bissell, deputy administrator of the ECA, was able to arrange it with the tacit support of the Marshall Plan's chief representative in Paris, Averell Harriman. Communication was also helped by Bissell's assistant Frank Lindsay actually moving from the ECA to the OPC (Bissell himself would be recruited into the CIA by Allen Dulles in 1953). Such was the coordination that William Foster, from his position under Harriman in the ECA headquarters in Paris, effectively operated as 'the conduit for economic assistance and defense mobilization, as well as for psychological and economic warfare components provided by the OPC'.[59]

Is it right, then, to refer to the 'discreet financing' from the Marshall Plan as coming from 'an unexpected source'? Bissell's own view that the ERP and OPC 'was a complementary operation to secure Western Europe' is perhaps nearer the mark. The legislation for the ERP had exactly provided for a source of funding which could be used for unspecified projects with little accountability. Without assuming that covert operations were on the agenda during the drafting of the ERP, it certainly appears that the overt and covert sides to the

reconstruction of Western Europe were closely intertwined. The political economy of US internationalism allowed for a very broad application of means to achieve its goals, and the development of a covert capability should be seen in that initial context.[60]

Italy had been the test case for widespread overt and covert intervention. After the fall of the Czechoslovak democratic government to a communist-led coup in February 1948, there were fears that Italy would be next. In March Kennan, in a memo to Secretary of State Marshall, stated baldly that a communist victory in the elections (scheduled for 18 April 1948) would undermine the entire US position in Western Europe.[61] Debates raged through the hierarchy of the Truman administration as to how to authorise sufficient clandestine help to ensure victory for the Christian Democrats of de Gasperi. In March Truman himself, via Forrestal, sanctioned the direct use of covert action to influence the outcome of the election, over and above the advice of the CIA's legal counsel Houston. Immediately, $10 million in cash was taken from the Economic Stabilisation Fund (mainly consisting of confiscated Axis assets) and distributed through various conduits to anti-communist labour unions, political parties and other groups. These efforts were apparently vindicated – de Gasperi's Christian Democrats won a surprising 307 of the 574 parliamentary seats. As the *New York Times* put it, the election had been 'West versus East, or America versus Russia, or democracy versus totalitarianism'.[62]

Whether it was psychological warfare that achieved (or even significantly altered) this result remains open to question, but a precedent had been set, since now it seemed as if political situations could be manipulated according to specific designs as long as enough determination, organisation and money was provided. It also led to a long-term American effort to ensure that the result always went the right way.[63] Beyond this, however, was a realisation on the part of US officials that the tactics of the Communist parties in Western Europe had to be met with similar efforts. The US ambassador in Italy wrote to Marshall in January 1948 that:

> the Communists and left-wing Socialists have, as Department is aware, formed a popular democratic front made up of countless labor, agricultural, veteran, feminine, youth, cultural and social organizations, all communist controlled or inspired, for the purpose of popularizing their cause …

It was also noted that the 'communists have conducted [a] series of "Congresses" clearly designed to provide foci' for attracting wider support.[64] Likewise, the possibility of utilising or even generating particular groups in civil society for the purposes of solidifying the US image of a post-war Western Europe began to be considered as a justifiable method. Policy prescriptions followed the Italian episode to formally legalise covert support for 'the use of anti-communist democratic forces in foreign countries, *particularly those which are left of center*'.[65] This is a crucial point, because it shows that while US foreign policy (and general public opinion) was ostensibly moving against all positions on

the political left, the CIA began to employ a strategy of undermining communist organisations and support by promoting more moderate leftist social democratic movements. This was especially the case with the unions, the international student movement and, through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, in the intellectual–cultural scene as well. Braden later remarked: 'in much of Europe in the 1950s, socialists, people who called themselves "left" – the very people whom many Americans thought no better than Communists – were the only people who gave a damn about fighting Communism'.[66] It was Thomas W. Braden, formerly with the OSS and close to both William Donovan and Allen Dulles, who proposed, and became head of, the International Organisations Division (IOD) in the CIA to run this policy. Braden proceeded to 'collect' and coordinate the growing number of civil society operations under his own department, including among them the CCF. This was not a smooth process, since IOD 'crossed geographical lines' within the CIA administration and Braden had to create his new space against internal bureaucratic resistance. Although Wisner was Braden's direct boss, it was with Allen Dulles (as CIA Deputy Director and then Director) that Braden worked more closely. The IOD did not initiate all these schemes, but did provide a lot of extra funds and, naturally, some guidance. As he said in relation to his allies in the trade unions, 'when they ran out of money, they appealed to the CIA'.[67] Atlanticism needed to be institutionalised not only economically, politically and militarily, but also socially, culturally and intellectually. The scale of the American commitment could not leave anything to chance, and the expansion of the state–private network under CIA tutelage attempted to make sure it did not. It is worth considering some of these groups before examining the specific case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in this scenario.

The importance of the trade unions

As already mentioned, the positive participation of American labour organisations and unions was vital to the success of the Marshall Plan. By breaking the communist control of European unions, the path to socio-economic prosperity on the American model could be freely exported and implemented abroad. But this could only be achieved through the consenting participation of union members in Europe itself. American hegemony would be an illusion without a transatlantic convergence of interests.

The paths taken by the major American union organisations through the bitter disputes with management in the 1930s and the war years are too complex to follow in detail here. The central point, though, is that by the late 1940s the leadership of the two biggest amalgamated institutions, the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), were supportive of a conciliatory approach involving working alongside management in a collective bargaining arrangement for the sharing of mutual benefits with the employees.[68] The union management therefore effectively positioned themselves in favour of the 'politics of productivity' that had been developed

through the New Deal and that was extended to Europe through the Marshall Plan. Fear of another depression meant that governmental responsibility for economic well-being was all too readily accepted. Within the AFL, an aggressive drive against communist influence in the European unions was being planned well before the end of 1947. In line with the general development of thought at that time, this was seen not in the classic form of capitalism against socialism but in the broader context of freedom against totalitarianism. The foremost influence on this policy direction was Jay Lovestone, up until 1929 the Secretary of the American Communist Party and one of its founder members, but thereafter increasingly a critic of Stalin's dictatorial methods. AFL foreign policy was already in action before the war. David Dubinsky and Matthew Woll of the Jewish Labor Committee had been active in the 1930s aiding the escape of labour activists and intellectuals from fascist Europe, and during the war underground networks of support were maintained via the Labor League for Human Rights. Lovestone, along with fellow socialists Dubinsky and Irving Brown, became the prime mover of post-war AFL foreign policy through the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC).[69]

The FTUC, set up in 1944, was intended to aid the rebuilding of democratic institutions and union organisations in post-fascist, post-war Europe. It is important to emphasise that the FTUC's anti-communist efforts were almost entirely union-financed up until the formation of the OPC, with its rapidly expanding budget and secret directive, in 1948.[70] Even though covert financial help became available, it was generally preferred to support and capitalise on existing anti-communist efforts wherever possible in order to promote them as the norm within civil society. After that there was never a shortage of finance, and cooperation between the AFL, CIO and CIA was to a great extent to do with the channelling of large funds to non-communist European unions and about union policy abroad in general.[71] The goal of preserving democratic institutions in European civil society during wartime was therefore transformed (and expanded) into an anti-communist drive after 1945.[72] At first the expansion of FTUC activity occurred in correspondence with the needs of the ERP, since Averell Harriman considered Irving Brown to be an indispensable asset within the world of trade union organising. Brown, as FTUC European representative, became the main AFL anti-communist trouble-shooter abroad for several decades after the war. Already in 1952 *Time* referred to him as 'The Most Dangerous Man', listed his anti-communist accomplishments in France, Italy and Greece, and portrayed him as a key link-man between 'Russian exiles, contacts inside Communist parties, European politicians and American Mutual Security Administration officials'.[73] Under the Marshall Plan Brown was principal union coordinator for the State Department and thus worked closely with Paul Nitze on the Technical Assistance Program. Then, in 1948, the FTUC agreed a formal arrangement with the OPC to act as a financial conduit to European anti-communist groups, and up to 1958 the Committee received $464,167 from the CIA for a whole range of different activities. This is certainly the thin end of the wedge, and other sources have pointed to a budget of between $1 million and $2

million dollars provided for Brown by the Agency. Coordination by the CIA was attempted via Wisner's assistant Carmel Offie; in 1951–3 by Braden; then by Braden's successor at the IOD, Cord Meyer. But Brown (and, in a more shady way, Lovestone) was a believer in the independence of the union cause and was prepared to divulge the whereabouts of the funding through results alone. Particular focus was placed on France (with the formation of the non-communist Force Ouvrière by Brown) and Italy to prevent the communist unions from undermining the Marshall Plan, and the solidification of a broad non-communist union front by pursuing the break-up of the Soviet-led World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which had included the CIO and the British Trades Union Congress, in 1948–9.[74]

Some scholars have emphasised that the aim of the ERP's union policies was 'to emasculate the labor movement by co-opting its leaders or splitting its ranks in order to prevent the working class from pressing its expensive, inflationary demands' such as higher wages. Coercion rather than consent, in other words, was the dominant policy motive in this case.[75] Yet Irving Brown's Atlanticism, as outlined in a speech in 1951, appears as a ringing exposition of what Chomsky has referred to as 'international military Keynsianism':

> Aid from America is indispensable but not sufficient in order to accomplish this enormous double task of making guns and preserving if not expanding the standards [of living] of the working peoples of Europe … This is why renewed efforts must be undertaken to break down the barriers both within and between nations through a greater unification of the European economy. For, if a united European army is necessary for the defense of Europe, a united, integrated European production system is equally necessary.

Yet this must not entail an American dictat. He insisted that 'each nation … has its own political, economic, and social forces which must grapple with their own internal problems and reach their own solutions', since any direct influence would 'lay America open to charges of intervention, aping Soviet methods … '[76] The goal was therefore not for the US to impose 'the American Way' but to link up with and support indigenous elements abroad *who would impose it for themselves*. If there was an American hegemony, then such alliances with European elites were the touchstone for the whole process. In line with the above, Brown was also active with funding and organisational support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom in its first two years, a role that has not been recognised enough. Brown, through the FTUC, provided the $100,000 for the CCF's initial conference in Berlin in 1950, and paid out $170,000 to the newly formed Congress Secretariat to get the organisation moving. When the International Committee of the CCF discussed its future agenda in Brussels in November 1950, the meeting took place in the conference hall of the anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), organised by Brown. But Brown did more than simply look after the logistics; he was also one of the unofficial

core group who monitored the process of the Congress's inauguration in Berlin.[77] It is also noticeable that *Preuves*, the CCF's first journal, was used early on as a mouthpiece for the anti-communist union movement.[78] There is no doubt that the CCF would have had difficulty materialising without the organisational skills and support that Brown could provide. While claiming no status as an intellectual – 'I was the spokesman of the uncultured' he said later – he did see a valuable connection between the labour struggle and the intellectual-cultural dimension, something that his ostensible boss in the FTUC, Jay Lovestone, did not. For Brown they were interconnected sites of the overall anti-communist campaign. Brown was therefore a key link-man between the Marshall Plan's political economy and the institutionalisation of Atlanticism in intellectual-cultural affairs in the shape of the CCF.[79]

The Atlanticist elites

There existed throughout these efforts a clear determination to aid the rehabilitation of European civilisation in all areas of social activity, albeit according to an American pattern that apparently worked in contrast to European self-destructiveness. This was also expressed in support for the idea of European unity. Even before the impetus for cooperation provided by the European Recovery Program, considerable funds were being transferred across the Atlantic to support the European Movement and its first conference at The Hague on 7–10 May 1948.[80] The American Committee on United Europe (ACUE), set up in April of that year by William Donovan, was intended to fulfill this purpose. Its membership featured only 380 people by 1950, yet they represented a remarkable cross-section of intelligence and big business personnel: Donovan (former Director, OSS), chairman; Allen Dulles (secretary of the CFR and adviser on development of the CIA), vice-chairman (Paul Hoffman of the ECA replaced Dulles when the latter became CIA Director in 1953); George S. Franklin Jr (Director of the CFR), secretary. The board included Thomas Braden, David Dubinsky, Walter Bedell Smith (CIA Director 1950–3), Charles R. Hook (chairman of Armco Steel Corporation) and Lucius D. Clay (former C-in-C, US Forces Europe). Braden was the CIA staffer who, in 1950–1, incorporated the CCF into the Agency network of civil society organisations under his supervision as head of the IOD. Many of the other participants were top-level management from large American business concerns.[81] ACUE thus displayed a notable convergence of corporate and strategic interests focusing on the course of European affairs at this time. While it played an important role in influencing public opinion via lecture tours by leading Europeans, utilising its media connections and private fund-raising, the generally uncoordinated administration of the committee and its lack of a definite policy limited its actual impact.[82] On the issue of fund-raising, Rebattet stated that:

> the vast majority of the American funds devoted to the campaign for European unity, and practically all the money received for the European

Youth Movement, came from State Department secret funds. This was of course kept very secret. ACUE thus played the part of a legal covering organisation. Donations from business made up a maximum of one-sixth of the total sums given during the period under study.[83]

It was Allen Dulles who effectively took over the organisation from Coudenhove-Kalergi as part of his ambition to set up a major American clandestine network. In connection with Frank Wisner of the OPC he created alongside the ACUE the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), again consisting of members of the political-economic elite, in order to find an anti-Soviet purpose for the thousands of refugee intellectuals who had fled the Eastern bloc. As Aldrich has noted, 'ACUE worked closely with US government officials, particularly those in the Economic Cooperation Administration and also with the National Committee for a Free Europe.'[84] Members of the NCFE included Julius Fleischmann, the Cincinnati philanthropist, who, by 1952, would be the main front man for sourcing CIA money to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and Arthur Schlesinger, the author of the *Vital Center* and one of the key players in the attempt to use the CCF to unite intellectual thought across the Atlantic. Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner secured Dwight Eisenhower (then President of Columbia University) as a public sponsor for its fund-raising campaign, the Crusade for Freedom. It was the NCFE that set up Radio Free Europe in Munich, a propaganda station staffed by East European emigrés and directed at their former homelands which operated, according to Eisenhower, in line with 'the simplest, clearest charter in the world: "Tell the Truth"'. Ninety per cent of the costs were covered by CIA funding, which began at $10 million a year and increased rapidly.[85]

Retinger was behind a further development in the linkage of the transatlantic elites. In May 1954 the first meeting of the Bilderberg Group took place at the hotel outside Arnhem in the Netherlands that gave the group its name. Designed to bring together the top levels of business and government from the USA and Western Europe for regular secret briefings, discussions and planning sessions, Bilderberg was originated to ensure that Atlantic unity, if not formalised, would at least be continuously strengthened via the search for common political and economic objectives. Discussion at the first meeting covered communism, decolonisation, economic policy and European integration.[86] American interest in such a venture was, perhaps surprisingly, initially weak, although both Walter Bedell Smith and the ubiquitous C.D. Jackson, both top-level confidants of President Eisenhower, attended in 1954. It was only with the defeat of the proposal for a European Defence Community in that year that American involvement increased, there suddenly being a heightened concern that the Atlanticist alliance was more fragile than had been thought.[87] Several of the participants at the three Bilderberg meetings in 1954–5 were also connected to the CCF. Most prominent among this group were tireless organiser Irving Brown and Swiss philosopher Denis de Rougemont, founder of the European Cultural Foundation and one of the CCF's main spokesmen. Participants in

both institutions also included the Austrian Fritz Molden, the German journalist Dolf Sternberger and Social Democrat Carlo Schmid, the Greek Penayotis Kanellopoulos, and British Labour politicians Hugh Gaitskell and Dennis Healey.[88] Considering that Bilderberg involved mainly high-level political and economic figures and the CCF was ostensibly a cultural organisation this is not an insignificant crossover of personnel, and reflects the interlocking economic–political–cultural interests among sections of the Euro-American elite in the 1950s.

This, then, was Atlanticism – the creation of a solid consensus among the elites in Europe and the USA that worked towards first the acceptance of an American role in European affairs, and then its solidification. Institutions such as ACUE, NCFE, and Bilderberg demonstrate the alignment of significant economic and political interests with the maintenance of this hegemonic framework. Before moving on to the particular instances of how this was done in the area of culture in Euro-American relations, the issues of elitism, coercion and consent need to be expanded on in the context of the social structure and worldview of the CIA.

The CIA and ruling class hegemony

Who was the early CIA? A typical viewpoint on this has been to stress the 'enlightened liberalism' of many of the first generation of Agency staff. For instance, one study states that:

> espionage establishments tend to attract the elite, privileged, and better-educated members of their society. In the West at least, intelligence officials often come from older, upper-class families whose scions, already assured of great wealth, are now more interested in public service.[89]

Stewart Alsop gave this image a name when he referred to the social milieu out of which the CIA largely came as the Bold Easterners, representing those from the East Coast Protestant social elite. Implicit within this was the opinion that these were people who acted instinctively on the basis of an enlightened general interest in times of crisis. This association of the Agency with social elitism has always been linked to the determination that the first generation of post-war operatives were decidedly liberal in their political outlook. William Colby, who came from the OSS to be CIA Director from 1973 to 1976, considered the Agency in 1950 to be a 'vanguard' occupied by Ivy League graduates from the best social backgrounds. Braden and Meyer, graduates of Dartmouth and Yale respectively, were good examples. 'The CIA's International Organisations Division, headed by Tom Braden and his deputy, Cord Meyer, had a firmly liberal coloration', its international goal being the need to attract those voters who supported social and political change away from communism and back to 'the democratic socialism of the West'. Before joining the CIA in 1951 at Allen Dulles's request, Meyer had actually been an organiser for the liberal United

World Federalists, a position that caused him to be investigated by the FBI for suspected associations with communists.[90]

What evidence there is to support these claims is not always clear. Surveys of available information (the CIA not being willing to divulge employee information) have suggested that while it may contain a high degree of top-level graduates, this has been in line with the higher echelons of the American government service as a whole.[91] The Ivy League connection, however, has more substance, there being a strong link between these universities and the social composition of the CIA, especially in the case of Harvard, Yale and Princeton (other League institutions being Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth and Pennsylvania). In the late 1940s, when the Agency was developing, the appeal of working for the 'secret service' was great, its prestige as the coordinator of intelligence-gathering and covert operations attracting the graduate elite. The OSS had also involved many from academic backgrounds, particularly those from Yale.[92] In this way the OSS–CIA became something of a self-perpetuating elite network beyond the scrutiny of other areas of government. Allen Dulles, Princeton graduate, high-profile lawyer, and CIA Director 1953–61, came to personify this image.[93] Some have made much of the 'Georgetown set' – the in-crowd of OPC–CIA and government staff, 'elitist, but not snobbish', who formed a close-knit community around Washington DC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Within this group the social divisions were also apparent. Frank Wisner, a graduate of the University of Virginia, perhaps 'never got over feeling like an outsider among the Groton–Yale–Harvard crowd'. But the image of 'a *Bruderbund* of Anglophile sophisticates who found powerful justification for their actions in the traditions of the Enlightenment and the principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence' continues to dominate. The image therefore remains of 'a body encompassing not just careerists but visionaries and salvationists' operating according to a liberal ethic.[94] As Peter Coleman put it:

> Now, at a unique historical moment, there developed a convergence, almost to a point of identity, between the assessments and agenda of the 'NCL' [Non-Communist Left] intellectuals and that combination of Ivy League, anglophile, liberal can-do gentlemen, academics and idealists who constituted the new CIA.[95]

However, it would be a mistake to take this 'liberal CIA' claim at face value.

> American liberalism has various meanings, but it can be said that disillusionment and pragmatism were among the factors that impelled some of the CIA's *reputed* 'liberals' to join the ranks of the 'neoliberals' (later known as 'neoconservatives'), described by one authority as 'liberal advocates of hard anti-communism.[96]

Much has been made since of the CIA's willingness to work with any manner of unsavoury allies: 'It was a visceral business of using any bastard as long as he was

anti-Communist', as one CIA officer later put it.[97] Yet this is an insufficient standpoint from which to view the CIA–CCF link. It was more like an 'instrumental liberalism', prepared to act to preserve democratic freedoms in ways that would seem to undermine those same freedoms, but which were considered necessary because of the threat of the Cold War situation. The Ivy League social elite seemed to demonstrate the connection between 'profound intellectual sophistication and an understanding of power'. As Sheldon Wolin has argued, while classical liberalism has been presented as a desire for 'natural liberty' and the removal of all constraints to the pursuance of personal interests, its motivating impulses have been driven by anxiety over the human condition and a strong urge for social order and conformity.[98] Yet it is unacceptable to assume that all its operations, however 'liberal' they may be presented to be, were based upon principles of freedom of action. The claim of liberalism may be substantiated because of the CIA support for unions and political parties on the democratic left at a time when American public and political conservatism would have found this intolerable and largely unbelievable. Meyer, echoing Braden's earlier comment on the importance of supporting the European Socialists, later stated that 'the real competition for votes and influence was focused on the left side of the political spectrum, where the struggle for the allegiance of the European working class and the liberal intelligentsia would be decided'.[99] However, this policy was regarded as the best method to undermine support for the Communist parties by solidifying an Atlanticist, Keynesian centre-left and centre-right. In other words there was an attempted closure of political debate within certain boundaries. Whatever the social background or political allegiances of its staff, CIA policy can at best be said to have operated according to an 'instrumental liberalism', limited by the interests of American hegemonic internationalism. Any activity sponsored or set up by the Agency, even if it appears culturally enlightened, always had that element of control for specific purposes hidden within it. As a useful definition of Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony has put it:

> by 'hegemony' Gramsci seems to mean a sociopolitical situation … in which a certain way of life and thought are dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, … particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation. An element of direction and control, not necessarily conscious, is implied.[100]

The basis for this situation, from a Marxist position, is generally taken to be the dominance of a particular ruling class, a dominance which stems from their control of a dominant mode of production. As stated in the introduction, Gramsci's own view of class was quite broad: 'the very fact that Gramsci uses a variety of terms, sometimes in an almost interchangeable way … indicates … the complexity of the group which is actually involved in governing'.[101] It is therefore better, in this sense, to see the early CIA not as a fraction of the dominant class but as an element within the power elite who were able to occupy and

expand a particular field of US foreign policy: intelligence and covert operations. That the CIA was acting in support of a particular socio-economic system and its extension to Western Europe, as exemplified by the Marshall Plan, there should be no doubt. But a rigid class-based analysis would obscure both the semi-autonomous functioning of the Agency, and also the essential *opportunism* that was apparent in this situation, an opportunism which went alongside the more planned and coherent elements of post-war American hegemony in the political-economic-military fields. Hegemony always contains a certain amount of the haphazard, and this goes for the Agency's involvement in cultural activities as much as anything else.

> The CIA's interest in imaginative literature and its creators and publishers has been depicted by some as misguided benevolence, or even a championing of Western values and human freedoms against the totalitarian mind, but it was also profoundly meant to be an Agency 'dirty trick', the means of influencing consciousness, an attempt to 'preempt', in Agency lingo.[102]

Criticisms of this approach were widespread when many of the fronts were exposed in the late 1960s. Jason Epstein referred to the 'consortium' of the State Department, the CIA, the Foundations, and their contacts throughout business and cultural life. They 'were not moved by a disinterested love of the intellect or by deep aesthetic convictions', he said, 'they were interested instead in protecting and extending American power'.[103] Yet such a sweeping denunciation is not so easy to maintain, because it removes the genuine belief held by many in the 1940s and 1950s that the 'American way of life', represented as a stable, capitalist democratic society, was under threat from Soviet communism and the ideas that it inspired. These shared beliefs across the intellectual spectrum, from the government to the independent intelligentsia, do not form a conspiracy. There was manipulation for specific ends, in this case the furthering of American hegemonic interests under the guise of the freedom of the Western world, and this manipulation did involve an elitist desire for control of social life in particular forms. Yet, as Charles Maier stated in relation to the reconstruction of the post-war European economy along American lines, it was the link between American and European elites that brought about a greater degree of social stability rather than the imposition of American norms per se. There was a consensus of interests that saw the creation of an Atlantic unity as an essential goal, and this meant the tying of American interests into the social life of the Western European nations. This occurred in the realm of culture no less than in the economic and political fields. CIA interest in culture was genuine, up to a point. Typical of this was Thomas Braden, 'a new type of bureaucrat, equally at home in government and in academic circles'. Braden served as Executive Secretary at the Rockefeller-owned Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1948–9, and moved on from the CIA to become a book publisher and president of the California Board of Education.[104] But there was always a slant to it. Richard Elman has pointed out the dual aspect to this.

> In Agency parlance the aim was 'control', to filter acceptable ideas and opinions through a central intelligence (represented, in part, by Agency-subsidised groups such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom) capable of coming to the defence of a culture and a civilisation that was depicted as being under siege.[105]

The Congress, therefore, represented an intervention into European intellectual life by the CIA to support and organise intellectual opinion around the concept of Atlantic unity. It is argued here that this intervention can only be fully understood in the context of the economic and political aims of the post-war USA, and that the cultural–intellectual position put forward by the Congress was a significant addition to American hegemonic aims with regard to its interests in Western Europe. The defence of 'Western civilisation' (as the CIA saw) therefore required the fostering of a common US-European Atlantic culture, and the CCF was its cultural–intellectual representation. This intervention could only succeed because of its connection to already existing concerns among the European intellectual community about the future of intellectual-cultural freedom in the post-war world. How the CCF combined European post-war concerns with the intellectual-cultural leadership for an American hegemony is the next issue to be examined.

4 The formation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom

Approaching the Congress

> During the height of the Cold War, the US government committed vast resources to a secret programme of cultural propaganda in western Europe … It was managed, in great secrecy, by America's espionage arm, the Central Intelligence Agency. The centrepiece of this covert campaign was the Congress for Cultural Freedom, run by CIA agent Michael Josselson from 1950 till 1967 … Its mission was to nudge the intelligentsia of western Europe away from its lingering fascination with Marxism and Communism towards a view more accommodating of 'the American way'.[1]

The Congress for Cultural Freedom was indeed one of the most prestigious and, in important ways, one of the most controversial of the CIA's many and varied anti-communist activities during the Cold War. Agency operations to overthrow foreign governments or assassinate their leaders have become the stock-in-trade of every popular representation of the US secret service in action. However, it is in relation to its attempts to influence opinion within civil society that more complex questions arise, for these efforts were necessarily undertaken under the proviso that the image of civilian initiative should remain intact. As Saunders rightly asks, 'did financial aid distort the process by which intellectuals and their ideas were advanced? Were people selected for their positions, rather than on the basis of intellectual merit?' As a recent work on the British Information Research Department has pointed out, 'by promoting and supporting specific intellectuals, politicians and trade unionists it helped shape and define the political consensus for a generation. That consensus … was defined by its anti-Communism'.[2] The issue then becomes a contest over intellectual integrity and the questionable legitimacy of the dominant opinions that were supported in this way, such that intellectual–cultural life was distorted by outside forces. Typical of this viewpoint would be Edward Said's comment that 'organised anti-communism in the US led aggressively to covert support by the CIA for otherwise unexceptionable groups such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom'.[3]

This approach often ends up being a moral argument against the hypocrisy of those involved. How, after all, could the merits of the free society of the West be

promoted by those who, outside of the knowledge of the public, were being financed or aided by organs of the state, without their ideas and political positions becoming irreparably tarnished in the process? In other words, was the much trumpeted free society not free at all, but only a *representation* of freedom? The CIA connection has defined the environment in which the CCF will forever be judged, and with good reason, thereby leading to the situation where 'CCF's defenders still feel more pressured to justify their position than do its critics'.[4] However, the drawback of this is that it deflects attention from the relevance of the ideas put forward under the broad banner of anti-communism. While it is impossible to look at the formation and goals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom without addressing the impetus for its existence from American overt and covert interests, neither is it sufficient to reduce the Congress to being simply another CIA front. This approach does not address the role of the Congress in the institutionalisation of ideas and intellectuals around the belief in a US-led Free West in the post-war world, particularly in the context of an American-European concert of interests. It does not recognise the fact that while the CIA certainly provided the money and influenced the organisational direction, the ideas were already common among the intellectual community both in the US and Europe before their stabilisation and institutionalisation. By supporting the CCF, the CIA was attempting to utilise both the image of intellectual freedom of thought, and the representation of the traditional intellectual as the 'conscience' of society and the guardian of cultural values, in order to confront the portrayal of communism as the path to freedom and the Soviet Union as its emancipatory leader. Thus there was a battle between contesting hegemonies over the post-war world with the early years of the Cold War representing the point when these:

> previously germinated ideologies … come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a '*universal*' plane.[5]

Commenting on the increasingly necessary organisation of capitalist society due to the expanding complexities of capitalism itself from the late nineteenth century onwards, Sassoon has pointed out that the New Deal (and by extension the Marshall Plan) were situations where 'the state undertakes new tasks in order to maintain a social basis of consent and to guarantee the conditions for an expansion of the forces of production'. Above all, this greater need for organisation occurs in civil society, 'which must be radically transformed', and this inevitably affects the position and role of intellectuals. Again, according to Sassoon, 'if traditional intellectuals wanted to maintain their influence, they had to change their way of working and become organisers', and in doing so 'they are "assimilated" into the capitalist project as their old role [as traditional intellectuals] becomes anachronistic'. The result is that, due to the expansion of state

activities combined with the voluntary organisation of intellectuals, they 'are "standardised", they organise in professional associations', of which the CCF must be considered a prime example.[6]

That many were aware of this expansion of politics and political organisation into areas previously left alone in democratic civil society cannot be doubted. As Lionel Trilling commented in 1951:

> it is the wide sense of the word [politics] that is now forced upon us, for clearly it is no longer possible to think of politics except as the politics of culture, the organization of human life toward some end or other, toward the modification of sentiments, which is to say the quality of human life.

Trilling observed in another piece in the same book that there was a need 'to organize a new union between our political ideas and our imagination – in all our cultural purview there is no work more necessary'.[7] The CCF participants themselves, mostly unaware of the CIA connection, fully supported anti-communism as a noble cause. While commercial capitalism was considered a threat to cultural values, there was no doubt that communism was the greater of the two evils. Dwight Macdonald, one of the more astute critical minds of his generation, proclaimed in debate in 1952:

> I choose the West – the US and its allies – and reject the East – the Soviet Union and its ally, China, and its colonial provinces, the nations of Eastern Europe. By 'choosing' I mean that I support the political, economic, and military struggle of the West against the East. I support it *critically* … but in general I do choose, I support Western policies.

Despite his many misgivings, especially that this 'fight to the death between radically different cultures' must mean to 'extend the power of the State and so encroach on freedom' within liberal society itself, his statement that 'I prefer an imperfectly living, open society to a perfectly dead, closed society' was a sentiment echoed by many at the time.[8] Spoken during the period of Senator McCarthy's accusations of complicity with left-wing interests amongst many in government, and after the Truman administration's Loyalty Program and the wholesale trampling of civil liberties in the effort to exorcise the communist threat from American society, Macdonald could easily be pilloried for dereliction of duty as a critical intellectual.[9] Yet perhaps his position is instead illustrative of the dilemma facing many traditional intellectuals in the USA and the West in general. The role of the intellectual and the cultural values to be defended in the post-war world were very much at stake, and it was these that the Congress attempted to clarify. After the 1930s, the Second World War and the beginnings of the Cold War, 'many continued to fear more than anything else the eclipse of liberty and of the free personality under the exorbitant encroachment of statism and mass society'.[10] Czeslaw Milosz, a Polish cultural attaché who defected from his embassy post in Paris in 1951 – and immediately entered the CCF orbit as a

prized possession – summed the dilemma up in his influential book *The Captive Mind* (1953): 'Well then, what can the West offer us? Freedom *from something* is a great deal, yet not enough. It is much less than freedom *for something*.' Milosz made much the same observation as Gramsci – in the USA 'a new civilisation has arisen … which assures its masses a share in the output of its machine production'. But where was the intelligentsia in this revolutionary development that could offer a positive vision beyond commercial abundance? Milosz, despite jumping ship, still proclaimed that the socio-economic development being carried out in Eastern Europe could have the most far-reaching consequences.[11]

The tensions caused by occupying a space overt in its anti-communism yet aware of the threat of capitalist commercial kitsch to cultural values, while all the time being an asset of the CIA, were always apparent with the CCF. The question 'What kind of freedom can be advanced by such deception?' therefore still remains to be answered in any depth, especially in such a way that registers its complexity.[12]

The world peace offensive: action and reaction

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, as an exercise in cultural hegemony, was not entirely a creation of the internal necessities of American internationalist political economy. Culture, it will be remembered, always occupies a contested space, and in the late 1940s that space was encroached upon by the revival of the Cominform, or Communist Information Bureau, in order to undermine the Atlanticist alliance that was forming around the Marshall Plan in Western Europe.

The Comintern (Communist International) had been dissolved in 1943 as part of Stalin's wartime *rapprochement* with his Western allies, but it was reformed as the Cominform in September 1947 and lasted until Krushchev dissolved it in 1956. The Cominform was limited to a membership of European communist parties, and had two principal goals: the coordination of left resistance to the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, with particular focus on France and Italy, and the ruthless consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. The French and Italian Communist Parties 'became the hegemonic parties within the working class, and extended their influence into other social sectors, especially among intellectuals. Both took part in the governments which followed the liberation in 1945'.[13] These were positive signs that well-directed propaganda could steal the initiative by playing on already existing wariness about American political, economic and military interests in Europe. As Andrei Zhdanov, a key Politburo member, reported to the initial Cominform meeting held from 22 to 29 September 1947 in Szklarska Poremba, Poland, the post-war world had become solidified into two camps, East and West, with no space left for neutralism on either side. The Cold War stage was being set: when the American actor Robert Montgomery declared at the CCF meeting in Berlin in 1950 that 'there is no neutral corner in Freedom's room', it was the rhetorical mirror image of Zhdanov's position.[14]

Through 1948–9 the Cominform staged several major events that were designed to unite the European and American intellectual community around the cause for peace. Stalin's aim was to resuscitate a 1930s-style democratic 'popular front' of the centre-left workers and intellectuals, led by the communists and able to coopt the language of nationalism against American dollar diplomacy. Key to this approach was the presentation of the Soviet Union as on the side of post-war reconciliation and the USA as the war-like nation bent on continuing the aggressive foreign policy begun by Nazi Germany. These efforts were combined with what appeared to be serious peace overtures in May 1948, which suggested there was a genuine interest in Moscow in resolving its post-war differences with the USA. Yet by that stage the European Recovery Program (ERP) Bill had already passed through Congress, and, in the wake of the Czech coup and the Italian elections, the internationalism of the Truman administration had set itself firmly in the position of confronting further possible Soviet expansion. The US foreign policy commitment to a particular conception of Western Europe, if still not completely clear at that time in all its dimensions (such as over the future of Germany), was certainly non-negotiable.[15] What is more, by 1947–48 the chances of another Popular Front were limited, and, as one observer has put it, the proletariat was instead 'momentarily buried under the European bourgeoisie's fear of revolution and the prospect of dollars'.[16]

In the 1920s and 1930s, under the direction of the mercurial Willi Münzenberg, the Soviet Union had played on the progressive consciences of many European and American intellectuals to mobilise them in support of the Russian Revolution and its continuation elsewhere. This policy had been expanded due to the increasing threat of Nazi Germany, leading to the infamous World Congress of Writers for the Defence of Culture. Staged in Paris in June 1935, it was intended to organise intellectual opinion in line with the newly declared Popular Front against fascism.[17] This approach was revived with the holding of a German Writers Congress in East Berlin in October 1947, followed by the Wroclaw World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in Poland in September 1948. These formed the beginnings of what David Caute considered to be the most significant success of the internationalist communist movement – 'its virtual expropriation of the word "peace" as interpreted by the World Peace Movement.'[18] The Movement's objective was to portray the suspect ambitions of the USA as the main threat to post-war stability, organising intellectual-cultural opinion around the powerful image of the Soviet Union as the upholder of the greater morality and the guardian of social progressivism.[19] Whereas before the war the Popular Front policy had sanctioned compromising alliances between communists and other leftist groups for the goal of defeating fascism, the post-war approach was ideologically harder and more determined by the party line. Importantly, this meant that the cultural perspective put forward was highly conservative, arguing that all cultural activity (be it writing, performance or art of any kind) should be dedicated first and foremost to representing the cause of social emancipation. Art should not represent freedom but realism, and should fulfil its role as part of the wider political struggle. As Andrei Zhdanov,

the principal spokesperson for the Cominform in 1948, said in 1934, 'in an epoch of class struggle there is not and cannot be a literature which is not class literature, not tendentious, allegedly non-political'.[20] This was strongly linked to demands for the withdrawal of American influence in European affairs. '"Peace" had a specific thrust, as every congress made clear: it meant *à bas* the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, Western rearmament and the new West German state. It meant *à bas* the American bomb – but not the Soviet bomb.' Again, there was a mirror-image at the CCF Berlin meeting in 1950. James Burnham, the former Trotskyite who, by 1950, was well on the way to his later incarnation as godfather of neoconservatism, proclaimed in his attack on the Cominform's policy and neutralism in general:

> I am against those bombs … which are designed for the destruction of Paris, London, Rome, Brussels, Stockholm, New York, Chicago, Berlin, and of Western civilisation generally. But I am … *for* those bombs made in Los Alamos, Hanford, and Oak Ridge … [21]

The use of the French phrase *à bas* by Caute was deliberate, since French delegations at these gatherings were particularly strong, reflecting the influence of the left in the wartime resistance movements and in society as a whole. Yet what was being stated by the Peace Movement was not simply anti-Americanism. It was more an attempt to once again mobilise Western intellectual sympathies for the great moral good of the egalitarian, anti-capitalist social ideal, for which the Soviet Union happened to be the dynamic exponent, 'the mirror of the global future'.[22] After the moral vacuum caused by the experience of European fascism, there were many who supported the cause of creating a 'new Europe'. However, attempts to disengage this ideal from the bare facts of Soviet political actions under Stalin, and his desire for complete control of people and ideas, led to increasing dissension from the world-view put forward.

The most notorious example of such dissension was *The God that Failed*, a collection of six essays edited by Labour MP Richard Crossman, three by 'the initiates' (Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone and Richard Wright) and three by 'worshippers from afar' (André Gide, Louis Fischer and Stephen Spender) on their disillusionment with communism and the communist movement.[23] While there was no direct connection between the book and the CCF, the intellectual significance of it is obvious: Koestler and Silone became prominent organisers of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Spender became the British editor for the CCF journal *Encounter* in 1953, Louis Fischer was a candidate for the post of the CCF's first General Secretary, and Crossman attended several CCF seminars in the 1950s. Crossman, head of the German section of the Psychological Warfare Executive during the Second World War, made use of his contacts (such as C.D. Jackson) to turn *The God that Failed* into a high-profile anti-communist document, 'as much a product of intelligence as it was a work of the intelligentsia'. Noting that three of the six contributors (Koestler, Fischer and Silone) had either worked for or been close to Willi Münzenberg in the 1930s, Saunders states that:

under the cover of *The God that Failed*, these former propagandists for the Soviets were recycled, bleached of the stain of communism, embraced by government strategists who saw in their conversion an irresistible opportunity to sabotage the Soviet propaganda machine which they had once oiled.[24]

The book certainly displays the close relationship between intellectuals and the developing mainstream of Cold War politics in the West. But the above perspective can be turned round – the intellectuals combined with and accepted the support of the power structure in order to promote their views, as much as the power structure used the intellectuals for reasons of propaganda.

> The important point to note is that the intellectuals clearly recognised the Cultural Cold War as *their* cause … The organisational weapons with which the Cultural Cold War was to be waged had grown directly out of their political activities during the late 1940s. Above all, the principle on which the American propaganda effort was founded, that is cultural freedom, was exactly the one they themselves had been defending ever since the 1930s.[25]

Yet the proclamations against communism in *The God that Failed* did not entail an equally fervent statement in favour of some other cause in its stead. Of the three former stalwarts Koestler may best be remembered as an anti-communist militant in the period after the Second World War, but he was also searching for a credo that would justify continuing the fight. Unable to balance the damaged reality of liberal democracy with his need for a 'socialist imagination', Koestler bowed out of political confrontation in the mid-1950s. Already in 1944, presaging Macdonald, he had written that the intelligentsia's role should be 'to save *some* of the values of democracy and humanism or to lose them all; and to prevent this happening one has to cling more than ever to the ragged banner of "independent thinking" '.[26] Fischer, who as a roving journalist with the *New York Post* and the *Nation* in the 1920s and 1930s was an outright communist sympathiser, could only comment in 1946 that while democracy was better than the several dictatorships he had experienced, 'I am not sure it is good'. Having abandoned his hard left views, by 1950 he was attracted to a 'pacifist mysticism' and wrote a biography of Gandhi.[27] Silone had been a colleague of Gramsci's in the Italian Communist Party, and rose to join not only the Party's central committee but also the executive of the Comintern in the late 1920s. Expelled in 1931 for not condemning Trotsky, his gradual disillusionment led him towards a form of Christian humanism. While his morbid (but prescient, with regard to the CCF) remark that 'the final struggle will be between the Communists and the ex-Communists' expresses well his political fatalism, Silone certainly saw moral limits to the cause. Hence his cautious observation: 'the logic of opposition at all costs has carried many ex-Communists far from their starting points … '. It is difficult, therefore, to find much of a positive vision for the liberal-democratic West in the positions staked out by Koestler, Fischer and Silone. Stating that

Koestler was keen to 'trade on his insider's knowledge of the Communist appa-ratus' as 'his entry ticket into McCarthyite America' does not leave much room for appreciating the equally important post-war disillusionment that many felt towards the USSR and communism in general.[28]

At the German Writers Congress in Berlin in October 1947, the first event where the tactics of the Cominform came into play, the criticisms of American war-mongering did not go unanswered. Melvin J. Lasky, 'a volcano in near-permanent eruption', was a journalist linked with *Partisan Review* and *New Leader* who had moved away from profound Trotskyite sympathies in the late 1930s towards a solid support for social democracy.[29] Born in 1920, his family had emigrated to the USA from the Polish town of Lodz in 1905. In 1945, while serving as a historian with the US Seventh Army, Lasky found himself in Berlin and decided to stay. Walter Laqueur has commented that 'the war brought Lasky in touch with his youth, like it brought [others], and these people became Europe-orientated … These people … came from very small circumstances and then suddenly had very small empires … '.[30] This description could include others, such as Irving Brown and Laqueur himself, who carved a name for himself in the late 1950s with his CCF-sponsored journal *Soviet Survey*. However, Lasky is the prime example of someone who was able to seize the initiative and create a hugely influential role for himself during the years when Cold War posi-tions were still being solidified.[31] The Writers Congress, organised by the Association for the Cultural Restoration of Germany (Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschland), was the first major event for the post-war German intellectual scene, and a great deal was at stake. Lasky, attending as a journalist, was given the stage on the third day without the agreement of the Kulturbund leadership by his friend and acting chairperson Gunther Birkenfeld (later the 'decisive personality' in the German branch of the CCF), as a defiant act to balance the Soviet delegation's presence. His speech, which praised the inherent freedom and intellectual possibilities within American society, supported the right of the poet and writer to be free of the dictates of any government (which did not mean, noticeably, the right to write apolitical litera-ture). Inspired by Gide's praise of the non-conformist, Lasky seized on the importance of the intellectual as social critic bound by nothing other than social conscience, and went on to declare that 'a great writer has always been, more or less, a revolutionary, a fighter … He refused to approve.' Lasky finished by refer-ring to the persecution of Russian poet Anna Akhmatova and challenging the Soviet delegation to a contest over cultural freedom ('Kampf um die kulturelle Freiheit'). For Lasky, this could never be about 'culture for culture's sake', but about the use of culture as a 'dangerous and subversive adjunct of politics' to expose the damaging truth about communist oppression.[32]

Lasky may have spoken out of turn at the conference, but he soon became part of a wider effort to confront the Cominform's programme. In October 1947 US military governor Lucius Clay inititiated Operation Talk Back, which marked a shift from the previous de-Nazification and re-education programmes towards a more determined anti-communist stance. Above all, this involved over-

coming the lack of coordination in cultural policy within OMGUS by focusing more on the use of culture to influence the political orientation of German society. Initially the responsibility of the Information Control Division (ICD), by 1948 these tasks were being passed to OMGUS's (Office of the Military Governor, United States) Cultural Relations Division (CRD). A major figure in this re-orientation effort by the ICD and CRD was Michael Josselson. Josselson, originally from Estonia, had become a prime intelligence asset due to his linguistic abilities and expertise acquired during his stint with the Psychological Warfare Division in the war. Josselson was also cleared to be chief of the OPC's Berlin station for covert action in the autumn of 1948, having been recruited by US embassy official and intelligence officer Lawrence de Neufville. Central to Talk Back was the solidification of links with German centre-left intellectuals and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), a major influence in which was the mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter. The priority, therefore, had to be the secure anchoring of the Western sections of Germany within the Western European-American orbit. The Berlin blockade that began in June 1948 only made this more apparent. Lasky, with his contacts among the *New Leader/Partisan Review* crowd, American unions, and the SPD in Berlin, was turning into a pivotal figure around whom the reorientation of post-war German intellectual circles was beginning to take shape.[33]

In October 1948 Lasky was able to found *Der Monat*, a high-quality literary review that aimed to reconnect German readers with the intellectual writers and debates of the West. *Der Monat* essentially stemmed from the ability of Lasky to seize the initiative with the possibilities that Talk Back offered.[34] Lasky certainly used his experience of *Partisan Review*, with its adherence to and defence of cultural values separate from the demands of radical leftist politics, as a kind of blueprint for *Der Monat*.[35] *Partisan Review*'s mix of anti-Stalinism and esoteric high culture, which placed it in opposition to both the 'social realism' of the left and the 'commercial realism' of popular culture, made it a model in miniature for the intellectual middle-ground that Lasky wanted to maximise on an international scale.[36] This was the space between capitalism and communism – the space of the 'vital centre' and the democratic left. In a report given to OMGUS by Lasky in December 1947 on the purpose of a new journal, he stated the need to combat 'the variety of factors – political, psychological, cultural – which work against US foreign policy, and in particular against the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe'. In order to confront 'the same old anti-democratic anti-American formulas on which many European generations have been fed' and overcome the 'cultural void' in American policy that was being exploited by the left, a review aimed directly at the German-reading intelligentsia was the goal.

> It would serve both as a constructive fillip to German–American thought and re-evaluation (and re-education); and also as a demonstration that behind the official representatives of American democracy lies a great and progressive culture, with a richness of achievement in the arts, in literature,

in philosophy, in all the aspects of culture which unites the free traditions of Europe and America.[37]

Der Monat was more than an anti-communist propaganda venture. It was a deter-mined effort to solidify a reorientation of German thought within the post-war development of a Western social democratic consensus. Lasky has since said that he was criticised from within OMGUS for not publishing enough articles that explicitly supported the Marshall Plan. Instead, *Der Monat*'s goal was to provide a focus for a post-war cultural–intellectual life that could be built on the founda-tions laid by the socio-economic reforms of the Marshall Plan. But Lasky was also something of a maverick, determined to operate outside the chain of command. Deploring the lack of editorial direction among allied publications in Germany, he stated his determination that 'facts must illustrate, must dramatize, must certainly be *timed*; our truth must be *active*, must enter the contest … '. Significantly, Lasky rejected 'our natural feeling … that the substance of foreign policy is essentially political'. The neglect of the cultural realm and the defence of cultural-intellectual values was 'a serious void in the American program'.[38]

In an article in 1948 Lasky complained bitterly how the 'weakness and confu-sion' of the Allied authorities in Germany meant that 'nowhere are the *principles* of cultural freedom recognised'. Only through the abandonment of all censor-ship could the Western powers foster the revival of a post-fascist critical democratic society – and by doing so highlight the lack of such freedoms in the Soviet sector. Such forthright views probably hindered rather than helped Lasky's relations with the occupying authorities, but *Der Monat* was given the go-ahead.[39] More sophisticated than the official American occupation 'scholarly journal' *Amerikanische Rundschau*, *Monat*'s print run declined from an initial 60,000 copies (compared to the *Rundschau*'s 185,000) to a steady 25,000 by the mid-1950s. Lasky had envisaged '50–75,000 and then build up' – an optimistic suggestion probably intended to make the case for financial self-sufficiency. However, from the beginning financial support was clearly necessary, with *Monat* receiving around DM 420,000 in 1950 from the US High Commission under John McCloy (who replaced Clay and OMGUS in 1949 with the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany).[40] The support was considered worth it, since, with Lasky at the helm, the revue would become the perfect intellectual vehicle to promote the Congress for Cultural Freedom in West Berlin less than two years later. As *New Statesman* journalist Peter de Mendelssohn put it, with little exaggeration, 'in order to convoke a "Congress for Cultural Freedom" to Berlin, [Lasky] had, in fact, to do little more than send out invitations to his prominent contributors over the past two years'. In 1957, with Lasky involved as editorial adviser for all CCF journals, *Monat* became officially affiliated with the CCF, and the $52,000 supplied by the Congress for 1959 was typical of the annual amounts provided at that time.[41]

Was Lasky actually a civilian when he began *Der Monat*? Frank Kermode, who worked with Lasky as an editor of *Encounter* in the mid-1960s, states that he set it up 'while still attached to the US army in Berlin', while Ninkovich claims 'he

joined the Army's Political Information Branch' to secure the support of the US Military Government. There is no question that Lasky could not survive in mid-1940s Berlin purely on money paid for occasional articles to *Partisan Review* and *New Leader*. With regard to his appearance at the Writers Congress, it would seem a likely event for a journalist to attend. What is more, Lasky was apparently provoked to act when he heard that a Soviet delegation to the congress had flown in from Moscow. Bloom states that Lasky was 'chosen' for the role of disrupting the stage-managed nature of the conference (by whom? Josselson?), while in contrast Shub's account suggests that Lasky would have handed the speech to a more prominent American if there had been anyone present – but the Western powers had mistakenly treated it as a German-only affair. Lasky himself has talked of some kind of military information role, although the details for this period, and of any formal/informal relationship with the CIA, remain unclear. But whatever Lasky's official position, his comment that when it came to the CCF the 'CIA had no line' is perhaps his most important observation, to be matched with CIA case officer Lawrence de Neufville's warning to 'be careful of thinking there was a system for anything in those days. It was all improvised.'[42] The CIA may have begun to provide the money and some of the organisation, but it needed private individuals to pursue their own initiatives, since that was what rebuilding civil society was all about. Whatever the connections, *Der Monat* should still be regarded as a high-quality landmark journal which met the needs of many among the intellectually and culturally starved German populace. Lasky's respected place within the post-war German intellectual scene is enough of a recognition of this.[43]

With *Der Monat* up and running by autumn 1948, Lasky would spend much of 1949–50 also organising the next venture – the solidification of anti-communist intellectual opinion by means of a major conference. Lasky has since referred to Orwell as the inspiration for the idea – they had met after the war, with Orwell inviting Lasky to write for *Tribune*. In 1946–7 Orwell and Koestler had attempted to reform (or replace) the pre-war League for the Rights of Man in order to promote and protect human rights and freedom of thought, and 'with the primary aim of coordinating those at present isolated movements, people and groups from America to Hungary, which have a common outlook … '. But the aim was to stay outside the crystallising divisions of the Cold War. Orwell, despite his obvious hatred of the Soviet Union, was more interested in the threats to civil liberties posed by *all* governments, and there was a good deal of anti-Americanism among the British left intelligentsia. The plan did not materialise, as a result of various organisational and personal drawbacks. Lasky's venture would be much clearer in its political allegiances, with Koestler, by 1949 looking to move to the USA, fully in support of a more direct anti-Soviet stance.[44]

At the Cominform World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in Wroclaw, in September 1948, no-one was able to fill Lasky's role. A.J.P. Taylor was sufficiently deviationist to condemn both 'Wall Street' and 'the Kremlin' for post-war political designs that threatened world stability. François Bondy later claimed

that 'the various international figures – to the extent that they were not already members of the "apparatus" – were very reluctant to get themselves conscripted into an obvious propaganda campaign'. Many Western participants attended, such as a large French contingent that included Pablo Picasso, Paul Eluard, Fernand Léger, Irene Curie and Julien Benda, and a group of ten Dutch politicians, academics and journalists. But there was not meant to be any serious dialogue, only the presentation of visible support for the Soviet peace mission. Julian Huxley, then General Secretary of UNESCO, attended in a private capacity to act as chairperson, but only came away with the impression of how 'the Congress gave a frightening display of the power of doctrinaire opinion in a cultural confrontation'.[45]

The following Peace Congress was the catalyst for a more determined response – the beginning of 'the battle for Picasso's mind'. In March 1949 the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, which included many who had been involved in the Popular Front activities in the late 1930s, held a remarkable conference at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York itself. There were 800 prominent delegates, including the Americans Lillian Hellman, Aaron Copland, Arthur Miller, Clifford Odets, Norman Mailer and former Vice-President Henry Wallace. Sympathetic sponsorship came from, among others, Charlie Chaplin, Leonard Bernstein and Albert Einstein, and the head of the Soviet delegation was the renowned composer Dmitri Shostakovich. Popular support was shown when the final public rally brought 18,000 people to Madison Square Garden. It seems clear that the general line of the conference was not wholly one-sided, since criticism was levelled at the aggressive foreign policies of both the USA and the USSR. But even if some speakers favoured 'formalizing the world's split' between East and West for the sake of peace and stability (effectively the 'Two Camps' Cominform line), the idea that the Waldorf meeting could promote any sort of uncertainty over post-war goals was unacceptable to the hardening Cold War consensus in the US government. For the first time, cohesive links were being made between government and anti-Stalinist intellectuals. The result was that, instead of creating any meaningful dialogue, 'violent partisanship on both sides was the winner'.[46]

Sidney Hook was a philosopher who had attempted to adapt the values of Marxism to the American scene. Born into a poor immigrant neighbourhood in Brooklyn, socialism was 'a source of hope in a world of deprivation', and, although never a party member, Hook did openly support the Communist Party presidential candidate William Foster in 1932. However, the Moscow trials of 1936–7 pushed him into linking Stalinism and fascism as equally totalitarian, and Hook became a leading figure among the dissident groups formed in the late 1930s that sought alternative directions for critical thought against the doctrinaire rigidity of the Stalinist American Communist Party.[47] In May 1939, under the honorary leadership of his mentor John Dewey, Hook formed the Committee for Cultural Freedom to oppose all doctrinaire controls on intellectual expression, whether from the right or the left.[48] Opposed by leftist liberals (journals such as *The New Republic* and *Nation*), Trotskyites and the Communist

Party (because of the association of communism with the evil of fascism) the Committee's manifesto was signed by ninety-six academics and literary intellectuals (including Sol Levitas and Arthur Schlesinger). They declared that this was:

> an organisation independent of control, whether open or secret, by any political group, pledged to expose repression of intellectual freedom under whatever pretext, to defend individuals and groups victimised by totalitarian practices anywhere, to propagate courageously the ideal of untrammelled intellectual activity.[49]

The Committee faded away when the Soviet Union became the ally of the USA in the Second World War. Yet by the mid-1940s Hook's position would begin to receive governmental patronage, and would prove to be an important forerunner for the internationally orientated Congress for Cultural Freedom. Before that occurred the alignments on the New York intellectual scene went through various changes. Efforts to create an embryonic transatlantic intellectual community had begun immediately after the war, when Hook's erstwhile opponent on the left, Dwight Macdonald, attempted to establish links with Albert Camus via their mutual friend Nicole Chiaromonte in 1945–6. Unfortunately, delays in defining coordination and purpose meant that the inauguration of 'Europe–America Groups' (EAG) by Macdonald, Chiaromonte and Mary McCarthy did not materialise until March 1948. A manifesto issued at that time demonstrated that the aim was to support the continued existence of a critically independent intelligentsia on the democratic left. But by this time the pressures of the Cold War were reducing the space for such politically autonomous ventures, and the EAG initiative was largely undermined from within by the machinations of fellow members Hook and the editors of *Partisan Review*, Philip Rahv and William Phillips. This contingent wanted to create a more militant anti-Stalinist organisation, and their chance arose with the announcement of the Waldorf conference. This was the catalyst for Hook to form the Americans for Intellectual Freedom (AIF), the forerunner for the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) and an important organisational stepping-stone towards the CCF.[50]

The EAG should not be discounted, since its fund-raising did net $2,000, some of which was distributed to various European anti-Stalinist intellectuals and causes by Chiaromonte, who also arranged the publication of the EAG manifesto in the Parisian anti-Stalinist monthly *Révolution Prolétarienne*. Camus set up a French affiliate, the Groupes de Liaison Internationale, but a combination of membership wrangles, Camus's work commitments and his poor health ensured it lasted only until mid-1950. Its manifesto from 1948, however, was a remarkable statement of exactly the refusal to take sides that the CCF would attack in Berlin. 'Reasons for living', it declared bluntly, were being threatened by both 'Stalinist ideology' and 'American worship of technology'. While the latter 'is not totalitarian, because it accepts the individual's neutrality[,] in its own way it is total because, through films, press and radio, it has known how to

make itself indispensable psychologically … '. It is little wonder, then, that Camus's only collaboration with the Congress was his contribution of a preface to the CCF-sponsored book on the fall of Hungary's Imre Nagy in 1956.[51]

Funds were obtained for the AIF action at the Waldorf from David Dubinsky, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union leader who was playing a prominent role in the FTUC with Irving Brown.[52] Union support also came in the form of Arnold Beichman, public relations agent for the Electrical Workers Union, and Merlyn Pitzele, labour editor for *Businessweek* (both Beichman and Pitzele would later be active in the American branch of the CCF in the 1950s). A rival rally was held at Freedom House, messages of support were gained from Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler and T.S. Eliot (who had been described as 'a jackal and hyena' of American imperialism at Wroclaw by Russian writer Alexander Fadajev), and individual protesters such as Dwight Macdonald, Mary McCarthy and Nicolas Nabokov asked awkward questions about intellectual freedom within the USSR to disrupt the Waldorf sessions. While Macdonald felt that 'the anti-communist left has taken the offensive', William Barrett instead lamented more pessimistically that 'there is no American organization adequate in resources, energy, or direction to fighting Stalinist propaganda on a satisfactory intellectual level'.[53] But, unknown to Barrett or Macdonald, a framework was slowly coming together. The State Department's Public Affairs division looked favourably at the AIF and what could be done with it. From another direction, Michael Josselson apparently attended the Freedom House rally and commented to emigré Russian composer and former OMGUS/ICD colleague Nicolas Nabokov that they should do something similar in Berlin.[54]

The Waldorf conference, and particularly the quick response to it organised by Hook and his colleagues, had been noticed with interest by the head of the OPC, Frank Wisner. Wisner assigned his all-purpose deputy, Carmel Offie, to check what the State Department was going to do about further Cominform operations, particularly the upcoming World Peace Congress to be held in Paris in April 1949.[55] At this point the efforts to organise an anti-communist consensus around some kind of institutional framework became a blend of overt–covert, state–private initiative, involving the State Department, the OPC and individuals. Wisner contacted Averell Harriman to ask for 5 million francs (about $16,000) from the Marshall Plan counterpart funds to organise something more effective. Via Brown, French socialist David Rousset and the newspaper of which he was an editor, *Franc-Tireur*, became sponsors for an 'International Day of Resistance to Dictatorship and War'. Rousset in turn invited, among others, Hook and the novelist James Farrell; the OPC covertly paid for the travel costs of the American, German and Italian delegations. Interestingly, Koestler, Raymond Aron and James Burnham were not invited because they were 'too anti-communist', while a space was offered for representatives of the Cominform's Peace Movement, an offer they failed to take up.[56] However, the event was sabotaged by the decisive splits that were appearing in the French intellectual–political scene. Rousset was part of a breakaway group of socialists who defied Communist Party control but who instead promoted a neutralism that wanted

Europe (and especially France) to be free of both Soviet and American influence. In 1948–9 this 'Third Way' movement organised itself into the Rassemblement Democratique Revolutionaire (RDR), which included Jean-Paul Sartre and his journal *Les Temps Modernes*.[57] In 1950 Sartre wrote that the future cultural unity and vitality of Europe:

> can exist only if it is one of the elements of a politics that seeks to defend not only the cultural independence of Europe against America and against the USSR, but also its own political and economic unity, so that Europe may stand as a whole and single force between the two blocs – not as a third bloc but as an autonomous force.

Declaring his support for 'a unified, socialist European society' that would reject the so-called certainties of the Cold War, Sartre was clearly adopting a position opposed to American policy ambitions. The idea of a European 'Third Way' outside American influence was the same, for many American internationalists, as a Europe wide open to Soviet influence and potential control. Such a Third Way position was held by many among the French intelligentsia. Yet as Kuisel notes, 'nonalignment might have been a preferred stance for these mandarins but it attracted little support from the public who, while sympathising with neutralism, preferred the security they had within the Atlantic alliance'.[58]

Into this situation came Sidney Hook. Hook had already taken his anti-communism on the road, having attended an International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam in 1948 and berated the 'political cretinism' that was preventing many from seeing how 'the soul of the West' was under threat from despotism.[59] At the gathering in April 1949 Hook gave a speech at the Sorbonne which outlined the Cold War conflict as he saw it: between a dictatorship based upon organised terror and an imperfect democratic system that at least offered the possibility of criticism and progressive reform. He then stated what, in his eyes, the only realistic future for Western Europe could be.

> And because I wish to diminish the possibilities of war and increase the possibilities of peace, I personally support both the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. The first can help Europe to achieve the social and industrial reconstruction necessary for greater economic justice and lay the foundation for a united Socialist Europe. The second will prevent the expanding Soviet dictatorship from overrunning the West before Europe recovers and stabilizes itself in a democratic Socialist economy.

Considering that 'the prevailing mood [at the conference] was as anti-American as it was anti-Soviet', it is not surprising that such a statement would provoke a strong response.[60] Sartre immediately and publicly dissociated himself and the *Temps Modernes* group from the cause of the meeting. The evening gathering was also disrupted when a Trotskyite group took over the podium on the pretext that a speech was being made which advocated the use of nuclear weapons. The

spectacle created by the whole event was 'a cross between a political fair and a political bedlam'.[61] As for the Paris Peace Congress, the French government's refusal to allow entry for many foreign delegates caused a twin Peace Congress to be held in Prague, where Picasso's Peace Dove was adopted as the movement's symbol. The Cominform strategy was therefore far from being derailed, and after Paris and Prague it continued with the American Continental Congress for Peace in Mexico City in September 1949, followed by the inauguration of the permanent committee of the World Peace Congress in Stockholm in March 1950.[62]

Mobilisation of the intellectuals

Did Hook know about the growing interest in his anti-communist trouble-shooting in US government circles? Undoubtedly, he must have. Indeed, in 1949 Walter Bedell Smith, before he became CIA Director in October 1950, arranged to meet Hook to discuss 'matters of mutual interest'.[63] There was a definite correspondence of interests between the anti-communist intellectuals and American Cold War internationalism which combined in a basic interpretation of the world as split irreconcilably between East and West. Hook himself, sounding like a State Department official, wrote after the Paris meeting that 'the informational re-education of the French public seems to me to be the most fundamental as well as the most pressing task of American democratic policy in France'.[64] Thus Christopher Lasch could write later that:

> both as symptom and as source, the campaign for 'cultural freedom' revealed the degree to which the values held by intellectuals had become indistinguishable from the interests of the modern state – interests which intellectuals now served even while they maintained the illusion of detachment.[65]

The CIA, the provider of finance and organisational infrastructure, was first and foremost a part of the institutionalised power structure of the American elite and was certainly instrumental in attempting to direct the passage of events for their own interests. The politics of hegemony meant keeping the area of 'general interest' as wide as possible, within the confines of a strict anti-communism, in order to incorporate as many intellectual identities as they could. As Richard Elman put it:

> From the Control's [Agency's] point of view this image is really of a dog being led on a very long leash. Central to its success with intellectuals, who were said to be committing themselves to freedom, and independence, was the Agency's calculation that some, if not most, should be permitted to remain 'unwitting' *because they were in basic agreement with Agency politics*, or could be more co-operative and useful if permitted to act as if they were unwitting.[66]

This reintroduces the issue of control, since the CIA were also encouraging a particular intellectual climate. This was, above all, a haphazard business. If

there is one aspect to the events and intentions which gradually coalesced into the Congress for Cultural Freedom, it is the sense of organisational confusion which dominates. Organisational problems took time to resolve, goals had to be defined, and all the while personalities and ambitions were crossing at every step.

The notion of control also obscures how the Congress operated as a mainly European intellectual institution in the context of post-war American power and ambitions. The CCF aimed to coordinate and express the intellectual and cultural norms of the American-dominated Free West in a European setting, attempting to take European conditions into account. It was a search for an Atlantic synthesis, an institution of American hegemony rather than imperialism, since the positive support for American involvement in European economic and political affairs amongst significant sections of the economic–political elite should not be underestimated. That this did not involve a static framework of fixed power relations must be emphasised. Hegemony refers to the necessary linkage between the economic, political and cultural spheres, but never their complete integration – hegemonic elites necessarily provide leadership 'in some of these spheres, but not in all of them equally successfully all of the time'. There is always slippage in the hegemonic vision which requires the attempt to manage consent to be a constant business.[67] It was an impossible task to incorporate everybody, Sartre being the main example. By the late 1940s the goal was becoming clear: to foster a broad consensus among those involved in all areas of cultural and scientific activity that the very freedom to be an intellectual in the Western tradition was now something that had to be openly and forcefully defended. To stay outside this consensus had to be presented as a betrayal of that same Western intellectual-cultural tradition. Behind this lay the sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit declaration that the space for this intellectual defence of freedom was being provided by American power. However, this overall message was not so simple to project.

Hook may not have been much of an empire-builder, but he did share another feature with Lasky and Brown in particular – he was a formidable organiser. Writing in 1961, Thomas Molnar commented on how 'the intellectual in America is looked upon, and accepts himself as, the *organizer*, the formulator of the rules … the goals and tasks to be organized are, of course, given, and are considered as a data of nature … '. There was a 'formula', a solution for every social problem, and it was this attitude which ERP officials and their intellectual advocates such as Hook, Brown and Lasky took with them to Europe. However, this desire to overcome all material difficulties, when transposed into Europe, lacked exactly a 'broad vision' and instead evoked 'the specter of the technocrat' – 'the depoliticized efficiency expert who sacrifices or outright ignores the values embodied in a long cultural heritage'.[68] Any American hegemony would therefore have to demonstrate not only the protection of the European cultural heritage, but also a cultural fecundity able to create new forms compatible with the new post-war society in the making. There also had to be a secure place for

the traditional intellectual, in danger of being rendered obsolete by the all-purpose solutions proffered by technocratic management.

In the aftermath of the Paris *débâcle*, moves to achieve a longer-standing consensus in the form of a continuing organisation went forward on parallel fronts. Hook had met Lasky in Paris – he may have come across Lasky before in Berlin while briefly acting as educational adviser to OMGUS in 1948 – and they discussed their common goal of uniting European intellectual opinion against neutralism and anti-Americanism.[69] Lasky then arranged a meeting in Frankfurt in August 1949 with Franz Borkenau and Ruth Fischer, both disillusioned former Stalinists, and an international conference of the non-communist left was discussed for Berlin, the site of Cold War confrontation *par excellence*, the following year. The aim at this stage does not seem to have been the creation of a permanent organisation, as the CCF would become.[70] What was the significance of this meeting, and particularly of Fischer's role? According to Lasky, Fischer's influence on the developing plan was 'nothing at all', and Josselson later wrote that it was 'absolute nonsense' to claim that Fischer inspired the creation of the CCF. Yet they both seem to downplay her influence unnecessarily. Fischer did have contact with the OPC at that stage, and intended 'to talk to "a few friends in Washington" about the idea during her trip there that fall'. There is also no doubt that her personal contacts with the ex-communist intelligentsia, including Koestler, Theodor Plievier and Rudolf Pechel (all of whom attended the first Congress meeting), contributed to the success of the CCF's launch in Berlin the following year. But Lasky, in contact with Brown, had himself already made moves to secure enough financial backing for the enterprise from the FTUC.

The plan did indeed reach Offie at the OPC in mid-September, but due to uncertainty over how to go about it (especially with regard to the domestic problems of overt American sponsorship of 'motley bands of former communists') nothing was done by the OPC for the rest of the year. Lasky went on to the cultural congress of the European Union in Lausanne at the end of 1949, where he discussed the idea with William Donovan (attending as representative of ACUE). Significantly enough, Thomas Braden, then on ACUE's board, was also in Lausanne acting as Donovan's assistant.[71] Meanwhile Josselson also began to have a major influence. Josselson knew Lasky in Berlin, and had attended the German Writers Congress as an observer (but it is unclear whether he had any influence on Lasky's action there), and must have had some role in the founding of *Der Monat* due to his role as Intelligence Officer with OMGUS\ICD. Some have even claimed that both these men were linked to the OSS during the war.[72] Josselson himself put together a proposal that reached Wisner in January 1950. He took the basis of Ruth Fischer's approach, which was intentionally confrontational, and transformed it into something more subtle.

> Josselson sensed that an explicitly cultural and intellectual conference, to be called 'the Congress for cultural freedom', could seize the initiative from the Communists by reaffirming 'the fundamental ideas governing cultural (and

political) action in the Western world and the repudiation of all totalitarian challenges'.[73]

Josselson also secured DM 100,000 from OMGUS to be put at Lasky's disposal in May 1950. Lasky, apparently continuing at his own pace, in February 1950 secured the support of both the NCFE and the Mayor of West Berlin, the anti-communist SPD politician Ernst Reuter, and an organising committee of German intellectuals was formed. Reuter was at the forefront of moves to rebuild the shattered social democratic movement in post-war Germany, and to lead it in a reformist, pro-American direction. From the beginning the Congress was therefore aligned with an important section of the German non-communist left.[74] Under the aegis of *Der Monat* and Reuter, invitations began to be sent, with Lasky stating that 'the issue of totalitarianism is the litmus-paper test' for who would be invited. Lasky, who had attended the Paris International Day with Josselson 'to see how it was done' and had discussed the problems faced there with Hook, was determined to avoid the same mistakes and therefore to define the limits for participation – and consent – in Berlin. But Lasky's official employment by OMGUS as editor of *Der Monat* was exactly the high-profile American interest that Wisner and OPC wanted to avoid. Wisner approved Josselson's plan as late as April 1950, allocating a budget of $50,000 and the code name QKOPERA.[75] But Wisner had conditions, the main one being that Lasky must not keep his public role. Wisner was also wary of James Burnham, even though Burnham was acting as a consultant to the OPC at this time, because of Burnham's increasingly right-wing approach to the Cold War.[76] Josselson made it clear that it was only because of Lasky's reputation through *Der Monat* that so much interest was being generated for the Congress amongst European intellectuals. Lasky, self-appointed General Secretary of the whole affair, was going ahead with his plan anyway, and it was Lasky who addressed the inaugural meeting of the Congress to announce its purpose and its agenda.[77]

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, 26–9 June 1950

> The aphorisms of the American Founding Fathers and of Lincoln relate empirically to the circumstances of life in West Berlin.[78]

> West Berlin is economically a deficit undertaking, even more than Western Europe as a whole, and even less than the latter is it of any strategic value. However, since the Americans love clearly-assigned functions, neat book-keeping headings, they have listed Berlin under 'Advertising' – it is 'the show window of the West behind the Iron Curtain' … Two show windows face each other; 'way of life' against 'way of life' … [79]

The most remarkable coincidence about the conference was that it opened hours after the dramatic announcement that North Korea had invaded the South, raising many doubts and fears as to whether this represented a major

communist-inspired offensive on a number of fronts. With all the question marks surrounding the CCF, this stage-setting coincidence of events could not have been better planned. The Western sectors of Berlin were obviously considered to be one of the prime targets of any such offensive, and the atmosphere of the event seems to have been dominated by a mixture of trepidation and defiance because of this. Not for nothing did Koestler refer to it as 'a kind of intellectual airlift' to the beleaguered city.[80]

Two fundamental aspects of the importance of the Congress need to be emphasised before its membership and agenda are examined. First, it represented above all a unification of post-war American and European intellectual interests and concerns, especially in the context of a greater American material presence and influence in continental affairs. As Christopher Lasch noted, 'the Congress for Cultural Freedom, growing directly out of the postwar power struggle in Europe, centred most of its attention on Europe, as did American foreign policy in the fifties … '.[81]

Just as the Marshall Plan can be seen as the internationalisation of the New Deal, so the Congress came out of an attempt to internationalise the American non-communist left, and the two should be considered as connected within the attempt to secure a post-war hegemony. The expansion of US corporate interests and the configuration of political–economic forces that the Marshall Plan envisaged for Western Europe required an anti-communist cultural–intellectual justification. While this was achieved by the conference in Berlin, the problems of maintaining a single vision between the American and European participants in this venture in the following years would prove to be difficult. This was exemplified by the strained relations between the CCF and its American affiliate (the ACCF), which was formed in 1951. The Congress, under Josselson's stewardship, addressed European intellectual concerns in European circumstances, and sometimes in ways that the ACCF disagreed with. The Americans were in general more militantly anti-communist, as their reaction to Senator McCarthy displayed.[82] Hence the hegemonic aspect to the Congress – it aimed to tailor its stance according to European conditions and opinions, while at the same time maintaining the underlying status of the USA as the defender of the Free World and its cultural-intellectual life. The CCF was thus also the cultural counterpart to NATO, such that each national intelligentsia must recognise their membership of a wider group of Western intellectuals who had the same interests and values to defend: 'culture can exist only in freedom and that freedom can lead to cultural progress'.[83]

Second, it offered the first major attempt to gather, institutionalise and organise the intellectual disillusionment with Soviet-led communism. The power of the Soviet Union in the world of ideas – as *the* country of the revolution, the country that was at the forefront of world history – had been so strong that many were prepared to accept the vagaries and violence of Stalinist policies (the Purges, the gulags, the secret police) as necessities for the revolutionary state to survive in a hostile reactionary world. In terms of remaining radical and critical towards the status quo, and projecting this criticism from a socially progressive

perspective, there was nowhere else to go other than the Communist Party (or the various Trotskyist/Leninist splinter groups that were often further to the left). The outlook of the Congress was a direct response to this intellectual 'vacuum', and it is crucial in this respect to understand Coleman's point that 'the basic hallmark, in short, of the Congress's anti-Communism was that it felt itself to be of the Left and on the Left'. First and foremost the aim of the CCF was to collect that disillusionment and give it an identity and a role in the Cold War struggle of ideas with the Soviet Union. The Congress offered an international forum for those intellectuals, sometimes relatively isolated as with Raymond Aron in France, who were inclined towards anti-communism, the 'free society' and democracy in Western Europe in the 1950s.[84]

This was the goal. The mobilisation of the intelligentsia would then halt the drift from disillusionment to neutralism, and solidify the general opinion of American internationalism that there was no longer any space for indecision – one was either for totalitarianism (i.e. Soviet communism) or against it, and it was time to choose sides. Of course, it is one thing to organise a three-day conference to give voice to this anti-communist position, and quite another to maintain an air of radicalism in a comfortably funded institutionalised setting.

For the inaugural conference in Berlin there were 118 invited participants, 40 per cent of whom came from the USA and Germany. Several were emigrant intellectuals from Nazi Germany, including historian Golo Mann (whose brother, Thomas, had been active for the Cominform 'Partisans for Peace'), Franz Borkenau, Richard Löwenthal, Frankfurt School political theorist Franz Neumann (author of the major study on Nazism, *Behemoth*),[85] Fritz Eberhard, Hermann Kesten, Walter Mehring, Theodor Plievier and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Of these, Mann, Neumann, Mehring, Kesten and Rosenstock-Huessy had been resident in the USA, and Löwenthal in Britain, from the mid-1930s onwards (and were actually listed in *Der Monat* as coming from USA and Britain respectively, not Germany, reflecting their new-found residency). Other intellectual exiles included Giuseppe Borgese (editor of the liberal world-federalist journal *Common Cause*) and Ignazio Silone from Mussolini's Italy, Sol Levitas, Nicolas Nabokov and eight others from Soviet Russia, Joseph Czapski and Jerzy Gieddroyc from communist Poland, Frantisek Kovarna and Karel Kupka from communist Czechoslovakia, Mintauts Cakste from communist Latvia. There is a sense from this list that the CCF was able to 'collect' the footloose intelligentsia who had been set adrift by the political repression of the early twentieth century. With *Der Monat* Lasky had aimed to provide a focus for the reconfiguration of the displaced Weimar intelligentsia, and his goal for the CCF was to operate in a similar way on a larger scale. Able to provide something of an international intellectual 'home' and identity for the displaced and exiled, the CCF also gathered the anti-totalitarian – and specifically anti-communist – impulses from this same group.

This was emphasised by how many had either been involved in the resistance or imprisoned by repressive regimes. Those involved in wartime resistance leadership included Haakon Lie and Per Monsen (Norway), Frode Jakobsen

(Denmark), Payanotis Kanellopoulos (Greece), Georges Altman and Henri Frenay (France). Those who had been imprisoned included Eugen Kogon, David Rousset, Rudolf Pechel, Luise Rinser, Fritz Molden, Per Monsen and Remy Roure (by Hitler); Altiero Spinelli (by Mussolini); Josef Czapski and Elinor Lipper (by Stalin); Margaret Buber-Neuman (by Hitler and Stalin); Boris Nicolaevsky (by the Tsar and the Bolsheviks). Arthur Koestler and Ignazio Silone had been imprisoned in Spain during the civil war. Former communists François Bondy and Walter Mehring had both been 'political internees' in France.[86]

The link between the anti-fascist groups and the European movement is another important aspect of the outlook of this inaugural meeting. Grémion points out that there was a direct connection between European federalism and the non-communist resistance. Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi had scripted a federalist manifesto before the end of the war, and a Manifesto of the European Resistance was issued from Geneva in July 1944 after groups from nine countries had met to discuss the future of the continent. Apart from declaring support for a Germany fully integrated into 'European life', it also included 'the demand for cooperation in the economic reconstruction of the continent after the war, without which any democratic political order would be threatened'. Prominent federalists at the Congress such as Spinelli, the German Eugen Kogon, the Dutchman Henri Brugmans, the Englishman Julien Amery, the Swiss François Bondy and Denis de Rougemont, and Henri Frenay (who was made president of the European Union of Federalists in 1949) therefore gave the CCF an important contact with the European movement and its presumption to speak for Europe as a whole. The presence of ex-communist social democrats such as Ernst Reuter and Spinelli countered the general perception that the anti-fascist resistance had been dominated by communists. The European movement that came out of the war wanted above all a new beginning, away from the mistakes of the past. 'Resistance views on the future therefore stressed the need to transcend historical national boundaries, dismissed as artificial and discredited, in order to rebuild a revitalised and genuine European community.' It is worth noting in this respect how there were no explicit national delegations in Berlin – each participant was invited *as an individual*.[87]

The Congress was therefore uniting the massive intellectual consequences of the European fascist upheaval with an American-led anti-communism, and presenting the result as an anti-totalitarian defence of Western cultural–intellectual values. The effect of the 1930s and 1940s on the European psyche, and 'the usurpation of the European idea by German Nazism', are the crucial background to this. What this points to is the crisis of the 'European mind' that occurred in the wake of fascism. Europe as 'a concept which rests upon foundations of the mind' – upon principles, customs, values, tradition, the 'treasure of associated nations' – had to be reconstructed anew. This is what Hannah Arendt meant when she quoted René Char: 'Our inheritance was left to us by no testament.' But there was little room for optimism in the late 1940s. Existentialism was the philosophy of the times, a denial of the universalism of the European

tradition of thought and its presumptions of progress. Sartre's position was that each individual should act with responsibility according to the historical circumstances they were faced with. Raymond Aron's response was that 'a first-rate thinker like Sartre clings to a Marxism of a most elementary kind'.[88]

The Congress was therefore also an effort to bolster the damaged European tradition of the free-thinking 'universal' intellectual and re-launch it in new circumstances. The CCF did not have a distinct 'plan for Europe' – no statement was issued or panel held on any such specific programme. Lasky and the CCF's organisers did not attempt to coopt the European movement for the Atlanticist cause in order to avoid the conflict of interest of an 'independent' Europe, although there was considerable support within the American Atlanticist elite for European unity (within, of course, acceptable political parameters). The point is not that the Congress represented first and foremost a movement for European unity, but that it represented (or intended to represent) the main currents of postwar European thought outside of the Soviet-influenced 'Cominform community'. This was a battle not just of ideas but also of *status*, since the attainment of a sufficient level of intellectual recognition brought with it credibility and legitimacy. This was reflected in the impressive line-up of honorary presidents that Lasky managed to put together in order to give the whole project considerable intellectual legitimacy and weight. Significantly, they were all philosophers, enrolled as representatives for the new-born 'Euro-American mind': Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers and Jacques Maritain: the rationalism of Russell, the pragmatism of Dewey, the idealism of Croce, the phenomenological existentialism of Jaspers, the Catholic humanism of Maritain. In this spirit *Der Monat* referred to '*Das Weltparlament de Intellektuellen in Berlin*', consciously evoking the responsibility of the intellectual as argued by Julien Benda. To confirm this impression, Russell had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950.[89]

Among those who had been active in the communist movement were Koestler, Spinelli, Reuter, Silone, Borkenau, Löwenthal and Theodor Plievier; former Marxists were Hook, Burnham, James Farrell, Belgian author Charles Plisnier and Swedish poet Ture Nerman. The drama of their apostasy was emphasised by both Koestler and Plievier arriving with bodyguards to prevent any possible Soviet-inspired attacks. The presence of so many ex-communists signified an expansion of the approach that had produced *The God that Failed* – the alliance of former left-wing radicals with the anti-Soviet cause of Western institutions. Koestler was visibly the figure who took on the mantle of the CCF's *raison d'être*. Born into a Hungarian middle-class family, Koestler was radicalised by the political and economic upheavals of the 1920s, and joined the Communist Party in 1931 in Berlin. From 1933 until 1938 he worked with Willi Münzenberg, orchestrating the communist fronts of the era, especially during the Spanish Civil War, but the fallacious twists and turns of Party policy led him to a profound disillusionment before the Second World War. Imprisoned in Spain, France and briefly in England, Koestler entered the post-war years living in Paris and leading a lonely anti-communist struggle against the prevailing leftist

mood of the French intelligentsia. In this context the Congress offered a perfect platform for him to take centre stage and go on the offensive.[90]

Of the 'national groups', the French offers an interesting insight into the politics of those who attended, particularly as the strength of the communist-led left, in politics and in wider opinion, was a major concern for the US–European Atlanticist elites in the 1940s. Of the ten who attended, four (Georges Altman, Henri Brunschwig, Suzanne Labin, André Philip) were associated with the non-communist left and the Socialist Party (SFIO) and two, Suzanne Labin (author of *Staline le Terrible* in 1948) and David Rousset, were publicly associated with anti-communism. No-one was from conservative Vichy circles, the most right-wing being novelist Claude Mauriac who worked for de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Française (RPF) as editor of its journal, *Liberté de l'Esprit.* Two were significant figures in journalism, Remy Roure (editor of *Le Monde* 1945–52) and Altman (editor of *Franc-Tireur*). Altman and Henri Frenay had been active in the resistance, Altman with the Franc-Tireur group in Lyon and Frenay as a co-founder of the Combat movement (which, through Frenay's contacts with Allen Dulles, received financial support from the OSS), while Roure, also a wartime editor of the resistance paper *Fighting France*, was captured and spent time in both Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Altman and Rousset, along with Sartre, had been co-founders of RDR in 1948, and it was no small matter that both went from the Third Way of RDR to participating in (but not necessarily agreeing with) the Atlanticism of the CCF by 1950. *Franc-Tireur*'s transition, under Altman's editorship, from pro-communist in 1946 to RDR in 1948 to Atlanticism by 1950 is exemplary of the shifting positions of the time, and demonstrates the importance of someone like Altman for the Congress's position. The general impression, then, is that the group represented a cross-section of the centre-left and centre-right, marked by its separation from both the communist movement *and* Vichy France, and on the whole supportive of some form of American presence in Europe. It was also a group with some intellectual credibility. Notable is the absence of Raymond Aron, a declared Atlanticist, who did send a message of support to Berlin and who would become one of the CCF's greatest advocates in France. In 1950 Aron was writing a regular column in the right-wing *Le Figaro* and described himself as 'a militant in the RPF from 1948 to 1952', supportive of de Gaulle's desire to re-write the constitution and present himself as the answer to French political instability. Gaullism did have a strong advocate in James Burnham, who was probably the cause of Mauriac's presence, but Aron's absence may be illustrative of the conflicts and compromises over the CCF's political trajectory that became more apparent during and after Berlin.[91]

The proceedings of the Congress in Berlin were monitored by Lasky, Hook, Burnham, Koestler and Irving Brown. Brown, described in his biography as 'an executive aide for Koestler', provided the organisational and financial back-up, as Dubinsky had done for the anti-Waldorf efforts in New York the previous year. Following the opening session entitled 'The Challenge to Cultural Freedom', held on Monday 26 June, four sessions were organised for the next two days: 'Science and Totalitarianism', 'Art, Artists and Freedom', 'The Citizen

in a Free Society' and 'The Defense of Peace and Freedom'. While the opening session was invitation only, the others were open to the public and the audience were able to address the speakers. Also, the invited participants came and went over the four days, giving the impression of a free exchange of people and views and not a rigid stage-managed event. [92]

The Congress was steered by the above *ad hoc* group towards anti-communism *and* anti-neutralism. In his address to the opening session on 25 June, Koestler attacked the 'neither-nor attitude' of the contemplative intellectual, whose self-conscious estrangement from reality ('a professional disease') meant 'they are incapable of admitting, even to themselves, that there are situations in which an unambiguous decision is vital for spiritual and physical survival'. For his longer paper to the workshop 'Defense of Peace and Freedom', Koestler outlined his belief that the principles of the left had become corrupted beyond recognition. Presaging the End of Ideology position that the CCF would begin to represent by the mid-1950s, Koestler stated the following:

> The thesis which I wish to put before you is that the antinomies 'Socialism and Capitalism', 'Left and Right', are rapidly becoming meaningless, and that so long as Europe remains bogged down in these false alternatives which obstruct clear thinking, it cannot hope to find a constructive solution for its problems.

For him, 'history has moved on to … a new conflict which cuts across the old lines of division. The real content of this conflict can be summed up in one phrase: total tyranny against relative freedom.' James Burnham followed Koestler with a like-minded, but more direct speech. Rejecting the Peace Movement as a Soviet con trick, Burnham wondered whether, if Europeans insisted on rejecting the conflict between the USA and the USSR and continued to search for a neutralist 'Third Way', 'culture and civilisation [would] be, then, in safe harbour … if American power were withdrawn, and all Europe exposed to the full Soviet onslaught?'.[93]

Yet it was exactly this kind of firebrand anti-communism that had caused Wisner to demand a low-profile for Burnham in Berlin. Peter de Mendelssohn noted how 'restlessness grew among the Italians, the French, the Scandinavians and the British as the Burnham–Koestler world emerged in clearer outline'.[94] The CCF would not be all-out pro-American, since any attempt to achieve such an organisation would clearly fail.

> The Congress strongly endorsed Schlesinger's NCL strategy and approved of the network set up to implement it, known as the 'Lovestone Empire' after its coordinator, Jay Lovestone [it was run by Irving Brown]. Although some anti-communists, among them Koestler, Burnham and Hook, distrusted the NCL because of its often anti-American rhetoric, *it was precisely those demonstrations of its independence from American control that made the NCL so effective* in its battles against the fellow-travelling left for the allegiance

of non-communist but anti-American nationalists in Europe and the Third World.[95]

Schlesinger himself, who had outlined the political space for the militant liberalism of the 'Non-Communist Left' in *The Vital Center* and helped to mobilise it via the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), was present in Berlin to take part in its international extension. When Schlesinger had written in 1949 of the combination of 'the AF of L, ADA, and the NCL group in the State Department in support of the Third Force in Europe' he could have been thinking of the future Congress.[96] Schlesinger, like Hook, had significant stints in Europe during the late 1940s, his work with Averell Harriman on the ERP being combined with a post as guest professor at Leiden University, the Netherlands, in 1948–9. For Schlesinger, the ADA represented 'the watershed at which American liberalism began to base itself once again on a solid conception of man and of history'. The ADA, set up in January 1947 to support both the New Deal legacy against a conservative Congress and to break the link established by the 1930s Popular Front between mainstream liberalism and communism, from its inception deliberately sought an international impact. In his report on Berlin for the ADA, James Farrell emphasised the importance of the links established between liberal intellectuals and trade union organisers, going so far as to say that 'all of the speeches at Berlin, the very Congress itself, were made possible … by the social gains, the social advances made by the American labor unions and by the positive legacy of Roosevelt'. Significantly, Lasky has been described by Hochgeschwender as an unofficial middleman in late 1940s Berlin between the ADA, the United Auto Workers union (represented by Walter Reuther), and the reformist pro-American elements in the German SPD. Despite some initial reservations among more left-of-centre members, the ADA supported both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and its intellectual mentor, conservative theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, became one of the CCF's honorary presidents after the death of John Dewey in 1952.[97]

An extreme example in Berlin of the Euro-NCL position was the speech given by Franz Borkenau. Attacking the utopian tendencies in Western thought, he stated that 'the liberal utopia of absolute individual freedom found its counterpart in the socialist utopia of complete individual security'. While America represented the former, Russian Communism was attempting the latter 'fanatically and at the cost of monumental sacrifices'. He thus endorsed the transcendence of both utopian, 'materialist' ideologies through the revival of 'the ancient Christian and humanist ideals', out of which 'the new faith in liberty' had 'discovered its own true essence'.[98] Borkenau's position had some affinity with the overall resurgence of Christian belief after the war, exemplified by the rise in popularity of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe (particularly in Italy, West Germany and the Netherlands). But the main focus for opposition to hard-line anti-communism came from Ignazio Silone. Silone, the highest-ranking former communist at the conference, had taken some persuasion to be convinced that it was not simply 'a US State Department operation'.[99]

Silone's Christian moralism wanted to revive the togetherness of the anti-fascist Resistance. Three years before, he had declared in another speech that:

> whenever a meeting of writers, or artists, or 'intellectuals' in general yields to the temptation of pronouncing judgement on men's conduct during the tragic events of recent years, it is essential that somebody should undertake the task of putting them on guard against any hypocritical self-satisfaction.

Silone took it upon himself to fulfil that purpose in Berlin, and it was his position, addressing the needs of a European intelligentsia scarred by the traumas of the previous two decades, that would prevail over the Koestler–Burnham approach once the Congress moved on from Berlin.

The manifesto: truth and power

On Thursday 29 June the Congress ended with a rally at the Funkturm in the British sector of the city. While Koestler capped a successful conference for himself by declaring at the rally that 'Freedom has taken the offensive!', the coming years would put to the test the proposal that the Congress should offer more than an opportunity for an anti-communist intellectual united front. Koestler had drafted a Freedom Manifesto that ran to thirteen articles, the main emphasis being a rejection of neutralism as much as an attack on totalitarianism. It is worth looking at sections of the Manifesto in some detail, because it was through this document that the CCF set out its position on the legitimate limits for intellectual political opinion.[100]

Koestler had offended the British contingent by criticising the 'insularity' of the Labour government's foreign policy in its weak interpretation of the threat of communism, and it was the British delegates A.J. Ayer and Hugh Trevor-Roper who objected most to the wording of the Manifesto. During the Second World War, Ayer had worked with first the Special Operations Executive, then with MI6 in Paris in 1945, and he maintained links with the security services in the post-war years. While certainly sufficiently well-known a philosopher to merit an invitation to Berlin, Ayer was content to let his visit be paid for by the anti-communist propaganda unit, the Information Research Department, and it is highly likely that he reported back to his former MI6 colleagues on the conference's progress. Yet Ayer was 'an obstructive element' in Berlin, reacting against 'the hysterical atmosphere in which the Congress was held, orchestrated as it was by revengeful ex-Communists, *imprimis* Arthur Koestler'. He even attempted to secure the resignation of Bertrand Russell from his symbolic post as one of the CCF's honorary presidents. As it is unlikely that Ayer was deliberately acting as a 'spoiler' for other interests, his (and Trevor-Roper's) 'mischievous objections' to the Manifesto should be taken more seriously.[101]

The Manifesto begins with a bold statement of principle: 'We hold it to be self-evident that intellectual freedom is one of the inalienable rights of man.' Articles 2 and 5 emphasise the importance of freedom of expression and its

reliance on the tolerance of diversity. Articles 3 and 4 claim that the lack of democratic accountability and the refusal to submit disputes to international arbitration increase the likelihood of war. Without these domestic and international controls, 'campaigns for peace which are not backed by acts that will guarantee its maintenance are like counterfeit currency circulated for dishonest purposes'. Articles 6, 8 and 9 stress that 'no political philosophy or economic theory … no race, nation, class or religion can claim the sole right to represent the idea of freedom', and that the perverse way in which totalitarian regimes have portrayed the restrictions on freedom as a sign of historical progress has created a danger far greater than any before. Article 7, in recognition of the impact abroad of anti-communist legislation and witch-hunts in the USA, proclaimed that 'in times of emergency, restrictions on the freedom of the individual are imposed in the real or assumed interest of the community'. The inclusion of 'assumed' is noticeable here. The article also adds that such measures should be clearly outlined, temporary and democratically supervised. The means to meet the totalitarian threat must themselves not be allowed to 'degenerate into a permanent tyranny'.

Up to this point in the document there was apparently no major dissension over wording or purpose. The initial impression is of concern for freedom of opinion both from political extremism and from the response this generates within democratic society itself. However, the following articles did produce a clash of perspectives. Article 10 declared that instability would be guaranteed as long as the world was divided between the free and the unfree. This was the language, above all, of James Burnham, one of the harshest critics of Kennan's influence on US policy and a strong advocate of moving 'from containment to liberation'. It echoed what Josef Czapski, himself attending at the instigation of Burnham, had said during his speech at the Opening Session: 'It seems unrealistic to me to want one half of Europe to be free while the other half lies bound and fettered – a mere fiction. There is only one Europe and she wishes to live in liberty.'[102] The means to achieve this liberation, of course, were not outlined at the conference, and it is easy to see why Burnham's influence over the proceedings and the emerging platform for the CCF was something that Wisner above all had wanted to avoid. To succeed, the Congress must not be a *militant* organisation, since that would repel the audience it was angling for – the Western-orientated liberal intelligentsia of the centre-left/centre-right.

Article 10, along with article 14, also included additions from Trevor-Roper and Ayer. In both cases the Englishmen insisted on the insertion of phrases that avoided the presentation of freedom as something that could be defined in absolute ahistorical terms. Thus their insistence that 'the defence of existing freedoms, the reconquest of lost freedoms, *and the creation of new freedoms* are parts of the same struggle'. A new article was inserted to emphasise this point – 'The defence of intellectual liberty today imposes a positive obligation: to offer new and constructive answers to the problems of our time.' While there was a general acceptance that the world was indeed divided between the free and the unfree, this extra article highlighted the fact that the free society of the West should not

be treated in a self-congratulatory manner as the epitome of freedom itself. Such a move would only cause a premature closure of debate. The opinion of many in Berlin was that a conference in support of cultural freedom was worthy of support, but that it must be based on more than simply outspoken anti-communism. As Henri Frenay asked during 'The Citizen in a Free Society' session, 'what is to be the result of the work of the Congress?'[103]

Through the Manifesto the Congress was able to exhibit several of the themes related to the role of intellectuals as discussed in Chapter 1: it offered a comprehensive interpretation of the world, it opposed the use and abuse of political power from an ostensibly independent standpoint (the intellectual as social critic and social conscience), and it called on those who attended in Berlin to voluntarily adopt this standpoint for the good of society as a whole. The use of a manifesto itself was also a conscious alignment with the traditions of intellectual activity in the political realm. But there is an added dimension to this, and that is the way in which the Manifesto actively sought to define the ground for intellectual–political commitment and opinion in the conditions of the Cold War. It is here that the work of Foucault becomes a valuable addition to that of Gramsci. While Gramsci's formulation of hegemony remained (however ambiguously) within a Marxist framework, Foucault has been credited with leaving the Marxist problematic behind for a closer reading of the relations between 'truth', 'power' and the configurations of what constitutes hegemony itself.[104]

Foucault claimed that the age of the 'universal intellectual', derived from the 'man of law' who confronts power with justice, had given way in the mid–twentieth century to that of the expert, technician or 'specific intellectual', more limited and focused in their field of operation. Interestingly, Foucault comments that 'this figure of the "specific" intellectual has emerged since the Second World War', particularly with the atomic scientists (he mentions Oppenheimer as the best example).[105] The function of the intellectual has therefore changed, in much the same way as Gramsci recognised, such that, unless the traditional intellectuals conformed to the new socio-economic conditions of the early twentieth century, they would effectively disappear.

> It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in the intellectual is not the 'bearer of universal values'. Rather, it's the person occupying a specific position – but whose specificity is linked … to the general functioning of an apparatus of truth … There is a battle 'for truth', or at least 'around truth' – it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted', but rather 'the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true', it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays.[106]

Thus, 'each society has its own regime of truth … that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true … '. The Congress was therefore

part of the regime of truth of the Cold War West, operating as a 'normalizing technology' that sought to establish 'a common definition of goals and procedures, which take the form of manifestoes and, even more forceful, agreed-upon examples of how a well-ordered domain of human activity should be organised'.[107] This is particularly evident in article 12 of the Manifesto, which declared neutrality in the face of the totalitarian threat to be an 'abdication of the free mind' – in other words a betrayal of the whole Western intellectual tradition. Of course, the backing of the CIA puts this in a clearer perspective, but only to a certain extent. The key figures who put together the CCF saw it as their own crusade for intellectual freedom and integrity that happened to be supported by the US government. There is no finer example of this than Silone's comment in the Opening Session, since it was Silone who almost did not attend due to his fears that the event would be nothing more than a propaganda spectacle:

> Therefore your Congress will be for propaganda purposes? A new episode in the Cold War? No – it will be a meeting of free men; of writers and artists who, above all, will not give up what they feel to be their supreme duty: to tell the truth freely, during a period so grave as that which exists today.[108]

Silone was right to say this, since this aspect of the cultural Cold War – its 'privatisation' by groups in civil society who considered it to be a struggle for them as much as for government departments – does need to be emphasised. But this does not take away the linkage between truth and power that Foucault later pointed out. '"Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.'[109] Whatever the noble intellectual ambitions of the CCF, it was always to be embroiled in this inescapable relationship with the less noble pursuit of power itself.

5   The search for consensus 1950–2

If the Congress for Cultural Freedom was a hegemonic institution designed to incorporate as wide a spectrum of non-communist intellectuals as possible to solidify the US-European alliance, what were the mechanisms and identities that were used to achieve this? In answering this question, the following two chapters will look at two principal aspects. First, the use of high culture and the defence of cultural values associated with it as the defining characteristic of Western civilisation that the CCF sought to associate itself with. Second, there was the emergent consensus amongst the Congress's core members and organisers around the 'end of ideology' in socio-political thought. In many ways this was an extension of the 'consensus society' of managed capitalism as envisaged by the Marshall Plan, and can be considered as the Plan's intellectual dimension.

After Berlin

For American observers the Berlin conference had been a success, at least as a response to the well-publicised gatherings of the Cominform. After all, as a report in *Die Zeit* recognised, this large-scale meeting of Europeans and Americans had overcome differences of opinion to produce the first major intellectual response to Soviet totalitarianism.[1] It was recognised especially that the Congress could offer a potential home for those intellectuals 'politically adrift' since 1945, particularly those who had favoured neutralism.[2] However, the possible continued success of the CCF would depend crucially on the outlook that it now adopted. It is clear that this did not evolve as part of a coherent strategy, since moves by Koestler and Lasky came up against the goals of others. An Executive Committee of Koestler, Brown, Rousset, Silone and German Social Democrat politician Carlo Schmid was elected in Berlin. Prior to any meeting of this executive, a 'steering committee' was unofficially convened at Koestler's house at Fontaine-le-Port outside Paris in July and August 1950, with Lasky, Brown, Silone and Bondy present. The first meeting's agenda was clear – the minutes stated 'First priority: France, Italy'.[3] Arrangements were made for the formation of a French national committee, Les Amis de la Liberté, with a temporary office in the Hotel Baltimore in Paris. A French journal was planned,

Articles of Association for the Congress drawn up and a committee on Soviet affairs discussed. As well as Lasky's focus on Paris and Berlin, Silone began to arrange an Italian Association for Cultural Freedom. Koestler also wanted a labour organisation, Front de la Liberté, and mass rallies to highlight the threat of communism in Korea and elsewhere. Lasky had wanted Koestler in Berlin mainly for his impact as an orator, and had not been disappointed. But Koestler was now the driving force behind these initial moves to solidify the Congress organisation.

At the beginning of July Lasky wrote a report on the proceedings of the Berlin Congress, and it is worth looking at in some detail because of Lasky's crucial role in the whole process. He began by emphasising how the CCF came about due to the concerns of the Western intelligentsia in the conditions of mid-twentieth century political repression.

> It was not an official body, but a free association of men and women. It was not a 'front' for the totalitarians of the left or the right … It was the initial attempt of the intelligentsia of the civilized world – poets and scientists, philosophers and journalists, socialists and conservatives, churchmen and trade-unionists, painters and publishers – to join together freely, to discuss, to criticize, to formulate an independent program for the defense of their common democratic ideal.[4]

It was significant, therefore, that he could claim the presence of leading anti-fascist resistance leaders from Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Italy and France. For Lasky, the 'debate, disagreement, argument' during the conference was 'effective in demonstrating that the Congress was not "a fixed affair" but a genuine free and democratic forum'. It is interesting to note his comment that 'the "pro-American line" was not taken by Americans, especially not official Americans', in other words that it was representatives of the US intelligentsia and not the US government who spoke in Berlin, and that this contributed greatly towards a successful Euro-American meeting of minds. This distinction may be suspect, but Lasky was right about the free debate, since in Berlin the Congress was not and could not be a wholly orchestrated occasion. However, the limits to free debate were certainly set at the boundaries of neutralism, and this was repeated again and again. The CCF, as well as demonstrating 'absolute hostility toward totalitarianism', also showed 'that tendencies towards "neutrality" and appeasement in the West are from now on counterbalanced by a free, independent body of high intellectual stature'. Lasky's deliberate reference to the 1930s appeasement of Hitler and the moral authority of the Congress in rejecting this approach to totalitarianism are revealing here. What is more, he goes on to state that:

> a comparison with Communist-controlled organizations of the 1930's and early 40's should indicate the potential force of a structurally similar, politi-

cally opposite (i.e. anti-totalitarian) International Intellectuals' Organization today, as now founded by the Congress for the first time.

This was Koestler territory; the *modus operandi* of Willi Münzenberg had found a new home. But Lasky could see very well that the 'united front' which emerged from Berlin needed to be carefully managed, and there are pointers here for the subsequent development of the Congress.

> The main difference in the Congress was represented by two tendencies – the one (spokesmen: Koestler and Burnham) put main emphasis on the drive of the Soviet imperialism towards world-conquest and the urgent necessity of resistance programs. The second tendency (spokesmen: most of the French, Italians, British, and non-Berlin Germans): concentrated on the strengthening of the West-European unity idea, social and economic reforms (so as to eliminate Communist strongholds in discontent), and a less polemical attitude toward Moscow. There is no fundamental conflict between these two positions. But they can come into dangerous battles if not properly *moderated*. It is not easy to convince both sides that there is no difference in *principle*, but only a difference of accent, of priorities, of language. The Congress managed to work out the formula which satisfied the broad base of Congress participants – resistance to the East, reconstruction in the West.

Lasky was well aware that unless a careful effort was made to maintain a broad political consensus, the polemics of Koestler and Burnham in particular, and a hard-line Cold War stance in general, would tear the Congress apart, almost certainly preventing a genuine Euro-American alliance. The choice was therefore between a direct political confrontation with the Cominform Peace Movement, or a softer appeal based on intellectual–cultural values and prestige. Within five days of Lasky's report being completed his concern was borne out, when a letter critical of the Berlin conference was sent by Hugh Trevor-Roper to the *Manchester Guardian*, causing Bertrand Russell to resign as Honorary Chairman. Russell won the Nobel Prize in 1950 and was vital for the CCF's early credibility. It took some pleading from Koestler and Schlesinger to persuade him to return to the fold, but Koestler's hopes for a militant Congress had been further damaged.[5] Where was Lasky situated on this issue? Similar to his stance towards *Der Monat* Lasky was supportive of a combination of militancy *and* quality, since for him the two were inseparable. As his report on Berlin declared:

> The fact was generally noted, and contributed a great deal to the success of the Congress, that it was not a 'political demonstration', or rather not only a political demonstration but simultaneously a performance of very high intellectual and cultural level. Here again that which had to be demonstrated

was presented by its very fruits: That culture can exist only in freedom and that freedom can lead to cultural progress.[6]

However, the American secret service also had a major say in the matter. Frank Wisner of the OPC was determined to remove Lasky from the running of the Congress, going so far as to threaten the refusal of funds if this was not followed through. It so happened therefore that the OPC office in Berlin, led by none other than Lasky's friend Michael Josselson, 'contrived to have [Lasky] removed from the project'. Hook only commented later that 'Lasky … was not available on a permanent basis' because of the success of *Der Monat*.[7] Why did he have to go? Saunders offers possible explanations:

> Either Lasky had some kind of relationship with OPC, and there was therefore a real security risk because he refused to lie low; or he was, as he always claimed, an independent orator, in which case his removal represented the first of many such strong-arm tactics on the part of CIA.[8]

Or there is a third option – that Lasky was a mixture of the two, and therefore difficult to pin down with any black-white interpretation. The 'privatisation' of the Cold War through the determination of intellectual-cultural groups to fight their own anti-communist fight created many anomalies in terms of power and influence when they teamed up with government agencies, and Lasky is a prime example of what was then a novel situation.

During 1950–51, several key figures without whom the CCF would not have got off the ground – namely Lasky, Koestler, Brown, and to a lesser extent Burnham – were gradually excluded from the public running of the newly formed permanent organisation. Lasky, due to his close friendship with Josselson and his evident abilities, would continue to be a major behind-the-scenes adviser, particularly to do with the running of the CCF journals *Encounter*, *Preuves* and *Der Monat* (officially affiliated to the Congress in 1957). But Josselson was always careful. When Lasky wanted to arrange an Ernst Reuter Memorial Lecture after the former Berlin Mayor's death, Josselson requested all correspondence to be done on CCF stationery in the CCF's name because Lasky remained associated with the US government by 'the public at large'. Brown continued to act as the main source of finance until the autumn of 1951, by which point Josselson had become the main organisational force. But Brown was a vital element in the emerging structure. Nicolas Nabokov, on replacing Lasky as Secretary General, wrote in June 1951 that he had ideas of how the Congress could develop 'but before I do it, there are matters of principle, of personalities, and of … finance which I have to discuss carefully with Irving'. Brown also remained on the Congress Executive Committee and was clearly consulted on internal matters for years afterwards.[9]

While Brown and Lasky handed over their tasks for the sake of organisational clarity, the departure of Koestler and Burnham from the CCF scene had more to do with their ideological cant. In September 1950 Koestler departed France

for the more congenial environment of the USA. His brand of fiery anti-communism had not made his life easy in the left-wing atmosphere of Paris, and he combined his departure with his resignation from the Congress's Executive Committee. James Burnham was able to persuade him to change his mind, and when Koestler was in the USA he met with Brown, Jay Lovestone, Arthur Schlesinger and other 'serious persons' in Washington. However, the turn away from radical political gestures taken by the CCF after Berlin, together with his own desire to return to more academic pursuits away from the strains of political engagement, led to Koestler's final withdrawal a few months later. Koestler's biographer David Cesarani cites a few possible explanations, such as 'nervous strain' and the fact that:

> Koestler was ill-equipped for organisational work: he was the worst combination of a perfectionist and a worrier … [T]he 'nervous breakdown' was probably just a pretext. The most likely reason is that Koestler was too much of a loner to persist in any institutional framework.[10]

Cesarani backs this view up with evidence that Koestler didn't succeed in belonging to any group endeavour for very long. However, it is more likely that Koestler's political stance was the deciding factor. In Berlin Koestler had placed himself well outside any conception of the non-communist left, arguing that 'European Liberals and Social-Democrats refer to themselves as "the moderate Left" which, if words are to be taken seriously, must mean that they differ only in degree but not in kind from their neighbours of "the extreme Left".' The Left and Socialism were becoming meaningless terms in the reconfigured political landscape of the Cold War, since now it was down to only 'total tyranny against relative freedom' and the particular shades of that freedom did not matter any more. Koestler's was not a message that endeared itself to those Europeans fully aware of the value of centre-left and centre-right social democracy for forging some kind of post-war stability, and he had been critically confronted by the British, French, Italians and others. Neither was it in line with the covert US policy to back up the European NCL – recall Braden's comment that 'socialists, people who called themselves "left" … were the only people who gave a damn about fighting Communism'. It is not surprising, therefore, that there were undoubtedly behind-the-scenes moves to take the Congress away from Koestler's grasp, and he clearly noticed that his attempts to continue directing operations were being increasingly ignored. Since the 1930s Koestler, along with many of his displaced contemporaries, 'had been searching for a political and ideological home', but whereas some found one with the Congress, Koestler's desire to control its purpose turned him from an asset into a liability. As he later said, 'I did not withdraw from this movement. I was made to withdraw in a gentle and effective way.'[11]

Burnham became similarly disillusioned with the turn away from confrontational politics and his own absence from the control room. For the meeting of the International Committee in Brussels on 27–30 November 1950, Burnham

contributed a whole list of requests. Wanting discussions with 'a real political and ideological content' and 'a clear businesslike agenda', Burnham outlined his wish for further steps towards an East European University for exiles, for resolutions opposing the Partisans for Peace, and to deal with the fact that 'there are already many persons who are anxious to have a conference held in Latin America, with small but important guests [*sic*] from Europe and from the USA.' Burnham also addressed the need to solidify support in Britain, having corresponded with Julian Amery 'to straighten out the Ayer–Trevor-Roper trouble' and 'to form a nucleus for Congress organization [*sic*] in England'. In addition, just prior to the November meeting, Burnham arranged with NCFE Director Frank Altschul to have 'a maximum of [CCF] material … speeches, addresses, and resolutions' broadcast by Radio Free Europe.[12]

Burnham's influence at this point was palpable. Although his plans for a Latin American conference took some years to materialise, reflecting the priority of other concerns (particularly European),[13] the Brussels agenda did include Burnham's proposal for debates with the Peace Movement and Josef Czapski outlining plans for an exiles university. He had also arranged, via the offices of Belgian associate Sylvain Troeder, a larger public meeting to coincide with the closed deliberations of the CCF Committee.[14] However, Brussels also demonstrated that the nascent organisation was being pulled in opposing directions. While Ernst Tillich, leader of the 'Kampfgruppen gegen Unmenschlichkeit' in Berlin (and whom both Koestler and Burnham had met in June), described his successes smuggling anti-communist propaganda eastwards and people westwards, François Bondy, the Swiss editor of *Die Weltwoche* and head of the publications committee, outlined his aim for a publication 'of high intellectual merit addressed to the world of culture'.[15]

In February 1951 Burnham wrote to Bondy to express his disappointment with developments in Paris. Burnham stated:

> From the beginning, my own conception of the political foundation of the Congress has been, and remains the same: what can be called an 'anti-communist united front', excluding only outright totalitarians (whether Fascists or Communists) and thereby comprising Socialist and non-Socialist, Right as well as traditional left, religious and non-religious, etc.[16]

Complaining of the 'Leftist bias' in the CCF as a whole, Burnham saw the exclusion of Gaullists from the Paris office as a grave threat to the 'united front' ideal. Burnham was particularly annoyed by the evident influence of Irving Brown and 'the Lovestone empire' on the Congress. Later the same year Burnham wrote to newly established General Secretary Nicolas Nabokov, expressing on two occasions that he hoped Nabokov and the CCF would take on some kind of supportive role with the exiles university. He also added:

> My own impression is that there are two primary deficiencies in the Congress work so far as France itself is concerned: 1) Publicly distinguished

individuals are not active in the work of the Congress; 2) There is too much tendency to make the Congress an 'office operation' – and not enough splashing in the open public world.[17]

Nabokov replied by listing the many activities the Congress was organising, but did admit that:

> our constant efforts should be directed towards proving to European intellectuals that the Congress for Cultural Freedom is
>
> > a) not an American secret services agency, and
> > b) not an organization in which intellectuals are being asked to accomplish tasks which to most of them are distasteful (public speeches, press conferences, public meetings etc).[18]

Nabokov also declared that 'I am afraid that I really won't have time to cooperate with [Czapski] on [the Free University] project, except perhaps in a very sporadic way.' Time may have been a factor, but it is more likely that through 1951 operational lines were being drawn up that regarded the university plan as an NCFE scheme and therefore separate from CCF responsibilities.[19] Burnham continued to support CCF initiatives, especially Nabokov's 'Festival of the Twentieth Century', but it seems relevant that he ceased to be a regular consultant for the CIA in 1952, by which time it must have been clear that he could no longer influence Congress business as he would like. The following year Burnham edited a volume of essays on America by a group of European 'observers who are friendly, objective, frank and loyal'. The contributors were all friends of Burnham and included Amery, Troeder, Czapski and Raymond Aron. Significantly, they were all 'not merely non-communist but anti-Soviet and anti-communist; they are all non socialist and I think that all or almost all are anti-socialist'. The message was clear: for Burnham this side of the European intellectual spectrum was being neglected.[20]

These arrangements, which effectively removed the explicit political agenda in favour of a Congress for *Cultural* Freedom, have led historian Peter Coleman to say that 'it is impossible to separate this *coup* – at once ideological and pragmatic – from the decision of the US Central Intelligence Agency to assume responsibility for the continuing funding of the Congress'. The fact that the manoeuvring of personnel and ideology in 1950–51 coincides with the formation of the IOD under Thomas Braden is, of course, an important correlation. It was not a smooth process to define the new organisation's objectives, approach, or major personnel, especially when public discussions were being measured against behind-the-scenes objectives. Conflicts of ideology and conviction were common, and took time to be overcome.[21]

Through the meetings of the International Committee in Brussels (November 1950) and the Executive Committee in Versailles town hall (February 1951) and Paris (May 1951), the CCF began to assemble a coherent organisation and

purpose largely at the expense of the combined influence of Koestler and Burnham. Lasky, so recently 'removed', was also not present at the first major post-Berlin reunion in Brussels, but was 'invited' for Versailles. Out of the Brussels meeting, and covering for the loss of the Lasky–Koestler fulcrum, came a secretariat of three Swiss: Bondy, philosopher and Europhile Denis de Rougemont, and René Lalive d'Épinay. Yet the way forward was still unclear. It was Koestler, with the formation of the populist Les Amis de la Liberté (aligned with the Gaullists), who had provided the Congress with an embryonic national organisation in France.[22] Also his pamphlet *Que veulent les Amis de la Liberté?* – where Koestler demanded that the CCF 'change the present confused and poisoned intellectual climate', and invoked Benda by claiming that 'if we fail we shall become guilty of another *trahison des clercs*' – was a powerful statement of intent on which the Congress could build, if it chose.[23]

It is not surprising, therefore, that at the following Executive Committee meeting in Versailles two major fault-lines appeared, first, between the CCF's role as an intellectual or a mass organisation and, second, between its cultural and political identities. Carlo Schmid, as might be expected from a politician, wanted to link up with political parties and trade unions in order to reach a wider audience for the cause of anti-communism, thereby taking the CCF away from purely intellectual–cultural interests.[24] The cultural/political divide came out further when moves were made for a follow-up congress to be held in Paris in summer/autumn 1951 under the title 'Peace and Freedom', or 'The Freedoms We Could Lose'. The goal for this gathering was 'to maintain in one part of its work a very high intellectual level' but not to be 'purely academic or theoretical', since everything should be 'put within the range of the general public'. The focus, reflecting the intellectual concerns of Koestler and his long-time colleague Manès Sperber, was 'to analyse the causes of confusion about the meaning of certain basic concepts such as "peace", "freedom", "democracy", "progress" etc, and to re-establish their true meaning in a series of well-prepared debates … '. Silone, again in opposition to Koestler's militancy, added the need to concentrate on Western cosmopolitanism and 'the belief in the spirituality of universal values', thereby making the CCF demonstrate that 'though repudiated by present day communists, internationalism is more than ever the basic condition of peace and freedom in the world'. For his part, de Rougemont wanted to invite a wide cross-section of thinkers from the European literary scene in order both to stimulate debate and claim greater legitimacy for the results. However, the proposed inclusion of Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Thomas Mann brought to a head the following question: should the Congress be antagonistic towards 'non-complying' intellectuals, or should it search further for common ground? Interestingly, de Rougemont's plan was opposed in principle by writers and intellectuals (including Raymond Aron, Stephen Spender and Nicola Chiaromonte) because of their dislike of aligning themselves with those who still advocated some sort of 'neutrality' towards communism. Key organisers such as Lasky and David Rousset, along with several members of the ACCF, could see the merits of attempting to

coopt major figures on a broad anti-totalitarian platform and supported the idea of a major public meeting. The division between the two groups gives an insight into the problem of fashioning a definite consensus on the CCF's goals at this time.[25]

By May 1951 the shift away from confrontational politics was highlighted by the emerging dominance of two figures, one publicly and the other more privately, in the management of the Congress: the composer and *bon vivant*, Nicolas Nabokov (cousin of Vladimir), and OPC man Michael Josselson. At the Executive Committee meeting that month Nabokov was appointed as General Secretary, with Josselson supporting him from the more behind-the-scenes position of Administrative Secretary. Nabokov had not been a unanimous choice, and his selection proves the way things were moving in terms of where the decisions were being taken. In particular, Irving Brown (with Koestler's backing) had proposed Louis Fischer, and had received 'a rather good reception' for his candidacy from Silone and George Altman. It is clear that Brown, who also canvassed Schmid, Rousset and Eugen Kogon on the matter prior to the Brussels meeting, was keen to gather a group of supporters to push Fischer through. But Nabokov had the heavyweight support of Josselson, most of the New York intellectuals, and, back in Washington, among others George Kennan and Charles Bohlen. Sidney Hook for one stated two criteria for deciding on the right person: 'First, he should not be an American. Second, if possible, he should not have been too closely identified in the past with the Communist movement.' Hook ruled out Fischer and went on to suggest de Rougemont for General Secretary and Nabokov as 'assistant'. It is clear that Brown was frustrated not to be able to find someone who was acceptable to all parties on both sides of the Atlantic and was somewhat disillusioned after Brussels – 'I found too much opposition to the candidacy of Louis Fischer for a number of reasons which I'd rather not write about.'[26] Writing to Fischer afterwards, Brown said this:

> I am still convinced that you would have been ideal for directing the organization. I am still skeptical about how the present machinery will operate … [I]t is somewhat discouraging to have to deal with intellectuals whose sense of organization is quite weak. In addition, the real intellectual members of the Executive Committee do practically nothing … Much more could be done if we had a driving militant leader as organizer.[27]

Nabokov had been one of the more fiery orators in Berlin – 'out of this Congress we must build an organization for war' – and it would seem that he too could have been, potentially, 'a driving militant leader' for the Congress. Burnham supported Nabokov's candidacy, writing to him in June 1951 to urge him to remain with the CCF instead of leaving 'for a job on George Kennan's Russian affair'. Nabokov therefore came to the CCF position with the backing of the American intellectuals of the ACCF in the expectation that he would continue the hard-line Koestler strategy. But the flamboyant Nabokov was also exactly the theatrical impresario that the Congress needed at that time. A

Russian emigré who had known Josselson since Berlin in the 1920s, in 1945 Nabokov served with the US Strategic Bombing Survey in Germany before joining the 'deNazification' programme of the music section of ICD at OMGUS. Able initially to satisfy both the Europeans and the more strongly anti-communist Americans, Nabokov soon steered a course away from direct political engagement and began to indulge his cultural tastes to the full.[28]

In Brussels Nabokov had been aware of the tensions between the different factions that were beginning to come out. Presenting a report on the 'Essential Aims of the Congress', Nabokov stated that:

> the action of intellectuals should be intensified by greater cohesion between the free intellectuals of all philosophical tendencies … It is evident that we must find for that some solid and profound ideological basis which will become our common way of working.[29]

In May at the Executive Committee meeting, Nabokov decisively replaced discussion on the next conference with a grander scheme for a month-long festival to be held in Paris in 1952 entitled 'Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century'. This intervention was a plan not a proposal – he gave an outline of the major musical, artistic and literary events to be held, the composers to be present, the works to be performed, and the orchestras that would perform them. It was a virtual *fait accompli*, all the more remarkable when gauged against the considerable amount of work that had already gone into the 'Peace and Freedom' conference plan. The delay in the winter of 1950–1 over the General Secretary's position had to be rectified swiftly, and this was the result. Burnham was enthusiastic, but his added comment that 'the approval here is not unanimous' displayed the growing divisions between European and American perceptions over the direction of the CCF. Silone supported it, since this plan was closer to his vision of a cosmopolitan Congress supporting Western cultural-spiritual values not 'in a collective and anonymous way but as *a Western intellectual personality* directly addressing another Eastern personality'. The Congress would thus speak as the voice of the Western intellectual–cultural tradition against the forces that threatened it – communism and the Soviet Union. Whereas de Rougemont's proposal was still based on the targeting of individuals of high status (e.g. Sartre), Nabokov's plan instead sought to find the common ground that would unite all intellectuals around the defence of cultural values. Thus the festival aimed to place the apolitical values of high culture into a deliberately charged political context – and to gain political rewards as a result.[30]

The advent of the Nabokov–Josselson leadership, with de Rougemont remaining in the prominent position of President of the Executive Committee, points to a concerted effort by the CCF's backers in the CIA to get the institution established as a living entity with a precise identity. Josselson now became the structural organiser and the manager of the budget. The amounts passed to the Congress were initially worked out on a gradual year-by-year, period-by-period

basis. Tom Braden, in charge of the International Organisations Division from 1951 to 1954, did work within a budget (although what the limit was remains unclear) and was contacted regularly by Josselson (via de Neufville or others) with proposals for the amount of funding required and the agenda that the CCF would follow. There is no question that the Congress, once it became a fully operational publisher of journals and organiser of conferences in the early 1950s, was a very expensive operation. Braden recalled later that in what was probably 1954 he passed about $800,000 to $900,000 to the Congress. Financial accounts for 1955 show a total income for the Congress of $860,619.01; for 1956, it was $960,895.78; for 1959, $1,200,720.97. By 1966 total expenditure for the Congress had reached $2,070,500.[31]

The CIA, its financial freedom ensured by the 1949 Central Intelligence Act, channelled the money to the CCF (and many of its other operations) via its remarkable network of 'dummy' philanthropic foundations and willingly 'witting' allies among the corporate elites. The CIA apparently 'adopted' about thirty of the 15,000 already existing foundations in the US for this purpose.[32]

> The CIA's intrusion into the foundation field in the 1960s can only be described as massive. Excluding grants from the 'Big Three' – Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie – of the 700 grants over $10,000 given to 164 other foundations during the period 1963–66, at least 108 involved partial or complete CIA funding.[33]

The big three foundations, Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie, were reluctant to involve themselves in covert activities for fear of damaging their own schemes abroad. Although the Ford did fund the Congress seminar programme from 1957 onwards, it was never more than a bit player in Congress funding. Neither was the Rockefeller Foundation fully committed to the Congress. While it gave $10,000 towards the Science and Freedom conference in Hamburg in 1953, $12,000 to support the Science and Freedom Committee that grew out of the conference, and $10,000 to sponsor the CCF's International Competition of Musical Composition in 1954, a request for funding towards the showcase 'Future of Freedom' conference in Milan in 1955 was rejected, probably because of its more political overtones.[34]

However, apart from the big three, the Agency had other favourite conduits. For the Congress, this was mainly the Hoblitzelle and Farfield Foundations. Between 1961 and 1966 at least $430,700 reached the CCF through the Hoblitzelle, which, with Karl Hoblitzelle being chairman of the Republic National Bank of Dallas, and another trustee, James Aston, being a board member of American Airlines, Lone Star Steel and the Texas Research Foundation, was at the centre of the Texas big business establishment.[35]

The Farfield Foundation was ostensibly a philanthropic body set up with the purpose of funding 'organisations, groups and individuals which are engaged in … revealing to the nations and peoples of the free world the inherent dangers which totalitarianism poses'. The foundation was officially incorporated on 30

January 1952 in order to ease payments across the Atlantic for Nabokov's Festival of the Twentieth Century to be held in Paris that May. Through summer and autumn 1952, the Farfield was steered towards becoming the main financial donor for the CCF, with a first sum of $60,000 deposited with the CCF's American Express account in Basle on 30 October. The president of the Farfield until 1962 was Julius Fleischmann, a Cincinnati millionaire and a patron of several cultural institutions including New York's Museum of Modern Art, the Boston Museum of Contemporary Arts, and the New York Metropolitan Opera, and himself a former director of Ballet Russe de Monte Carlo and the Ballet Foundation of New York. Fleischmann, who had served as a naval attaché in intelligence in London during the war, was also a member of the NCFE and was certainly well connected. When Stephen Spender's application for a visa to teach at the University of Cincinnati was held up for unknown reasons in early 1953, Josselson cabled Fleischmann to 'urgently request [he] telephone State and any other influential friends to have Spender visa granted immediately'. Josselson also used the Farfield as a contact source, requesting in 1952–3 'a list of wealthy American philanthropists' (such as Nelson Rockefeller, John Hay Whitney, Lucius Clay and C.D. Jackson) and their office addresses 'in order to keep them informed of our activities' and hopefully 'rouse their interest'. Efforts were clearly made to cultivate the Rockefeller connection. In early 1953 Josselson asked Fleischmann to contact Nelson Rockefeller 'directly and personally' with information on the Spanish CCF journal *Cuadernos*, since 'Mr Rockefeller who as you know is always interested in Latin American affairs should somehow be briefed about our activities and present plans there'.[36]

Fleischmann's Farfield had a coterie of trustees from the corporate elite such as publishers Cass Canfield and Gardner Cowles, New York lawyer William Heuvel, and William Burden, whose positions over the years (Director of Hanover Bank, trustee of Columbia University, Director of CFR, President of MoMA, trustee of Institute for Defence Analysis) placed him somewhere near the centre of the American establishment. It is interesting to note how this part of the funding operation was kept completely above board, with Fleischmann cabling Josselson in autumn 1952 that 'no grant possible until receipt of written formal request' (*sic*) to the Farfield board. About 80 per cent of Congress money was channelled through the Farfield, but the well-known extent of Fleischmann's wealth meant he was a good front-man for such an operation. Efforts were also made to incorporate Fleischmann into the Congress structure with a definite position, apparently at Fleischmann's request. Initially the suggestion was that Fleischmann could become the first vice-president of the CCF, thereby avoiding the potential difficulty that 'an extension of our Executive Committee in the American direction would have [a] psychologically bad effect'. However, Fleischmann was indeed accepted on to the Executive Committee in June 1953, his presence as an additional American balanced by the simultaneous admission of Hungarian emigré Michael Polanyi (at that time a resident of Britain).[37]

The cultural agenda I: *Preuves* and *Encounter*

For the longevity of the Congress it was one thing to hold high-profile confer-ences on major themes in order to bring Western-orientated intellectuals together for a show of consensus, but quite another to hold this consensus together in the interim periods. As discussed above, the differing opinions between various indi-viduals and national groups, and especially the divide between American and European perceptions over the direction the Congress should take, were poten-tially destructive unless carefully managed. What was needed was a more permanent intellectual locale (or series of locales) around which the CCF's particular political–cultural outlook could coalesce and be more clearly defined. If this could be accomplished, then the Congress's chance of becoming a refer-ence point, if not *the* reference point, for the orientation of the post-war anti-communist intelligentsia would be assured. And the best way to achieve this would be through the creation of a series of high-quality, trustworthy mouth-pieces to express the public identity of the Congress on a regular basis. While several journals were founded (for instance *Cuadernos* in Spanish for Latin America, *Tempo Presente* in Italy run by Silone and Chiaromonte, *Quest* in India, and *Quadrant* in Australia), the two most important, *Preuves* in Paris and *Encounter* in London, will be considered here.

Prior to Nabokov's Masterpieces festival came the first result of the post-Berlin discussions – the French cultural journal *Preuves*, inaugurated in March 1951 as a Congress monthly intellectual–political review and newsletter of thirty pages in length under the stewardship of François Bondy. Bondy was a valuable asset for the CCF in this transition period from Berlin to Paris. A representative of the 'Mitteleuropa' intelligentsia of the early twentieth century, Bondy was a key linkman among this 'exiled generation'. As he said later, 'the preoccupations for *Preuves* were German–French reconciliation and European unification'. It was Bondy's cosmopolitanism, related to his youth in Berlin and journalism in both Switzerland and France (he was attached to the anti-PCF journal *Que Faire?* before the Second World War), enabled him to be confirmed as editor of the CCF's first major publishing venture at the Executive Meeting in May. As with everything in this period, the decision did not come without considerable internal strife, since two others were in contention for the position: Manès Sperber, the Hungarian friend of Malraux who had worked with Koestler in 1938 on Willi Münzenberg's journal *Die Zukunft* and was consistently active with the Congress throughout its whole existence, and Suzanne Labin, a member of the Socialist SFIO who had been prominent in the French delegation to Berlin. The delay in confirming Bondy was also related to differences in opinion over how *Preuves* should be pitched in the French scene. Aron for one wanted a more news-based weekly, since the monthly journal market was already highly compet-itive.[38]

The journal attempted to present itself in line with CCF policy as an inde-pendent critical review against the abuses of power and demagogy everywhere, including the USA. George Kennan contributed an early piece on the possible threat of a hardened anti-communism to American democracy. The 'Negro

Question', one of the weakest areas in the American claim to democratic sincerity, was also addressed, as it had been in Berlin the previous year by African-American author George Schuyler. In addition (and not surprising considering Brown's influence at this stage), *Preuves* published a symposium in response to the critical work of Daniel Guérin, *Où va le peuple américain?*, which had openly attacked the American union movement for becoming conformist and betraying its principles. Significantly, the reply to Guérin was contributed by two Americans and two Frenchmen, it being essential to demonstrate an Atlanticist united front on this issue.[39]

Bondy steered *Preuves*, which means 'proof' or 'evidence', according to several principles: The defence of European cultural values against Stalinism, the dissociation of Russian culture from 'Sovietism', a consideration of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and a maintenance of a transatlantic dialogue on key political and cultural issues. Following the disputes over editorial direction and the gradual clarification of the CCF's funding, Bondy was able to transform *Preuves* in October 1951 into a fully fledged cultural review modelled on the format and outlook of *Der Monat* and with the aim of being comparable in style to *The Nation* and *The Spectator*. It then began to reflect more closely the settled dimensions of the Congress, attempting to steer a path between the political left and right and aiming to speak the voice of the free-thinking post-war European mind and European cultural values in a synthesis with the critical American intelligentsia under the banner of an Atlantic community.[40] As Bondy declared in the editorial frontispiece to each issue, the intention was to defend critical and creative thought against the restrictions of political demands everywhere. The journal was therefore:

> giving a voice to intellectuals holding a diverse array of tendencies, speaking freely and responsibly in their own name: their testimony provides *Preuves* with the critical spirit which is our best weapon against the huge deceptions of the shackled intellect.[41]

Bondy lived by this creed, demanding complete editorial freedom from Nabokov and the CCF's Executive Committee in June 1952, and threatening to resign if this was not upheld. *Preuves*' integrity (and chances of survival) relied on this independence. The mix of high culture and Cold War politics, or indeed their inseparability, was now its defining characteristic. However, *Preuves*' anti-neutralism and pro-NATO stance did not sit easily with the prevailing mood of either the French intelligentsia or many among the political elite. Its appearance and consolidation through 1951 was a vital step for the Congress to raise its profile in the French-speaking intellectual scene. But it could never have survived without generous financial help. Coleman notes that the late 1950s were '*Preuves*'s high point – its sales were three thousand … ', an indication of the broad rejection and suspicion of its liberal anti-communism. The financial reports of the Congress show that for the year 1955 *Preuves* received, jointly with *Cuadernos*, $27,532.24 in subsidy, with an additional subsidy for *Preuves* alone of $3,827.52.

In 1956 'subsidy for publication of Congress magazines in France (*Preuves* and *Cuadernos*)' had ballooned to $166,637.46, with an additional subsidy for *Preuves* of $2,705.95. For 1959 a clearer picture is presented: *Preuves* alone received $77,283.01 in subsidy (via the Farfield Foundation). Yet its unpopularity in the 1950s has given way in more recent times to a re-evaluation of its long-term quality and impact, reflecting the fact that the limited number of sales is not a just interpretation of its influence in the post-war French cultural–political milieu. Whether *Preuves* ever fully achieved Bondy's aim to present 'not only an ideological journal, but a space for intellectual reflection' on contemporary issues remains debatable, but it did provide the 'crystallisation point' for the emerging anti-totalitarian intellectual scene in France.[42]

Preuves was followed up in October 1953 with the arrival of *Encounter*, a cultural–political monthly published in London. *Encounter* has always been the CCF's most visible contribution to post-war Western culture, and, since the CIA disclosure, at the centre of some of the bitterest recriminations. The reason for this, sometimes forgotten under all the questions over 'Who knew?', is that it did turn out to be a very successful venture into the world of literary politics.

The British contribution to the Congress up to this point had been limited if not frankly hostile. Against Julian Amery's participation and Russell's symbolic (but increasingly awkward) role as Honorary President has to be set the criticism of Ayer and Trevor-Roper, followed by the resignation of Herbert Read, the art critic and co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London, from the International Committee in September 1950 due to his refusal 'to defend culture by any organisational or political means'. After Read's departure Bondy significantly commented to Koestler that 'the English non-participation is our weakest point'. The general lack of interest among the British intelligentsia in 'fighting' an anti-communist struggle, especially one organised by Americans, was apparent from the beginning. Isaiah Berlin, who had worked in Washington, DC during the war for the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information and who knew the key Congress personnel and their supporters – Nabokov, Josselson, Kennan, Bohlen – was unwilling to lend his considerable status to the organisation. Instead, his opinion was that 'I do not think that the answer to communism is a counter-faith, equally fervent, militant, etc.' Yet if he avoided being 'intellectually institutionalised', the influence of his intellectual outlook and persona was clearly considerable on those who knew him. Schlesinger went so far as to mention in *The Politics of Freedom* that 'a full history of the NCL movement would have to include the key role of a brilliant Oxford don, Isaiah Berlin'.[43]

The only consistently active work was being done by T.R. Fyvel, the editor of *Tribune*, and Malcolm Muggeridge, the editor of the *Daily Telegraph* until 1953. Fyvel knew Richard Crossman from their work in the Psychological Warfare Branch in North Africa and was friends with Irving Brown. Muggeridge had travelled from the left (visiting Moscow in 1932–3 and working for the *Manchester Guardian*) to the right (MI6 during the war, followed by the *Daily Telegraph*) and Christianity, a path related to his increasingly jaded opinion on the prospects for progressive political change in general. Muggeridge was certainly a valuable

liaison between British intelligence, the CCF and the British intellectual community for the *Encounter* project, and Fyvel too became associated with the Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) when it began to support *Tribune* in 1951. Muggeridge had written after the Wroclaw conference in 1948 that he had 'decided sometime to do a general study of the Russian attitude to literature, science, and music, as that represents the most effective means of making communist and fellow-traveller intellectuals feel uncomfortable'. This was clearly a position that would fit well with a journal project such as *Encounter*, although Muggeridge would later not only proclaim disdain for the resulting publication ('dead fruit on the whole') but for the whole facade of the Cold War itself – 'It is about nothing. The very words which express it are becoming, on both sides, emptier and emptier, more and more turgid, laboured and tedious.' While it is difficult to point towards a definite origin, it is clear that plans for what Fyvel referred to in 1951 as the need for a new 'Anglo-American Left-of-Centre publication' were developing somewhat in parallel in the USA, Britain and with the CCF in Paris, both publicly and behind the scenes.[44]

Under the stewardship of Muggeridge and Fyvel the British Society for Cultural Freedom was founded in January 1951 and was able to present itself, among other things, as a credible foundation for launching a high-profile literary journal.[45] Discussions over who would be in control of the venture and who was to finance it were protracted over the next two years, the main difficulties being the level of acceptable control by the Congress and the 'correct' role for the CIA in a project close to the needs and aims of British intelligence itself. The proposed journal was meant to fulfil several roles: to confront the popularity of the neutral/left weekly the *New Statesman* (which, it should be noted, was popular in India), to provide a quality outlet for cultural and political writing in line with the Congress principles on the defence of Western cultural values, and to use the journal for the dissemination of an anti-communist cultural–intellectual identity in Scandinavia and, especially, in India and other areas of British influence in Asia. 'The urgent need to woo the intellectuals of "free" Asia (China having already been "lost") … explains the attention given in *Encounter* to Indian topics and writers, more than in any comparable journal on either side of the Atlantic in the 1950s.'[46]

Josselson had initially wanted this English-language journal published in Paris to avoid 'Anglo-American provincialism', particularly after an alternative plan had failed. Partly through Lasky's friendship with editor Michael Goodwin, the Congress had attempted to financially and ideologically coopt the journal *The Nineteenth Century and After* in 1951 (which caused its name-change to *The Twentieth Century*), but a rejection of CCF control over content by key figures such as George Lichtheim had effectively ended this development. However, Josselson's interest in the intellectual condition of continental Europe this time had to give way to a London-based operation. Through 1952 the co-editors, Briton Stephen Spender (literary material) and American Irving Kristol (political affairs), were chosen to share the management tasks. Spender, who dabbled with leftism or assertions of intellectual independence as the poetic mood took him, had already

professed his Atlanticism and anti-communism in *The God that Failed* and else-where. Kristol was a young veteran of the New York Trotskyite scene of the 1930s, and had gone on a similar rightist trajectory to many of his contemporaries, becoming assistant editor of *Commentary* and executive secretary of the ACCF in 1952–3. A mix of anti-communist stridency and high modernism, reflecting the incongruous partnership of Spender and Kristol, would set the tone for the early years of the journal's existence.[47]

The editorial to the first issue in October 1953, entitled 'After the Apocalypse', expressed the hope (strongly reminiscent of Koestler and Sperber) that 'words will once again mean what they say, and we shall be spared the tedious sophistry by which despotism could pose as a higher form of freedom, murder as a supreme humanism'. Coming six months after Stalin's death, *Encounter*'s arrival under this heading is notable for its confidence, self-assuredness and conviction that a new era was dawning. Clearly, for a journal that was intended to persuade readers to recognise the follies of neutralism, there was no better way to begin than by claiming that the battle was already over. Articles included work by Virginia Woolf, Albert Camus, Christopher Isherwood, C. Day Lewis and Edith Sitwell, with American political contributions from Kristol and Nathan Glazer (of *Commentary*), Leslie Fiedler and J.K. Galbraith. De Rougemont contributed the significantly titled piece 'Looking for India'. It was a cosmopolitan issue that included writers from six different countries.

'Inspired by the cultural ecumenism of T. S. Eliot', *Encounter* from the start sought legitimacy in the intellectual–cultural world via the appearance of major figures on its contents page. This was understandable although also somewhat overdone. Walter Laqueur later criticised the CCF and Josselson for being too much in thrall to big names, and *Encounter* was no exception. What was later remarked on, particularly by Conor Cruise O'Brien in his valedictory accusations during the mid-1960s, was how the success of the journal 'lay in inducing distinguished writers of high principle to lend unwitting support to the "more purposeful activities" of lesser writers', the latter being the ones who pushed a potent pro-Americanism under the guise of the cultural prestige offered by others. The first issue was a fine example of this, with the likes of Woolf, Sitwell and Isherwood combined with Fiedler's charged polemic against the Rosenbergs. The upshot of this politically was the sense of *Encounter* as an ideological 'Trojan horse' among the English-speaking intelligentsia, and culturally that it was out of date rather than a reflection of contemporary debate.[48] A.J.P. Taylor remarked presciently of the first issue that:

> the culture, whose freedom we are defending, is genuine, but it seems to have been going on for a very long time, and it is getting a little thin on the top … most of [the articles] are written by the elderly and the established.[49]

Would-be competitors such as Cyril Connolly's *Horizon* had folded, leaving a clearer space for the *Encounter* vision that resulted in impressive sales for such a journal (16,000 by 1958, 34,000 by 1963). Yet, despite such sales, subsidies

remained high ($77,089.88 for 1959) due to the determination to maintain its status as *the* cultural–political journal in the English-speaking world. Up to £200 was paid for contributions, certainly enough to attract erstwhile critics such as Herbert Read, and after 1955 the journal also expanded its interests (and its travel-writing itinerary) worldwide. Some have focused on the journal's politics as little more than propaganda and 'a very serious invasion of British cultural life', while others have regarded the cultural agenda of *Encounter* as a product of the prevailing mood and not an 'artificial' creation. '*Encounter* was born middle-aged … [its] negative conservatism matched the times', claims cultural historian Robert Hewison, who goes on to note that 'the two new literary magazines launched in the 1950s, the *London Magazine* and *Encounter*, exactly fit [the] description of a right-wing orthodoxy dominated by survivors of the 1930s'. Likewise on the terrain of its politics, for David Caute 'common sense and the history of *Encounter* … both indicate that CIA funds were not the *cause* of the magazine's anti-communist, pro-American orientation, merely a materially-supporting factor'. These arguments notwithstanding, a problem of cultural legitimacy has always surrounded the journal because of it being implicated in the anti-communist power structure in the West.[50]

Politically, *Encounter* was as one would expect: critical of the communist East, sympathetic towards the free West and its allies. The 1954 article series 'Democracy and its Discontents' emphasised the ability of the Western democracies to adapt to change and social pressures, whatever their obvious faults otherwise.[51] This was all very well, but as the follow-up series on 'The Intellectuals' made clear, there was no longer much space for any acceptable dissent to be expressed.[52]

These articles sought to chart some of the significant social changes that were occurring in the major Western states. Herbert Lüthy rightly pointed out how 'the rejection of a certain materialist vulgarity, which is all too easily caricatured as "Americanism", does constitute a kind of natural common denominator of all French intellectuals'. Likewise Golo Mann commented that 'the age-old conflict between the Western and the "pure German" intellectual has died down, for everybody is somehow pro-Western now and everybody a good German to boot'. These were important trends, and Lüthy and Mann were right to identify them. However, the dominant sense was that all major conflicts in Western society had been resolved, and that, as a consequence, any form of radicalism was no longer socially legitimate.

> During the 1950s intellectuals were no longer part of a revolutionary avant-garde rejecting capitalist society, and their political convictions no longer created conflicts and polarization. In contrast with the 1930s, they represented a constructive element in the contemporary Western world … [53]

Most remarkable in this respect was the growing association between *Encounter* and the reformist, Atlanticist leadership of the Labour Party centred around Hugh Gaitskell, a link cultivated by Lasky after he took over from Kristol as the

American editor in 1957. This was the consensus politics of Keynesian welfare state capitalism, and *Encounter* became its cultural mouthpiece. By this stage the journal was also paying more attention to regions outside Europe, the battle of ideas having expanded to the increasingly important Third World.[54]

Considering the involvement of several 'interest groups' in its foundation, it is not surprising that *Encounter* never seemed to satisfy any of them sufficiently. From the perspective of the ACCF, *Encounter* represented 'the policy of the Congress of playing down its anti-communist political role' and caused much dissatisfaction. Added to this was the annoyance of the editors of the New York journals *Partisan Review* and *Commentary* about the CCF creating a direct competitor to their publications. In 1951 Hook had floated the idea of the CCF promoting the 'progressive and international minded' *Partisan Review* and *New Leader* in Europe 'so that [Europeans] get some idea of the common community of freedom which actually exists despite practical differences'. But they could never be fully 'adopted' and an in-house operation was meant to be far more reliable. Added to this was the constant tussle between Paris (Josselson) and London (Kristol) over editorial policy, which was only settled with Kristol's eventual departure. Kristol was determined to retain editorial independence over the political content. As he said to Josselson in 1955, 'we are *not* a substitute for a sensible Social-Democratic weekly, and can't try to act as one … What we *can* do is to create a certain kind of intellectual–cultural milieu, which would in turn have far-reaching, but indirect, effects'.[55] Yet, with increasingly profound knowledge of the background to *Encounter*, how is one to understand it culturally and politically? Hugh Wilford has stated that:

> *Encounter*'s success should not necessarily be interpreted as a victory for the CIA. The main reason that it became so popular in Britain was that British NCL intellectuals bent it to their own ends, stopping the gap left by *Horizon* with it, and giving it the appearance of authenticity. It is not enough to read a product of the Cultural Cold War like *Encounter* as an unmediated expression of US ideology. It represented an ongoing, complex negotiation of European and American concerns and needs.[56]

The key issue here is authenticity. In the inaugural editorial Kristol and Spender had announced that '*Encounter* seeks to promote no "line"' and 'that it should regard literature and the arts as being values in themselves, in need of no ulterior justification'. It was for this claim that the journal was pilloried in the 1960s. O'Brien, before he became more outspoken in his criticism, commented that by avoiding a 'line' *Encounter* 'seeks rather to carry the impression that its anti-communist and pro-capitalist propaganda is not propaganda at all, but the spontaneous and almost uniform reaction of the culturally free, of truly civilised people'. O'Brien was quite right, since *Encounter* in particular (and the Congress in general) was part of a hegemonic system of cultural production that sought to produce 'concepts, systems and apparently "natural" understandings to explain who we are individually and collectively, who the others are, how the world

works'. What is more, it was largely successful in doing so. *Encounter* unquestionably presented itself from day one as the dominant culture, the bearer of normative cultural and political values, and the centre of the zeitgeist. And in doing so it was always intricately linked to the dominant political–economic forces in the West. Drawing on *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels, cultural historian Alan Sinfield has commented that 'the point is surely only sensible: those with material power will control institutions that deal with ideas, and that is why people are persuaded to believe things that are neither just and humane, nor to their advantage'. *Encounter* was a hegemonic journal of some sophistication, and it should be regarded as a remarkable piece of cultural production from the conditions of Cold War orthodoxy. But Sinfield also adds the crucial caveat to the above point on the material–ideal linkage, that it 'must not be taken too narrowly'. In other words, no hegemony can ever be complete. Other variables aside (subsidy, competition, etc.), *Encounter* must have connected to key aspects of cultural-intellectual conditions in the 1950s for it to have succeeded in the way it did.[57]

The cultural agenda II: the 'Festival of the Twentieth Century'

> The fountainhead of all treasons is loss of faith in the fact that freedom of expression is the one enduring source of any and every form of economic and political freedom. Freedom of inquiry and of expression is the one solid protection against the moral corruption that follows from use of power as final authority.[58]

Nicolas Nabokov, newly installed as CCF Secretary General by May 1951, came into the position with a plan to demonstrate the essential vitality of Dewey's statement above – the Festival of the Twentieth Century. Nabokov later claimed, typically, that he dreamed the whole escapade up 'during that nightless night' while on the plane to Europe for the May meeting, but it had a longer birth than that.[59] Nabokov's Festival in May 1952, largely prepared by him alone (although there was a nine-person organisational committee that included Fleischmann), was an impressive and ostentatious affair. A composer by trade, Nabokov concentrated mainly on the musical attractions. Works by sixty-two composers, predominantly of the twentieth century, were performed. There were Parisian premières for Alban Berg's *Wozzeck* by the Vienna Opera and Benjamin Britten's *Billy Budd* by the Covent Garden Opera Company. George Balanchine directed the New York City Ballet, and Igor Stravinsky conducted his own version of *Oedipus Rex* to the choreography of Jean Cocteau. The Boston Symphony Orchestra, at great cost, conducted a tour through Europe in April as well as performing at the Festival, a venture that Tom Braden of the IOD would later claim credit for.[60]

Works by Prokofiev and Shostakovich that were banned in the Soviet Union

were promoted as typical of the Russian culture being destroyed by the tyrannies of Soviet communism. Alongside this musical fanfare there were further attractions: an exhibition of 126 modern paintings and sculptures, ranging from Impressionism to works from the 1940s, organised by New York's Museum of Modern Art curator and ACCF member James Johnson Sweeney; a panel discussion on 'The Spirit of Painting in the Twentieth Century' that included Herbert Read and Lionel Venturi; a series of literary debates under the title L'Avenir de la Liberté (The Future of Freedom) that attracted André Malraux, W.H. Auden, William Faulkner, Allen Tate, James Farrell, Louis MacNeice and Robert Lowell. It was a spectacle of modernism that intended to portray the West as the protector of free expression and cultural achievement in response to the Soviet attacks on the decadence of bourgeois-capitalist culture. Nabokov wanted to wipe away Zhdanov's claim that 'the present state of bourgeois literature is such that it is no longer able to create great works of art'. Neither did Nabokov concentrate solely on the high arts. Searching for another coup, he also made efforts to secure the participation of Charlie Chaplin, or at least the première of his latest film *Limelight*. Chaplin, of course, had been one of the sponsors of the Waldorf conference in 1949, and he did not reply.[61]

Responses from those connected to the CCF were mixed. Nabokov, writing to Brown in early 1951, was convinced that 'it will again give a kind of sense and purposefulness to the dislocated and disintegrated cultural life of France and most of Europe'. Of course, European culture was very active in 1952 in contrast to the impression above that post-war chaos still prevailed. But certainly no-one had considered the need to present a large cultural festival that would claim to speak for 'cultural Europe' as a whole. Such a plan could only have originated from the broader transatlantic perspective of the USA, with a budget to match. Nabokov felt this was the best method to make a name for the Congress and 'gain more support for it among distinguished European intellectuals'. Burnham agreed, as long as it could 'play, in its own sphere, a major part in the struggle for the world' by offering 'a confident contrasting display of what they [the Soviet Union] and we have to offer in the arts, music and literature, and an answer thereby to the question which side represents the future'. Hook, along with others in the ACCF, found the whole affair a waste of money that did nothing for the Congress or the cause of cultural freedom, but Nabokov insisted afterwards that 'it was the only kind of action we could have undertaken here in Paris which would have established the Congress in the minds of the European intellectuals *as a positive, and not only a political, organisation*'. Brown, Josselson, de Neufville and Lasky were also hesitant about the festival idea. Lasky for one did not think it would affect European opinion one bit, and would rather have seen the money go towards more translations of writers such as Koestler for wider circulation. For Lasky it had the hallmark of Joe Bryan, friend of Wisner and former head of the OPC's eccentric Psychological Warfare Workshop (Bryan had actually been removed by Bedell Smith in 1950). But Lasky was not one to undermine the greater cause, informing Nabokov that the 'Festival outline strikes me as truly splendid'. Clearly, the push for the festival came from the Atlanticist

'power elite' in the USA. When Nabokov visited America in August 1951 to organise details of the festival, one of the people he met was C.D. Jackson, then vice-president of Luce's *Time-Life* corporation and President of the NCFE. Jackson was to be very satisfied with the results.[62]

In a progress report for 'accredited committee members' only Nabokov outlined the far-reaching goals of the festival: To 'establish the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Europe and the world at large as a powerful association of intellectuals united by a broad program to defend our culture against any form of totalitarian control'; to display 'the most important works of the creative minds of our century'; prove, in contrast to 'the sorry output of writers, poets, painters and musicians living under tyranny', that 'this culture, with all its richness and variety, even with its contradictory elements, could have been born only in a climate of freedom', and establish the CCF as 'a watchdog of this freedom'; 'counteract the hold exercised by the Communist Party upon the mind and will of intellectuals of the Western world, especially in the field of the arts'; to demonstrate American cultural prowess and emphasise that 'the culture of the United States is inseparable from the culture of Europe'. It was a formidable set of goals, such that the CCF 'must begin to exercise an influence comparable to that of the Communist Party in the Western world'. Facing up to the criticism that 'we are undertaking a frivolous project', Nabokov emphasised how 'the arts present in Europe – mainly in France and Italy – are one of the richest fields for our political activity'. The influence of 'psychological warfare' approaches is implicit.

> In order to achieve our aims, we shall build our publicity campaign progressively, emphasising chiefly the cultural impact of the exposition. Only gradually shall we begin to stress the political meaning of the exposition, the political side being inherent in the program itself.[63]

A budget for the month-long festival was drawn up. The costs for the concerts, operas, ballets, performers' fees, and administrative expenses came to $283,900. With expected receipts totalling $90,000, the resulting balance was in the red by $193,900. If one considers that this figure includes only $23,000 of the overall costs for the Boston Symphony Orchestra tour, the whole enterprise was a sizeable undertaking.[64]

The literary debates were based around certain broad themes: 'Isolation and Communication', 'The Writer in the City', 'Revolt and Human Fellowship', 'Diversity and Universality' and 'The Future of Culture'. On the whole, these debates didn't go far beyond the expected profundities of most literary gatherings. A highlight of sorts (and a great coup for the Congress) was André Malraux in 'The Future of Culture' symposium exclaiming that 'America is a part of Europe and does not propose an ideology distinct from our own.' Yet W.H. Auden, speaking on 'Revolt and Human Fellowship', looked past the obligatory statements on the need to oppose totalitarianism and provided an insight into the connection between intellectuals and revolution.

> Every revolution requires a counter-revolution which must be distinguished from reaction. The reactionary thinks that the revolution is not a revolution but a rebellion which can be crushed and the status quo reinstated. The counter-revolutionary realises the essential point of this revolution and defends this revolution against its own excesses. Every revolution, if it was not betrayed, would wreck the world. Against excesses of concentration camps, our duty is to be counter-revolutionaries.

Faced with the excesses of the Soviet experience, was the CCF an example of such a counter-revolution? In this scenario the CIA and several of the more right-wing members of the intellectual community would certainly have belonged to the reactionaries. Auden was pointing towards the need to rescue the tradition of the critical intellectual from its attachment to the Soviet Union as the embodiment of historical progress. But he wanted this to happen without abandoning the commitment to progressive radicalism itself.[65] The CCF's commitment to intellectual freedom and defence of the intellectual tradition has to be balanced by the management of this commitment within certain boundaries – one might say the 'boundaries to freedom' – which effectively outlawed much of the radicalism Auden was defending.

Responses to the festival were mixed. In Germany the festival's focus on twentieth-century experimentation connected with debates surrounding the social relevance and importance of abstract art and atonal music, especially in response to Soviet criticism of Western 'formalism'. In France the reaction was more reserved. Parisian intellectual life was generally hostile to the suggestion that the USA had anything to do with cultural modernism in any form. It was highly significant that the modern art was supplied by an American museum, and that the literary debates would have been a failure had no major American writers attended, which explains Nabokov's 'urgent SOS' to Hook in February 1952 to secure American participation. Malraux for one had said he would only speak if Faulkner were present. The French press on the whole reacted favourably to the culture, but could not disguise their dislike of how this culture was delivered supposedly thanks to the all-powerful presence of the USA. *Combat*, which had printed the CCF Manifesto and defended its principles in debate with others in the French press, referred to 'NATO's Festival', and the fact that Stravinsky, Balanchine, Schoenberg, Bruno Walter and several other famous names on the festival programme had migrated to and become residents in the USA before the Second World War led them to be sneered at as great 'Americans'. In a similar vein a report in the conservative *Figaro* (Aron's paper), commenting on the Boston Symphony being conducted by Frenchman Charles Munch, declared 'the Americans have landed, but under the command of a Frenchman', to which was added that twenty-three of the musicians themselves were after all French as well.[66]

Jean Cocteau, working with Stravinsky on *Oedipus Rex*, left intriguing insights on the festival in his diary. Commenting on the three performances, he was unequivocal:

> Triumph. The papers couldn't help acknowledging it … on account of the
> two radio braodcasts. They did so reluctantly and insultingly. Except for the
> paper *Combat*, the whole press is absurd, ignorant … Stravinsky and I are
> quite used to this procedure.

He added a word about his intellectual mentors, Stravinsky and Picasso, 'the two
men who have had the greatest influence on me. These two men of genius sepa-
rated by politics – about which they couldn't care less.'[67]

In December 1952 Fleischmann received the award of Chevalier of the
Legion of Honour from French President Vincent Auriol for this 'meritorious
contribution to Franco-American cultural relations'. Yet, while the goal of the
festival may have been admirable, its effect was to raise doubts as to the *continuing*
vitality of modern Western culture. According to Herbert Lüthy the air of
nostalgia suggested 'a commemoration of the "great Parisian events" of "*la belle
époque*"', creating the impression of 'a rearguard festival', criticism akin to that
levelled at *Encounter* a year later. Speaking at the symposium on 'The Spirit of
Painting in the Twentieth Century', Herbert Read offered similarly trenchant
criticism of the festival's outlook. Attacking the 'retrospective and complacent
attitude' present, he disliked 'in this Congress a spirit of withdrawal and defence
– the defence of a position from which we do not intend either to retreat or to
advance'. What is more:

> we have criticised the totalitarian states because they attempt to subordinate
> art to a political philosophy, because they demand that art should be, not
> only realist, but at the same time socialist. But we make the same mistake if
> we demand that art should conform to some supposed tradition of Western
> culture. Any determinist attitude towards art is absurd and futile.[68]

The CCF tried to rectify this in the coming years by supporting new talent: an
International Musical Competition for young composers and an International
Playwrights Competition held in 1954, and the 'L'Oeuvre du Vingtième Century
Prix' in painting for artists aged between 18–35 in 1955. These events were also
in line with Nabokov's goal of 'addressing the youth of Western Europe' who
have 'lost faith in our culture'. But, to maintain any form of credibility, the
Congress clearly had to move beyond the 'heritage' perspective of the festival
and provide a more constructive outlook in tune with the intellectual zeitgeist of
the contemporary world.[69]

The event achieved Nabokov's prime goal of establishing the Congress for
Cultural Freedom as a major organisation within European cultural–intellectual
circles, and in doing so the longevity of the CCF was assured. With influential
figures such as C.D. Jackson impressed by the scale of the venture, funding for
the future was secured through the ever-increasing capabilities of the Farfield
Foundation. The 'Masterpieces' festival also marked a crucial shift in the control-
ling apparatus of the CCF. Through 1950–1 the Americans had been central in
the grounding of the Congress and its purpose, an understandable situation

considering the role of Hook in 1948–9 and the effects of his mobilisation of the AIF at the Waldorf conference. But this influence from the New York intellectual scene began to decline from 1952 onwards due to both their criticism of the usefulness of the festival and their internal strife over how to react to the approach of Senator McCarthy's virulent anti-communism. When Nabokov wrote in his progress report that the festival was going to be more than 'a kind of "cultural fair" aimed at amusing and entertaining the Parisian snobs and international tourists', he was responding directly to criticism he had received on his visit to New York in August 1951. Nabokov's vision for the festival, which highlighted the weakness of Socialist Realism within the Soviet conception of the arts when placed against the whole impressive heritage of Western modernism, was not something for those wanting an explicitly political approach. Only Burnham on the American side could see the value of Western modernism being used as a 'political–cultural instrument' in this way. The CCF's move from the multi-directional possibilities of Berlin and after in 1950–1 to the politics of apolitical culture in 1952–3 therefore also involved the centralisation and solidification of the organisation and its personnel around the headquarters in Paris, at the expense, in particular, of the ACCF in New York.[70]

6 The end of ideology and 'The Future of Freedom'

> More than the West imagines, the intellectuals of the East look to the West for *something*. Nor do they seek it in Western propaganda. The *something* they look for is a great new writer, a new social philosophy, an artistic movement, a scientific discovery, new principles of painting or music. They rarely find this *something*.[1]

If the Festival of the Twentieth Century had demonstrated the commitment of the Congress to the cultural values of artistic innovation and freedom of expression within a free society, it was necessary for the organisation to then broaden this perspective by linking it with an overall interpretation of social, political and economic behaviour in the West that offered something more constructive than a negative anti-communism. What is more, after the death of Stalin in 1953, there was a need to rejuvenate the purpose and goals of the Congress and adapt its intellectual standpoint to a changing post-Stalinist era.[2] Only by putting forward a wider vision could it hope to maintain the participation of the diverse array of supporters it had gathered during and after Berlin. To consider the CCF as a hegemonic institution in the Gramscian sense requires that it should have provided an ideology which connected to prime economic interests and which could claim normative status. It is worth quoting at length from Jackson Lears on this point:

> In Gramsci's scheme a given group or class, as it develops in the economic sphere, finds some values more congenial than others, more resonant with its own everyday experience. Selectively refashioning the available spontaneous philosophy, a group may develop its own particular world view – an ideology that cements it into what Gramsci called a 'historic bloc' possessing both cultural and economic solidarity. The idea of historical bloc departs significantly from notions of class embedded in the Marxist tradition: it promotes analysis of social formations that cut across categories of ownership and non-ownership and that are bound by religious or other ideological ties as well as those of economic interest … [T]o achieve cultural hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc must develop a world view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, and they must be able to

claim with some plausibility that their particular interests are those of society at large.[3]

While the Berlin conference had dramatically opened up a large-scale transatlantic dialogue on cultural–intellectual values and identities in the post-war world, organisational conflicts and differences of opinion prevented much of a coherent position emerging prior to Nabokov's festival. An initial move in this direction, inspired by the defection of Polish cultural attaché Czeslaw Milosz, was attempted in September 1951 with the organisation of a 'closed' intellectual symposium for invited participants only, held in a castle in Andlau near Strasbourg. The meeting had two central questions to discuss:

> 1) How do we reach the mind of the communist intellectual?
>
> 2) The Diamat (Dialectical Materialism) is a persistent challenge of [*sic*] the free world. What are the ways and means to respond to this challenge and what common anti-Diamat action can be devised for the intellectuals of the free world?'[4]

This meeting marked an early but important shift in the approach of the Congress 'from an instrument of struggle against totalitarianism to an international forum for debate'. The CCF would instigate a series of small-scale seminars along the lines of the Andlau meeting, later in the 1950s, to focus on specific aspects of political and socio-economic change. But it was through the large-scale conferences in Hamburg in 1953 and Milan in 1955 that the political identity of the Congress became apparent: it was based largely on a common belief in the exhaustion of ideological motivation, to be replaced by a more practical 'empirical realism' as the basis for all intellectual endeavour in the social and practical sciences. As one commentator has put it, 'whoever receives honours for coining the phrase "end of ideology", all indications point to a group of intellectuals associated with the CCF as the source of its popularization'.[5]

The Berlin conference had been dominated by the theme outlined most forcefully by Koestler and Burnham, which stated that the political world had entered a new stage of development whereby distinctions between left and right were now meaningless. According to them, the excesses of the Stalinist dictatorship and the transformation of political action by the totalitarian regimes of the fascist right and the communist left had created a situation that demanded a kind of 'militant liberalism' devoted to the cause of freedom. These views became the basis for the 'neoconservatism' which, under the influence of Burnham, Kristol, and such journals as *Commentary* and William Buckley's *National Review*, had a major impact on the climate of American intellectual opinion in the 1960s and 1970s.[6] The contours of this position were pointing too far to the right for many associated with the CCF in Europe (and some, such as Braden, in the CIA), but it did at least provoke debate on the need for a social philosophy more accommodating to centrist perspectives. For the Congress, an outlook more akin to the subtleties and compromise of forging post-war coalitions for European reconstruction and

revival was required. In particular it should reflect the importance of the centre-left/centre-right political formations which had begun to dominate West European politics by the early 1950s, and whose leaders had provided the bridge-head for an alliance of US–European interests in the initial stages of the Cold War. In an article written a year after the Berlin conference by intellectual histo-rian H. Stuart Hughes, the configurations of the 'end of ideology' position were developed further. The threat of communism, in the form of an imperialist Soviet Union, had brought about the collapse of differences between intellectuals who previously advocated classical liberalism, democratic socialism or conser-vatism, such that the defence of capitalist 'free society' was now the prime goal:

> In such a situation the ideological differences – the issues dividing capitalist and partly socialist states – that now characterise the Western coalition may cease to be of much practical importance. Pressed by the same necessities, these states will doubtless begin to resemble each other … A temperamental conservatism and governmental intervention in economic life will both be required.[7]

It is worth noting that Hughes's argument was not taken up immediately by other observers. This is possibly because of the pessimism that he expressed when he referred to this end of political ideology as 'the new conservatism of 1950, the political philosophy of the last stand'. Such a bleak outlook can be explained in part by Thomas Molnar's observation that the end of ideology meant the end of (class-based) political ideals and the role of intellectuals in pursuing them. Under the conditions of welfare-state capitalism and the end of scarcity, the classless society was being attained without recourse to revolution or political strife, and the 'articulators of ideologies' were (for the moment at least) giving way to the scientifically motivated 'engineers of cooperation'. Yet it is important to recog-nise that the proponents of the 'end of ideology' considered themselves to be at the forefront of progressive political discourse and *not* reactionaries. As sociologist Daniel Bell stated in the introduction to his much-cited work on this subject, 'the perspective I adopt is anti-ideological, but not conservative … [A] repudiation of ideology, to be meaningful, must mean not only a criticism of the utopian order but of existing society as well.' This is similar to Seymour Lipset's claim in another influential book of the time (which concluded with the chapter 'The End of Ideology?') that he considered himself 'a man of the left'.[8]

The 'end of ideology' did not mean 'the end of history' – that would come later. But it did indicate an important shift in the contours of leftist discourse, one that reflected the wider changes going on in the fields of socio-economic and political organisation. The involvement of the state in the running of the economy and its responsibility for the welfare of all citizens were profound devel-opments in the early part of the twentieth century, coming about either due to the organisational needs for fighting the First World War (in Europe) or combating the Depression (in the USA). Very broadly, after the Second World War these expanded responsibilities of the state became more widely accepted as

a necessary means to avoid a post-war recession (in the USA) and to promote an egalitarian justice after the sacrifices of wartime (in Europe). These positions in Europe and the USA then became united ideologically behind the common need to undermine communist support, and practically via the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods institutions, and NATO. This convergence of opinion behind the absolute barrier of anti-communism necessarily involved a re-evaluation of the 'limits to the possible' from a leftist position. Connected to this was a reflection on what these far-reaching changes in political and economic organisation meant for social discourse as a whole. Within this process the contribution of intellectuals was paramount in two areas: first, to provide a broad 'window of explanation' for these phenomena; second, and more important for the interests of the political and economic elites, to legitimate these phenomena via a coherent intellectual world-view. The 'end of ideology' can therefore be situated in relation to Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony, which represented an 'equilibrium' of interests rather than one-way domination.

> This research will also concern the concept of the State, which is usually thought of as political society – i.e., a dictatorship or some other coercive apparatus used to control the masses in conformity with a given type of production and economy – and not as an equilibrium between political society and civil society, by which I mean the hegemony of one social group … exercised through so-called private organisations such as the Church, trade unions, or schools. For it is above all in civil society that intellectuals exert their influence.[9]

The developing socio-economic and political conditions of the mid-twentieth century also required a reflective understanding of the changing place and role of the intellectual in society. As Lipset noted, 'the common definition of intellectuals [as] critics of society and necessarily detached from it' had to be clarified.

> While changing political events have everywhere destroyed the utopias of the democratic left, prolonged prosperity, with its concomitant improvement of the relative positions of workers and intellectuals, has reduced the visible reasons for an intense concern with economic reform. The political issue of the 1950s has become freedom versus Communism, and in that struggle many socialist and liberal intellectuals find themselves identifying with established institutions. This identification comes hard to intellectuals … and results in a feeling of malaise which takes the form of complaining that everyone, including the intellectuals, is too conformist. [The] solution to this dilemma is to continue to feel allied with the left … to think of themselves as liberals – and often even as socialists – but to withdraw from active involvement or interest in politics …[10]

In this scenario Hughes saw only the formation of an anti-communist 'herd' mentality, and the potential danger this represented for the very liberties that

were meant to be defended. In contrast, the 'end of ideology' position could be more positively (some might say charitably) interpreted in the context of W.H. Auden's call for a progressive counter-revolution of the intelligentsia against the excesses of leftist dogma. The association of the Congress world-view with the 'end of ideology' is probably best understood as some kind of amalgamation of the worst and the best aspects of these two opposing viewpoints.

By unofficially adopting an 'end of ideology' line the CCF was therefore aiming to coalesce the disparate (and often disillusioned) elements of the post-war European intellectual scene around a practical theme that would confront the emotive power of the Soviet Union as the progressive society. As Coleman has put it, with less hyperbole than one might think, 'with the gradual disintegration of the Soviet *mythos*, [the CCF] felt itself in the *avant-garde*, at the very centre of a redefinition of civilization'. In doing so it was claiming not only the moral high ground against the despotism of a revolution in Russia that had gone awry, but also the right to position itself as the voice of the critical intellectual tradition. For Coleman, the 'end of ideology':

> was in a sense the basis of almost all the Congress's activity. It encouraged the factual and calm examination of totalitarian regimes; the celebration of the free world in festivals without artistic dogmas; and the building of an international community of intellectuals based on civility.[11]

Despite his pessimism, there is no doubt that Hughes's article fitted within a trend of thought that was expanding beyond the premises put forward by *The Vital Center*, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Kennan's 'Mr X' article and the Berlin conference. Ideology for this post-war intellectual generation stood for fanaticism, particularly in terms of the desire to make the world fit the ideological model. It also resulted in simplified, falsified judgements on reality, with everything being seen through 'ideological lenses'. Bell referred to ideology as the channelling of emotion and passion into politics, so that 'truth arises in action, and meaning is given to experience by the "transforming moment"'. Above all, there was a rejection of ideological 'moral certitudes … by which ends are used to justify immoral means.[12] In contrast, what the 'end of ideology' position advocated was to replace the faith of ideological responses with a dispassionate empirical method that could look at each issue on its own merits. This fits closely with Charles Maier's comment on the Marshall Plan that 'American opinion generally viewed the transition to a society of abundance as a problem of engineering, not of politics.' If intellectual discontent and revolt against Stalinism had produced the non-communist left, then the 'politics of productivity' and the synthesis of Euro-American interests further supported an acceptance of political consensus away from ideological strife.[13]

> [T]hose who championed the associative [corporatist] system saw it as a 'middle way' between the laissez-faire capitalism of a bygone day and the paternalistic statism of an Orwellian nightmare. In this system, partisan

politics would give way to managerial expertise, public legislatures would yield some of their functions to private forums, and redistributive battles would dissolve in material abundance in which all could share.[14]

This transformation was apparent in the intellectual communities on both sides of the Atlantic, but it was most suggestively formulated by a trio of American sociologists: Bell, Lipset and Edward Shils. Shils, who became involved with the CCF through his contact with Polanyi in 1952–3, had the greatest impact in combining the discourse of 'end of ideology' with the outlook of the Congress. For Shils, the end of ideology represented a claim that Marxist-based critiques were no longer applicable or even relevant for examining modern industrial society: 'political events alone have not discredited Marxism. Perhaps more important is its sheer unresponsiveness to the multiplicity of life itself.' Modern social science was moving with the times, Marxism was not.[15] The relevance of this should not be lost, since it indicated the projection of the dominant principles of American social science to Western Europe via the CCF. In some notes on the importance of Sinclair Lewis's novel *Babbit* for an understanding of the development of the 'American mind', Gramsci felt it indicated 'that a new American civilisation is being born that is aware of its strengths and its weaknesses. The intellectuals are [beginning] to be a real superstructure and not only an inorganic and indistinct element of the structure-corporation.' These comments should be matched with his observations on 'Americanism and Fordism':

> The problem is not whether in America there exists a new civilisation, a new culture, even if only as a 'beacon', and whether it is invading or has invaded Europe … The problem is rather this: whether America, through the implacable weight of its economic production (and therefore indirectly), will compel or is already compelling Europe to overturn its excessively antiquated economic and social basis.[16]

Hamburg 1953

In July 1953 the CCF's first major conference since Berlin was held in Hamburg under the title 'Science and Freedom'. There were 109 participants from nineteen countries, the majority from Germany with 45, America with 13, Britain with 10 and France with 9. A cross-section of disciplines was represented, with the social sciences in the majority. As in Berlin, the German locale gave it a powerful Cold War atmosphere, and again it was a Social Democratic mayor, Max Brauer, who presided over the event. In his opening address Brauer followed the line of Nabokov's festival from the previous year, that cultural innovation could only occur in free societies: 'No scientific discipline can possibly develop its full potentialities when science and learning are forced into a condition of dependence upon some overriding authority … Every subjection of science destroys the progress of science.' Having posed the all-too-recent oppression of Fascism and the continuing threat of 'Bolshevism', Brauer then

demanded that the scientific community stand up for their responsibilities as intellectuals with a public role:

> It becomes the duty of the scientist to come out into the arena of public life and fight for his own freedom and for that of the body of knowledge entrusted to him. If the truth is to be victorious we need a militant spirit on the part of the academic community; the militant will of free science.[17]

This was a vibrant call to arms, and de Rougemont upped the stakes in his following address by declaring that 'science appears to us at the present time to be even more seriously threatened by the tyrannies of modern dictatorship than the arts'. To back these themes up an impressive Sponsoring Committee had been assembled that included Nobel prize-winning physicist Arthur Compton, Otto Hahn and Lise Meitner (the scientists who had demonstrated nuclear fission in 1939), philosopher of logic Ernest Nagel, philosopher of existentialism Karl Jaspers, and nuclear physicist Robert Oppenheimer. The latter was a highly significant choice. Michael Polanyi, President of the Organising Committee for Hamburg, had outlined three underlying principles behind the conference: 'to clarify the philosophical foundations of the idea of freedom in science', to raise awareness of the conditions for the scientific community in the Soviet Union and to examine the problems of scientific activity in the 'free countries'. During 1952–3, Oppenheimer, the leader of the Manhattan Project that had built the atomic bomb, was increasingly under suspicion by the FBI and others in government because of his criticism of plans to go ahead with developing the H-bomb. In 1954 Oppenheimer was declared a security risk and stripped of his status within the government-sponsored scientific community. A high-profile 'scientist of conscience', Oppenheimer would attend other Congress events in the 1950s. With this episode as a backdrop to the conference, it is revealing to read the presentation of Samuel Allison, the Director of the Institute for Nuclear Studies at the University of Chicago, on the subject of 'Loyalty, Security and Scientific Research in the United States'. Promoting the classic image of the USA as a 'melting pot' society able to amalgamate a variety of clashing opinions (including communism), Allison began his paper by quoting Shaw: 'The degree of tolerance available at any moment depends on the strain under which society is maintaining its cohesion.' The threat of nuclear conflagration was indeed putting strains on the American body politic, but Allison also foresaw that 'the counter current of liberal and rational thinking will prevail', and that tolerance would increase once the threat subsided.[18]

Polanyi, born in Hungary, was a renowned physicist at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin before he emigrated to England in 1933. In 1940 he founded the Society for Freedom in Science to promote the ideal of a self-governing scientific community outside political interference, and his growing interest in the social relations of science led him to take a Chair in Social Studies at Manchester University in 1946. In his preface to the published account of the conference, Polanyi stated that the motives for setting it up had been 'the collapse of the particular form of Messianic ideal which has increasingly domi-

nated European political thought since the birth of the idea of progress …
[T]his delusion collapsed after a head-on collision with its own embodiment in
the Soviet Communist system.' Strikingly, Polanyi portrayed the conference as
part of a line of dissent against this false ideal that began with the Kronstadt
rising in 1921 and that was further demonstrated by the outbreak of resistance
against the communist government in East Germany in June 1953. Kronstadt
was 'the first stage in the resurrection of liberalism which is today gaining
strength in every part of Europe … It was our task to consolidate a small sector
of the intellectual front advancing on this historical line towards the reconquest
of freedom.' Although Coleman claims that Hamburg was not meant to be 'a
fighting conference' like Berlin, the opening addresses suggest otherwise. Out of
the conference came another CCF journal, the bi-annual bulletin *Science and
Freedom* edited by Polanyi. 'Of all the Congress's publications in the 1950s it was
the closest to being a civil liberties journal', focusing on such topics as apartheid
in South Africa, racial segregation in the USA and the abuse of civil rights in
Franco's Spain. In his closing address in Hamburg, Nabokov referred to the fact
that so many intellectuals had been forced to become migrants because of polit-
ical repression in the previous twenty years. In a comment that could be related
to the CCF, he said that 'we emigrant intellectuals … are bound to believe more
fervently than ever in the absolute validity of untrammelled freedom for the
human spirit'. Yet Polanyi's publication did not successfully add to the network of
journals through which the Congress was maintaining its diverse intellectual
community and it is possible that the lack of financial support for the venture
from the CCF was related to the more controversial topics that Polanyi chose to
publicise.[19]

Milan 1955

Two years after Hamburg, another major conference was held, in Milan in
September 1955, and it was here that the CCF became most associated with the
'end of ideology' thesis. Already, in December 1953, Polanyi, through his posi-
tion as head of the Congress Science and Freedom committee, initiated the
organisation for the gathering under the title 'The Future of Freedom'. The
choice of Italy came ostensibly from the several Italian members on Polanyi's
committee, but strategically it is clear that after Germany (Berlin 1950,
Hamburg 1953) and France (Paris 1952) Italy was an obvious target for a major
Congress manifestation. In 1954 Nabokov travelled to Italy on a fact-finding
mission to decide on the location, and it was Milan, with its dominant social-
democratic politics (similar to Berlin and Hamburg) and significant academic
institutions, which was chosen. Polanyi worked with an organising committee
that included Lasky, de Rougemont, Hook, Raymond Aron and C.A.R.
Crosland, and it was they who selected the eventual 140 delegates, predomi-
nantly economists and social scientists, who attended the five-day gathering.[20]

   Polanyi's impulse for Milan, in line with his switch from physics to social
science, came from his wish to address the significant political and socio-economic

changes that were occurring in the post-war West. It was meant not only to represent 'the most diverse views in economics, sociology, and political philosophy', but also to provide a forum for 'some fresh insight' into the changing contours of contemporary reality. Echoing the language of the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer had been a participant in Hamburg), the conference envisioned that the nineteenth-century belief in inevitable human material and spiritual progress had been brought into question by totalitarianism and 'the inner imperatives of an industrial–technological civilisation'.

> The vocabulary of politics, like the realities it reflects, is in a state of transition. What remains of the venerable and simple antithesis: 'capitalism vs. the state', 'progress vs. economic planning', 'the individual vs. the state', 'progress vs. reaction', 'left vs. right', 'freedom vs. authority'? … Beneath the surface of everyday political discussion and controversy, there are already signs of a tendency to rethink our conventional political ideas in the light of recent history. We believe the moment opportune for this tendency to become articulate.[21]

Above all, it was suggested that the distinction between capitalism and socialism was becoming blurred due to the greater acceptance across the political spectrum, albeit still within limits, of state intervention in the economy. Crucially, the old liberal tenet of freedom from the state no longer appeared to hold, since the state was now playing a fundamental role in socio-economic management. Polanyi was therefore guiding the Congress towards a re-examination of the central values of liberalism, a task that followed logically from those ideas discussed by the CCF in 1950–1 for a redefinition of political vocabulary ('peace', 'freedom', 'progress', etc.) to provide 'a better understanding of the values which are the foundations of a free world'.[22]

   The result, according to Lipset, was that 'the ideological issues dividing left and right had been reduced to a little more or a little less government ownership and economic planning'. The stimulus for Lipset's 'end of ideology' thesis came from his experience at the Milan conference, where he came across what seemed to be a dramatic shift in Western politics.

> The fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognised that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems. This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action.[23]

For Lipset it was exactly the *lack* of political controversy which made Milan so significant. Likewise, in his report on the conference for *Encounter*, Shils spoke of

how 'almost every paper was in one way or another a critique of doctrinairism, of fanaticism, of ideological possession'. Milan represented the solidifying of 'the turning-point to which we have come in the last years … the end of ideological enthusiasm'. It should be clear from this that the difference in approach and outlook between the aggression of Berlin in 1950 and the more measured consensus in Milan in 1955 was considerable. Whereas Berlin had been a rallying call to the Western intelligentsia to stand by their intellectual heritage in the face of repression, Milan was detached from such a call to arms, instead treating the conditions and apparatus of Soviet communism as something to be examined as a socio-economic phenomenon. Berlin was a conference with its roots in the political struggles of the 1930s. Milan, on the other hand, was more in tune with the issues of its time. As Job Dittderner has pointed out, 'in 1950 at Berlin, anti-Communism was thematic. By the time of the Milan conference in 1955, anti-Communism was a presupposition.' This scholarly attitude was epito-mised by Hannah Arendt's paper in Milan, 'The Rise and Development of Totalitarianism and Authoritarianism Forms of Government in the Twentieth Century'. There was certainly more of an air of complacency at Milan that had not been present before. In the face of the claim that 'communism had lost the battle of ideas', making the whole gathering something of a 'post-victory cele-bration', Max Beloff demurred. That 'The Future of Freedom' took place may well have been a tribute to the values of Western civilisation, but 'only occasion-ally were we reminded that the chief task of the Western intellectual today is to bear witness for cultural values in his own society'.[24]

A major figure in this transformation of the Congress from 1950 to 1955 was Raymond Aron. Aron had taken over after the departure of Koestler as one of the prominent personalities on the CCF Executive Committee, and it was Aron more than anyone who moulded Polanyi's original ideas for the conference. Grémion notes how the Aron–Polanyi axis began to displace that of de Rougemont–Silone as the major intellectual influence in the workings of the Congress in the mid-1950s, thus marking a further transition away from the key personnel of the CCF's foundation. Aron had joined the Socialist Party in the late 1920s and had studied with de Beauvoir and Sartre at the École Normale Supérieure. In 1945, when Sartre sought to bring together a cross-section of political opinion for his journal of post-war intellectual revival, *Les Temps Modernes*, Aron joined the editorial board. But Aron's move to the right, becoming a prime advocate of 'realist' Atlanticism along the way, caused their separation. In 1947, Aron joined de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Français, while Sartre began forming the RDR with David Rousset, a movement Aron later admitted that he 'had not taken seriously'. In 1955 Aron achieved intellec-tual status in two important ways: he published *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, a diatribe against the illusions of the hard left and particularly its influence in France, and he became Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne.[25] In his book Aron attacked the central 'myths' of the left, the revolution and the proletariat, and finished his work with a conclusion entitled 'The end of the ideological age?' In line with Lipset and Polanyi, Aron also accepted that socio-economic and

political circumstances had changed dramatically due to new methods of organisation and planning.

> Imperfect and unjust as Western society is in many respects, it has progressed sufficiently in the course of the last half-century so that reforms appear more promising than violence and unpredictable disorder. The condition of the masses is improving. The standard of living depends on productivity – therefore, the rational organisation of labor, of technical skills, and of investments. Finally, the economic system of the West no longer corresponds to any one of the pure doctrines; it is neither liberal nor planned, it is neither individualist nor collectivist.[26]

All false utopias propagated by ideologies should be abandoned in favour of 'acting in accordance with the teachings of social science' and its rational, positivist detachment. Criticised in the French press for his negative outlook and prominent scepticism, Aron was later adamant that 'skepticism did not mean the loss of all faith or indifference to public life; I wished that thinking men … would no longer be inclined to justify the unjustifiable'. Like Lipset, Aron saw that the decline of ideological intent might mean the loss of some of the fundamental struggles that had characterised the democratic tradition, but this was only a reflection of the evolving limits to democratic politics itself. For Aron, it was not that capitalism was in itself unjust, it was more that its benefits were not being utilised or experienced by all. Through higher productivity and better socio-economic organisation within a mixed economy, poverty could be reduced and the very conditions which led intellectuals to advocate leftist strategies would disappear. *Opium* encapsulated the 'politics of productivity' in a highly articulate intellectual form. Aron also embodied an important shift within intellectual politics. Whereas in the 1930s the struggle between communists and anti-communists in the intellectual–cultural realm had often been conducted between writers, by the mid-1950s the social sciences had become the dominant field of contest. Aron's work, from the early 1950s onwards, was a reflection on 'the relationship between industrial society and democracy … and the role of the intellectual within these circumstances'. Significantly, several reviews made comparisons between *Opium* and Benda's *Treason of the Intellectuals*, indicating that Aron's book represented a similarly important engagement with the dilemmas of the traditional intellectual in the twentieth century. It is not surprising, therefore, that Aron, a figure of growing international stature, was one of the speakers at the opening session of 'The Future of Freedom'.[27]

Behind Milan's theme of re-examining liberalism lay the goal of connecting American and European social democratic thinkers and leaders to support the process of 'revisionism' among the West European left. It was hoped that an 'Atlantic alignment' could be fostered on the axis of the Americans for Democratic Action, the British Labour Party and the German SPD.[28] Noticeable among the national delegations were the nineteen British delegates, including five Labour MPs: Hugh Gaitskell (who became party leader in

December 1955), C.A.R. Crosland, Richard Crossman, Denis Healey and Roy Jenkins.[29] Together with seven academics from Oxford University (including philosopher Stuart Hampshire, political scientist Max Beloff and economists G.F. Hudson, Colin Clark and Peter Wiles), this was an impressive contingent in contrast to the rather lacklustre response of the British intelligentsia to the CCF in the early 1950s. In Berlin, the only politicians present had been the Conservative MPs, Julian Amery and Christopher Hollis. By 1955, with Labour in opposition and a bitter internal feud going on between the 'left' and 'right' wings of the party, the Milan conference offered another setting for the moderate social democrats in the party to join their political allies and raise their international status. Healey served on the Steering Committee for Bilderberg throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and Gaitskell also attended the March 1955 Bilderberg meeting in Barbizon, France. Crossman, the editor of *The God that Failed*, had previously been leader of the Keep Left group of Labour MPs determined to allow the Labour government to pursue its own socialist agenda separate from outside (i.e. American) influence. By the early 1950s, however, Crossman had abandoned ideas of a Euro-socialist 'Third Force' and was more in line with the majority of the party in his acceptance of American power and influence. Despite Crossman's unpredictability, he had three consistent political traits in the 1950s: an 'astonishingly undoctrinaire' attitude to capitalism, 'an extremely critical attitude towards the Soviet Union' and 'a far more sophisticated attitude to power politics than most people on the Left'.[30] Finally Crosland, on the Milan organising committee, would publish in 1956 'the most important text of the new revisionism', *The Future of Socialism*.[31] Crosland built on the legacy of Keynes that capitalism, successfully managed to ensure long-term growth, could provide the means for socially progressive ends. As Donald Sassoon has claimed:

> This is no marginal admission: if capitalism can promote growth, then socialism can leave well alone and concentrate on its remaining priority: ensuring an equitable social division of the fruits of growth … This belief was shared by all socialist revisionists throughout Europe in the 1950s, and was a necessary part of their new vision. It drastically revised the general view – held by many socialists immediately after the Second World War – that capitalism could not possibly recover successfully.[32]

The focus on capitalism, and specifically on the transition of state–market relations and the efficacy of planned production, was the fundamental theme behind the Milan conference. Just as the Marshall Plan brought to Europe the systems of large-scale technocratic management for solving all socio-economic problems, so the CCF became the public forum for the Plan's intellectual justification. One of the principal American participants was Harvard economist Professor J.K. Galbraith, who already in 1952 had proclaimed that 'there are no problems on the side of depression with which the American economy and polity cannot, if it must, contend' and who confirmed this optimistic thesis with *The Affluent Society* in 1958. Speaking in the seminar entitled 'Economic Systems: Their Aims and

Their Realities', Galbraith attacked the assumption of 'general rules' within social science, and particularly in relation to how the economy operates. Debunking the positions of the doctrinaire *laissez-faire* liberal and the *dirigiste* socialist, Galbraith pressed for an acceptance of the 'mixed economy' of state–private controls as the norm, and a successful norm at that. Thus 'individual cases must, to a quite extraordinary degree, be decided on their individual merits', outside any 'great unifying principles'. Wanting to avoid complacency, Galbraith ended by making clear that there was still some way to go to achieve this: 'We have yet fully to assert our faith in rationalist approach [*sic*] to social decisions.'[33]

Daniel Bell was another key figure within the growing dominance of American social science. A former student of City College, New York, Bell had been involved with the group of students (which included Lasky, Kristol and Lipset) who sought a critique of Stalinism from the left in the late 1930s. While Trotsky was the main influence at that time, Bell was more of a social democrat, moving from being co-editor of *New Leader* in the 1940s to labour editor with Henry Luce's *Fortune* in the 1950s. In his defining work, *The End of Ideology*, published in 1960, Chapters 1 and 2 came from his original paper for the Milan conference, and Chapters 14 and 15 were papers presented at Congress seminars held in Oxford in 1957 and Vienna in 1958 respectively. Bell has always been open about his debt to the Congress for providing a stimulating intellectual milieu, admitting also that 'I owe much to Michael Josselson, whose practical political wisdom was often ballast for political fancies'.[34]

Bell, like many of his intellectual contemporaries, became a supporter of the Roosevelt legacy and its continuation by Truman in the late 1940s. 'The New York intellectuals had taken their past and present and wound them into an overtly neat view of the New Deal as a blend of social democracy and evolutionary socialism', so that the American model of state involvement via the mixed economy became the best method to secure social stability and prosperity.[35] Echoing the pronouncements of William Clayton, Kennan and others around the time of the ERP (European Recovery Program), Bell stated in Milan that:

> It is not poverty per se that leads people to revolt; poverty most often induces fatalism and despair … *Social tensions are an expression of unfulfilled expectations.* It is only when expectations are aroused that radicalism can take hold … It is in the advanced industrial countries, principally the United States, Britain, and northwestern Europe, where national income *has* been rising, where mass expectations of an equitable share in that increase are relatively fulfilled, and where social mobility affects ever greater numbers, that extremist politics have the least hold.[36]

Commenting on the fundamental link between family enterprise and the ownership of property within the development of capitalism in Western society, Bell

stated that the growth of the more anonymous corporation within the USA was an important break with this tradition. In Europe, 'family capitalism' continued to hold a prime place in the economy, the result being 'caution, conservatism, and fear of allowing outside capital to enter into its affairs', a central reason 'for the slow rate of economic growth on the continent'. In contrast, 'the breakup of family capitalism may explain, in part, the "dynamic" nature of modern American capitalism, for the establishment of independent managerial controls has produced a new impetus and new incentives'. Following on from Paul Hoffman's vision for the ERP, Bell considered that the technological development of American capitalism made possible by corporate economies of scale was securing not only freedom from want, but also a whole new configuration of socio-economic and political relations. The automation of the assembly-line system was creating 'a second industrial revolution', transforming the concept of 'work' itself and undermining some of the central tenets of the leftist critique of capitalism.[37] This was another major shift from the outlook of the Congress five years previously. Whereas the ethos in Berlin had been the need to gather intellectuals around the traditions of the free-thinking intelligentsia in order to undermine support for the hard left, in Milan the message was that a well-organised economy would effectively undermine the basis for the hard left *in toto*.

Interesting in view of the consensus surrounding social democracy and the mixed economy in Milan was the presence of Friedrich von Hayek, who spoke at the opening session. Hayek, an economist at the University of Chicago, had declared in *The Road to Serfdom* that the spread of centralised planning in the economy was only the first step towards centralised control of social life in general. An avowed free market liberal, Hayek disagreed fundamentally with the proposition that state intervention in the economy had anything to do with the defence of freedom. Hayek's presence at the conferences in both Hamburg and Milan came about partly because Polanyi was a colleague in the Mont Pèlerin Society, a group formed by Hayek of liberals opposed to Keynesianism which first met in 1947. Polanyi's role with the Society for Freedom in Science from 1945 to 1949, and his concerns about centralised state controls, made him a natural ally of Hayek, and it is thus curious to note that there was a tension between Polanyi and Aron, the two principal creators of Milan, over the real merits of the planned economy.[38]

There were other dissenting voices within this scenario. In the session on 'Correspondence and Contrasts between the Economic Systems of the West and that of the Communist World', Peter Wiles raised doubts about the achievements in the West by claiming that the Soviet economy was in fact out-performing its rival. For Wiles the effects of 'Communist industrial efficiency', the removal of all opposition to centralised planning, and the lack of concern for consumerist or standard-of-living issues had created a situation where the Soviet Union could expand at a rate up to 3 per cent faster than the USA. The potential consequences of this, as Wiles said elsewhere, were considerable, not just in a military sense but more so because the Soviet Union could 'even run a genuine Marshall Plan of its own, and infiltrate the poor free countries

with technicians and managers'. For Wiles, the only way forward was for the West to raise production further itself, since there was little hope that a rich Soviet Union would be less ideologically hostile than a poor Soviet Union. Wiles was criticised most heavily for the lack of credibility of Soviet statistics on which his whole thesis rested, but, as Bertrand de Jouvenal said in a subsequent paper, 'admiration for the Soviet economic and social regime is very widespread among Western intellectuals; for many of them it outweighs the repugnance they feel for the absence of individual security and freedom of expression'. The Soviet Union was still 'crowned with a moral halo' because its industrial success was connected to an equally dramatic social revolution, and it was this combination which was of great consequence in terms of its potential impact in the emerging world of decolonised nations. Wiles's position certainly created some controversy, and although Melvin Lasky noted a level of scaremongering alongside the genuine academic concern, the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union only two years later soon added some remarkable proof of the Soviet Union's technological potential.[39]

Another dissenting viewpoint was that of Dwight Macdonald, who remained unimpressed by the 'clichés' on freedom expressed at the conference. Macdonald had been a strong contender to replace Kristol as American editor of *Encounter* earlier in 1955, but opposition from several in the New York intellectual community (especially Hook) to Macdonald's determined independence made Josselson decide to offer him only a one-year 'visiting editor' position. In Milan Macdonald was most unhappy about the arrangements for the seminars, since the conference held 'all its sessions *en masse*, which required that all speakers, even the ones who had written papers under discussion at the session, be limited to a maximum of five minutes apiece (sometimes cut to three and even two)'. The result was an almost complete inability to confer, 'with 150 or so delegates frustrating all attempts at dialogue through their sheer numbers'. Therefore, while some good papers were produced, there were limits to the circulation of personnel and the exchange of ideas, two factors which, for Macdonald, should have been the whole point of the exercise.[40]

> 'Freedom' is an extremely vague idea, and hence for a conference on it to be fruitful, it must either be somewhat delimited (as it was in the, I understand, more successful earlier conference in Hamburg on Science and Freedom) or else there must be some dramatic current issue (as was the case in the Congress's first conference, in Berlin, at the hottest point of the cold war). Neither of these obtained in Milan, where agreement was general, vague, and tepid.[41]

For Macdonald it was ironic that such a gathering should democratically allow everyone a voice while at the same time making it difficult to achieve any form of dialogue. This also affected the quality because it 'tended to level down; everybody had equal rights, but, alas, some have more to contribute than others; in a small round table, this would be resolved naturally … but here it was levelling

with a vengeance'. Therefore, while Milan tried to mimic the liberal–pluralist ideal of equal representation for a multiplicity of interest groups within a democratic system, the result was that no meaningful contestation of the conference's theme could develop.[42]

Macdonald appears most impressed by the contributions of George Kennan, who attended the Milan conference as a kind of '*eminence grise*' of Sovietology. It is fitting that Kennan, the architect of containment, was present. For Grémion, the arrival of Kennan in CCF circles signified the replacement of the aggressive 'rollback' of communism as advocated by Burnham with the more patient 'containment' approach as put forward by Kennan. Kennan regarded the line of the 'liberationists' as wholly mistaken: It would give the USSR ample excuses to deny any domestic freedoms, it had no coherent plan of who or what should replace the communist regimes once overthrown, and it was, above all, based on hubris: 'we were, as political conspirators, not that good'.[43] Yet by 1955 Kennan had been excluded from the US Foreign Service and was something of a footloose intellectual, disillusioned with the direction US foreign policy had taken since his influential days in the late 1940s. In contrast, Kennan was treated by the CCF as an important observer of East–West and US–European relations, and even on broader issues of social change. In response to his 1957 Reith lectures, which covered the issue of a possible disengagement from Europe by both the USA and the Soviet Union, the Congress organised a symposium in Paris, under the leadership of Aron, to contest Kennan's conclusions.[44] Kennan also took a prominent role in the CCF seminar 'Industrial Society and the Western Political Dialogue' held at Rheinfelden in September 1959. Organised by Aron, the seminar aimed to construct a dialogue on the possible future directions for Western socio-political and philosophical development in an 'end of ideology' age.[45] Robert Oppenheimer was also present at Rheinfelden.[46] The presence of 'exiled' former government insiders such as Kennan and Oppenheimer gave the Congress a stronger profile and credibility as an institution committed to the free expression of opinion and not as a mere tool of US foreign policy, even (or, perhaps, especially) if it dissented from the status quo. In July 1959 Kennan wrote to Nabokov that:

> I can think of no group of people who have done more to hold our world together in these last years than you and your associates in the Congress. In this country [the USA] in particular, few will ever understand the dimensions and significance of your accomplishment.[47]

Due to the later revelations about the CIA, Kennan's second sentence has proved remarkably accurate.

The turn away from Europe

Milan's support for socio-economic organisation as represented by the 'mixed economy' seems to reflect the fact that the corporate liberalism of the Marshall

Plan had finally found its advocates on the intellectual level.[48] The 'politics of productivity' and the belief in the possible solution to all socio-economic problems through the application of efficient expertise and technocratic management was now seen as the basis for not just the satisfaction of needs and social stability, but also the foundation for the continuing prosperity of Western cultural–intellectual values. Within five years the Congress had been able successfully to gather a significant caucus of European intellectuals together, both to oppose Soviet communism *and* to accept the greater involvement and influence of the USA in European affairs. It was especially notable that the French and Italian delegations (twenty-one and twenty-four members respectively) outnumbered the fifteen Americans.[49] As Job Dittberner has pointed out:

> That Western social scientists considered doctrinaire liberalism and socialism bankrupt was hardly new or surprising. Both had been under sustained attack since the last quarter of the nineteenth century … What struck a new chord at Milan was the extent and depth of agreement, a new consensus that a mixed economy was the only proper way to proceed and the only method that had shown any success.[50]

Yet how far can this presentation of Western intellectual consensus be taken at face value? For Dittberner, the conference was arranged to promote the idea of a decline in the efficacy of ideology by engineering as wide an intellectual consensus as possible, particularly in terms of who was invited and who not, even if 'end of ideology' itself was not an explicit theme as such. Milan's importance came from its normative approach to what would otherwise be expected to be wide open to debate. This is the most important point about Milan. The 'end of ideology' was obviously related to the broad anti-communism that the CCF represented, but its relevance spread beyond any simple attacks on the oppression of communist regimes.

> The Cold War may have provided the enveloping atmosphere for the end-of-ideology theme, and the theme was used as a weapon against Russia and the left, but it would be a serious mistake to interpret it only on the political level – to confuse the origin of the theme with its political use, intellectual content, and persuasiveness … At the Milan conference, the end-of-ideology … purported to describe an actual situation: 'successful' governments were not following the formulas of traditional political doctrines. And because those traditional political doctrines were considered bankrupt, the conference *prescribed* a flexible, pragmatic approach to political and economic problems. To attribute the end-of-ideology position wholly to Cold War passions would be slick political sociology-of-knowledge legerdemain.[51]

By 1955 the 'battle of ideas' in Europe had, from the CCF's perspective, apparently been won. It is worth noting that Thomas Braden, founder of the IOD (International Organisations Division) and the 'coordinator' of the CIA's

intellectual–cultural agenda, left the Agency in 1954 because, with Western Europe securely anchored within a Western alliance, he felt his job had been done.[52] Significantly, Milan pointed to a greater concentration on matters beyond European borders. This emphasis had been present before, particularly surrounding the formation of *Encounter* and the importance of India. The Congress had already organised a conference in Bombay in March 1951, the purpose of which had been to mobilise Indian intellectuals against premier Nehru's 'neutrality' and to establish a connection between South-East Asia and the USA. In February 1955 a 'Second Asian Conference on Cultural Freedom' had been held in Rangoon, where Indian delegate and CCF Executive Committee member Minoo Masani promoted the upcoming Milan conference as a forum where discussion of 'economic progress in the underdeveloped countries' would be a priority.[53]

Yet in Milan sharp divisions had opened up between the Westerners and the twenty-five Latin American, African and Asian delegates. For a start, it was probably the first time that Western intellectuals had been confronted by critics of colonialism from the lands themselves. Michael Polanyi commented that Milan had originally been planned with the idea that 'the decisive problems of our age were those raised in Europe by Europeans', but the interventions of Asian and African delegates had made him aware of how 'our European conflicts could be seen as a fragment, rather than as a whole of the contemporary scene'.[54] This gives an extra edge to Max Beloff's otherwise hyperbolic comment that Milan 'in some important respects altered the shape of our mental world'.

> When it was suggested that freedom in the sense of Western democratic institutions was not equally suited to every country, it was answered that this was the pretext for the maintenance of foreign rule; at best the existence of economic backwardness was treated as due to the negligence and apathy of the advanced countries; at worst, as the result of deliberate imperial exploitation.[55]

The success of the Soviet economy and its potential as a model for others was a strong factor, giving added weight to the contribution by Peter Wiles, and the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations held earlier in the year was ample evidence that many nations were not prepared to abide by the presumed clear-cut rules of an East–West confrontation. It is understandable that some of those who came to Milan from other parts of the world wanted to discover what Western democracy stood for and what it could offer them. The positive and negative aspects of Soviet communism were becoming well documented, but what were the real values of the West, and, with questions of independence looming larger for many countries, what could the colonial powers offer their former colonies in a rapidly changing world? For Bell, the states of Africa and Asia were forging new 'ideologies of industrialization, modernization, Pan-Arabism, color, and nationalism'. The question was therefore not so much whether Soviet-type Communism would be adopted by them (for Bell this was

no longer a serious option) but whether the newly emerging and developing soci-
eties would be able to create stable democratic institutions or become dominated
by totalitarian elites. Significantly, Bell claimed that 'the answer lies with the
intellectual classes and their conceptions of the future', a state of affairs that one
would expect the CCF to have tried to influence in Milan.[56]

The results of the conference seem confused on this issue. While the organ-
isers had taken into account the relevance of questions related to the developing
world, the issues involved were so far-reaching that, for Shils, 'the bounds of
provision were broken as soon as the discussion started'. Instead of a sense of
widespread sympathy or a coordinated response from the Western delegates,
calls for increased aid and economic and political commitments were met with
'vigorous criticism of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries for their
excessive demands which generated hopes which could not be realised'.
Exporting the 'end of ideology' position to regions that did not experience the
conditions of prosperity in the West was an almost insurmountable problem. For
example, Shils saw no connection between economic growth and political liberty.

> The Westerners had in their earlier statements disavowed any sympathy for
> the idea that liberty rests on an economic basis. Not only were they anti-
> Marxist but they were opposed to the same line of thought when it
> emanated from the extreme liberals, who insisted that political liberty
> depended on a free market economy.[57]

As its main commentators stressed, any claim for an 'end of ideology' must
mean that the most significant issues of socio-economic management had been
(or were soon to be) resolved. But this did not sound so convincing to those dele-
gates coming from countries that had not passed through the same long-term
periods of development as in the West. When non-Western delegates tried to
bring the issue of a potential trade-off between economic growth and political
freedoms into the open, such a relaxation of civil liberties could not be tolerated.
Political freedom had to come before anything else, no matter what the possible
benefits of faster economic growth, otherwise the door would be open for a
gradual acceptance of unjust radicalism. Thus Shils could only offer the
response that:

> our theories of liberty, of the relation between religion and progress, tradi-
> tion and intellectual independence, must be thought out and formulated in
> such a way that they will do justice to the situations of the new countries of
> Asia and Africa and South America.[58]

Lipset was, up to a point, more accommodating than Shils. Showing greater
understanding for the more prevalent political radicalism in Asia and Africa,
Lipset considered it unjust that these countries should 'adapt their politics to
Western images of responsible behaviour'. Instead he called on the Western
NCL to 'communicate and work with non-Communist revolutionaries in the

Orient and Africa at the same time that they accept the fact that serious ideological controversies have ended at home'.[59] But the final word should go to Macdonald, who felt that a golden opportunity had been created for a significant meeting of minds between West and South, and that this had not been seized. As he noted:

> the Western delegates came to Milan to discuss freedom as an abstract philosophical principle, or as a problem in sociology, political theory, other academic disciplines, or as an aspect of European and Anglo-American history and culture; while the Asian delegates came to find out what 'freedom' really means to people with white skins … [60]

In these circumstances it clearly would not have been enough for a Western delegate to point to the auditorium full of delegates and say '*this* is freedom'. Macdonald even referred to the cynical interpretation of the whole affair, that 'a body like the Congress for Cultural Freedom must hold a conference every now and then to show the world, and its own backers, that it is still alive and kicking', and that it is, above all, still needed.[61] How much the lack of discussion came down to bad or deliberate management, or simply intellectual conceit, is impossible to say. But it is difficult to escape the prescriptive element involved that Dittberner rightly mentions.

After Milan a seminar programme entitled 'Mid-Century Dialogues' was set up to organise round-table discussions on economic growth and political change, particularly focused on the Soviet model and the future of socio-economic development in the West and elsewhere. The Milan conference had been considered a success for the CCF, and Josselson considered it a good moment to launch a new initiative in a different direction. Funded by the Ford Foundation and leaving behind the large-scale conference format, the programme represented a move towards dealing with some of the key issues (and complaints) that surfaced in Milan. Organised by Michael Polanyi and Daniel Bell (who took a sabbatical from *Fortune* in 1956–7), sessions were held in Tokyo, Oxford, Vienna, Rhodes, Ibadan and Rheinfelden from 1957 to 1959. Not surprisingly, given the debate in Milan, the first seminar in Tokyo in April 1956 was entitled 'The Problems of Economic Growth', followed by 'Representative Governments and Public Liberties in the New States' in Rhodes (October 1958) and 'Representative Government and National Progress' in Ibadan (March 1959). While more Western-orientated themes were also represented, such as 'Workers' Participation in Management' in Vienna in September 1958 and 'Changes in Soviet Society' in Oxford in June 1957, the emphasis was on choosing subjects (and locations) with a more direct impact for Southern countries. Bell was responsible for the Tokyo, Oxford and Vienna meetings. Edward Shils, who had joined the CCF through his contact with Polanyi in 1952–3, took the place of Bell when the latter left the organising committee in 1957, and it was Shils who played an important role in both the Rhodes and Ibadan meetings on political change. Following up his views in Milan, Shils said at Rhodes that 'liberal

democracy and economic progress seem to be sufficiently worthy objects of commitment, and there is no need to justify them before a competition whose claims command no respect'.[62]

The seminars marked a more definitive shift away from purely Euro-American affairs that had been evident in Milan. In assessing the seminars, Coleman considered that they had two objectives:

> One, which was achieved, was to bring forward for discussion around the world (including in Congress magazines) a range of issues whose time had come. The other objective was to build a liberal intellectual world community. *For this purpose the spirit of the discussions was as important as their intellectual level …* [63]

There are two possible responses to the last part of Coleman's statement. Either the CCF meetings were simply a sham, bringing together well-known intellectuals for the purpose of providing a public relations 'picture' of intellectual freedom. Or the Congress did attempt to engage with and influence the important socio-political debates of its time. However, in the context of the CCF and its desire to operate as a normative institution, even here it is difficult to separate 'engagement' from 'control'. If the goal was to bring together as wide a cross-section of the non-communist intelligentsia as possible, then the Congress has to be judged a success. G.F. Hudson, commenting on the 'Future of Freedom', noticed this:

> The founders of the organisation seem to have discovered a method of achieving a solidarity of the normally fragmented liberal intelligentsia without imposing articles of faith that would inevitably be unacceptable to large sections of those brought together in these conferences.[64]

However, if the CCF is to be considered on the question of its defence of intellectual–cultural freedoms and values, the result is more equivocal. Regarding what was said at Milan, Macdonald felt that:

> a more satisfactory theory of the basis of freedom was generally agreed on at the conference than the traditional Marxian-liberal one: namely, that it depends not on political institutions or economic systems but rather on the moral choice of human beings, shaped by tradition, to achieve and defend it.[65]

He then commented that this moral choice did not really need the extravaganza of the CCF's conference to make it clear. This illustrates well the political hidden agenda of the Congress that always went hand in hand with its adherence to apolitical intellectual–cultural values. If the CCF was going to achieve its goal of becoming the normative institution in intellectual-cultural affairs, it had to attract as wide a membership as possible for its own legitimacy. That it could do

this despite its determination to exclude and isolate those who would not agree on its anti-totalitarian precepts, particularly on the left, is a testament to the fact that it did connect with actual intellectual needs and concerns of its time. This connection, as Gramsci noted, is one of the crucial precepts for any hegemony. The 'boundaries to freedom' were clearly set, and the legitimate identity of the critical intellectual tied to them. In the early 1950s enough intellectuals were prepared to agree with this. Yet a decade later, the Congress would look more like a conservative Cold War institution, out of touch with a changing political landscape. And once the site of contestation was shifted away from the confines of the Euro-American intellectual community, neither did the contours of the CCF's standpoint fit so well.

Conclusion

> Literature is something which is just as good in ten years time, propaganda is not, and the contrast is acute for many … [1]

In his study of the post-war American intelligentsia, Richard Pells pointed out that the Berlin conference 'was called to demonstrate the militant unity of Western intellectuals, not to exchange philosophies'. Nevertheless, 'the anti-Communist convictions of the congress did not originate with the CIA; these had already congealed long before intelligence operatives began spending Washington's money on cultural warfare'.[2] Clearly, US government money alone was not going to solidify a disparate transatlantic group of anti-communist intellectuals for very long. For the CCF to hold on to its claimed status as some sort of anti-communist vanguard after Berlin, defining in the process the grounds for post-war cultural–intellectual opinion and behaviour, there had to be a search for something more constructive in what Western society had to offer. Of course, the dilemma was that Western society was meant to offer precisely the freedom of intellect without interference that precluded any offical government-sponsored support. After all, 'any hint of a government subsidy for the arts, especially by an intelligence agency, usually offended intellectuals, who cherished the belief that intellectual integrity was at odds with official commands of any stripe'.[3] When apologists for the CIA's behind-the-scenes support for organisations such as the Congress state that the Agency was acting as some kind of American ministry of culture, there is a kind of naive truth to their claims. What this naivety excludes, however, is that such funding always requires some payback, and it is the level of direct Agency control over the CCF, and its consequences for the CCF's intellectual–political standpoints, which remains a contentious issue.

In 1954 Irving Howe published an article entitled 'This Age of Conformity' in *Partisan Review*, in which he castigated the prevailing consensus within the American intelligentsia 'that the danger of Stalinism allows them little or no freedom in their relations with bourgeois society'. Since the New Deal, according to Howe, intellectuals had become increasingly involved as employees of a state that saw its responsibilities in the economy and in social life in general as greatly expanded. The result was:

a society in which ideology plays an unprecedented part: as social relations become more abstract and elusive [within large-scale industrialism and mass society], the human object is bound to the state with ideological slogans and abstractions – and for this chore intellectuals are indispensable, no one else can do the job as well.

This is not far from Sassoon's thesis on Gramsci, and the necessary incorporation of the traditional intellectual within the expanding boundaries of state-managed capitalism. Howe rejects this historical process as disastrous, since the identity of intellectuals as social critics is nullified as well.

Whenever they become absorbed into the accredited institutions of society they not only lose their traditional rebelliousness but to one extent or another *they cease to function as intellectuals*. The institutional world needs intellectuals *because* they are intellectuals but it does not want them *as* intellectuals.

'The danger of Stalinism', he admitted, did 'limit our possibilities for action' and 'may force us into political alignments that are distasteful'. But these should only be short-term developments necessitated by the times.

The danger of Stalinism may require temporary expedients in the area of *power* such as would have seemed compromising some years ago, but there is no reason, at least no good reason, why it should require compromise or conformity in the area of *ideas*, no reason why it should lead us to become partisans of bourgeois society.

For Howe, truth and power can still be separated, whatever the broader political circumstances, and without this distinction the identity of the intellectual is nothing. Howe created the journal *Dissent* around this time exactly to put the values of social criticism to continuing important use. With hindsight, however, Foucault's comment on the impossibility of separating truth from every system of power, 'for truth already is power', is probably closer to the mark when looking at the narrative of the CCF. Not for nothing was it the intellectual climate of the 1950s that drew Foucault into examining this issue.[4] But Howe's article drew a furious, and revealing, response from Sidney Hook:

The editors of *Partisan Review* have turned out to be disgusting opportunists and morally rotten to the core. Resentful at not being able to gain money from various Foundations, from the Congress or the Committee, so that they could pay themselves fat salaries, they have gotten a Trotskyist by the name of Irving Howe to write a long piece attacking American intellectuals for being conformist. The American Committee is attacked, the *New Leader*, *Commentary*, Trilling, I and others. Kristol is singled out especially since they regard *Encounter* as a special threat to PR … It is sure to disturb a lot of our

friends who won't know the background and the dishonourable methods of polemic Howe uses.[5]

For Hook the essential point was that, by printing this article, *Partisan Review* had broken with the 'united front' of Western intellectuals against communism. Instead of addressing the issues raised, Hook dismisses the whole argument presented by Howe as being driven by intellectual (and financial) jealousy, and laments how its criticism will have a debilitating effect on the work of the Congress. Hook, along with people like Lasky, Josselson and Burnham, were convinced of their own mission, and in the historical circumstances of the Cold War they reserved the right to act as guardians of a certain cultural–intellectual identity. When Edward Shils said that in the late 1940s, faced with the encroaching power of the Soviet Union, 'these two Russian Jews [Lasky and Josselson] decided to save Western civilisation', that is certainly how they saw it themselves.[6] Such high stakes demanded desperate measures. Much of the criticism levelled at the CCF later on instead emphasised only how the intellectual community involved was serving the interests of the 'power elite'.[7]

> Professional intellectuals had become indispensable to society and the state (in ways which neither the intellectuals nor even the state always perceived) … because the cold war seemed to demand that the United States compete with communism in the cultural sphere as well as in every other … The modern state is an engine of propaganda … This propaganda, to be successful, demands the cooperation of writers, teachers and artists not as paid propagandists or state-censored time-servers but as 'free' intellectuals capable of policing their own jurisdictions and of enforcing acceptable standards of responsibility within the various intellectual professions.[8]

Several people commented on the implications for intellectual life of this link-up with the state. Jason Epstein noted how the CIA:

> had set up and were financing an apparatus of intellectuals selected for their correct cold war positions, as an alternative to what one might call a free intellectual market where ideology was presumed to count for less than individual talent and achievement.

But Epstein wrote this in 1967, fifteen to twenty years after the period of the CCF's formation, and he admits that 'it would have seemed absurd fifteen years ago to dismiss the threat of Soviet aggression'. This illustrates more than ever the need to historicise the events and opinions that led to the Congress, and how they necessarily linked up with the requirements of American power in that period. Epstein also notes with pathos that 'perhaps there is a necessary trap in human affairs by which the intellect, no matter how pure the will, must always, in the end, find itself at the disposal of more highly organized powers'.[9] What needs to be added is how the intellect, in certain circumstances, will

actively *choose* to work with those powers. If this results in a 'treason of the intellect', there is all the more reason to try to understand *why* this occurs. For those intellectuals who had experienced totalitarianism of the left and the right in the 1930s and 1940s and who were driven to defend at all costs the values of tolerance, individuality and human dignity, a response to their cause from the power structure was welcome.[10] Responses to this issue later divided into denial, acceptance or indignation.[11] Sidney Hook commented that 'in my own mind I had no doubt that the CIA was making some contribution to the financing of the Congress … Everyone involved in the activities of the Congress had heard the rumours of covert CIA support.'[12] Nabokov was disingenuous in the extreme, claiming that the CIA link was beyond his 'wildest dreams'.[13] On the other hand Galbraith, who admitted being told of the CIA involvement at a CCF gathering in 1960, still defended its *raison d'être* in a letter to the *New York Times* in 1967 as 'a valuable public enterprise … in danger of being discredited'. And, as Hannah Arendt said in relation to Silone, but which could be applied to everyone connected to the Congress: 'what would it serve [them], for instance, to insist on knowing the truth? If they were told, now, in confidence, that the CIA had been subsidizing them a number of years ago, what could they do with this knowledge?' Concentrating on the question 'Who knew?' avoids the larger issue of why they were in that position in the first place.[14]

The duality of this power–knowledge relationship on a personal level is expressed well in a letter Nabokov wrote to Fleischmann in 1954 to plead for financial support for the Polish defector André Panufnik, who had been 'next to Shostakovitch and Katchaturian the top "musical figure" behind the Iron Curtain'. Commenting that 'what Panufnik wants and needs most of all is to write music in the environment of freedom', Nabokov went on:

> He is entirely ready to cooperate and collaborate with us for he is entirely sold on the ideals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. He told me that to him we are the only organization in the sphere of culture that understands what is really going on in the world … I am sure that if we can extend this man a helping hand we would win an extremely useful permanent friend for the Congress who might be as important to us as has been in the first year of our existence the Polish escaped writer Czeslaw Milosz.[15]

Nabokov genuinely wanted to help Panufnik as one intellectual to another, but he was also fully aware of the 'cultural capital' to be earned in doing so.[16] It is near-impossible to separate the two motives. As Neil Berry says, 'it may be hard to grasp how a messianic intellectual like Josselson came to have anything to do with the CIA'.[17] But the Agency potentially offered the perfect means for taking the struggle over cultural–intellectual values on to another level, with a constant stream of funds and the possibility for building an effective transnational organisation. More than anyone, Josselson walked the line between the back room demands of CIA control for American interests and the front room ethos of

intellectual independence and universal cultural values. 'Josselson, although clearly a part of the Agency chain of command, also took his job of representing the Congress's interests very seriously. This was a uniquely hard position to hold, and to hold credibly.' It is not surprising that when de Neufville left Paris in 1954 to be replaced by other Agency men less attuned to the origins and subtleties of the Congress's work, Josselson found it more and more difficult to meet the demands of both positions and became, with his deteriorating health, literally the first casualty.[18]

It is clearly a mistake to assume that the formation and consolidation of the CCF was part of a master-plan for American international supremacy hatched by the CIA. The chaotic nature of the Agency's operations in the early days is enough proof of this.[19] In the early years the CCF was not a monolithic organisation but a collection of shifting alliances and personnel, adapting to and being representative of the current of the times. Grémion points out that the Congress meetings in Berlin, Hamburg and Milan each involved a different American group in alliance with the Europeans: in Berlin it was the ACCF, in Hamburg the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and in Milan the Americans for Democratic Action.[20] Whatever the differences between European and American intellectuals on the CCF's purpose, as happened between the ACCF and the Paris HQ, the essential aim of an Atlanticist cultural identity was never lost. ACCF member Lewis Galantière, editor of a collection of essays that aimed to highlight the need for an 'Atlantic Dialogue' on the community of values that existed between Europe and America, saw the main problem to be 'the reluctance of Europeans in general, and of the opinion-creating intellectuals in particular, to see in the United States a leader worth following'. Likewise another writer in a similar collection stated that while 'America has offered political, economic, and even military leadership to Europe … Europe needs more, for Europe's troubles are not at all only physical'.[21] The Congress was just such an attempt to fill this transatlantic void.

In his contribution to Galantière's book, Melvin Lasky declared that 'the creation of a common European–American spiritual community is the primary life-preserving task of Western culture. New bases for transatlantic understanding must be reached'.[22] In creating the framework through which this might be achieved, Lasky was a firm believer in mixing the cultural and the political for specific ends. Having been a part of the left-wing student scene in late 1930s New York, Lasky channelled these influences into fighting the Cold War by means of an 'Eliotic Trotskyism': a belief that (high) culture could only be saved against its worst enemy, communism, by vigorous organisation and commitment.[23] For Lasky 'timed' and forthright intervention in the cultural–intellectual realm was vital for Western culture as well as politics. It is possible to see how his 1930s Trotskyism transforms from a theoretical leftist critique of Stalinism into a profound determination to utilise all cultural–intellectual means to finish the job. Eliotic culture and Trotskyism had one thing in common – they represented a definite elitism. As Lasch remarked, on the attraction of Leninism for intellectuals, 'even after they had dissociated

themselves from its materialist content, they clung to the congenial view of intellectuals as the vanguard of history'.[24] Lasky's militant belief in the cause was fuelled by such an elitism, but it was an elitism determined not to be an 'Olympian bystander' but to engage to the full. This was enhanced by his presence on the 'front line': post-war Berlin. Writing in 1951 to Shepherd Stone, then a member of the German High Commission, Lasky declared that:

> The greatest difficulty we are running up against here – e.g. in Berlin and Germany, not to mention the rest of the western world – is the real lack of politically-experienced politically-wise persons … If we want to face realities we must recognise that there is a crisis of intelligence, a crisis of information, a disastrous lack of politically trained minds.

Lasky's response to these conditions is remarkable for its insight into how he viewed the struggle:

> What is needed, and badly needed, is a Political Academy. What is required is a school in which instructors and students on an informal and friendly level take up the basic questions of our time on a serious and sophisticated level … It must be open-minded but firm, generous in its approach to all Western points of view but uncritical of none.

And the goal:

> To train a *political force* for the democratic battles ahead … The weapons are ideas. The training is mental, to harden intellectual muscles, to limber up the mind. The discipline is an ideological confidence, an intelligent awareness of what is happening and what has to be done. The task is to help train political leadership cadres, to assist in creating an international circle of democrats with a united sense of mission.[25]

For Lasky 'so long as we are battling the Bolsheviks the fight will always be in the last analysis a political one', and every means had to be put at the disposal of this cause. Yet if this letter illustrates the methods that Lasky was genuinely thinking of, it also illustrates the times in which they were written. A decade later and the same ideas would seem dangerously coercive. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and US internationalism had led to Vietnam, and a new generation in the 1960s were not prepared to fight the same battles as before. After the late 1950s the Congress continued to maintain its Cold War stance, but the historical circumstances had changed and it failed as an institution to change with them – one might even say that, because of its dominant Cold War logic, it was impossible for it to change with them. The purpose of the CCF was, after all, to hold the line as the 'vital centre', not bend with the times. But a hegemony has to adapt to succeed.

> Cultural hegemony is not maintained mechanically or conspiratorially. A dominant culture is not a static 'superstructure' but a continual process. The boundaries of common-sense 'reality' are constantly shifting as the social structure changes shape … Newer values, which sometimes seem potentially subversive at first, are frequently sanitized and incorporated into the mainstream of enlightened opinion.[26]

With the Congress, historical context is everything. In the 1950s it was dedicated to forming alliances between the American and European NCL in defence of cultural–intellectual values, and as ideological support for the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic alliance. The time was right, in other words, for such an institution to succeed. By the 1960s, the CCF was an overextended institution attempting to secure a worldwide network of liberal-minded intellectuals in a period when American power was being harshly demonstrated in Vietnam, and the legacy of Western colonialism made it a hopeless task. The CCF could no longer fulfil its hegemonic function in the changed historical circumstances.

> In its early years, it helped fashion a consensus among many American and Western European intellectuals about the need to combat Soviet propaganda. But when the political orthodoxies of the 1950s crumbled in the 1960s, when the congress's own intellectuals could not agree on issues like the Vietnam War … [it] became obsolete.[27]

Even an increasingly confident Western Europe was balking at continued subservience to American political and economic superiority. Being dedicated to the cause of intellectual freedom in Europe was one thing, but in the whole world was quite another. It is somehow appropriate, therefore, that the final blow came from the CIA, and specifically Tom Braden himself.[28] The intellectuals involved with the CCF had been in agreement with its 'timeless' principles of intellectual freedom and seen it as a necessary development in a time of crisis. Once the CIA story broke, they were left to face the recriminations arising from the Congress's 'hegemonic history'. While many were deeply embarrassed, it is not surprising that there were some, in particular Melvin Lasky, who will always remain adamant that they did the right thing.

Appendix
Manifesto of the Congress
for Cultural Freedom

1 We hold it to be self-evident that intellectual freedom is one of the inalienable rights of man.
2 Such freedom is defined first and foremost by his right to hold and express his own opinions, and particularly opinions which differ from those of his rulers. Deprived of the right to say 'no', man becomes a slave.
3 Freedom and peace are inseparable. In any country, under any regime, the overwhelming majority of ordinary people fear and oppose war. The danger of war becomes acute when governments, by suppressing democratic representative institutions, deny to the majority the means of imposing its will to peace. Peace can be maintained only if each government submits to the control and inspection of its acts by the people whom it governs, and agrees to submit all questions immediately involving the risk of war to a representative international authority, by whose decisions it will abide.
4 We hold that the main reason for the present insecurity of the world is the policy of governments which, while paying lip-service to peace, refuse to accept this double control. Historical experience proves that wars can be prepared and waged under any slogan, including that of peace. Campaigns for peace which are not backed by acts that will guarantee its maintenance are like counterfeit currency circulated for dishonest purposes. Intellectual sanity and physical security can only return to the world if such practices are abandoned.
5 Freedom is based on the toleration of divergent opinions. The principle of toleration does not logically permit the practice of intolerance.
6 No political philosophy or economic theory can claim the sole right to represent freedom in the abstract. We hold that the value of such theories is to be judged by the range of concrete freedom which they accord the individual in practice. We likewise hold that no race, nation, class or religion can claim the sole right to represent the idea of freedom, nor the right to deny freedom to other groups or creeds in the name of any ultimate ideal or lofty aim whatsoever. We hold that the historical contribution of any society is to be judged by the extent and quality of the freedom which its members actually enjoy.
7 In times of emergency, restrictions on the freedom of the individual are

imposed in the real or assumed interest of the community. We hold it to be essential that such restrictions be confined to a minimum of clearly specified actions; that they be understood to be temporary and limited expedients in the nature of a sacrifice; and that the measures restricting freedom be themselves subject to free criticism and democratic control. Only thus can we have a reasonable assurance that emergency measures restricting individual freedom will not degenerate into a permanent tyranny.

8 In totalitarian states restrictions on freedom are no longer intended and publicly understood as sacrifices imposed on the people, but are, on the contrary, represented as triumphs of progress and achievements of a superior civilisation. We hold that both the theory and practice of these regimes run counter to the basic rights of the individual and the fundamental aspirations of mankind as a whole.

9 We hold the danger represented by these regimes to be all the greater since their means of enforcement far surpasses that of all previous tyrannies in the history of mankind. The citizen of the totalitarian state is expected and forced not only to abstain from crime but to conform in all his thoughts and actions to a prescribed pattern. Citizens are persecuted and condemned on such unspecified and all-embracing charges as 'enemies of the people' or 'socially unreliable elements'.

10 We hold that there can be no stable world so long as mankind, with regard to freedom, remains divided into 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The defence of existing freedoms, the reconquest of lost freedoms, and the creation of new freedoms are parts of the same struggle.

11 We hold that the theory and practice of the totalitarian state are the greatest challenge which man has been called on to meet in the course of civilised history.

12 We hold that indifference or neutrality in the face of such a challenge amounts to a betrayal of mankind and to the abdication of the free mind. Our answers to this challenge may decide the fate of man for generations.

13 The defence of intellectual liberty today imposes a positive obligation: to offer new and constructive answers to the problems of our time.

We address this manifesto to all men who are determined to regain those liberties which they have lost and to preserve and extend those which they enjoy.

Notes

Preface

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3 Michael Rohrwasser, Einmischung der intellektuellen – Antitotalitäre Traditionen in Deutschland und Frankreich', Freiheit in die Offensive: 50 Jahre Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit (conference held in Berlin, 23–4 June 2000).

Introduction: Approaching the CCF – Gramsci, culture and the Cold War

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10 See D. Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1994; 'The American Century: A Roundtable', Parts I and II, *Diplomatic History*, vol. 23, nos 2–3, 1999.

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14 P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris 1950–1975*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, pp. 24–6.

15 A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 265. The reference to politics as of secondary importance for Marx reflects his treatment of economics, or more precisely political economy, as being analytically primary. See E. Hobsbawm, 'Gramsci and Marxist Political Theory', in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci*, London, Writers & Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1984.

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17 Ibid. p. 97 note.

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24

> Traditional international relations theory maintains the distinctness of the two spheres [state and civil society], with foreign policy appearing as the pure expression of state interests. Today, however, state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical (referring to difficult-to-define aspects of a complex reality) and are only very vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct spheres of activity.
>
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29

> Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too.
>
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31 K. Marx, *The German Ideology*, quoted in R. Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, London, Quartet, 1976, p. 163–4.

32 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London, Verso, 1987, p. 69.

33 K. van der Pijl, 'Class Formation at the International Level: Reflections on the Political Economy of Atlantic Unity', *Capital and Class*, no. 9, 1979; K. van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso, 1984.

34 A. Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, London, Hutchinson, 1987, p. 122.

35 E. Hobsbawm, 'Gramsci and Marxist Political Theory', in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), op. cit., p. 21.

36

> Certainly, it is not necessarily a form of vulgar materialism to say that, though we cannot ascribe ideas to class position in certain fixed combinations, ideas do arise from and may reflect the material conditions in which social groups and classes exist.
>
> S. Hall, 'The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees', in
> B. Matthews (ed.), *Marx: A Hundred Years On*, London,
> Lawrence & Wishart, 1983, p. 80.

37 Gramsci, op. cit., p. 12.

38 S. Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 89.

39 V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996; see also the Bulletins of the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC; Online, available at: http://www.si.edu/bulletin-pdf.htm.

40 A useful overview of Cold War historiography can be found in A. Stephanson, 'The United States', in Reynolds, op. cit.,

41 See the discourse analysis of American foreign policy as a necessarily constructed and contingent 'identity of exclusion' in D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992.

42 For an in-depth class-based analysis of US foreign policy see J. Kolko and G. Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945–1954*, New York, Harper & Row, 1972.

43 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 277.

44 See G. Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–52', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 23, September 1986.

45 R. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, p. xii.

46 See J. Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.

47 R. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s*, Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institute Press, 1997; W. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945–1961*, New York, St Martin's Griffin, 1998.

48 Lucas, op. cit., p. 7.

49 G. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War within the Cold War*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 2.

50 'Americanism and Fordism', in Gramsci, op. cit., pp. 277–318.

51 Ford's innovative mass production techniques and radical worker–management relations were recognised at the time by many on the left as a radical transformation of the possibilities of capitalism. See M. Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass*

Production and American Global Power, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 77.

52

> People who laugh at these initiatives … deny themselves any possibility of understanding the importance, significance, and objective import of the American phenomenon, which is also the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker and of man.
>
> <div style="text-align:right">Gramsci, op. cit., p. 302.</div>

53 Ibid. pp. 280–1, 285.
54 R. Bocock, *Hegemony*, Chichester, Ellis Horwood, 1986, p. 46; C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1980, p. 319.
55 A. Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, translated by L. Lawner, London, Quartet, 1979, p. 48; Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 317.

1 Intellectuals and hegemony

1 T.S. Eliot, *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*, London, Faber & Faber, 1962 [1948], p. 83.
2 See R. Brym, *Intellectuals and Politics*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1980, p. 12.
3 See E. Shils, 'The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis', in *The Intellectuals and the Powers and Other Essays*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972. Edward Shils, through his meeting with Michael Polanyi, himself joined the Science and Freedom Committee of the Congress in 1953. Shils was an active participant in the activities of the Congress thereafter, and later became the principal trustee of its archive in Chicago.
4 R. Williams, *Culture*, London, Fontana, p. 214 (emphasis added).
5 Z. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity, and Intellectuals*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, p. 23.
6 Ibid. p. 19.

> The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations.
>
> <div style="text-align:right">A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 8.</div>

7 A. Zhdanov, 'Speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers', in *Art in Society 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, C. Harrison and P. Wood (eds), Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 410–11.
8 J. Elleinstein, *The Stalin Phenomenon*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, pp. 148–9.
9 J. Szacki, 'Intellectuals between Politics and Culture', in I. Maclean, A. Montefiore and P. Winch (eds), *The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 231.
10 Bauman, op. cit., p. 1.
11 N. Chomsky, *Intellectuals and the State*, Baarn, Wereldvenster, 1977, p. 3.
12 Bauman, op. cit., p. 1.
13 H. Seton-Watson, 'The Russian Intellectuals', in G. de Huszar (ed.), *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait*, Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1960.

14 The predicament of an educated elite unable to use their knowledge towards the betterment of society was best expressed in Mikhail Lermontov's novel *A Hero for Our Time* from 1840.

15 J. Billington, 'The Intelligentsia and the Religion of Humanity', *American Historical Review*, vol. 65, no. 4, July 1960, p. 812.

16

> I see no reason for not using the two terms … as interchangeable except for a slight difference in emphasis due to historical factors: 'intelligentsia' implies (because of the specific Russian conditions which gave rise to the concept) deeper ideological commitments and concerns with the state of the world.
> > P. Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba*, New York, University Press of America, 1990, p. 43.

17 A. Sadri, *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 69–70, 73.

18 See L. Coser, *Men of Ideas*, New York, Free Press, 1965, p. viii; R. Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, New York, Vintage, 1962, p. 33.

19 Shils, op. cit., p. 3.

20 'The intellectual *par excellence* used to be the writer: as a universal consciousness, a free subject, he was counterposed to those intellectuals who were merely *competent instances* in the service of the state or capital – technicians, magistrates, teachers.' M. Foucault, 'Truth and Power', in P. Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*, London, Penguin, 1984, p. 68; also the definition of intellectuals 'as all who are full-time servants of the Word or the word.' P. Viereck, *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals*, New York, Capricorn Press, 1965 [1953], p. 13.

21 Bauman, op. cit., p. 25.

22 Ibid. p. 23.

23 E. Shils, 'The Traditions of Intellectuals', in de Huszar (ed.), op. cit., p. 55

24 Reprinted as *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1955.

25 Bauman, op. cit., p. 30; 'Benda proposed that intellectuals should stop thinking in terms of collective passions [e.g. nationalism] and should concentrate instead on transcendental values, those that were universally applicable to all nations and peoples.' E. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual*, London, Vintage, 1994, p. 23.

26 Benda's position on the literary periodical *Nouvelle Revue Française* was attacked in 1937 because of his Jewishness. See A. Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism: A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism 1919–1945*, New York, Avon-Macmillan, 1971, p. 231.

27 K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, [1929], quoted in J. Wilkinson, *The Intellectual Resistance in Europe*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 4, 40.

28 Mannheim actually took this terminology from Alfred Weber. See K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, pp. 137–8; K. Mannheim, 'The Sociology of Intellectuals', *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 10, no. 3, 1993, pp. 75–7.

29 'Although they are too differentiated to be regarded as a single class, there is, however, one unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals, namely, education, which binds them together in a striking way.' Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 138.

30 Mannheim, 'The Sociology of Intellectuals', op. cit., p. 75.

31 Bauman, op. cit., pp. 38–50.

32 Hollander, op. cit., p. 41.

33

> It is useful … to remember that the intelligentsia … have a much longer history as the upholders of traditional worldviews and supporters of authority than as

performers of their (more recent) social role which prescribes the questioning of authority, marginality, and highly developed critical faculties.

Ibid.

34 See E. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*, London, Vintage, 1994.
35 N. Chomsky. 'The Responsibility of Intellectuals', in *American Power and the New Mandarins*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969, pp. 256–7.
36 'The hardest aspect of being an intellectual is to represent what you profess through your work and interventions, without hardening into an institution, or a kind of automaton acting at the behest of a system or method.' Said, op. cit., p. 90.
37 P. Bourdieu, 'The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of the Intellectuals in the Modern World', *Telos*, no. 81, Fall 1989, p. 99.
38 On this issue see E. Shils, 'Intellectuals, Tradition and the Traditions of Intellectuals', *Daedalus*, vol. 101, no. 2, Spring 1972.
39 See E. Shils, 'Intellectuals and Responsibility', in I. Maclean *et al.* (eds), op. cit.
40 In contrast to the negative aspects of this elitism, Bourdieu has called for a 'large collective of intellectuals' to overcome their specialisations and social atomisation in order to coordinate responses 'against all forms of cultural imperialism'. P. Bourdieu, op. cit., pp. 108–9.
41 Eliot, op. cit., p. 35.
42 E. Shils, 'Remembering the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *Encounter*, vol. 75, no. 2, September 1990, p. 56. In this respect, how the CCF became part of the intellectual mainstream is shown by *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait*, G. de Huszar (ed.), Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1960, which includes contributions from the following intellectuals who were connected to the Congress and its affiliates at one time or another: Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, Seymour Lipset, Czeslaw Milosz, Ignazio Silone, Stephen Spender, Allen Tate and Peter Viereck. Country studies were also provided by reprints from CCF journals such as *Encounter* (Herbert Lüthy, 'The French Intellectuals', Golo Mann, 'The German Intellectuals') and *Quest* (Prabhakar Padhye, 'The Intellectual in Modern Asia').
43 H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 203.
44 Szacki, op. cit., p. 234.
45

The forms human life and conduct assumed did not seem any more part of the 'nature of things' or part of a divine order which would neither need nor stand human intervention. Instead, human life and conduct appeared now as something which needed to be formed, lest it should take shapes unacceptable and damaging to social order …

Bauman, op. cit., p. 94.

For an analysis of the development of the terms 'civilisation' and 'culture', and their incompatible meanings in French, German and English usage, see N. Elias, *The Civilising Process: The History of Manners*, vol. 1, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1978 [1939].
46 Williams, op. cit., pp. 123–7.
47 P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989, p. 1.
48 Ibid. p. 2.
49 The association of 'culture' with the beneficial ordering of society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries carried with it the characteristics of optimism,

universalism and ethnocentrism (Europe as the site of the ideal society). Bauman, op. cit., p. 95.

50 'Superior or refined culture is distinguished by the seriousness of its subject matter, i.e. the centrality of the problems with which it deals, the acute penetration and coherence of its perceptions, the subtlety and wealth of its expressed feeling.' E. Shils, 'Mass Society and its Culture', in Shils, *The Intellectuals and the Powers*, op. cit., p. 232.

51 See D. Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment*, London, Quartet, 1977.

52 On the 'mass culture' debate in the USA, see A. Ross, *No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 42–64.

53 S. Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 52–3.

54 W. Adamson, 'Gramsci and the Politics of Civil Society', *Praxis International*, vol. 7, nos 3–4, 1987/8, pp. 320–1, 322.

55 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 161.

56 Ibid. pp. 169–70.

57 For a brief account of Gramsci's relevance in the debate surrounding 'instrumentalism' and 'reductionism' see J. Hoffman, *The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in Marxist Political Theory*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. 1–3.

58 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 263.

59 A. Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, London, Hutchinson, 1987, p. 253.

60 C. Buci-Glucksmann, 'Hegemony and Consent: A Political Strategy', in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci*, London, Writers & Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982, p. 123.

61 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 261 (italics added).

62 Gramsci gave two definitions of the state, one 'limited' (the state, or political society, separate from civil society) and one 'enlarged' (the state incorporating political and civil society). The difference is taken here to refer to whether a hegemonic situation is either present (i.e. the enlarged state) or absent (i.e. the limited state). See ibid. pp. 12 and 262–3. For a discussion of these definitions, see Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics,* op. cit., pp. 112–13.

63

> [T]he supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups.
>
> Gramsci, op. cit., p. 57.

This interpretation was far more complex than any that had been offered on hegemony previously, particularly that of Lenin. In 'What Is to Be Done?' (1902), Lenin had foreseen the role of the vanguard party as fusing workers and intellectuals into a single unit to lead the rest of the working class. It therefore involved a necessary alliance of classes around the universal identity of the proletariat, which, as Marx claimed, necessarily 'cannot emancipate itself without emancipating the other spheres of society' (cited in Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 52–3); on the development of the concept of hegemony see P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', *New Left Review*, no. 100, November 1976

64 See the difference of opinion between Norberto Bobbio and Jacques Texier in C. Mouffe (ed.), *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. While Bobbio claims a primacy for the ideological superstructures of civil society over the economic structure, Texier insists on a dialectical unity between the two levels.

65 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 366; for a discussion on the historic bloc, see Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, op. cit., pp. 119–26.
66 C. Mouffe, 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci', in Mouffe (ed.), op. cit., p. 180.
67 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 12.
68 Ideologies ' "organise" human masses and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.', ibid. pp. 376–7.
69 K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1974, p. 64.
70 See G. Vacca, 'Intellectuals and the Marxist Theory of the State', in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci*, op. cit. pp. 37–69.
71 W. Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory*, Berkeley, University of California, 1980, pp. 176–7.
72 C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1980, p. 57.
73 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 350. For Gramsci's conception of the 'collective will', the 'national-popular' and the influence of Georges Sorel, see ibid. pp. 124–32.
74 Foucault, 'Truth and Power', in M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980, p. 68.
75 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op cit., p. 5. Gramsci did not use the terms 'technocrat' or 'cadre' himself, but these and other terms such as 'managers' (J. Burnham, *The Managerial Society*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1960 [1941]), 'experts' (G. Benveniste, *The Politics of Expertise*, London, Croom Helm, 1972), 'professional elites' (H. Perkin, *The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World*, London, Routledge, 1996), or 'cadres' (K. van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London, Routledge, 1998) have since been used to express the same or similar socio-economic configurations that Gramsci was trying to deal with.
76

It is my impression that [intellectuals] prefer to influence the exercise of authority or to exercise it themselves but they do not like to be responsible to the electorate or to an elected legislature for their accomplishments in it. They prefer to influence the exercise of authority as advisors, experts, consultants or publicists.
        E. Shils; 'Intellectuals and Responsibility', in I. Maclean *et al.*, op. cit., p. 267.

77 Williams, op. cit., p. 214.
78 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 97 note.
79 For a discussion of these intellectual professions see R. Simon, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1982, pp. 97–8.
80 'The early Notebooks in particular reveal a great deal of reading about Western European intellectuals, e.g. Julien Benda.' Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution*, op. cit., p. 273 note 14; see also Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, op. cit., p. 236 note 1.
81 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, D. Forgacs and G.N. Smith (eds), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 261 (italics added).
82 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 9 (italics added). Similarly, Gramsci comments elsewhere that 'all men are "philosophers" ' when criticising the belief that philosophy is a 'strange and difficult thing' open only to a specialised elite, ibid. p. 323. It is important to recognise the radical democratic anti-elitist stance that lies behind both these positions, cf. R. Holub, *Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism*, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 169.
83 See the critique of Gramsci's approach because of this broadness in Williams, op. cit., pp. 215–16.

84 J. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 130.

85 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 5 (italics added).

86 Ibid. pp. 5–6, 10.

87 'The notes Gramsci wrote on the question of the intellectual are … of extraordinary importance for his philosophy of praxis in general … [W]ithout the intellectual … there is perhaps no Gramscian critical theory.' Holub, op. cit., p. 151.

88

> 'A human mass does not "distinguish" itself, does not become independent in its own right without, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people "specialised" in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas.'
>
> Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 334.

89 Femia, op. cit., p. 130.

90 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 7–9.

91 Ibid. p. 10.

92 Femia, op. cit., p. 132.

93 See K. van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso, 1984, pp. 146–50.

94 Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution*, op. cit., p. 179 (italics added).

95 Ibid. p. 174.

96 'He recognised that hegemonic rule (or the overwhelming predominance of hegemony over domination as the form of political control) is the "normal" form of government, at least in industrial societies, and therefore almost infinite in its variety.' Ibid. p. 173.

97 R. Bocock, *Hegemony*, Chichester, Ellis Horwood, 1986, p. 94.

98 See E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London, Verso, 1987), where they claim that the development of the concept of hegemony involved a gradual admittance of the decline in efficacy both of 'historical necessity' and the natural unfolding of events according to an inscribed logic, the latter being the official line of Second International Marxism.

99 See Femia, op. cit., pp. 46–7.

100 See Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, op. cit., p. 57.

101 R. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 113. Wanting to remove the stigma attached to Marxism of an economic base that determines everything else in social life, Williams also quotes this from Marx: 'As regards art, it is well known that some of its peaks by no means correspond to the general development of society; nor do they therefore to the material substructure … ', ibid. p. 78.

102 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, *Gramsci and the State*, op. cit., p. 12.

103 See R. Williams, 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', in *Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays*, London, Verso, 1980, pp. 32–3. 'Thus art is degraded as a mere reflection of the basic economic and political process … or it is idealised into the separate sphere of aesthetics … Neither art, nor philosophy, nor science has ever served only these ends; each has also served the general growth of humanity.' R. Williams, *The Long Revolution*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965, p. 134.

104 See J. Karabel, 'Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Problem of Intellectuals', *Politics and Society*, vol. 6, Spring 1976, p. 154. It is worth recognising that Gramsci, despite being highly critical of Croce, was still strongly influenced by his work and position in Italian society. See *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 56 note; Adamson, *Hegemony and Revolution*, p. 172.

105 R. Bellamy, 'Gramsci, Croce and the Italian Political Tradition', *History of Political Thought*, vol. 11, no. 2, Summer 1990, p. 325.
106 Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, op. cit., pp. 269–70.
107 Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, op. cit., p. 418.
108 Eliot's presentation of this position in *Notes towards a Definition of Culture* is prompted by fears that the egalitarian tendencies of 'popular culture' (and their connection with the 'social levelling' policies of Labour Party social democracy) could lead to the denigration of culture in general. The Congress, in a sense, can be viewed as an attempt to disprove this.
109 Regarding the disillusionment among American intellectuals concerning the Soviet Union as the guiding light of emancipation, Edward Shils writes that:

> by the end of the 1950's, the truth about the Stalinist purges had been accepted by most intellectuals in the USA. Khrushchev's revelations of February 1956 at the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was only a final and authoritative confirmation of what had already been generally recognised.
>
> 'Intellectuals and the Center of Society in the United States',
> in Shils, *Intellectuals and the Powers*, op. cit., p. 155 note 12.

The situation in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy with their powerful communist parties, was very different, providing the impetus for the formation of the Congress itself.
110 E. Augelli and C. Murphy, *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis*, London, Pinter, 1988, p. 19 (italics added).
111 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, op. cit., p. 98.

2 The political economy of US hegemony 1945–50

  1 M. Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 30.
  2 P. Abbott, *Political Thought in America*, Ithaca, NY, Peacock Press, 1990, p. 263.
  3 D. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe. America and Postwar Reconstruction*, London, Longman, 1992, p. 20.
  4 See V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, 'The Soviet Union', in D. Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 53–69.
  5 S. Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union*, New York, New York University Press, 1999, pp. 13–14.
  6 'The Fair Deal at Home and Abroad: Harry S. Truman's State of the Union Message, 1948', in R. Watson (ed.), *The United States in the Contemporary World 1945–1962*, New York, Free Press, 1965, p. 154.
  7 Ellwood, op. cit., p. 34, 80–2.
  8 C. Clifford (with R. Holbrooke), *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*, New York, Random House, 1991, p. 129.
  9

> The imposition of an interpretation upon the ambiguity and contingency of social life always results in an other being marginalised. Meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established identity.
>
> D. Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 24.

10 P. Roberts, ' "All the Right People": The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy Establishment', *Journal of American Studies*, vol. 26, 1992, p. 432.

11 See R. Skotheim, *Totalitarianism and American Social Thought*, New York, Holt-Rinehart-Winston, 1971.

12 'The Truman Doctrine – Speech before Congress', in H. Commager, *Documents of American History*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963 (italics added).

13 On 21 February 1947 a message was sent by the British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel to the State Department that Britain would no longer be able to support its military or financial aid to the Greek government in its civil war against the communist forces after 31 March. See S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, London, Penguin, 1991 (6th edition) pp. 78–87; D. McCullough, *Truman*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992, pp. 539–42.

14 Lucas, op. cit., p. 8.

15 'US Position re Soviet Proposals on Kiel Canal and Dardanelles' (8 July 1945), quoted in M. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1953*, New York, Hill & Wang, 1994, p. 51.

16 Ibid. p. 50.

17 Lucas, op. cit., pp. 21–2.

18 McCullough, op. cit., p. 554; Clifford, op. cit., pp. 109–29.

19 See M. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1992.

20 'Opposition from a Conservative Republican: Senator Robert A. Taft's Reply to Truman, January 8th 1948', in Watson, op. cit., p. 170. See also H. Berger, 'A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early Cold War Program', in D. Horowitz (ed.), *Containment and Revolution: Western Policy Towards Social Revolution, 1917 to Vietnam*, London, Anthony Blond, 1967.

21 R. Barnet, *The Alliance: America–Europe–Japan, Makers of the Postwar World*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1983, pp. 110–11; Ambrose, op. cit., pp. 78–81.

22 D. Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978, p. 25.

23 K. van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso, 1984, p. 148.

24 E. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade and After: America 1945–1960*, New York, Vintage, 1960, p. 59; McCullough, op. cit., pp. 529–30; J. Kolko and G. Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*, New York, Harper & Row, 1972, p. 379.

25 S. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 2.

26 Leffler, *The Specter*, op. cit., pp. 80–1.

27 The Bill was vetoed by Truman for electoral reasons, so as not to alienate support for the Democrats among the working class. As anticipated, Congress then overrode his veto. See McCullough, op. cit., p. 566; Caute, op. cit., p. 32; R. Gid Powers, *Not without Honour: The History of American Anti-Communism*, New York, Free Press, 1995, pp. 201–2.

28 Caute, op. cit., pp. 32–6.

29 See M. Leffler, 'The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–1948', *American Historical Review*, vol. 89, 1984; Barnet, op. cit., p. 130.

30 'Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe', PPS 1, in T. Etzold and J. Lewis Gaddis (eds), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978, p. 102 (italics added).

31 A. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 2.

32 Marshall's speech of 5 June 1947 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1947*, vol. 3, Washington, Department of State, 1977, pp. 237–9.

33 A. Wolfe, *America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth*, New York, Pantheon 1981, pp. 24–5. On this elite community see also W. Isaacson and E. Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (Dean Acheson, Averell W. Harriman, John J. McCloy, George Kennan, Marshall Planner Charles Bohlen, lawyer and Secretary of Defence [1951–3] Robert Lovett), New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986.

34 G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, New York, Bantam, 1969, p. 310.

35 'Philosophical Basis of the Policy of Containment: George F. Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"', in R. Watson (ed.), op. cit., p. 55. The influential Council on Foreign Relations printed a version of the 8,000-word telegram in its journal *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947 ('Sources of Soviet Conduct' by 'Mr X', vol. 25, pp. 566–82), and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had it copied and circulated among nearly everyone involved with foreign and military affairs in the administration. But Truman was apparently initially unmoved. See McCullough, op. cit., p. 491. On Kennan's impact see W. Miscamble, 'George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950', *Reviews in American History*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1984.

36 Campbell, op. cit., p. 159.

37 V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 44–6. On the post-war Soviet military capability see M. Evangelista, 'Stalin's Post-War Army Reappraised', *International Security*, vol. 7, 1982–3, pp. 110–38.

38 M. Hogan, 'Corporatism', in M. Hogan and T. Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 234.

39 G.-H. Soutou, 'France', in Reynolds, op. cit., p. 106.

40 Correspondence with the author, 11 February 1997; J. Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction 1945–1960*, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997, p. 175.

41 'The News of the Week in Review', *New York Times* (section 4), 23 September 1951.

42 Roberts, op. cit., p. 428.

43 'NSC-68 proved to be the American blueprint for waging the Cold War during the next 20 years', W. LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945–1980*, New York, John Wiley, 1985, p. 97; N. Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, London, Verso, 1991, p. 10. See also P. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision*, New York, Grove-Weidenfeld, 1989.

44 D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1970, p. 374.

45 The text of NSC-68, declassified in February 1975, can be found online at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm (2 April 2001). See also 'National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy', *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950*, vol. 1, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1977, pp. 126–493, for a comprehensive rundown of documents and correspondence associated with the planning of NSC-68. Chomsky notes that 'National Security Council memoranda are the highest-level government planning documents' and therefore have to be taken very seriously as a background to policy-making, in Chomsky, op. cit., p. 64 note 2.

46 Acheson, op. cit., pp. 376, 378.

47 Ibid. pp. 374, 377.

48 Lucas, op. cit., pp. 79–80.

49 Nitze maintained this hard-line stance on communism throughout his influential career as a defence specialist, a banker with Brown Bros, Harriman and Co., and with the reincarnation of the anti-detente Committee on the Present Danger in November 1976, Gid Powers, op. cit., p. 369–79. The original Committee on the Present Danger had been created in December 1950 as a group of non-governmental elites who would promote the message of US foreign policy (i.e. NSC-68) within civil society. See Lucas, op. cit., p. 99.

50 A. Schlesinger Jr, *The Vital Centre*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1949. The following quotations are taken from the English edition, *The Politics of Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1950.

51 Ibid. p. 155; F. Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, p. 91.

52 Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 234, 184–5.

53 Ibid. p. 237.

54 R. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, p. 69. Other members of Pells's 'American contingent' were Sidney Hook and James Burnham (both involved in the formation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom), Irving Kristol (co-editor of the Congress journal *Encounter*, 1953–9), and Reinhold Niebuhr (Honorary President to the Congress).

55 A. Schlesinger Jr, 'Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited: A Symposium', *Commentary*, vol. 44, no. 3, September 1967, p. 71.

56 G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1950–1963*, New York, Pantheon, 1983, p. 90.

57 Kennan, *1925–1950*, op. cit., pp. 490–1. See also the discussion between Kennan and NSC-68's advocate, Dean Acheson, in P. Hammond, 'NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament', in P. Hammond, G. Snyder and W. Schilling (eds), *Strategy, Politics, and Defence Budgets*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 308–11.

58 G. Kennan, 'International Exchange in the Arts', Speech given to the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art, 12 May 1955, ICA archive, London.

59 See L. Adler and T. Paterson, 'Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's–1950's', *American Historical Review*, vol. 75, no. 4, April 1970, pp. 1046–64.

60 For its impact in America, see A. Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and their World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 219–20; A. Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1987, pp. 267–71; R. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, Hanover, NH, Weslyan University Press, 1989, pp. 84–97.

61 Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, op. cit., p. 114.

62 McCullough, op. cit., p. 565.

63 Rupert, op. cit., p. 44.

64 H. Ford, *My Philosophy of Industry*, London, Harrap, 1929, p. 45. Rupert, using the Ford Motor Company as his case study, has amply documented the violent struggles in the workplace that occurred before this synthesis of interests could come about. See Rupert, op. cit., pp. 104–66.

65 J.M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1970 [1936], p. 106.

66 French socialist Albert Thomas in the preface to the ILO study 'Scientific Management in Europe', quoted in Rupert, op. cit., p. 75.

67 As Keynes and others recognised, there were limits to how far the 'social management' of capitalism could go before its controls undermined the very capitalist system it was intended to save. See van der Pijl, op. cit., pp. 17–18.

68 C. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War Two', *International Organisation*, vol. 31, no. 4, Autumn 1977, p. 611 (reprinted in C. Maier, *In Search of Stability*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).

69 Maier, 'Politics … ', op. cit., p. 611. Edward Stettinius of US Steel (later Secretary of State in 1945), James Forrestal of Dillon, Reed (later first Defence Secretary in 1947), Donald Nelson of Sears Roebuck and William Knudson of General Motors became directly involved with the running of some government programmes. For

the different phases of the New Deal and their consequent varying interest groups, see van der Pijl, op. cit., pp. 93–4.

70 Maier, 'Politics … ', op. cit., p. 613.

71 Gid Powers, op. cit., p. 121; On the transformations of New Deal policies see A. Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, New York, Vintage, 1996.

72 M. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 3.

73 Hogan, 'Corporatism', op. cit., p. 227.

74 K. van der Pijl, *Wereldorde en Machtspolitiek: Visies op de Internationale Betrekkingen van Dante tot Fukuyama*, Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1992, p. 197. For the development of the Marshall Plan as a consequence of the New Deal see Hogan, *Marshall Plan*, op. cit., pp. 4–26.

75 On the continuities in American goals abroad from the 1920s to the post-Second World War period, see M. Hogan, 'Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 8, no. 4, Fall 1984.

76 See B. Rowland, 'Preparing the American Ascendancy: The Transfer of Economic Power from Britain to the United States', in Rowland (ed.), *Balance of Power or Hegemony: The Interwar Monetary System*, New York, New York University Press, 1976; Maier also notes how the policies of the first Roosevelt administration were against the interests of the New York banking elites (especially J.P. Morgan) who had been working closely with the British financial establishment, 'Politics … ', op. cit., p. 610.

77 Section VII of the Lend Lease agreement committed Britain to ending the imperial preference system. See Maier, 'Politics … ', op. cit., p. 610.

78 For a trenchant analysis of the American demands for free trade before agreeing on the loan, see Kolko and Kolko, op. cit., pp. 65–8.

79 The Council's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, was set up in 1922. See L. Shoup and W. Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1977; M. Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*, Providence, RI, Berghahn Books, 1994.

80 L. Shoup and W. Minter, 'Shaping a New World Order: The Council on Foreign Relations' Blueprint for World Hegemony', in H. Sklar (ed.), *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, Boston, MA, South End Press, 1980, pp. 140–1. See also the CFR-sponsored study on Marshall aid that stressed the crucial position of Europe for US interests – H. Ellis, *The Economics of Freedom: The Progress and Future Aid to Europe*, New York, Harper, 1950.

81 D. Eakins, 'Business Planners and America's Postwar Expansion', in D. Horowitz (ed.), *Corporations and the Cold War*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 144, 156–7, 160.

82 However, Noam Chomsky adds that 'it is little recognised that Marshall Plan funds were more or less matched by capital flight from Europe to the US, so in effect US taxpayers were asked to support US bankers and rich Europeans. The matter was discussed publicly at the time, but was suppressed by a good deal of alarmist and jingoist rhetoric.' Correspondence with the author, 25 November 1997.

83 Summed up by David Horowitz's crude comment that 'the world must be made over in the American image [read: subjected to the American corporate system] if the American Way of Life [read: the corporate economy] is to survive at home'. D. Horowitz, 'Introduction', in Horowitz (ed.), *Corporations...* op. cit., p. 17.

84 'The European Crisis', in W. Clayton, 'GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 78, no. 4, December 1963, pp. 496–8. Clayton's bleak memo of a starving Europe, 'The European Crisis', was written on his way back

from negotiating for the International Trade Organisation in Geneva in May 1947. See G. Fossedal, *Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of Democracy*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1993; W. Clayton, Columbia University Oral History Collection, Part II, No. 38, pp. 133–97.

85 'The News of the Week in Review', *New York Times* (section 4), 25 April 1948; Killick, op. cit., p. 92.

86 Clayton, op. cit., p. 497. Kennan later stated that Clayton's memo arrived too late to have a direct effect on the Policy Planning Staff paper given to Marshall on 23 May, but that nevertheless 'his views filtered through to us, I am sure, in other ways'. Kennan, *1925–50*, op. cit., p. 346.

87 A. Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, p. 9. For instance, the British loan agreement of 1946 was only steered through Congress when it was presented as an anti-communist measure, Kolko and Kolko, op. cit., p. 68.

88 For an overview of the development of the ERP plan see S. Jackson, 'Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program', *Journal of American History*, vol. 65, March 1979.

89 Kennan, *1925–50*, op. cit., p. 359 (italics added).

90 Van der Pijl, *Atlantic Ruling Class*, op. cit., pp. 148–9.

91 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras … ', op. cit., p. 342. Maier recognises that without Marshall aid European recovery would have been slower, but not non-existent.

92 See M. Kipping and O. Bjarnar (eds), *The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models*, London, Routledge, 1998.

93 See Milward, op. cit., pp. 19–43; J. Bradford de Long and B. Eichengreen, *The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Programme*, Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

94 For a linkage in outlook between *laissez-faire* economics and American pragmatism see A. Carey, *Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1997, p. 77.

95 Maier, 'Politics … ', op. cit., p. 615.

96 Ellwood, op. cit., p. 94.

97 Rupert, op. cit., pp. 49–50; Barnet, *The Alliance*, op. cit., pp. 119–20.

98 See Carew, op. cit., pp. 80–92.

99 Barnet, *The Alliance*, op. cit., p. 120.

100 Killick, op. cit., p. 92.

101 Ibid. p. 88.

102 Barnet, *The Alliance*, op. cit., pp. 117–19. See also the contemporary studies of F. Northrop, *European Union and United States Foreign Policy*, New York, Macmillan, 1954, and E. van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy*, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1966. Van der Beugel, formerly the head of the Dutch bureau for the Marshall Plan, was secretary from 1960 onwards of the elite discussion forum on Atlantic partnership known as 'Bilderberg', cf. M. Peters, 'The Bilderberg Group and the Project of European Unification', *Lobster*, no. 32, December 1996, p. 6.

103 Van der Pijl, *Atlantic Ruling Class*, pp. 146–7; Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 86–7. See also M. Leffler, 'The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 12, no. 3, Summer 1988.

104 See A. Rappaport, 'The United States and European Integration: The First Phase', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 5, Spring 1981, pp. 121–49.

105 'Report on ECA', 7 February 1950, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 1949–1950, vol. 2, Washington, 1976, pp. 182–3. Hoffman then moved to the Ford Foundation, cf. D. Macdonald, *The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions*, New York, Reynal, 1956.

106 For 'classic' interpretations of the Marshall Plan that stress the rejuvenation of Europe, see J.M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, New York, Viking, 1955; Acheson, op. cit., pp. 226–34.

107 Maier, 'Two Postwar Eras … ', op. cit., p. 333.

108 Leffler, *Specter*, op. cit., pp. 80–1.

109 See Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 7–10.

110 A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 317.

111 Only the German SPD and the Italian PSI maintained a neutralist policy, the former to facilitate German reunification and the latter to aid cooperation with the communists. Both had abandoned this stance by the late 1950s. See D. Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, London, Fontana, 1997, pp. 167–85.

112 I. Poggiolini, 'Italy', in Reynolds, op. cit., p. 131.

113 J. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs 1947–48*, New York, Harper, 1948, p. 57.

114 On this 'realignment of the European bourgeoisies' see van der Pijl, op. cit., pp. 138–43, 161–6.

115 See G. Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1986, pp. 268–73. On Dutch Atlanticism see for example J.G. de Beus, *The Future of the West*, New York, Harper, 1953. De Beus, a Dutch diplomat, argued via the civilisational cycles of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee that Western civilisation could only survive if Europe and America united their interests and goals.

116 See W. Burr, 'Marshall Planners and the Politics of Empire: The United States and French Financial Policy, 1948', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 15, no. 4, Fall 1991.

117 Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 92–3.

118 While Marshall aid had been offered to the whole of Europe for a continent-wide strategy of reconstruction, the terms of American involvement in its administration meant that the Soviet Union could never accept it. By making this offer, the Americans wanted to avoid the blame for splitting the continent. Yet by not being prepared to negotiate further on the future of Germany, insisting instead on the reintegration of the western zones, there was not much space left for compromise. See Leffler, *Specter*, op. cit., pp. 71–2; Ellwood, op. cit., p. 87; Lucas, op. cit., pp. 36–7.

119 Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, op. cit., pp. 110–11.

120 Kennan, *1925–50*, op. cit., p. 424.

121 Ellwood, op. cit., p. 103.

122 Kennan,*1925–50*, op. cit., p 358.

123 M. Wala, 'Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 10, no. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 247–8; Lucas, op. cit., p. 39.

124 Ellwood, op. cit., p. 161–2.

125 In contrast to how the money was spent in France and Italy, 97 per cent of Britain's funds went on reducing the public debt. See ibid. pp. 156, 162; Killick, op. cit., pp. 101–2; Lucas, op. cit., pp. 40–1.

126 For some of the actual socio-economic effects of the ERP see Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 136–41.

127 R. Wagnleitner, 'The Empire of the Fun, or Talkin' Soviet Union Blues: The Sound of Freedom and US Cultural Hegemony in Europe', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 23, no. 3, Summer 1999, p. 506.

128 Ellwood, op. cit., p. 239.

129 R. Kroes, 'American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 23, no. 3, Summer 1999, p. 467; Lasky to Bondy, 1

March 1951, IACF/CCF archive, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago, Series II Box 241 Folder 4.

130 Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 164, 239.
131 R. Mayne, *Postwar: The Dawn of Today's Europe*, London, Thames & Hudson, 1983, p. 90.

3 Securing the Pax Americana: overt and covert agendas

1 M. Roholl, ' "A Full and Fair Picture": American Foreign Cultural Policy vis-à-vis the Netherlands, 1945–60', in D. Bosscher, M. Roholl and M. van Elteren (eds), *American Culture in the Netherlands*, Amsterdam, Vrij Universiteit Press, 1996, p. 167.
2 R. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1994, pp. 46–9; E. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890–1945*, New York, 1982, pp. 213–14.
3 F. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 31.
4 Wagnleitner, op. cit., p. 51.
5 Ninkovich, op. cit., pp. 35–7.
6 Roholl, op. cit., pp. 169–70.
7 In February 1947 Director of Central Intelligence Vandenberg sent a memo to Truman highlighting the dangers of known communist sympathisers to important positions in UNESCO, causing a State Department reappraisal of its approach to the organisation. On UNESCO and US policy see Ninkovich, op. cit., pp. 93–106.
8 M. Lasky, 'The Congress for Cultural Freedom', 5 July 1950, IACF/CCF archive, Regenstein library, University of Chicago (hereafter referred to only with Series/Box/Folder numbers), Series III Box 1 Folder 1. In the early 1950s the CCF also attracted the support and participation of important UNESCO writer and functionary Roger Caillois, an addition of some significance for the Congress's place within the French intellectual scene at that time. See P. Grèmion, *Intelligence de l'anti-communisme: Le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris 1950–1975*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p. 166.
9 See P. Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs*, New York, Harper & Row, 1964; C. Thomson and W. Laves (eds), *Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1963.
10 A. Macleish, 'Introduction', in R. McMurry and M. Lee, *The Cultural Approach: Another Way in International Relations*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1947, pp. v–vii.
11 Democratic Senator William Fulbright, a former Rhodes scholar at Oxford, believed in the possibilities for avoiding future conflict through the cultivation of mutual understanding via increased social contact. See W. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961*, New York, St Martins Griffin, 1998, pp. 8–9; R. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, pp. 58–61.
12 *Congressional Record – House*, 14 May 1947, 80th Congress, vol. 93, Pt 3–4, p. 5289 (microfiche edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).
13 Senator H. Alexander Smith and Representative Karl Mundt, both conservative Republicans, initiated the Bill, having been shocked during a visit to Western Europe by the level of (apparently Soviet-inspired) anti-Americanism. Hixson, op. cit., pp. 10–11; Ninkovich, op. cit., pp. 128–9; Wagnleitner, op. cit., pp. 55–6.
14 'Exposé de M. Dean Acheson, Secrétaire du Département d'Etat, sur "La Diplomatie totale" ', *Annexe au Bulletin Quotidien de Presse Étrangère*, no. 1525, 11 March 1950.

15   Quoted in S. Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union*, New York, New York University Press, 1999, p. 84.

16   For a focus on covert campaigns in Asia see R. Aldrich, G. Rawnsley and M. Rawnsley (eds), *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945–65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations*, London, Frank Cass, 2000.

17   Hixson, op. cit., pp. 14–16.

18   M. Lasky, 'The Congress for Cultural Freedom', Series II Box 1 Folder 1.

19   For instance, the ECA gave $15 million of 'economic assistance' to the *International Herald Tribune* as part of its efforts to gain media support. See S. Lucas, 'Campaigns of Truth: The Psychological Strategy Board and American Ideology, 1951–1953', *International History Review*, 1996, vol. 18.

20   Ninkovich, op. cit., p. 118; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., pp. 81, 84, 166.

21   Ninkovich, op. cit., p. 119.

22   See T. Littleton and M. Sykes, *Advancing American Art: Painting, Politics, and Cultural Confrontation at Mid-Century*, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1989.

23   Wagnleitner, op. cit., p. 53.

24   C. Simpson, *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945–1960*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 11; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., p. 47.

25   W. Lippman, *Public Opinion*, New York, Free Press, 1965 [1922], p. 158.

26   H. Lasswell, R. Casey and B. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969 [1935], p. 43; N. Chomsky, *Intellectuals and the State*, Baarn, Het Wereldvenster, pp. 9–10 (italics added).

27   Quoted in Chomsky, op. cit., p. 11. See also A. Carey, *Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1997, pp. 23, 80–2; Simpson, op. cit., pp. 15–23, notes how in the 1930s the Rockefeller Foundation made use of Lasswell and others to develop communications research to find how to 'systematically manipulate mass sentiment in order to preserve democracy from threats posed by authoritarian societies such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union'.

28   Simpson, op. cit., p. 9.

29   TROY is described as 'a model of cooperation – or cooptation – between universities and the national security bureaucracy', in Hixson, op. cit., p. 17. See also A. Needell, '"Truth is Our Weapon": Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 17, Summer 1993.

30   A. Showstack Sassoon, 'Hegemony, War of Position and Political Intervention', in Sassoon (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci*, London, Writers & Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982, p. 101.

31   For instance Ernest May has written of the great expansion of the US government due to the security concerns of the Cold War, creating a 'national security state' of which the CIA was just one part. 'The US Government, a Legacy of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 16, Spring 1991.

32   Quoted in Lucas, 'Campaigns of Truth', op. cit., p. 280 (italics added).

33   J. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 306.

34   M. Fry and M. Hochstein, 'Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 8, July 1993, p. 18; J. Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 13, Spring 1989, p. 192.

35   D. Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis's "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins"', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 14, Spring 1990, p. 200. See also Stafford T. Thomas, 'A Political Theory of the CIA', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 11, Spring 1998.

36　J. Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 47. On Donovan, see A. Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*, New York, Times Books, 1982.

37　Ranelagh, op. cit., p. 58.

38　See B.F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA*, New York, Basic Books, 1983, chapters 3 and 4.

39　The basis for the divide between OWI and OSS responsibilities lay with the tension in US government circles between viewing propaganda either as a 'subversive operation' or as a 'public, responsible government operation'. See L. Bogart, *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda*, Washington, DC, American University Press, 1995, p. xiii.

40　A. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950*, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990, p. 40; T. Braden, 'The Birth of the CIA', *American Heritage*, vol. 28, 1977, pp. 7–8; J. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 242; For Donovan's letter to Truman on the future of the OSS and Truman's reply see M. Warner (ed.), *The CIA under Harry Truman*, Washington, DC, Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 1994, pp. 3, 15.

41　See Warner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 131–5. The Act was based on a report commissioned by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and compiled by fellow New York investment banker Ferdinand Eberstadt in 1945. Forrestal had a major role in forging an activist, internationalist post-war foreign policy, and he became the first Secretary for the united Defence Department. See Darling, op. cit., pp. 56–7; Ranelagh, op. cit., p. 105; T. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*, Frederick, University Publications, 1981, pp. 315–16.

42　Congressional opposition to a peacetime intelligence service remained strong through 1946. Also J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI opposed it for sphere-of-influence reasons, and sections of the isolationist press (particularly Colonel Robert McCormick's *Chicago Tribune*) alleged that it would mean an 'American Gestapo'. See Warner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 105–9; Ranelagh, op. cit., p. 108–9, note 30. A contemporary analysis of the National Security Act actually made no mention of the formation of the CIA, cf. R. Connery, 'Unification of the Armed Forces – The First Year', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 43, February 1949. Braden (op. cit., p. 11), who joined the CIA in 1950, also mentioned this lack of interest.

43　Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), *Final Report*: Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1976, p. 21.

44　On the impact of Pearl Harbor and 'Sovietophobia' on the thinking behind the CIA's formation, see R. Jeffreys-Jones, 'Why was the CIA Established in 1947?', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 12, January 1997, pp. 23–5. He also speculates that 'covert political action was already on the agenda during the CIA's 1946–47 gestation period', ibid. pp. 32–3.

45　The Agency's General Counsel Lawrence Houston determined in September 1947 that the Act did not authorise covert operations, meaning further authorisation was required from both the President, and, for the funding, from Congress. For Houston's memo see C. Thomas Thorne and D. Patterson (eds), *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1996, pp. 622–3.

46　For NSC-4 and 4-A, see ibid. pp. 640–2, 649–51. NSC-4, 'Coordination of Foreign Information Measures', covered overt funding and organisation of such things as the Voice of America radio station, 'America House' cultural centres, and academic exchange programmes. NSC-4-A, 'Psychological Operations', was the covert, classified, 'deniable' side to this. Some have commented on the contradictory status of these two directives together, intended to cover up the 'dirty war' that the USA could then deny any knowledge of. See Simpson, op. cit., pp. 38–9; *FRUS*

1945–1950, op. cit., p. 616; J. Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II*, New York, William Morrow, 1986, pp. 27–8; Darling, op. cit., pp. 260–1.

47 For NSC-10\2 see *FRUS 1945–1950*, op. cit., pp. 713–15. For a view on how NSC-10/2 was actually interpreted as a virtual declaration of war on the covert front, see comments by intelligence officer William Corson in Simpson, op. cit., pp. 40–1.

48 The original title of Office for Special Projects was changed for this reason. See Prados, op. cit., pp. 28–9; Simpson, op. cit., p. 39.

49 See Warner (ed.), op. cit., p. xx.

50 The OPC was funded and staffed by the CIA yet remained under State Department responsibility, making it initially answerable to Policy Planning Staff head George Kennan on policy issues. Kennan played a forceful and determined role in forging the institutional set-up for covert operations under the OPC. Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, op. cit., pp. 6–9, 29; Ranelagh, op. cit., p. 218 note 15; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., pp. 58–60; E. Thomas, *The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA*, New York, Touchstone, 1996, p. 30. On the effects of NSC-68 on OPC activity see Warner (ed.), op. cit., p. 323.

51 Smith, formerly Eisenhower's wartime chief of staff and a formidable bureaucratic organiser, was the Director who effectively defined the CIA's structure and mission. On the OPC–CIA merger see Ranelagh, op. cit., pp. 198–200.

52 For the Act see Warner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 287–94. The granting of unvouchered funds had been in the original 1947 Act, but had been removed due to fears that it would hold up the more crucial part of the Act to do with the creation of the Defence Department. As Central Intelligence Group legislative counsel Walter Pforzheimer noted, 'we could come up with the house-keeping provisions later on'. Yet the Act's provision of unaccountability did cause its own problems, since the amount of funding increased so rapidly that by 1951 it was already an issue of how the Bureau of the Budget should conceal it. See Braden, op. cit., p. 11; Darling, op. cit., pp. 189–91; Warner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 441–2.

53 K. O'Brien, 'Interfering with Civil Society: CIA and KGB Covert Political Action during the Cold War', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 8, Winter 1995, p. 434.

54 Quoted in S. Pisani, *The CIA and the Marshall Plan*, Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 1992, p. 61. Dulles had been instrumental, as chairman of the Intelligence Survey Group in 1948, in proposing the unification of intelligence-gathering and covert operations within an expanded vision of the CIA's purpose. The fulfilment of this development under Director Bedell Smith included the official recruitment of Dulles himself as Deputy Director in 1951. See 'Memo from Intelligence Survey Group to Executive Secretary of NSC', 13 May 1948, *FRUS 1945–1950*, op. cit., pp. 681–3.

55 CIA memos to Truman in the autumn of 1947 stressed the increasing dangers of a delayed ERP. See T. Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe 1946–1956', Part I, *Historical Journal*, vol. 25, 1982, p. 407.

56 B. Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA*, New York, Charles Scribners, 1992, pp. 235–6. It should be added that the figure of $200 million is arrived at by calculating 5 per cent of the total amount of Marshall aid between 1948 and 1951 ($13 billion). Killick, using figures from recent French sources, claims instead that the funds amounted to no more than $8.65 billion, with 13 per cent (about $1.1 billion) marked 'miscellaneous'. Divided over the four years of the Plan's existence, however, this too comes to about $280 million a year. However, the precise amounts that found their way to the OPC remain unclear. See J. Kolko and G. Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945–1954*,

New York, Harper & Row, 1972, pp. 380–1; J. Killick, *The United States and European Reconstruction 1945–1960*, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997, pp. 101–2.

57 Warner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 321–2.

58 According to Richard Bissell (later head of CIA covert operations). Pisani, op. cit., pp. 67, 71–3; Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book I, op. cit., p. 22. See also R. Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 30–73.

59 Pisani, op. cit., pp. 72–3, 95–6; Hersh, op. cit., p. 236; Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, op. cit., p. 99.

60 Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., p. 65; Pisani, op. cit., p. 71; G. Scott-Smith, 'The Organising of Intellectual Consensus: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and Post-War US–European Relations', Part II, *Lobster*, no. 38, Winter 1999.

61 'Director, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State', 15 March 1948, *FRUS 1948* vol. 3: Western Europe, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1974, pp. 848–9.

62 'Danger of Communism Still Grave in Italy', *New York Times*, 25 April 1948. De Gasperi was in favour of American aid and was one of the architects of post-war West European unity. Forrestal had been so desperate to avoid a communist takeover that he arranged private funds for de Gasperi's campaign through his contacts on Wall Street. For how seriously the 1948 Italian election was taken, see J. Miller, 'Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 7, Winter 1983; W. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance: The Birth of the American Intelligence Empire*, New York, James Wade, 1977, pp. 295–300; Pisani, op. cit., pp. 66–7.

63 Between 1948 and 1975 over $75 million were spent by the CIA on Italian elections, and this continued despite the exposures of the Church Report in 1975. The OPC would go on to further interventionist success in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), becoming a major part of President Eisenhower's foreign policy options. This over-confidence led to the Bay of Pigs in 1961. See Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., pp. 46–7; O'Brien, op. cit., p. 436; 'The CIA in Italy: An Interview with Victor Marchetti', in P. Agee and L. Wolf (eds), *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, London, Zed Books, 1978, pp. 168–73; Prados, op. cit., pp. 191–3.

64 Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to Secretary of State, 12, 21 January 1948, *FRUS 1948*, vol. 3: Western Europe, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1974, pp. 816, 819–20.

65 'Memorandum from Executive Secretary (Admiral Souers) to National Security Council', 26 April 1948, *FRUS 1945–1950*, op. cit., p. 665 (italics added).

66 T. Braden, 'I'm Glad the CIA is "Immoral"', *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967, p. 10.

67 According to Braden, Wisner's 'forte was blowing up bridges' and not cultural affairs. Telephone interview with Braden, 16 June 1998; Braden, 'Immoral … ', op. cit., pp. 12, 14; On Braden see 'CIA Man Who Told', *New York Times*, 8 May 1967, p. 37.

68 The landmark for this shift was the United Auto Workers–General Motors wage agreement in 1946, which ended a bitter four-month strike with the power of union and company management enhanced at the expense of shop-floor radicalism. See A. Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 52–4. Before their merger in 1955 the AFL and CIO were rival representatives of working-class power, including, for a period, rivals as representatives of American labour within US foreign policy.

69 On Lovestone's split with Stalin, which had a lot to do with 'American exception-alism' (i.e. the belief that American communism would develop according to specific American conditions and not according to orders issued from Moscow), see R. G. Powers, *Not without Honour: The History of American Anticommunism*, New York, Free

Press, 1995, pp. 104–5. Dubinsky was leader of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

70 Carew, op. cit., pp. 68–9. Lovestone's involvement continued for a long time. After the 1955 AFL–CIO merger, Lovestone became head of International Affairs. Braden retired as head of IOD in 1954, and Lovestone's contact in the CIA became chief of counter-intelligence and determined 'cold warrior' James Angleton. Angleton kept Lovestone on the CIA payroll for more than twenty years on dubious grounds. See T. Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, The CIA's Master Spy Hunter*, London, Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 291–2, note 20 pp. 383–4.

71 R. Godson, *American Labor and European Politics: The AFL as a Transnational Force*, New York, Crane and Russak, 1976, pp. 32–7; R. Radosh, *American Labour and United States Foreign Policy: The Cold War in the Unions from Gompers to Lovestone*, New York, Vintage, 1970, pp. 323, 438–49.

72 Allen Dulles was very much in favour of clandestine operations of this sort following his position as OSS station chief in Bern, and encouraged the continuation of support in the transition from OSS to CIA after the war. Paris had been the first choice when the FTUC set up its European office in 1946, but when the French communists declared that Brown would be 'physically harassed' they changed the location to Brussels. Godson, op. cit., p. 38; M. Warner, 'Sophisticated Spies: CIA's Links to Liberal Anti-Communists, 1949–1967', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 9, Winter 1996–7, p. 429. There is a considerable literature on CIA–labour links. See F. Hirsch and R. Fletcher, *The CIA and the Labour Movement*, Nottingham, Spokesman Press, 1977; W. Peck, 'The AFL–CIA', in H. Frazier (ed.), *Uncloaking the CIA*, New York, Free Press, 1978, pp. 226–65.

73 'The Most Dangerous Man', *Time*, 17 March 1952, p. 15. This article also highlights Brown's disagreements with the CIO over American policy. Countering the line of Victor Reuther that more emphasis should have been place on worker living standards, Brown, reflecting the wider outlook that brought him to support the CCF, replied: 'the idea that poverty breeds communism is a dangerous over-simplification'.

74 The success of this international labour policy was quite remarkable given the European leftist socio-political climate and the level of working-class solidarity after the war. The unions that left the WFTU in 1949, including the CIO, TUC and the French Force Ouvrière, set up the ICFTU, backed by considerable CIA finance. See P. Weiler, 'The United States, International Labour, and the Cold War: The Breakup of the World Federation of Trade Unions', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 5, Winter 1981; D. MacShane, *International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 69–74; B. Rathbun, *The Point Man: Irving Brown and the Deadly Post-1945 Struggle for Europe and Africa*, London, Minerva Press, 1996, pp. 219–22; A. Carew, 'The American Labor Movement in Fizzland: The Free Trade Union Committee and the CIA', *Labor History*, vol. 39, 1998.

75 Kolko and Kolko, op. cit., p. 451.

76 'Address delivered by Irving Brown, European Representative, to the Seventieth Annual Conference of the American Federation of Labor', 17 September 1951, Series II Box 47 Folder 9.

77 Carew, 'Fizzland...', op. cit., p. 27; Pisani, op. cit., p. 119; Lillie Brown to Francois Bondy, 21 September 1950, Series II Box 47 Folder 9; René Lalive d'Epinay to Sidney Hook, 12 March 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 57, 74; P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, New York, Free Press, 1989, p. 27.

78 See 'Où va le syndicalisme américain?', *Preuves*, no. 3, May 1951, pp. 22–6.

79 Rathbun, op. cit., pp. 245–6. I would like to thank Anthony Carew for sharing his views on Irving Brown's role.

80 Two main protagonists were behind the Movement: Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, who had been agitating for a pan-European Union since the early 1920s;

Joseph Retinger, a Pole who built up a wide network among exiled European leaders and American business and government interests during the war. See K. Wilson and J. van der Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 96–101.

81 F.X. Rebattet, 'The "European Movement" 1945–1953: A Study in National and International Non-Governmental Organisations Working for European Unity', PhD thesis, St Anthony's College Oxford, 1962. Rebattet was the son of a former secretary-general of the Movement and had access to its closed archives.

82 Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet all participated. ACUE members also included Henry R. Luce (Director of Time Inc.), Malcolm Muir (publisher of *Newsweek*) and Robert Littell of *Readers Digest*, ibid. pp. 304 note 1, 307.

83 Ibid. p. 314. Rebattet states clearly that 'the total American contribution to the campaign for European unity [from 1947] until the beginning of 1953 amounted to about £440,000'. This was almost half the entire budget for this period. See Rebattet, op. cit., p. 210; R. Aldrich, 'OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948–60', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 8, March 1997, p. 214.

84 Aldrich, op. cit., p. 185.

85 Hersh, op. cit., pp. 255–8; Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., p. 67, 101; Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, p. 131.

86 Dutch influence in the creation of Bilderberg was significant, reflecting the pro-Atlanticism of its economic and socio-political elites. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands owned the hotel and acted as Chairman 1954–76, and Paul Rijkens, head of Dutch multinational Unilever, served as Treasurer and on the Advisory and Steering Committees. See K. van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso, 1984, pp. 182–3; A. Hatch, *Prins Bernhard*, Amsterdam, Bechts, 1962, pp. 267–85; P. Rijkens, *Handel en Wandel: Nagelaten Gedenkschriften*, Rotterdam, Donker, 1965, pp. 135–59; P. Thompson, 'Bilderberg and the West', in H. Sklar (ed.), *Trilateralism*, Boston, MA, South End Press, 1980, pp. 157–89.

87 I must thank Valerie Aubourg for sharing her knowledge on the origins of Bilderberg with me.

88 E. Pasymowski and C. Gilbert, 'Bilderberg: The Cold War Internationale', *Congressional Record*, 92nd Congress, vol. 117, 1971, pp. 32056–60.

89 D. Wise and T. Ross, *The Espionage Establishment*, New York, Random House, 1967, p. 4.

90 Alsop, a Washington journalist 'insider', contrasted this 'derring-do, a willingness to take risks' with the bureaucratic stasis of the State Department. S. Alsop, *The Center: The Anatomy of Power in Washington*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1968, pp. 228–9, 233; W. Colby, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978, p. 127; C. Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA*, New York, Harper & Row, 1980. The title alone of Meyer's book sums up the disillusionment with UN-type solutions to post-war problems that many American liberals went through.

91 See G. Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Anatomy of Power and Purpose*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1969, pp. 14–17, 141 note 6. Robert Spears notes that in 1948–9, seventy-seven universities and colleges were represented among CIA employees. See R. Spears, 'The Bold Easterners Revisited: The Myth of the CIA Elite', in R. Jeffreys-Jones and A. Lownie, *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1991, p. 208.

92 Out of the Yale class of 1943, forty-two men entered the OSS, many of whom moved on to the CIA later. Informal recruiting was done via professors such as Norman Holmes Pearson. In a survey conducted from the 1982–4 copy of *Who's*

Who in America, 32 per cent of seventy past or present CIA employees mentioned had attended Ivy League institutions, of whom 86 per cent had been to Harvard, Yale or Princeton. R. Jeffreys-Jones, 'The Socio-Educational Composition of the CIA Elite: A Statistical Note', *Journal of American Studies*, vol. 19, December 1985, p. 423; R. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War*, New York, William Morrow, 1987, pp. 35, 247–312. James Angleton (head of CIA counterintelligence) and Richard Bissell (chief economic planner for the Marshall Plan, later head of CIA covert operations) were Yale graduates, Angleton being recruited by Pearson.

93 R. Jeffreys-Jones, 'Why was the CIA Established in 1947?', op. cit., p. 31. The 'special status' image was epitomised by Allen Dulles refusing to allow Senator McCarthy to investigate Agency personnel in the early 1950s, at a time when it was widely suspected of holding 'communist sympathisers' (such as Cord Meyer). See Ranelagh, op. cit., pp. 238–40. This free-wheeling character of the CIA changed from the 1960s onwards. 'By the mid-1980s, its top management was all careerist; unlike the OSS generation that stopped at Wall Street en route to or from the CIA, these were individuals who had spent their entire careers in the CIA.' G. Treverton, 'Covert Action: From "Covert" to Overt', *Daedalus*, vol. 116, Spring 1987, pp. 103–4.

94 Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, op. cit., pp. 102, 138; Saunders, op. cit., pp. 33–4; N. Berry, 'Encounter', *London Magazine*, vol. 34, no. 11–12, February–March 1995, p. 56.

95 Coleman, op. cit., p. 46.

96 R. Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 72.

97 Harry Rositzke, former head of secret operations inside the USSR, quoted in C. Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, p. 159.

98 Spears, op. cit., p. 205; S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1961, pp. 314–25, 343–51. Gary Gerstle has argued that this was a liberalism opposed to extremism on both the left and the right. This basically follows the point of view of Schlesinger's *Vital Center*, and does not address the issue of how far liberalism can be undermined by its own methods of defence as happened in 1950s America. G. Gerstle, 'The Protean Character of American Liberalism', *American Historical Review*, vol. 99, October 1994.

99 Meyer, op. cit., p. 57.

100 G. Williams, 'The Concept of "Egemonia" in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 21, 1960, p. 587.

101 A. Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, London, Hutchinson, 1987, p. 122.

102 R. Elman, 'The Aesthetics of the CIA', unpublished manuscript, 1977, p. 5, Richard Elman Archive, Syracuse University, New York.

103 J. Epstein, 'The CIA and the Intellectuals', *New York Review of Books*, 20 April 1967, pp. 20–1.

104 For instance, it is worth noting that while at Yale James Angleton was co-founder of the influential modernist poetry review *Furioso. Furioso* lasted from 1939 until 1953, with Angleton's name remaining on the masthead long after he had joined the CIA. Angleton probably had something to do with the CIA translating T.S. Eliot's poems into Russian for dissemination behind the Iron Curtain, an operation confirmed by the Church Report. Winks, op. cit., p. 334; Elman, op. cit., p. 8; Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book I, op. cit., p. 193; C. Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom', in Lasch, *The Agony of the American Left*, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1969, p. 99.

105 Elman, op. cit., p. 6.

4 The formation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom

 1 F. Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, p. 1.
 2 Ibid. p. 5; P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*, Stroud, Sutton, 1998, p. 175.
 3 E. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual*, New York, Vintage, 1993, p. 83.
 4 R. Valcourt, 'Conspiring for Democracy', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, vol. 4, 1990, p. 120.
 5 A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, pp. 181–2 (italics added).
 6 See A. Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci and Contemporary Politics: Beyond Pessimism of the Intellect*, London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 16–21; G. Vacca, 'Intellectuals and the Marxist Theory of the State', in A. Showstack Sassoon (ed.), *Approaches to Gramsci*, London, Writers & Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1982, p. 52.
 7 L. Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society*, London, Mercury, 1961 [1951], pp. xi, 100.
 8 D. Macdonald, 'I Choose the West', in *Memoirs of a Revolutionist: Essays in Political Criticism*, New York, Meridian, 1958, pp. 197–200.
 9 See D. Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1978.
10 R. Stromberg, *European Intellectual History since 1789*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 298.
11 C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, New York, Vintage, 1981 [1953], pp. 32–3, 35, 45.
12 Saunders, op. cit., p. 5.
13 The Italian Communist Party grew from 5,000 members in 1943 to 1,889,500 in 1946, receiving 19 per cent of the vote in that year's election. The French Parti Communist Français increased from 300,000 in 1939 to about 800,000–900,000 in 1946, gaining 28 per cent of the vote in 1946. F. Claudin, *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1975, p. 308.
14 V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Krushchev*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 132–3; P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, New York, Free Press, 1989, p. 29.
15 See J. Samuel Walker, ' "No More Cold War": American Foreign Policy and the 1948 Soviet Peace Offensive', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 5, Winter 1981. In November 1949 another Soviet offer of free elections in a neutral united Germany had a similar effect, pushing forward the redevelopment and remilitarisation of West Germany and its integration into the West. See K. Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy, The Making of the American Establishment*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992, pp. 327–8.
16 See Claudin, op. cit., pp. 465–79.
17 André Gide and André Malraux were the front men for this Congress. Julien Benda was also present. See R. Shattuck, 'Writers for the Defence of Culture', *Partisan Review*, vol. 51, 1984; for the importance of Gide's prestige and status as 'the conscience of Europe' for the Popular Front policy, see See S. Koch, *Stalin, Willi Münzenberg, and the Seduction of the Intellectuals*, London, Harper Collins, 1996, pp. 242–7.
18 The Wroclaw congress was publicised through an address by Soviet writers to their American counterparts warning them of the increasing fascist tendencies of their country. See D. Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973, p. 289; P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p. 19.
19 An important aspect to this was the portrayal of the United States as the heir to the fascism of Nazi Germany. By the late 1940s the USA was determined to reconstruct

and rearm the western part of Germany as a vital part of the integration and defence strategy in Western Europe. Alongside this the recruitment or acceptance of former Nazis, whether scientists, intelligence personnel (especially Reinhard Gehlen and his spy network) or members of Adenauer's government, was a remarkable reflection on how the Soviet Union was seen as by far the greater evil. See C. Simpson, *Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988; J. Gimbel, 'Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 14, Summer 1990.

20 A. Zhdanov, 'Speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers' [First Congress of Soviet Writers, August–September 1934, Moscow], in C. Harrison and P. Wood (eds), *Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp. 409–12.

21 Caute, *Fellow-Travellers*, op. cit., p. 291; J. Burnham, 'Rhetoric and Peace', *Partisan Review*, vol. 17, 1950, p. 866.

22 W. Thompson, *The Communist Movement since 1945*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, p. 20.

23 R. Crossman (ed.), *The God that Failed: Six Studies in Communism*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1950.

24 Saunders, op. cit., pp. 65–6.

25 H. Wilford, *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995, p. 199.

26 D. Cesarani, *Arthur Koestler: The Homeless Mind*, London, Heinemann, 1998, pp. 213–14.

27 Koch, op. cit., p. 384 note 73; L. Fischer, *Men and Politics: Europe between the Two World Wars*, New York, Harper & Row, 1966 [1946], p. 415; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999.

28 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 24–7; Crossman (ed.), op. cit., p. 118; Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, 'General Introduction', in A. Gramsci, op. cit., pp. 46, 88; Cesarani, op. cit., p. 343. An article in the *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (15 October 1998), citing Italian sources, stated that Silone had actually been a collaborator with the fascist OVRA secret police between 1928 and 1930. It is likely Silone was blackmailed because his brother was being held in prison at the time (and was killed there). As a member of the audience commented at a recent conference on the CCF ('Freiheit in die Offensive: 50 Jahre Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit', Berlin, 23–4 June 2000), it is less a case of whether Silone did or didn't collaborate and more of how he represents the tragedy of being caught between the vicious ideologies of the early twentieth century.

29 G. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War within the Cold War*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 178. Sidney Hook later proclaimed, in relation to himself, Lasky and Daniel Bell, that 'we are all offspring of Eduard Bernstein'. See N. Jumonville, *Critical Crossings: The New York Intellectuals in Post-War America*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991, p. 26. The *New Leader* was an anti-Stalinist, anti-Popular Front journal set up in the mid-1930s by Russian Menshevik emigré Samuel (Sol) Levitas. 'The *New Leader* was generally regarded as a half-way house for right-wing social-democratic anticommunists from which virtually no one returned.' Despite being part of the CCF scene in the 1950s and running many articles in support of the organisation, Levitas does not seem to have been able to establish a formal link (or extra funding) because of reluctance from the CCF HQ in Paris. According to Lasky, this was because the CIA funding for the CCF was explicitly meant for purposes outside of the USA. Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1987, p. 5; Levitas to Josselson, 17 December 1952, 16 June 1953, 25 November 1953, 26 January 1954, CCF/IACF Archive, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (hereafter referred to with

Series/Box/Folder numbers) Series II Box 250 Folder 1; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 5 April 1999.

30 Interview with Walter Laqueur, London, 3 April 2001.

31 See G. Scott-Smith, 'A Radical Democratic Political Offensive: Melvin J. Lasky, *Der Monat*, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 35, April 2000.

32 *Time*, vol. 50, 20 October 1947, p. 31; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 16–18; M. Hochgeschwender, 'De Geschichte des Kongresses für kulturelle Freiheit', paper given at the conference 50 Jahre Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit, Berlin, 23–4 June 2000; M. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1998, p. 142; B. Shub, *The Choice*, New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950, p. 82; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999. For the complete transcripts of the congress see U. Reinhold, D. Schlenstedt and H. Tanneberger (eds), *Erster Deutscher Schriftstellerkongress*, Berlin, 1999.

33 Hochgeschwender, op. cit., pp. 145, 151, 218; Saunders, op. cit., p. 42; R. Boehling, 'The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States' Occupation of Germany', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 23, 1999. On Josselson see Saunders, op. cit., pp. 11–12; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 40–3.

34 *Der Monat: Eine Internationale Zeitschrift für Politik und geistiges Leben*, no. 1, October 1948, ran to an impressive 112 pages and included articles and reports by Arthur Koestler, Jean-Paul Sartre ('Man Writes for His Time'), Alfred Kazin, Richard Crossman, Stephen Spender, Clement Greenberg, and opinions from Bertrand Russell, Franz Borkenau and Arnold Toynbee on 'The Fate of the West'. Lasky could also boast George Orwell as his London correspondent. To understand the effect of *Der Monat*, it is important to realise how cut off Germany had been from intellectual contacts abroad during the Nazi regime.

35 On the history and influence of *Partisan Review* see J. Gilbert, *Writers and Partisans: A History of Literary Radicalism in America*, New York, John Wiley Inc., 1968; T. Cooney, *The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and its Circle*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1986; H. Teres, *Renewing the Left: Politics, Imagination, and the New York Intellectuals*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996.

36 There is no doubt that the *Review* acted as a bridge between the American and European intellectual communities. In 1946 two issues (vol. 13 nos 1–2) were devoted to French authors and included work by Sartre, Camus, André Malraux, Jean Genet, Paul Valéry and Jean Cocteau. It was also the main US publisher of work by major European writers such as Orwell, Koestler and Spender. However, *Partisan Review* became more of a rival than an affiliate to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, especially once the CCF journal *Encounter* was issued in 1953. *Review* editors William Phillips and Phillip Rahv were not invited to Berlin in 1950 (in contrast to other American journal editors Sol Levitas of *New Leader* and Elliot Cohen of *Commentary*). When asked about their absence, Lasky could only reply 'I wish I knew', interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999.

37 M. Lasky, 'On the Need for a New Overt Publication, Effectively American-Oriented, on the Cultural Front', 7 December 1947, OMGUS Information Control Division, National Archives, RG260\Box 246. I must thank Frances Stonor Saunders for making this document available to me.

38 Ibid.

39 From 1948 to 1961, 40 per cent of the contributors in *Monat* were German and 35 per cent American. Hochgeschwender, op. cit., pp. 174–6; M. Lasky, 'Berlin Letter', *Partisan Review*, vol. 15, 1948, pp. 67–8; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 5 April 1999.

40 McCloy supported *Der Monat* because of its links to the SPD and its anti-neutralist, anti-communist stance. Before the American occupation administration left West Germany in 1952, McCloy wrote to the Ford Foundation (where he would become a

board member in 1953) asking for 'help to carry on certain operations which the future embassy may find it difficult to continue, but which are of great significance to United States objectives in Germany'. See Bird, op. cit., pp. 357–8, 770 note 85; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., p. 160; Lasky, 'Overt Publication', op. cit; *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945–46*, Washington, DC, Department of State, 1947, p. 66.

41 P. de Mendelssohn, 'Berlin Congress', *New Statesman and Nation: The Weekend Review*, vol. 40, 15 July 1950, p. 62; 'Congress for Cultural Freedom: Financial Statement for Year Ending 31 December 1959', CCF Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.

42 F. Kermode, *Not Entitled: A Memoir*, New York, Farrar, Strauss Giroux, 1995, p. 227; F. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938–1950*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 165; Grémion, op. cit., p. 17; A. Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and Their World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 261; Shub, op. cit., pp. 75–7; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 5 April 1999; de Neufville quoted in Saunders, op cit., p. 174.

43 See for instance W. Wende-Hohenberger (ed.), *Quo Vadis Deutschland? Zur Literarischen und Kulturpolitischen Situation der Jahre zwischen 1945 und 1949*, Siegen, 1991; M. Naumann, 'Melvin, Du hast gewonnen', *Die Zeit*, 17 May 1991, p. 74; H. Rudolph, 'Vordenker der Nachkriegszeit', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 15 January 2000.

44 Interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999; Cesarani, op. cit., pp. 252–6; B. Crick; *George Orwell: A Life*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982, pp. 497–8; G. Orwell, *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 4 1945–1950*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, pp. 100–1.

45 A.J.P. Taylor, *A Personal History*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1983; F. Bondy, 'Remembering Wroclaw', *Encounter*, vol. 63, June 1984, p. 48; H. Olink, 'Vredesaposteplen', *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 26 August 1998, pp. 40–1; J. Huxley, *Memories II*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978, pp. 56–8. Caute notes how Julien Benda at Wroclaw complained to Russian writer and organiser Ilya Ehrenburg that, despite being against the policies of the USA and for the cause of peace, he did not want to have to clap every time Stalin's name was mentioned. Benda had reluctantly become a 'fellow-traveller' during the late 1930s because the communists were the only group serious about their opposition to fascism. As he said in 1947, '*Je garde le droit de les juger. Je garde mon esprit.*' Caute, *Fellow-Travellers*, op. cit., p. 290; D. Caute, *Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914–1960*, London, André Deutsch, 1964, p. 176.

46 'Red Visitors Cause Rumpus' and 'Dupes and Fellow-Travellers Dress Up Communist Fronts' *Life*, vol. 26, 4 April 1949, pp. 39–43; I. Howe, 'The Culture Conference', *Partisan Review*, vol. 16, 1949, p. 506; F. Kirchwey, 'Battle of the Waldorf', *Nation*, 2 April 1949, p. 377.

47 S. Hook, *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 33; R. McElvaine, *The Great Depression*, New York, Times Books, 1984, p. 204; G. Dorrein, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*, Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1993, pp. 26–7.

48 Hook, op. cit., p. 259; Wald, op. cit., p. 279. The Trotskyites, including the editors of *Partisan Review* (William Phillips and Philip Rahv), Dwight Macdonald, James Burnham, James Farrell and Melvin Lasky, formed their own oppositional group, the League for Cultural Freedom and Socialism. The key issue was Hook's abandoning of any reference to socialism, which went too far for many at that time.

49 Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 272.

50 Wilford, op. cit., p. 197. For an overview of the ACCF see Wilford, op. cit., pp. 205–10.

51 On the EAG see H. Wilford, 'An Oasis: The New York Intellectuals in the Late 1940s', *Journal of American Studies*, vol. 28, 1994, pp. 213, 215–6; Wilford, *New York Intellectuals*, op. cit., pp. 171–8; H. Lottman, *Albert Camus*, New York, Doubleday,

1979, pp. 459–63; P. Vanney, 'Par-dessus les frontières, des îlots de résistance: Camus et les groupes de liaison internationale', *Bulletin d'Études Françaises*, no. 30, March 1999.

52 Meeting at the home of Dwight Macdonald, the *ad hoc* group of about thirty included the editors of *Commentary*, *New Leader* and *Partisan Review*. Hook mentions that Dubinsky was the main financial provider, but Phillips adds that Dubinsky gave $5,000 to cover expenses. Some have suggested that it was OPC money Dubinsky was using to fund the anti-Waldorf manifestation. See Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 388, 394; W. Phillips, *A Partisan View: Five Decades of the Literary Life*, New York, Stein & Day, 1983, p. 148; S.A. Longstaff, 'The New York Intellectuals and the Cultural Cold War: 1945–1950', *New Politics*, vol. 2, Winter 1989.

53 Macdonald quoted in Coleman, op. cit., p. 6; W. Barrett, 'Culture Conference at the Waldorf', *Commentary*, vol. 7, May 1949, p. 493.

54 Josselson had been European manager for the American department store chain Gimbels-Saks before emigrating from Nazi Germany in 1936. Joining the US Army's Psychological Warfare Division in 1943, Josselson stayed on in Berlin to work for OMGUS where he met both Lasky and Nabokov. As OPC officer in Berlin, Josselson's task became 'to provide the framework for the anti-communist "front" organisation, the Congress of Cultural Freedom [*sic.*], which had its first session in Berlin in June 1950'. Nabokov had briefly been associated with ICD in 1945–6. See Lucas, *Freedom's War*, op. cit., p. 95; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 40–1; D. Murphy, S. Kondrashev, and G. Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 106.

55 Offie was an Italian-American who had developed a reputation in the State Department diplomatic corps as a 'fixer' with very dubious methods, and who assiduously cultivated social contacts with top-level people such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen. Wisner grabbed Offie for the OPC and gave him free rein for two years, until he had to be removed due to the bad publicity surrounding Joseph McCarthy's questioning of Offie's sexuality and danger as a security risk in 1950. Offie, whose OPC work had been concentrated on the NCFE and the anti-communist unions in Europe, then moved to the American Federation of Labour under Jay Lovestone, and worked closely with Irving Brown until 1954 as a connection between the CIA and the AFL. See B. Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA*, New York, Charles Scribner, 1992, pp. 42–4, 442–8.

56 Delegates included former communists Franz Borkenau and Ignazio Silone, and messages of support came from Eleanor Roosevelt, Jon Dos Passos, Julian Huxley and Richard Crossman. S. Hook, 'Report on the International Day against Dictatorship and War', *Partisan Review*, vol. 16, July 1949, p. 724; M. Warner, 'Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 1949–50 (1)', *Studies in Intelligence* (CIA in-house journal), vol. 38, 1995. Online, available at: http:\\www.odci.gov.\csi\studies\ 95unclas\war.html (6 November 2000). Warner was Deputy-Chief of the CIA's History Staff and has overseen the gradual declassification of Cold War material since 1992. When an FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request was made by the author for material on the CCF in CIA files (letter sent 17 June 1996), Warner's article was returned (10 July 1997) with the disclaimer that any other information that may still exist resides in CIA operational files, and therefore beyond the reach of FOIA requests.

57 Rousset was associated with the independent left newspaper *Franc-Tireur*, of which Georges Altman was chief editor. Others in the RDR included Claude Bourdet of *France-Observateur* and the 'neutralist' intellectuals associated with *Le Monde* and *Esprit*. R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993, p. 46.

58 J.-P. Sartre, 'A European Declaration of Independence', *Commentary*, vol. 9, May 1950; Kuisel, op. cit., p. 46.

59 S. Hook, 'On the Battlefield of Philosophy', *Partisan Review*, vol. 16, March 1949, pp. 251–3.

60 Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 399; Hook, 'International Day', op. cit., p. 726.

61 Hook, 'International Day', op. cit., p. 725.

62 'Its momentum continued until the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950 when the Dove of Peace went boom.' Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 397.

63 Smith also at this time established contact with David Dubinsky, a useful conduit to the AFL and the American Jewish community. See R. Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 69.

64 Hook, 'International Day', op. cit., p. 731.

65 C. Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War', *The Nation*, 11 September 1967, p. 198.

66 R. Elman, 'The Aesthetics of the CIA', unpublished manuscript, p. 6, Richard Elman papers, Syracuse University, New York (italics added).

67 R. Bocock, *Hegemony*, Chichester, Ekkis Horwood, 1986, p. 94.

68 T. Molnar, *The Decline of the Intellectual*, Cleveland, OH, Meridian Books, 1961, pp. 263, 269, 293, 317.

69 Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 432; Grémion, op. cit., p. 21. Grémion also points out that Hook had had a profound effect on many of Lasky's generation of New York intellectuals in the 1930s.

70 Ruth Fischer (née Eisler), had previously been co-founder of the Austrian Communist Party, chair of the Berlin KPD during the Weimar Republic, and in the Comintern leadership committee before Stalin removed her due to 'Trotskyite sympathies'. Fischer, in contact with Lasky, Borkenau and Koestler, wrote a memo around the time of the Frankfurt meeting that called for a major counter-offensive against the Cominform's intellectual extravaganzas to be held in Berlin – something that Rousset had apparently also suggested, to Hook. The emphasis, she stated, should be strongly on ex-communists to make use of their first-hand accounts of Stalinist falsities. Her brother Gerhard Eisler, also a major Stalinist cohort, would be the chief propagandist in East Berlin denouncing the Congress when it eventually took place in June 1950. Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 432; I. Hamilton, *Koestler: A Biography*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1982, pp. 174–7.

71 Interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., p. 220; Lucas, op. cit., p. 97; Warner, op. cit., pp. 3–4; Ninkovich, op. cit., p. 165. Coleman claims that the CIA was already seen as the probable source of funding at this meeting, Coleman, op cit., p. 16.

72 Bloom, op. cit., p. 261.

73 Warner, op. cit., pp. 4–5.

74 Coleman, op. cit., p. 17; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., p. 223, 239. Nabokov later claimed that Lasky gave a press conference in autumn 1949 at the New School for Social Research in New York, where he not only said that Reuter would act as host for 'a grand international cultural conference in Berlin in June 1950', but also confirmed that 'counterpart' funds were being made available by OMGUS to pay for it. See N. Nabokov, *Bagazh: Memoirs of a Russian Cosmopolitan*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1975, p. 239.

75 Ninkovich, op. cit., p. 165; Grémion, op. cit., p. 21; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999; Warner, op. cit., p. 5; Saunders, op. cit., p. 86.

76 Burnham, the son of a Chicago railway tycoon, studied literature under T.S. Eliot at Princeton and was a literary critic before being influenced by Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* in 1932. He became Trotsky's effective spokesman in the world of the American left (clashing repeatedly with Hook) before Trotsky's endorsement of Stalin's Soviet Union in the fight against fascism led Burnham to break with the hard left in 1940. Burnham's *The Struggle for the World* (New York, John Day, 1947 – originally a research memo for the OSS) called for the United States to launch a crusade against communism. While the book came out in the same week as the

announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the two were publicly connected, Burnham became a vehement right-wing critic of US foreign policy, particularly of Kennan and the policy of containment. Dorrein, op. cit., pp. 23–63; B. Crozier (Burnham obituary), *National Review*, vol. 39, 11 September 1987, p. 36.

77 Grémion, op. cit., p. 27; Warner, op. cit., p. 5; Hook, *Out of Step*, op. cit., p. 432.

78 J. Farrell, 'Congress Comments' (Report for the ADA), Series III Box 1 Folder 1.

79 H. Lüthy, 'Berlin: The Unhaunted City', *Encounter*, vol. 2, no. 5, February 1954, p. 37.

80 A. Koestler, *The Trail of the Dinosaur*, London, Hutchinson, 1970 [1955], p. 112.

81 Grémion, op. cit., p. 24; C. Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *The Agony of the American Left*, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1969, p. 75.

82 The ACCF was split on McCarthy. James Burnham and Irving Kristol were tolerant of him as an inevitable result of American liberalism's failure to exorcise its own sympathies for communism. Burnham even resigned from the Committee over this issue. For an example of their position on the right of American liberalism see especially I. Kristol, ' "Civil Liberties": 1952 – A Study in Confusion', *Commentary*, vol. 13, March 1952.

83 T. de Vries, *Complexe Consensus: Amerikaanse en Nederlandse Intellectuelen in Debat over Politiek en Cultuur 1945 – 1960*, Hilversum, Verloren, 1996, pp. 122–3.

84 Coleman, op. cit., p. 12; de Vries, op. cit., p. 126.

85 That the Franz L. Neumann present in Berlin was the Frankfurt School intellectual and not the SPD politician of the same name is confirmed in *Der Monat*, nos 22–3, July –August 1950, p. 474.

86 *Der Monat* published all the names in a special supplement edition, nos 22–3, July–August 1950, pp. 476–7. The presence of Czapski and Gieddroyc, invited by James Burnham and well known through their Poles-in-exile review *Kultura*, gave special resonance to the CCF's attempt to represent the oppressed peoples on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Buber-Neuman was the wife of assassinated German communist leader Heinz Neuman, and actually the sister-in-law of Willi Münzenberg himself. See Coleman, op. cit., pp. 19–21; Grémion, op. cit., p. 25; Silone in Crossman (ed.), op. cit., p. 77.

87 Brugmans was President of the European University in Bruges and author of *L'Idée européenne 1918–1965* (Cahiers de Bruges, 1965). Grémion, op. cit., p. 24–5; K. Wilson and J. van der Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 111; D.W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945*, London, Longman, 1991, p. 8.

88 O. Holman and K. van der Pijl, *Restructuring the Ruling Class and European Unification*, Working Paper no. 28, RECIPE, Amsterdam University; E. Tassin, 'Europe: A Political Community?', in C. Mouffe (ed.), *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, London, Verso, 1992, p. 181; H. Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Six Essays in Political Thought*, London, Faber & Faber, 1961, p. 3; J.-P. Sartre, 'Présentation', *Les Temps Modernes*, no. 1, October 1945; R. Aron, 'Politics and the French Intellectuals', *Partisan Review*, vol. 17, September–October 1950, p. 604.

89 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 21–2.

90 Ibid. p. 22–4.

91 Grémion, op. cit., p. 26; Lottman, op. cit., pp. 299, 301; R. Aron, *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1990, pp. 172–3. I am indebted to Hugo Frey for providing information on this group.

92 Only Koestler of the central five was not an American, and even he was applying for American residency at the time. According to François Bondy, 'Irving Brown was more effective in making this meeting a success than all the Koestlers and Silones put together.' Coleman, op. cit., p. 27; B. Rathbun, *The Point Man: Irving Brown and*

the Deadly Post-1945 Struggle for Europe and Africa*, London, Minerva, 1996, p. 245; Grémion, op. cit., p. 27.

93 A. Koestler, 'Two Methods of Action' and 'An Outgrown Dilemma' in A. Koestler, *The Trail of the Dinosaur*, London, Hutchinson, 1970 [1955], pp. 117–19, 126; J. Burnham, 'Rhetoric and Peace', op. cit., pp. 866, 868–9.

94 De Mendelssohn, op. cit., p. 62.

95 R. Gid Powers, *Not without Honour: The History of American Anti-Communism*, New York, Free Press, 1995, pp. 210–11 (italics added).

96 A. Schlesinger Jr, *The Politics of Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1950, p. 157.

97 A. Schlesinger Jr, 'The Rise of the United States as a World Power', Inaugural Address, University of Leiden, 5 November 1948; Schlesinger, *The Politics of Freedom*, op. cit., p. 153; M. McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals 1957–1954*, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1978, pp. 5–7, 32–3; J. Farrell, 'Congress Comments', Series III Box 1 Folder 1; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., p. 151 note 4.

98 Hugh Trevor Roper actually commented on the affinity between anti-communism and nationalism-fascism in Borkenau's contribution, the link being the common attack on bourgeois liberal 'softness and sentimentality'. F. Borkenau, 'Return to the Old Values', *The Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1950, pp. 300, 301, 305; Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War', op. cit., pp. 68–9.

99 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 25–7.

100 See Appendix for the Manifesto.

101 A.J. Ayer, *More of My Life*, London, Collins, 1984, pp. 63–4; Saunders, op. cit., p. 76; S. Dorrill, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations*, London, Fourth Estate, 2000, pp. 477–8; J. Burnes, 'SISies', *Lobster*, no. 40, Winter 2000/1, pp. 11–12.

102 J. Czapski, 'Opening Address', 26 June 1950, Series III Box 1 Folder 2.

103 Coleman, op. cit., p. 29.

104 B. Smart, 'The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony', in D. Hoy (ed.), *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 157–61.

105 M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980, pp. 126–8.

106 Ibid. p. 132.

107 Ibid. p. 131; H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 198.

108 I. Silone, 'Opening Address', 26 June 1950, Series III Box 1 Folder 2.

109 Foucault, op. cit., p. 133.

5 The search for consensus 1950–2

1 For a selection of press reports on the conference, see 'Press-Echo', *Der Monat*, nos 22–3, July–August 1950, pp. 484–95.

2 M. Warner, 'Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 1949–50 (1)', *Studies in Intelligence* (CIA in-house journal), vol. 38, 1995. Online, available at http://www.odci.gov./csi/studies/95unclas/war.html (6 November 2000), p. 6; S. Hook, *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 440.

3 P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, New York, Free Press, 1989, pp. 34, 140; P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris*, Paris, Fayard, p. 55.

4 M. Lasky, 'Proceedings: The Congress for Cultural Freedom', CCF/IACF Archive, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago (hereafter referred to by Series/Box/Folder numbers), Series III Box 1 Folder 1.

5 Grémion, op. cit., pp. 54–5; H. Trevor-Roper, 'Ex-Communist v. Communist', *Manchester Guardian*, 10 July 1950; Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, pp. 91–2.

6 Lasky, 'Proceedings', op. cit.

7 Coleman, op. cit., p. 140; Warner, op. cit., p. 7; Hook, op. cit., p. 444.

8 Saunders, op. cit., p. 86.

9 In 1955, when Dwight Macdonald was being sounded out for the job of editor of *Encounter*, Brown was still very much part of the decision-making process. Saunders, op. cit., p. 217; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 73–4; Nabokov to Lillie Brown, 26 June 1951, Series II Box 47 Folder 9; Josselson to Lasky, 2 August 1954, Series II Box 241 Folder 5; Nabokov to Josselson, 7 June 1955, Series II Box 187 Folder 2.

10 D. Cesarani, *Arthur Koestler: The Homeless Mind*, London, Heinemann, 1998, p. 367.

11 Ibid. pp. 360, 369, 383; Grémion, op. cit., p. 95; I. Hamilton, *Koestler: A Biography*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1982, pp. 174, 199–200, 209, 217–18, 223–4; A. Koestler, 'An Outgrown Dilemma', in *The Trail of the Dinosaur*, London, Hutchinson, 1970, pp. 120, 126; T. Braden, 'I'm Glad the CIA is "Immoral"', *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967, p. 10. When the CIA connection was later exposed, Koestler expressed a clear ambivalence towards the whole episode. On the one hand he was aware of the damage the connection was doing to intellectual reputations, and disingenuously distanced himself. On the other, he had actively sought exactly these kind of connections himself in order to promote his own strident anti-communist views. However, Koestler did have fun at other's expense when he wrote a novel (*The Call-Girls: A Tragi-Comedy*, London, Hutchinson, 1972) that lampooned the 'international academic call-girl circuit' of intellectual conferences and symposia, of which the Congress had become perhaps the prime example.

12 Amery, who attended in Berlin as a Conservative MP, had been with the Special Operations Executive in Albania during and after the war and remained close to MI6. Whether there was any coordination between Ayer, Trevor-Roper and Amery before, during, or after Berlin is unclear, but Amery's work with the United Europe Movement does suggest that he was more interested in building international networks of influence than the other two. Amery later became president of the notorious right-wing think-tank the 'Pinay Circle'. B. Crozier, *Free Agent: The Unseen War 1941–1991*, London, Harper Collins, 1993, p. 193; S. Dorril, *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations*, London, Fourth Estate, 2000; Burnham to Bondy, 27 October 1950; Betty Turek (Burnham's secretary) to Bondy, 27 November 1950, Series II Box 48 Folder 9.

13 The Latin American conference idea eventually materialised as the Inter-American Conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Mexico City, 18–24 September 1956.

14 Troeder had been connected to the exiled Belgian government in London during the war, and became Director of the Ministry of Economic Affairs after 1945. Troeder had been impressed with Burnham's work and contacted him in 1949, after which Burnham wanted him to become an active participant with the CCF. Troeder was well-connected within Belgian Atlanticist business and political circles, and he even drew up plans for an ambitious international 'League for Intellectual Freedom' in late 1950, which did not materialise. It is probable that this potential Burnham–Troeder network (which would have been politically more to the right) was considered an obstacle to Congress work, and the CCF HQ never offered Troeder a position. (I must thank Valerie Aubourg for this information on Troeder.)

15 Burnham to Bondy, 27 October 1950, Series II Box 48 Folder 9; Brussels reports, Series III Box 2 Folder 1.

16 Burnham to Bondy, 6 February 1950, Series II Box 48 Folder 9.

17 Burnham to Nabokov, 1 June 1951, Series II Box 48 Folder 9.

18 Nabokov to Burnham, 6 June 1951, Series II Box 48 Folder 9.

19 When the exiles university plan was outlined by Czapski at the Brussels meeting it caused much heated debate as to its purpose. Both Hook and NCFE member Arthur Schlesinger were on the Congress committee to look further into the matter. The plan was a favourite of NCFE originator Allen Dulles, who approached the Ford Foundation in April 1951 to fund a 'beach-head university' in Strasbourg for educated refugees at a cost of about $500,000 a year. Aside from ostensible interest in the cause of intellectual solidarity, the aim was to gain better intelligence about the Soviet world from the university's participants. This proposal (and others from the CIA at this time) also caused much uncertainty among Ford board members as to the legitimacy of the Foundation acting as a semi-official instrument of American foreign policy, and it was rejected. Yet Dulles did actually succeed in founding a 'College of Free Europe' near Strasbourg under the directorship of Tyler Royall. Grémion, op. cit., pp. 63–4; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 50–2; Saunders, op.cit., p. 91; S. Pisani, *The CIA and the Marshall Plan*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1992, pp. 49–51; B. Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA*, New York, Charles Scribners, 1992, p. 257; J. Giedroyc, B. Crozier and M. Copeland, 'Activist, Strategist' (James Burnham obituary), *National Review*, 11 September 1987, pp. 35–6; Hook to CCF Paris ?, 5 March 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2.
20 J. Burnham (ed.), *What Europe Thinks of America*, New York, John Day, 1953, pp. x, xii.
21 Coleman, op. cit., p. 34; Grémion, op. cit., p. 69.
22 Les Amis de la Liberté was intended to be close to the Gaullist RPF, since Koestler increasingly considered de Gaulle to be the only hope for the future political stability of France. Once Koestler was no longer within the CCF hierarchy Les Amis was changed from a popular movement active with demonstrations to a more sedate cultural organisation operating out of Maisons de la Liberté across France, and continued to operate until the early 1960s. The shift is perfectly symbolic of the CCF's overall transition in 1950–1. Yet the Congress, despite diverging from Les Amis, continued to operate as the conduit for funding, with a subsidy as high as $86,235.66 passed on in 1956. Coleman, op. cit., pp. 140–1; Financial Report 1956, Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.
23 A. Koestler, *Bricks to Babel: Selected Writings*, London, Hutchinson, 1980, pp. 256–8.
24 To give an indication of the response to these initial moves of the CCF, *L'Humanité* published an article that pointed out Schmid's former activities as assistant to the commander of the German occupation in northern France. 'Les agents du secret service américain', *L'Humanité*, 13 February 1951.
25 Grémion, op. cit., pp. 70–1; Lalive d'Épinay to Hook, 8 March 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2. The conference proposal caused a stern response from Koestler, who would finally resign for good in relation to Nabokov's 'Festival of the Twentieth Century' plan. It is interesting to see the change in Lasky, for whom Sartre would definitely have failed the 'litmus paper test' on totalitarianism a few months earlier, and who did not invite Sartre to Berlin.
26 Grémion, op. cit., p. 67; Hook to Bondy, 21 November 1950, Series II Box 135 Folder 2; Brown to Koestler, 2 November 1950 and 30 November 1950, Series II Box 13 Folder 10. I must thank Frances Stonor Saunders for information on the Louis Fischer candidacy.
27 Brown to Fischer, 9 January 1950, Series II Box 13 Folder 10.
28 M. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in die Offensive? Der Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1998, pp. 273–4; Burnham to Nabokov, 16 June 1951, Series II Box 48 Folder 9; Saunders, op. cit., pp. 12–13. Nabokov's entry into US government circles was facilitated by W.H. Auden, who was working for the Strategic Bombing Survey when Nabokov met him in 1945. See N. Nabokov, *Bagazh: Memoirs of a Russian Cosmopolitan*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1975, pp. 218–25.
29 N. Nabokov, 'Essential Aims of the Congress', Series III Box 2 Folder 2.

30 Grémion, op. cit., pp. 72–3 (italics added); Burnham to Nabokov, 16 June 1951, Series II Box 48 Folder 9

31 J. Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 246 (from the Granada television documentary *World in Action: The Rise and Fall of the CIA*, Part I, broadcast 16/6/1975); Telephone interview with Thomas Braden, 16 June 1998; Series IV Box 11 Folder 9; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 275–6.

32 Saunders, op. cit., pp. 134–5; B. Whitaker, *The Foundations: An Anatomy of Philanthropy and Society*, London, Eyre & Methuen, 1974, p. 157.

33 Church Committee, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities*, Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence, Washington, Department of State, 1976, p. 182.

34 K. McCarthy, 'From Cold War to Cultural Development: The International Cultural Activities of the Ford Foundation, 1950–1980', *Daedalus*, vol. 116, no. 1, Winter 1987; Josselson to Fleischmann, 30 March 1953, and Nabokov to Fleischmann, 6 May 1953, Series II Box 100 Folder 4; Nabokov to Josselson, 9 August 1954, and Flora Rind to Nabokov, 10 February 1955, Series II Box 187 Folder 2.

35 The CCF received funds via the legitimate Hoblitzelle Foundation from CIA fronts the Tower Fund, the Borden Trust, the Beacon Fund, the Price Fund, the Heights Fund and the Monroe Fund. 'House of Glass', *Newsweek*, 6 March 1967, pp. 26–7; *New York Times*, 19 February 1967, pp. 1, 26, and 10 March 1967, p. 39; G. W. Domhoff, *The Higher Circles*, New York, Vintage, 1970, p. 268.

36 H. Wilford, *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995, pp. 198, 212 note 23; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 48–9; Josselson to Fleischmann, 28 January 1953, Josselson to Davis, 29 January 1953, Series II Box 100 Folder 4; ACCF press release, no date (Summer 1952), House to Josselson, 30 October 1952, and Josselson to House, 3 November 1952, Series II Box 101 Folder 10.

37 That the funding arrangement with the Farfield was not initially such a 'clockwork' operation as one might imagine is shown by Josselson's urgent cable to Fleischmann in October 1952, prior to the first payment: 'must have immediately foundation decision of year round support Congress organisation as discussed last July'. Saunders, op. cit., pp. 136–8; Josselson to Fleischmann, 24 October 1952, and Fleischmann to Josselson, ? 1952, Series II Box 101 Folder 10; Nabokov to Fleischmann, 23 February 1953, Josselson to Fleischmann, 18 May 1953, and de Rougemont to Fleischmann, 29 June 1953, Series II Box 100 Folder 4; 'Financial Reports', Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.

38 U. Ackermann, *Sündenfall der Intellektuellen: Ein Deutsch–Französischer Streit von 1945 bis Heute*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2000, p. 81; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 78–9; S. Koch, *Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Münzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals*, London, Harper Collins, 1995, p. 307.

39 Shuyler had given a speech entitled 'The Negro Question without Propaganda' at the Berlin conference. G. Kennan and R. Bendiner, 'L'Anticommunisme, menace-t-il la démocratie américaine ?', *Preuves*, no. 7, September 1951; H. Pierre, 'La Condition de noirs évolue aux USA', *Preuves*, no. 4, June 1951; Irving Brown, Walter Reuther (United Auto Workers leader), Paul Vignaux (Christian trade union offical) and Roger Hagnauer (Force Ouvrière executive), 'Où va le syndicalisme américain ?', *Preuves*, no. 3, May 1951; D. Guérin, *Où va le peuple américain* (two volumes), Paris, 1950–1.

40 In the second issue de Rougemont outlined the *Preuves*/CCF standpoint as based on three basic principles within Western thought and social life: the historical extension of rights, the critical spirit and individuality. D. de Rougemont, 'Mesurons nos forces', *Preuves*, no. 2, April 1951; Grémion, op. cit., p. 79.

41 Frontispiece, *Preuves*, no. 11, January 1952.

42　Coleman, op. cit., pp. 83–4; 'Financial Year 1955', 'Financial Year 1956', 'Financial Statement 1959', Series IV Box 11 Folder 9; Ackermann, op. cit., p. 83; P. Grémion (ed.), *Preuves: Une Revue Europeénne à Paris*, Paris, Fayard, 1989.

43　Bondy to Koestler, ? September 1950, Series II Box 197 Folder 11; M. Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1998, p. 199; A. Schlesinger Jr, *The Politics of Freedom*, London, Heinemann, 1950, p. 155.

44　Saunders, op. cit., p. 166; Dorril, op. cit., pp. 479–80; M. Muggeridge, *Like It Was: The Diaries of Malcolm Muggeridge*, selected and edited by J. Bright-Holmes, New York, William Morrow, 1982, pp. 295, 339, 460; M. Muggeridge, 'The Pursuit of Happiness (International) Inc.' (1958), in *Things Past*, New York, William Morrow, 1979, p. 126. In Muggeridge's published diaries he notes that 'a character from MI6 came to lunch, and we discussed at length a particular assignment' (2 June 1949). Whatever this refers to, Muggeridge accepted, and mentioned that it was completed on 4 November. Whether this has anything to do with a journal remains unclear. Muggeridge comes across as an ambiguous character, closely involved with the machinations of the secret service in the cultural Cold War, yet increasingly disparaging of the Western culture (except his Christian faith) he was attempting to bolster and dismissive of the Cold War that he was effectively participating in. As he said, 'it only means that in one of the most terrible conflicts in human history, I have chosen my side', M. Muggeridge, 'An Anatomy of Neutralism', *Time*, 2 November 1953.

45　On the history of the Society see H. Wilford, '"Unwitting Assets?": British Intellectuals and the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *Twentieth-Century British History*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2000.

46　Saunders, op. cit., p. 169; P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948–1977*, Stroud, Sutton, 1998, p. 128; M. Sabin, 'The Politics of Cultural Freedom: India in the Nineteen Fifties', *Raritan*, vol. 14, no. 4, 1995, p. 47. Interestingly, the point about India being a target for *Encounter* was backed up by James Angleton when asked in a telephone conversation by journalist Richard Elman, cf. letter from Richard Elman to the author, 25 February 1997.

47　Lasky to Bondy, 1 March 1951, Series II Box 241 Folder 4; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 60–1; S. Spender, 'We Can Win the Battle for the Mind of Europe', *New York Times Magazine*, 25 April 1948; On Kristol see G. Dorrein, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*, Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1993, pp. 68–88.

48　Saunders, op. cit., pp. 180–9; interview with Walter Laqueur, London, 3 April 2000; N. Berry, 'Encounter', *London Magazine*, vol. 34, nos 11–12, February–March 1995.

49　A.J.P. Taylor, 'A New Voice for Culture', *Listener*, 8 October 1953.

50　*London Magazine* was set up with funds from the *Daily Mirror*'s Cecil King in 1954; he would later also take over supporting *Encounter* from the CIA in 1967. Berry, op. cit., p. 58; R. Hewison, *In Anger: British Culture in the Cold War 1945–1960*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981, pp. 60–1; D. Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973, p. 299; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 59, 185; Financial Statement 1959, Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.

51　N. Muhlen, 'Democracy and its Discontents I: Germany', *Encounter*, vol. 2, no. 7, April 1954; H. Lüthy, 'Democracy and its Discontents II: France', vol. 2, no. 8, May 1954; M. Beloff, 'Democracy and its Discontents III: Great Britain', vol. 2, no. 9, June 1954.

52　E. Shils, 'The Intellectuals I: Great Britain', *Encounter*, vol. 4, no. 4, April 1955; M. Cuncliffe, 'The Intellectuals II: The United States', vol. 4, no. 5, May 1955; G. Mann, 'The Intellectuals III: Germany', vol. 4, no. 6, June 1955; H. Lüthy, 'The Intellectuals IV: France', vol. 5, no. 2, August 1955.

53　T. de Vries, 'Encounter: An Intellectual Concept of Atlanticism in the 1950s', in M. Materassi and M. Santos (eds), *The American Columbiad: 'Discovering' America, Inventing the United States*, Amsterdam, VU University Press, 1996, pp. 275–6.

54 Berry, op. cit., p. 50; A. Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1962, p. 108.

55 ACCF Executive Committee meeting, 14 December 1954, Series II Box 187 Folder 2; Hook to Bondy, 6 October 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 69–75; Kristol to Josselson , ? February 1955, Series II Box 187 Folder 2. A notorious example of outside influence on editorial policy occurred in 1957 when Dwight Macdonald's article 'America ! America!' was turned down apparently because it was too critical of the Eisenhower administration and American society in general. While it did eventually appear in *Tempo Presente* and the CCF-affiliate *The Twentieth Century* (October 1958), this did not allay suspicion. As Macdonald said later, after the exposure of the CIA connection, 'couldn't they see that for *Encounter* to publish it would weaken the rumours even then going round that the magazine was financed by the US government? One would have thought the CIA more sophisticated.' D. Macdonald, *Discriminations: Essays and Afterthoughts*, New York, Da Capo, 1985 (1974), pp. 57–9.

56 Wilford, *New York Intellectuals*, op. cit., p. 236.

57 C.C. O'Brien, 'Journal de combat' (1963), in *Writers and Politics: Essays and Criticism*, New York, Vintage, 1967, p. 170; A. Sinfield, *Literature, Politics, and Culture in Postwar Britain*, London, Athlone Press, 1997, pp. 26, 30–1.

58 John Dewey, message to the Berlin conference, Series III Box 1 Folder 2.

59 Nabokov, *Bagazh*, op. cit., p, 243. On the build-up to the Festival see G. Scott-Smith, 'The "Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century" Festival and the Congress for Cultural Freedom: Origins and Consolidation 1947–52', *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring 2000.

60 Braden later mentioned 'the enormous joy I got when the Boston Symphony Orchestra won more acclaim for the US in Paris than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches'. The use of the word 'bought' illustrates well Braden's instrumental thinking about this venture. The cost of the European tour came to $171,606.21. T. Braden, 'I'm Glad the CIA is "Immoral" ', *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967, p. 12; Audit: Boston Symphony Orchestra, 13 November 1952, Series II Box 46 Folder 1.

61 A. Zhdanov, 'Speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers' (1934), in C. Harrison and P. Wood (eds), *Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, p. 410; Nabokov to Chaplin, 17 January 1952, and Nabokov to Art Arthur (Publicity Director of the Motion Picture Industry Council and a friend of Irving Brown), 15 January 1952, Section III Box 2 Folder 7.

62 Saunders, op. cit., p. 113; Nabokov to Burnham, 6 June 1951, and Burnham to Nabokov, 16 June 1951, Series II Box 48 Folder 9; Coleman, op. cit., p. 56 (emphasis added); Hook, op. cit., pp. 445–6; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 3 April 1999; E. Thomas, *The Very Best Men: The Early Years of the CIA*, New York, Touchstone, 1996, p. 33; Lasky to Nabokov, 15 August 1951, Series II Box 241 Folder 4; 'Rapport sur le voyage de M. Nicolas Nabokov aux États-Unis du 2 Aôut au 8 Aôut 1951', Series III, Box 4, Folder 3.

63 N. Nabokov, 'Masterpieces of the 20th Century: Progress Report', 17 December 1951, Series III Box 4 Folder 4.

64 'Masterpieces of the 20th Century: Budget', Series III Box 4 Folder 3.

65 A. Malraux, 'The Future of Culture', 30 May 1952, Series III Box 3 Folder 6; W.H. Auden, 'Revolt and Human Fellowship', 23 May 1952, Series III Box 3 Folder 5.

66 The NATO reference came about because of the simultaneous appointment of the American General Ridgway, notorious in the Korean War, as commander of NATO forces. It is worth recalling that *Combat* had received American financial backing via the efforts of Henri Frenay. Nabokov to Hook, 18 February 1952, Series III Box 2 Folder 12; Coleman, op. cit., p. 56; Saunders, op., cit., pp. 121–4; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., p. 285; R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation*, Berkeley,

University of California Press, p. 28; F. Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II*, New York, Twayne, 1992, pp. 89–90; Trevor Barnes, 'The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American Foreign Policy in Europe 1946–1956, Part II', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1982, p. 667; *Figaro* quoted in H. Lüthy, 'Selling Paris on Western Culture', *Commentary*, vol. 14, no. 1, July 1952, p. 74. On the festival see also Genet (Janet Flanner), 'Letter from Paris', *The New Yorker*, vol. 28, no. 15, 31 May 1952; *Preuves*, no. 14 April 1952 and no. 15 May 1952; *La Revue Musicale* (Brussels), Numéro Spéciale, no. 212, April 1952, that includes articles by Nabokov, Cocteau and Pierre Boulez.

67 J. Cocteau, *Past-Tense: The Cocteau Diaries*, vol. 1, translated by R. Howard, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1987, pp. 142, 148–9.

68 H. Read, 'The Spirit of Painting in the Twentieth Century', 26 May 1952, Series III Box 3 Folder 5.

69 Press release of the ACCF, Series II Box 101 Folder 10; Lüthy, op. cit., p. 73; N. Nabokov, 'Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century: Progress Report', 17 December 1951, Series III Box 4 Folder 4.

70 H. Wilford, op.cit., p. 197; N. Nabokov, 'Progress Report', op. cit.; Hochgeschwender, op. cit., pp. 282–92.

6 The end of ideology and 'the future of freedom'

1 C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, New York, Vintage, 1981 [1953], p. 37.

2 M. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1998, p. 450.

3 T. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', *American Historical Review*, vol. 90, no. 3, June 1985, p. 571.

4 Logistical support for this meeting was also provided by Brown via the ICFTU office in Brussels. Bondy to Riddell, 7 August 1951, IACF/CCF archive, Regenstein library, University of Chicago (hereafter referred to only with Series/Box/Folder numbers), Series II Box 2; De Rougemont to Hook, 18 June 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2.

5 U. Ackermann, *Sündenfall der Intellektuellen: Ein Deutsch-Französischer Streit von 1945 bis Heute*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2000, p. 89; J. Dittberner,*The End of Ideology and American Social Thought: 1930–1960*, Ann Arbor, MI, UMI Research Press, 1979, p. 103.

6 See P. Steinfels, *The Neoconservatives: The Men who are Changing America's Politics*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1979; G. Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology*, Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1993.

7 H. Stuart Hughes, 'The End of Political Ideology', *Measure*, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1951, p. 154.

8 Dittberner, op. cit., p. 119; T. Molnar, 'Intellectuals, Experts, and the Classless Society', *Modern Age*, Winter 1957–8, reprinted in G. de Huszar, *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait*, Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1960, pp. 192–7; D. Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 16; S. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, New York, Doubleday, 1960, p. xxi.

9 A. Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*, translated by Lynne Lawner, London, Quartet, 1979, p. 204.

10 Lipset, op. cit., pp. 333, 369.

11 P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, New York, Free Press, 1989, pp. 13, 55.

12 See Bell, 'Afterword 1988: The End of Ideology Revisited', in *The End of Ideology*, op. cit., p. 437; S. Lipset, 'A Concept and its History: The End of Ideology', in *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded edn, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 555–9. Both Bell and Lipset acknowledge the major influence of Max Weber on the 'end of ideology' position.

13 R. Fowler, *Believing Skeptics: American Political Intellectuals 1945–1964*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1978, pp. 9–10; Bell, op. cit., p. 400; C. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II', *International Organisation*, vol. 31, no. 4, Autumn 1977, p. 615.

14 M. Hogan, 'Corporatism', in M. Hogan and T. Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 228.

15 Hochgeschwender, op. cit., pp. 452, 466; E. Shils, 'Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual', *Sewanee Review*, vol. 66, 1958, p. 454.

16 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith (eds), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 278; A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith (eds), London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 317.

17 P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris 1950–75*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p. 114; M. Brauer, 'Welcoming Address', *Science and Freedom* (Hamburg, 23–6 July 1953), London, Secker & Warburg, 1955, pp. 14–16.

18 D. de Rougemont, 'Opening Address', M. Polanyi, 'Preface', and S. Allison, 'Loyalty, Security and Scientific Reseach in the United States', *Science and Freedom*, op. cit., p. 10, 18, 79–86; D. Halberstam, *The Fifties*, New York, Villard Books, 1993, p. 343, 351–2.

19 The Science and Freedom Committee received £12,000 in 1959 for its operation, out of which must have come the money required for the bulletin, which was distributed, by mailing list only, to 5,500 recipients. Coleman, op. cit., pp. 98, 105–6, 108; L. Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe 1930–41*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, p. 113–14; M. Polanyi, 'Preface', and N. Nabokov, 'Closing Address', *Science and Freedom*, op cit., p. 9–10, 288–9; 'Financial Statement: 1959', Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.

20 Grémion, op. cit., pp. 153–5.

21 'The Future of Freedom: Statement of Purpose', Series II Box 6 Folder 2.

22 Lalive d'Épinay to Hook, 8 March 1951, Series II Box 135 Folder 2.

23 Lipset gave examples of 'end of ideology' positions in Swedish and German social science literature, thereby emphasising that this was not purely an American phenomenon. Lipset (1960), op. cit., pp. 439, 441, 442–3.

24 E. Shils, 'Letter from Milan: The End of Ideology?', *Encounter*, vol. 5, no. 5, November 1955, pp. 53, 54; Dittberner, op. cit., p. 126; M. Beloff, 'L'avenira della libertà', *Spectator*, vol. 195, 30 September 1955, p. 411.

25 Grémion, op. cit., p. 161; R. Hayman, *Sartre: A Biography*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1987, p. 226; R. Aron, *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1990, p. 219; Coleman, op. cit., pp. 38–40.

26 R. Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, New York, Norton, 1962 [1955], p. xv. 'I did not deny that there was a distinction between the right and the left in the National Assembly. What I denied was that there was an eternal left, the same in various historical circumstance, inspired by the same values, united in the same aspirations'. R. Aron, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 220.

27 R. Aron, *Opium*, op. cit., pp. 311–12, 318; Lipset (1960), op. cit., p. 443; R. Aron, *Memoirs*, op. cit., pp. 223–4; U. Ackermann, *Sündenfall der Intellektuellen: Ein Deutsch – Französischer Streit von 1945 bis Heute*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2000, pp. 91, 95. Grémion notes that there are 'traces' of Aron's engagement with the CCF in the book, such as a reference to Burnham whom Aron had stayed with during a trip to the USA in autumn 1950. Grémion, op. cit., p. 161.

28 Hochgeschwender, op. cit., pp. 450–1.

29 Healey later commented that, despite his late discovery of the CIA connection, the CCF 'nevertheless made a useful contribution to the quality of Western life at that time'. D. Healey, *The Time of My Life*, London, Penguin, 1995, p. 195.

30 H. Fairlie, 'Quest for Crossman', *Spectator*, 7 October 1955, vol. 195, p. 440; E. Pasymowski and C. Gilbert, 'Bilderberg: The Cold War Internationale', *Congressional Record*, vol. 117, part 24, 92nd Congress, 15 September 1971, pp. 32057, 32059; R. Crossman, 'Nationalism: Enemy or Ally ?', *Commentary*, vol. 10, no. 1, July 1950, pp. 1–6; D. Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, London, Fontana, 1997, pp. 175–6.

31 C.A.R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1956.

32 Sassoon, op. cit., p. 245.

33 J.K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1952, p. 193; J.K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin, 1958; J.K. Galbraith, 'Economics, Ideology, and the Intellectual', paper delivered at 'The Future of Freedom' conference. Nabokov, mindful of the budget, had written in February 1955 to ask whether Galbraith was coming to Europe anyway that summer so that funds for his travel costs could be given to someone else.

> The great advance in the economic and social sciences in America, and the importance of American thinking in these matters, make us seek to have as many American participants in this conference as we possibly can. At the same time, the prohibitive costs of transatlantic fares imposes on us the need for a stricter limitation of the American participation than we should naturally have desired … .
>
> Nabokov to Galbraith, 16 February 1955.

The cost of holding 'The Future of Freedom' was $93,013.98. Financial Year 1955, Series IV Box 11 Folder 9.

34 To give a further picture of the Atlanticist–New York intellectual milieu in which Bell moved, four of the chapters appeared in *Commentary*, two in *Encounter*, and one each in *Partisan Review* and *New Leader*. Bell, op. cit., pp. 448–50.

35 A. Bloom, *Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals and Their World*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 183.

36 Bell, 'America as a Mass Society', in *The End of Ideology*, op. cit., p. 31 (italics added).

37 Bell, 'The Breakup of Family Capitalism', in ibid., pp. 41, 44; D. Bell, 'Notes on Work, *Encounter*, vol. 2, no. 9, June 1954, pp. 13–15.

38 Hayek was also a colleague of Shils at the University of Chicago. R. Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931–1983*, London, Fontana, 1995, p. 107; Grémion, op. cit., p. 161. In contrast, Michael Polanyi's brother Karl is renowned for his critique of *laissez-faire* capitalism: *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1944.

39 P. Wiles, 'What is to be Done about the Success of Soviet Industry?', and B. de Jouvenel, 'Some Fundamental Similarities between the Soviet and Capitalist Economic Systems', in *The Soviet Economy: A Discussion*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1956, pp. 27–40, 43; P. Wiles, 'The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 31, no. 4, July 1953, pp. 579–80; interview with Melvin Lasky, Berlin, 5 April 1999.

40 D. Macdonald, 'Letter from Italy: No Miracle in Milan', *Encounter*, vol. 5, no. 6, December 1955, pp. 68, 73; F. Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, pp. 310–11; Josselson to Nabokov, 15 June 1955, Series II Box 187 Folder 2.

41 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 74.

42 Ibid. pp. 73–4.

43 G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1950–1963*, New York, Pantheon, 1972, p. 101.

44 Aron's main objection to the idea of simultaneous withdrawal by both sides was that this would create a more equivocal and potentially more dangerous situation than a Europe divided clearly between the two blocs. In other words, despite the traumas that the Hungarian revolution caused only the previous year, there was greater safety when 'everybody knows where the demarcation line is'. See Kennan, op. cit., pp. 252–4; Aron, *Memoirs*, op. cit., pp. 195–8.

45 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 119–20; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 325–7.

46 Philip Rieff commented that Oppenheimer's humiliation at the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954 was a deliberate move by the US government to exclude the powerful scientific elite from any influence in US military policy. Oppenheimer thus represented the fate of the scientist in the techno-political age, a perfect identity for inclusion within the CCF world-view. See P. Rieff, 'The Case of Dr Oppenheimer', in P. Rieff (ed.), *On Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies*, New York, Doubleday, 1969 (originally published in the CCF-sponsored journal *The Twentieth Century*, vol. 156, 1954).

47 Coleman, op. cit., p. 172.

48 For a collection of some of the papers presented see 'The Future of Freedom', *The New Leader*, vol. 39, no. 19 (section two), 7 May 1956.

49 Grémion, op. cit., p. 157.

50 Dittberner, op. cit., p. 125.

51 Ibid. p. 127.

52 'It was no longer exciting.' Thomas Braden, telephone interview, 16 June 1998.

53 Arranged before Josselson and Nabokov were in full control, Bombay 1951 was organised mainly by Indian intellectuals and the ACCF, the latter sending a large group including James Burnham, Norman Thomas and W.H. Auden. It had to be held in Bombay because Nehru had refused to allow it to go ahead in the capital, New Delhi. L. Natarajan, *American Shadow Over India*, Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1952, pp. 230, 251; I. Gendzier, *Development against Democracy: Manipulating Political Change in the Third World*, Hampton, Tyrone, 1995, pp. 88–9; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 99–101.

54 M. Polanyi, quoted in Shils, 'Letter from Milan', op. cit., p. 58.

55 Beloff, op. cit., p. 410.

56 Bell, *The End of Ideology*, op. cit. p. 403.

57 Shils, 'Letter from Milan', op. cit., p. 55.

58 Ibid. p. 57.

59 Lipset (1960), op. cit., p. 455. Through his work in Ghana, Kenya, Guinea and other countries in Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s, Irving Brown represented exactly what Lipset was referring to. See B. Rathbun, *The Point Man: Irving Brown and the Deadly Post-1945 Struggle for Europe and Africa*, London, Minerva, 1996, pp. 303–38.

60 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 74.

61 Ibid. p. 73.

62 Coleman, op. cit., pp. 111–22; Gendzier, op. cit., pp. 92–4; Grémion, op. cit., pp. 317–23.

63 Coleman, op. cit., p. 122 (italics added).

64 G.F. Hudson, 'Reluctant Columbuses in Milan', *The Economist*, 24 September 1955, p. 1044.

65 Macdonald, op. cit., p. 68.

Conclusion

1 C. Connolly (1937), quoted in J. Banville, 'The Friend of Promise', *New York Review of Books*, vol. 46, no. 2, 24 June 1999, p. 71.

2 R. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, Hanover, NH, Wesleyan University Press, 1989, p. 129.

3 R. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s*, Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997, p. 13.

4 M. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980, pp. 109, 133.

5 Hook to Josselson, 24 December 1953, IACF/CCF archive, Regenstein library, University of Chicago (hereafter referred to only with Series/Box/Folder numbers), Series II Box 135 Folder 3

6 Quoted in P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*, New York, Free Press, 1990, p. 13.

7 For an overview of the emergence of the CIA story in the media in 1966–7, and the resulting recriminations, see F. Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Granta, 1999, pp. 369–406.

8 C. Lasch, 'The Cultural Cold War', *The Nation*, 11 September 1967, p. 207.

9 J. Epstein, 'The CIA and the Intellectuals', *New York Review of Books*, 20 April 1967, pp. 16, 17, 21.

10 U. Ackermann, *Sündenfall der Intellektuellen: Ein Deutsch-Französischer Streit von 1945 bis Heute*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2000, p. 81.

11 See 'Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited: A Symposium', *Commentary*, vol. 44, no. 3, September 1967.

12 S. Hook, *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 451.

13 Nabokov also queried why funding had to be secret, suggesting that 'a kind of Marshall Plan in the domain of the intellect and the arts' would have been better, without apparently realising that this was exactly what he was involved with. See N. Nabokov, *Bagazh: Memoirs of a Russian Cosmopolitan*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1975, pp. 243–6. Edward Shils recounts how, having heard a rumour about the CIA from A.D. Gorwala in Bombay in October 1955 (who had heard it from writer James T. Farrell), he wrote to Nabokov to ask the truth. In reply Nabokov simply sent Shils a financial report of the activities of the Farfield Foundation. Shils, knowing full well Nabokov's connections to 'some very high officials of the United States Department of State', considered that in the circumstances 'it would have been slightly more honourable to have left the letter unanswered'. E. Shils, 'Remembering the Congress for Cultural Freedom', *Encounter*, vol. 75, no. 2, September 1990, pp. 62–3.

14 Lasch, op. cit., pp. 105; letter from Arendt to Mary McCarthy, 11 October 1966, in C. Brightman (ed.), *Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy 1949–1975*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1995, p. 195.

15 Nabokov to Fleischmann, 7 September 1954, Series II Box 101 Folder 11.

16 CCF financial reports indicate that in 1956 Panufnik did receive 'fellowship aid' of $1,980. 'Financial Year: 1956', Series IV Box 11 Folder 9

17 N. Berry, 'Encounter', *London Magazine*, vol. 34, nos 11–12, February–March 1995, p. 56.

18 Saunders, op. cit., pp. 108, 342. Josselson suffered a heart attack in 1960, was forced to resign from the Congress in May 1967 for his CIA connection, and remained a rejected and dejected man until his death in 1978.

19 Prior to the consolidation of the OPC under the direction of the CIA Director and the eventual OSO–OPC merger in October 1952, it is clear that both departments were undertaking covert operations in an uncoordinated fashion. See 'C. Offie to ADPC [Wisner]', 24 April 1950, in M. Warner (ed.), *The CIA under Harry Truman*, Washington, DC, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994, pp. xxv–xxvi, 325–6.

20 P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture à Paris 1950–1975*, Paris, Fayard, 1995, p. 160.

21 L. Galantière, *America and the Mind of Europe*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1951, p. 15; J. Morpurgo, 'Hollywood: America's Voice', *The Impact of America on European Culture*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1951, pp. 59 – 60. Of the ten contributors to Galantière's

book, Aron, de Rougemont, Koestler, Spender, Lasky and Nabokov were connected to the Congress, and Galantière and James Thrall Soby were members of the ACCF.

22 M. Lasky, 'Literature and the Arts', in Galantière, op. cit., p. 92.

23 T.J. Clark referred, in a different sense, to the 'Eliotic Trotskyism' of Clement Greenberg in 'Clement Greenberg's Theory of Art', *Critical Inquiry*, no. 9, September 1982.

24 Lasch, op. cit., p. 200.

25 Lasky to Stone, 30 August 1951, Series II Box 241 Folder 4.

26 R. Fox and T. Jackson Lears, *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History 1880–1980*, New York, Pantheon, 1983, p. 5.

27 R. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 75–6.

28 In 1967 Braden published an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* ('I'm Glad the CIA is "Immoral" ', 20 May 1967) that confirmed the emerging truths about the CIA role in the Congress and a host of other international organisations. Frances Saunders's speculation that this was a deliberate move by the CIA to finally 'blow' the CCF and cut its responsibilities with the institution is highly plausible, see Saunders, op. cit., pp. 397–404.

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